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In this dissertation, I argue that although the Gothic sensibility in the U.S. cultural 
tradition is often associated with the regional spaces of the South and the Northeast, we 
should also be willing to imagine the U.S. West in Gothic terms. Stories of ghosts, 
haunting, and trauma help us to come to terms not only with the historical legacy of the 
Western frontier, but can also help us grapple with the West in today’s period of global 
capital flows, inequality, frayed social ties, and the deterioration of meaningful 
metanarratives. Toward this end of reconsidering the West as a haunted space of trauma 
(past and present), I examine cultural texts that help illuminate the fraught, “out of joint” 
qualities of the post-1989 West: Sandra Cisneros’s Caramelo, Sherman Alexie’s Flight, 
Walter Kirn’s Up in the Air, Richard Rodriguez’s Brown, Jon Krakauer’s Into the Wild, 
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This isn’t about good people vs. bad people. It’s about the machine that’s taken over this 
country. It’s like something out of science fiction. The land, the cattle, human beings—
this machine don’t give a shit. Pennies a pound, pennies a pound. That’s all it cares about, 
a few more pennies a pound. 
--Rancher Rudy Martin (played by Kris Kristofferson), Richard Linklater’s Fast Food 
Nation 
 
During my trips to meatpacking towns in the High Plains I met dozens of workers who’d 
been injured. Each of their stories was different, yet somehow familiar, linked by 
common elements—the same struggle to receive proper medical care, the same fear of 
speaking out, the same underlying corporate indifference. We are human beings, more 
than one person told me, but they treat us like animals. The workers I met wanted their 
stories to be told. They wanted people to know about what is happening right now. A 
young woman who’d injured her back and her right hand at the Greeley plant said to me, 
“I want to get on top of a rooftop and scream my lungs out so that somebody will hear.” 
--Eric Schlosser, from Fast Food Nation (186) 
 
Working with and against the imagery provided by the Church and the conquest, 
[shamanic] yage nights offer the chance, not to escape sorrow by means of utopic 
illusions, but rather the chance to combine the anarchy of death with that of carnival, in a 
process that entertains yet resists the seductive appeal of self-pity and redemption through 
suffering…[This] profane illumination…brings the gods to earth…subjects fate to 
chance, and determinism to active human agency…a domain of chance and 
perhapsness…What is at work here is an image of truth as experiment, laden with 
particularity, now in this guise, now as that one, stalking the stage whose shadowy light 
conjures only to deconjure. 
--Michael Taussig, from Shamanism, Colonialism, and the Wild Man (467, 465) 
Toward the end of Richard Linklater’s 2006 film Fast Food Nation, co-written 
with Eric Schlosser and based on his 2001 muckraking book, a Mexican meat-packing 
worker named Francisco (Hugo Perez) slips and falls into a machine when it 





by the blades. His friend Raul (Willmer Valderrama) tries to help but falls on his back, 
watching the machine mangle Francisco’s leg. The scene is shocking, but not for obvious 
reasons. Somehow—though I almost hate to think of it this way--the sequence seems 
slightly ridiculous, even uncomfortably comic, such that it seems somewhat removed 
from reality. Perhaps this strange effect is related to the fact that earlier in the film, 
Francisco had been presented as a clown of sorts. In one such scene, while working 
alongside Raul spraying blazing hot water and chlorine chemicals on the plant’s roof, 
Francisco begins jumping up and down and shrieking. The problem? Not the dangerous 
cleaning material, which fogs up his goggles and makes him susceptible to accidents, 
but…a rat. Later, Francisco and Raul play soccer together, and Francisco cavorts around 
the field, hamming it up for his friend. With these scenes in mind, the accident seems like 
a physical prank, Francisco’s bouncing body a continuation of his Chaplin-like slapstick. 
And yet, when I first watched the scene, I felt something deeply unsettling in my 
stomach. On the one hand, it felt like too much, overkill, a way of bludgeoning the 
audience into accepting a “message” about the fast food industry. But on the other hand, 
the very excessive quality of the scene—and even its queasy comic effect—is exactly 
what makes the scene feel uncannily real. If such a thing happened in everyday life, it 
might feel just as unreal, a cruel joke and an unbearable message all in one. It could not 
help but feel out of joint. 
We do not see Francisco again in the film, but we learn that Raul has injured his 
back and that his company will not pay for his health care because he has tested positive 
for drugs. Nevermind that the use of methamphetamine (“crank”) was an open secret at 





keep up with the break-neck pace of the disassembly line); Raul has no recourse. He, 
along with his girlfriend Sylvia (Catalina Sandino Moreno) and her sister Coco (Ana 
Claudia Talancon), are in the country illegally, having paid a coyote to shuttle them 
across the border from Mexico. Sylvia, among all the film’s immigrant characters, had 
been most skeptical about the border-crossing foray (and most nostalgic for Mexico); 
early in the film, she leaves the meat-packing plant after one day, refuses to go back, and 
finds a job as a maid in a hotel. (Her sister Coco, by contrast, leaps into the new country 
with reckless abandon, initiates a risky love affair with her sadistic supervisor Mike 
[Bobby Cannavalle] and becomes hooked on meth, but also uses her erotic appeal to 
secure herself a good position at the plant). But with Raul laid up and unable to work, 
Sylvia takes drastic measures: she submits to sex with Mike in order to get one of the 
worst jobs in the plant, on the so-called “kill floor,” where the bodies of freshly killed 
cattle careen endlessly on hooks, ready to be chopped up by saw-wielding workers. 
Sylvia’s job is at the “gut table,” and involves processing the interior contents of the 
cows’ stomachs—in other words, their shit. The scene is phantasmagoric; we see slow, 
distorted shots of cows being decapitated, their legs sawn off quickly as they rotate 
through the kill floor, their bulging stomachs rolling like bags of jelly toward the 
workers. Sylvia, already traumatized by recent events, appears positively terrified in this 
unfamiliar milieu. Although her face is covered with a white mask, we can see tears 
rolling down her cheeks, mingling with splattered blood. 
 Such dreamlike images--Francisco’s accident, Sylvia’s descent into a shifting 
cavern of blood and death—exemplify what Walter Benjamin, in a 1929 discussion of 





inspiration, to which hashish, opium, or whatever else can give an introductory lesson” 
(“Surrealism” 71). In the profane illumination, we get down to the strange bottom (or 
rather, the bottomlessness) of the material world in which we live. Benjamin is not 
extolling phantasmagoria for its own sake, which he derides as a “histrionic stress on the 
mysterious side of the mysterious” (78). Rather, the profane illumination has a side that is 
not mysterious at all, since it is perfectly ordinary: “We penetrate the mystery only to the 
degree that we recognize it in the everyday world, by virtue of a dialectical optic that 
perceives the everyday as impenetrable, the impenetrable as everyday” (78). (Elsewhere 
he described the related concept of the dialectical image, in which condensed, 
overdetermined contradictions could emerge like a scene from a dream). Not content with 
depicting the mysterious side of the mysterious, Linklater offers us a more unsettling, 
everyday impenetrability. Although Fast Food Nation is not a supernatural horror film (it 
has no literal vampires or zombies), it is nonetheless gothic in that its narrative explores 
trauma and probes dark corners that we would rather not visit, and because we see its 
story through the partial lens of people who do not know what they are getting 
themselves into. Like other gothic narratives, Fast Food Nation highlights the 
uncomfortable permeability of bodies; its decapitations, spillovers, and unwanted sexual 
penetrations dramatize the unstable border between inside and outside, the painfully open 
contours of the self. And in doing so, it lays bare the guts of the region it depicts. Its 
portrayal of the U.S. West uncannily reveals what is constantly before our noses, but so 
often eludes representation; the film is one of few to seriously depict Western suburban 
sprawl, immigration (much of the movie is in Spanish), and the lives of low-wage 





providing jobs for the community (in the standard chamber of commerce parlance), but is 
instead revealed as a gothic castle concealing horrors behind an implacable façade.  
Mike, the manager who mediates between workers and the invisible executives of 
Uni-Globe, is something like a devil, not because he is unequivocally evil, but because of 
the contradictions he embodies. He is both evil and good, since although he can take 
away (a job, a preferred position, dignity), he can also give (money, drugs, access). He 
must be placated, but this placation comes at a price. In his dialectical quality, Mike 
resembles the devil in South American folklore as related by anthropologist Michael 
Taussig. In the 1970s, newly proletarianized Colombian farmers told stories that helped 
them cope with a strange new system, different from the kinship-based model of 
reciprocal exchange in which they had been raised: the capitalist structure built on wage 
labor and the abstract exchange of commodities. According to these “devil pact” stories, 
sugar cane harvesters could make Satanic deals that would allow them to cut more cane 
and earn more wages. The catch, however, was that although the deal resulted in more 
short-term production, proceeds from the extra cane could not be used productively, but 
only to buy luxury goods for immediate use. They could not be used to plant fields or buy 
animals: “these wages are inherently barren: the land will become sterile, and the animals 
will die” (The Devil and Commodity Fetishism 13). The devil pacts “have baleful 
consequences for capital and human life”: “It is…said by many persons that the 
individual who makes the contract…will die prematurely and in pain. Short-term 
monetary gain under the new conditions of wage labor is more than offset by the 
supposed long-term effects of sterility and death” (13-14). Similarly, Bolivian miners saw 





sustain production, the devil is also seen as a gluttonous spirit bent on destruction and 
death…this production is believed to be ultimately destructive of life” (14). The miners 
treat the devil as a familiar figure (they call him Tio, or uncle), and they believe he must 
be respected if they are to stay safe in the mines; as a result, they conduct ritual offerings 
to this devil, personified in statues to look like a gringo, with sunglasses and a cowboy 
hat. 
 Raul, Sylvia, Coco, and Francisco, too, give offerings to the ambiguous devil-
spirit of the meat-packing plant: blood offerings, sexual favors, and their own limbs. And 
although Mike is hardly the most powerful figure in the plant (he, too, must give 
offerings to those higher up, who push him to keep the assembly line moving in order to 
reach productivity goals), he is perhaps the closest personification available to the 
workers of the ambiguous authority under which they live. Like the Bolivian devil, he is 
aggressively virile and masculine (the statues are often depicted with huge erect penises), 
and although he does not wear a cowboy hat, he drives a huge truck with an expensive 
stereo, and parades his wealth before his charges. And he certainly has something to 
offer; given the comparatively high wages available at the plant when compared to jobs 
in Mexico, one can see why these migrant workers would be attracted to the job--if they 
are willing to grapple with this devil. In one scene in the film, Raul and Sylvia wander 
the streets of Cody, Colorado (actually filmed in Colorado Springs), amazed by the lights 
of a seemingly never-ending strip mall. Here, it seems, is a new and abundant life, and 
Raul is positively ecstatic to eat at a local Chili’s. And yet, just as Taussig’s South 
American storytellers see a contradiction between rapid short-term production and long-





wages do not necessarily buy them stability or a fertile, meaningful life; instead, Fast 
Food Nation’s narrative is largely one of pain, injury, loss, humiliation, and isolation, of 
drug addiction, exploitive relationships, and the collapse of former standards of behavior. 
At film’s end it is entirely unclear where the stories of these people might go. 
 Surely the South American stories do not apply perfectly to Linklater’s characters, 
who cannot retreat to the subsistence practices of Colombian farmers. Raul’s cohort were 
proletarianized long before they crossed the border, and may find a better deal from the 
devil in the U.S. than in Mexico. But the old stories ring uncannily true even in this new 
context, where devil pacts have become a banal fact of life; the commodity fetishism 
unleashed by the modern capitalist economy, augmented by the commodification of the 
image in the postmodern society of the spectacle (and the bewildering sorcery of high 
finance), still results in forms of barrenness that contradict official narratives of freedom 
and abundance. For years we have seen (often exaggerated) gains in productivity and 
wealth1-- but also disintegration: the collapse of moral narratives and the demise of 
notions of social obligation embedded in terms like reciprocity. In our new context--all 
but saturated with the ethos that struck South American neophytes as alien and upsetting-
-the devil is surely afoot. Jose E. Limon, for one, describes the devil rising again in the 
everyday folklore of 1970s South Texas, presumably to signal another moment of 
                                                          
1 As David Harvey points out in A Brief History of Neoliberalism, worldwide growth rates have actually 
fallen since the 1960s and 1970s: “Aggregate global growth rates stood at 3.5 per cent or so in the 1960s 
and even during the troubled 1970s fell only to 2.4 per cent. But the subsequent growth rates of 1.4 per cent 
and 1.1 per cent for the 1980s and 1990s (and a rate that barely touches 1 per cent since 2000) indicate that 
neoliberalization has broadly failed to stimulate worldwide growth” (154). So why does the global 
economy appear so dynamic in news reports? Partly because, as Harvey puts it, the growth has been 
uneven, mostly concentrated in India and East Asia: “That ‘success’ was to be had somewhere and for 
someone obscures how neoliberalism has generally failed to stimulate strong and sustained global growth. 
The illusion is created that if only we all performed like the successful growing countries of the moment 
then we, too, could be successful” (Harvey Cosmopolitanism and the Geographies of Freedom 66). But we 
might also point to the fact that most gains have gone disproportionately to the elite classes, especially in 





transition. This shift is the neoliberal turn, from an older Fordist economic model (in 
which workplaces largely stayed put and proletarian cultures could develop as a 
counterweight to exploitation) to the post-1970s model of what David Harvey calls 
flexible accumulation (in which global capital moves more easily, exploits labor more 
effectively, and shifts the sites and methods of production, distribution, and consumption 
in the blink of an eye): “I see [the devil’s] intense presence in southern Texas and later in 
all of Mexican America as a register of the society’s initial and shocking encounter with 
the cultural logic of late capitalism.” This new devil “is less a folk figure than in South 
America and more…a modernist figure indebted to the past but open and available as a 
flexible and critical tool for reading and critically evaluating a threatening present” (179-
180). For Limon, then, “dancing with the devil” is part of postmodern life, but in 
recognizing it as such we grasp a tool that we might use to understand our situation. 
Fast Food Nation (both Schlosser’s book and Linklater’s film) registers the shift 
toward a regime of flexible accumulation—and thus the rise of this new devil--in acute 
ways, revealing the contradictory legacy of mobility, speed, growth, and flexibility in late 
capitalist economy and culture. In describing the rise of the Western meat-packing plant, 
Schlosser maintains that conditions for workers, cattle, and surrounding townspeople are 
determined not simply by accident, but have emerged through a historical process that 
neatly follows the neoliberalization of the global economy. In this history, narrow 
efficiency, corporate profit, flexible labor contracts, and abstract “throughput” (the speed 
and quantity of units processed and shipped) emerge as paramount, squeezing out all 
other concerns: the lives of workers, environmental quality, and the broad public good 





masquerading behind the slogan of free choice. It is a story in which the state is used by 
powerful corporations for their accumulative purposes, but then gracefully bows out 
when it comes to the matter of regulation, social investment, and redistribution. And it is 
also a history of fun as a privileged category: of enjoyment raised to the status of a moral 
value (even an oppressive obligation), of bright colors and sensory pleasures, of 
marketing tie-ins with Beanie Babies and kids’ movies, and of privately financed 
playgrounds at fast food restaurants across the globe.  
Today’s slaughterhouse, like the fast food industry that drives its development, is 
largely a product of the past few decades, the outcome of both technological changes 
amenable to the hiring of unskilled workers and of Ronald Reagan’s deregulation 
policies, which allowed centralized meatpackers to take over smaller, regional players.2 
The result: a hugely powerful meatpacking industry employing a “migrant industrial 
workforce,” the industrial equivalent of itinerant farm workers (149). Most of these 
workers are encouraged to come (without papers) from places like Mexico, Guatemala, 
and El Salvador, and are subsequently treated like the cattle, subjected to the same 
brutally efficient push for high throughput. They are paid low wages, denied benefits and 
training, placed in dangerous environments, and pressured not to report injuries. By 
design, turnover is extremely high, making it difficult for workers to organize and defend 
                                                          
2 Of course, the meatpacking industry was a problem long before Ronald Reagan: around the turn of the 
century, Upton Sinclair described the horrifying conditions within Chicago’s meatpacking plants. In 
response to his 1906 book The Jungle, citizens demanded safer meat. Meanwhile, the trust-busting 
activities of Theodore Roosevelt and Woodrow Wilson helped to demolish the so-called Beef Trust, 
leading to a relatively decentralized meatpacking industry populated by many regional players. But 
although food inspection got much better, the treatment of labor did not improve until after World War II, 
when high-skilled meatpacking workers received high wages, good benefits, and relative dignity in most 
U.S. slaughterhouses. Around 1960, however, a company called Iowa Beef Processors (IBP) instituted 
what Schlosser describes as a “revolution” (151): an assembly line style of meat processing that vastly 
increased throughput and made skilled workers unnecessary. Slowly, even people who worked in formerly 
progressive plants (like Monfort in Greeley, Colorado) began to lose wages, benefits, and protections. And 
in the 1980s, President Ronald Reagan encouraged centralization in the meatpacking industry, in effect 





their interests. Workers stay at a job for an average of a few months before moving on, 
often to meatpacking plants elsewhere. And while these large corporations take in big 
subsidies from governments, they have little loyalty to the places they exploit. Instead, 
they move from place to place in search of the best deal (luring workers from the most 
impoverished areas), forcing nations, states, regions, and cities to compete for the 
privilege of hosting them and their mixed fallout. The upshot, as Schlosser puts it, is a 
situation in which everyone and everything is in motion: the assembly lines, the steers, 
the workers, the commodified beef, and the corporations themselves. But while this 
motion is liberating and empowering for the corporations, it is largely unpleasant for the 
workers, who feel coerced into a difficult nomadic life:  
Moving constantly is hard on their personal lives and their families. Most of these 
new industrial migrants would gladly stay in one job and settle in one spot, if the 
wages and the working conditions were good. The nation’s meatpacking firms, on 
the other hand, have proven themselves to be far less committed to remaining in a 
particular community….No longer locally owned, they feel no allegiance to any 
one place. (163) 
 
Yet those companies are in place. The neoliberalization of the meatpacking 
industry is also a process of Western-ization, as agricultural companies have moved from 
eastern centers like Chicago toward Western places like Texas, Colorado, Nebraska, and 
South Dakota. As Schlosser puts it, “The relentless low-cost competition from IBP [the 
meatpacking company Iowa Beef Processors] presented old-line Chicago meatpackers 
with a stark choice: go west or go out of business. Instead of symbolizing democracy and 
freedom, going west meant getting cheap labor” (155). And upon further inspection, it 
becomes clear that Schlosser’s entire book is a story of the U.S. West—or more exactly, 
of the transnational region that Americo Paredes called Greater Mexico. The march of 





the built environment—has occurred alongside the post-WWII development of the West. 
The high-growth period for fast food restaurants, it turns out, occurred after 1968, 
presaging the birth of what historian William Leach describes as the “intermodal” society 
(of container shipping technologies, communications networks, and a deregulated 
business environment) that connects the U.S. to the rest of the globe, and enables rapid 
flows of goods and information (54). Thus fast food culture is an important aspect of an 
entire global culture and economy built around high technology, efficiency, and 
throughput—and in the U.S. this culture reaches its epicenter in the West. Here we find a 
powerfully dominant automobile culture, a mythology of consumer pleasure rooted in 
sites like Disneyland, and a strange paradox: anti-government rhetoric sprouting 
alongside the benefits of government-financed projects, from freeways and military-
industrial hubs to dams and research centers (and crucially, subsidies for fast food-related 
industries).3  
Yet as Schlosser’s focus on the effectively invisible world of the migrant 
industrial workforce makes clear, New Western space is not only built on motion, but on 
inequality and exclusion; its mobile network is also highly segmented, dispersed, and 
unevenly constructed, such that it keeps “lower” spaces (meat-packing plants, apartment 
housing, dumping grounds, rural hinterlands, fast food kitchens) separate from “higher” 
ones (research campuses, gentrified urban cores, wealthy exurbs, and regulated “natural” 
                                                          
3 The fast food industry, for example, initially emerged from Southern California, a region largely settled 
during the age of the automobile; it depended on (and helped solidify) the automobile culture as an 
indelible fact of U.S. life. And just as neoliberalism requires state involvement even as it officially 
champions the free market, the U.S. West is defined both by dependence on government largesse and 
antipathy to its restrictions. Restaurants like McDonald’s took off in Western regions characterized by twin 
facets: conservative free-market politics on the one hand, and heavy government involvement on the other. 
The Sunbelt economy was based on military spending, on large-scale irrigation projects, and on the 
interstate highway system. And fast food chains have long benefitted from tax breaks, government 






areas). Appropriately enough, the film Fast Food Nation, set in the fictional town of 
Cody, depicts a spatial network both connected and divided, and driven by the 
imperatives of capital (from real estate companies and developers to the automobile 
industry and California-based fast food companies). Together, these industries exert a 
spectral influence across a whole range of landscapes and separated spaces: Mexican 
villages (and the desert borderlands through which the workers travel), low quality 
worker housing in flophouse hotels, suburban homes and their connected public schools, 
strip malls, party sites in the mountains above the city, college dorm rooms, and old-style 
ranchlands squeezed by new commercial and housing developments. And if in a sense all 
these spaces are unified—similarly situated beneath the spectral dome of capital—they 
are also mutually inaccessible and socially incommensurable, often divided by powerful 
boundaries. In Cody, encounters and confrontations are kept at a minimum, especially 
between classes. Public spaces, insofar as they exist, are mostly dominated by cars. In its 
suburban neighborhoods, we see no people outside talking with each other. Thus, like the 
façade of the slaughterhouse, Cody conceals from many of its citizens the gothic horrors 
occurring in its secret spaces. 
Since the spaces of Fast Food Nation remain largely separated from each other 
despite their imbrication in a common network, it is appropriate that the various 
narratives in this seemingly haphazard, tipsy (even awkward) film never truly connect or 
add up, as it were. If in other popular multinarrative films like Crash and Babel—as in 
the urban novels of Charles Dickens—separate narrative threads resolve through 
important coincidences, such that disparate characters meet or collide in a catharsis of 





these other films, which seem to trumpet their importance, Fast Food Nation feels tossed-
off and anticlimactic, as if mocking the idea of its importance. None of its characters 
succeed in any triumphal sense, and strangely, what initially seems to be its main 
character (a corporate marketing executive played by Greg Kinnear) disappears halfway 
through the film after failing to blow the whistle on his company. We are left, instead, 
with the ineffectual protests of a group of college-age activists (who resent the 
company’s treatment of animals, workers, and the environment) and the grinding 
struggles of the immigrant workers. Yet these two groups, who would seem to have 
common cause in their critique of Uni-Globe, never meet, since the film can imagine no 
social space in which they would actually encounter each other, either in conflict or in 
solidarity. In the face of such a spatial regime, the filmmakers are skeptical that their film 
will have a significant impact on producing the consciousness required for 
transformation. 
However meandering, the film is not devoid of desire, narrative meaning, 
urgency, or a sense of history. It is not an example of what Bill Buford described in the 
early 1980s as an avoidance of the “large historical statement” in U.S. fiction (cited in 
Jameson The Seeds of Time 149). On the contrary, Fast Food Nation seems positively 
driven by an agenda of social transformation, even if it can hardly imagine how such 
reforms might take place. But rather than resolving its tensions and contradictions (above 
all, the failure of common class interests to coalesce in a productive movement) in a 
cheap or sentimental way, Fast Food Nation allows those contradictions to hang in the 
air. Its spatio-temporality is above all dialectical; it dramatizes a particular, contingent 





depending on how those contradictions are resolved. This unremitting dialectical 
approach, in fact, explains the apparently wayward style of the narration, in which even 
failure is not final. At one point, for example, the college-age activists enact a farcical 
plan to free the cows from the Uni-Globe feedlot, but fail to achieve their objective since 
the cows refuse to move from their enclosure. This scene could be interpreted as a 
fatalistic symbol of the inevitable failure of Americans to break out of their passive role 
as fattened cattle, so to speak. But such a metaphysical reading ignores the experimental 
nature of the rescue attempt; Paco, one of the students, insists that if they had a “cattle 
prod” they might have succeeded. In light of his revisions, we should not necessarily 
interpret the passivity of the cows as a timeless judgment; rather, a single, historically 
situated attempt resulted in contingent failure. One of the students, Alice (Avril Levine) 
does in fact interpret the failure as a grand narrative of loss: “Why do the bad guys 
always win?” Paco, however, responds curtly, “They win until they don’t.” In other 
words, although oppressive structures exist, events are unpredictable: the company will 
continue to mistreat animals and workers until historical conditions change. 
 In terms of history, then, the film deploys a calendar shot through with an 
explosive sense of time, such that even if its characters fail to band together to transform 
the structures that shape their world, the (dim) possibility remains that eventually they 
will. Its seemingly lackadaisical, improvised vibe is actually congruent with the always 
imminent possibility of intrusion and change. In contrast to the fast food world, which 
portrays itself as natural, determined, and inevitable, Fast Food Nation portrays 
temporality as up for grabs, interruptible, surprising, and out of joint. The film’s 





former inhabitant of Cody who unexpectedly drops in on his niece Amber (Ashley 
Johnson) and his sister Cindy (Patricia Arquette). Although he is only in town for a night, 
and although Amber’s mother Cindy rails in a half-annoyed way about Uncle Pete’s 
wacky ideas, he profoundly influences his niece by warning her about the danger of 
becoming trapped in Cody and urging her to consider her life direction. His advice, 
however, is phrased with the film’s peculiar mix of urgency and self-effacement. 
Although he claims to have no absolute answers (“Do not listen to me”), he interrogates 
Amber and interjects a note of doubt into her psyche. After he tells a story about getting 
kicked out of the University of Colorado for protesting its investments in apartheid South 
Africa, she quits her job, initiates relationships with local college students, and 
participates in the illegal protest at the feedlot. Uncle Pete’s rhetorical structure (“Don’t 
listen to me—but really, listen to me”) is also the rhetorical structure of the film: an 
urgent encouragement combined with a pose of inadequacy that leaves a great deal on the 
audience’s shoulders. 
Uncle Pete’s out of joint appearance provides the film with a key moment of 
existential intensity, since in interrupting its narrative he disrupts the flow of homogenous 
time and renders history urgently present. By evoking the past (the anti-apartheid 
struggle, Cindy’s early pregnancy, the transformation of Cody according to the dictates of 
neoliberal development), Pete urges Cindy and Amber to become subjectively engaged, 
to give up fetishes like “hope,” or the “fun” provided by what Cindy describes as the new 
activities available in Cody (“You know, I actually think it’s better now. There’s more 
stuff to do”). He frames the issue in narrative terms, urging Amber to practice what Peter 





(23). In doing so, he also urges the viewer to pause, to step back and consider, even to 
question hysterically. Pete seems to truly care for his niece, enough to visit her, take her 
out, and drill her with his questions. And because he cares about her, he cannot accept 
Cody as it has become. Pete understands that he has neither a halo nor all the answers 
(“I’m not trying to come across like some Polly Perfect here. Alright? I’m going to make 
some cabinets for some rich New York investment banker fuck who probably spends two 
weeks a year at his Montana ranch, so don’t listen to me.”) But he nevertheless sticks to 
his guns, refusing to celebrate the transformation of Cody. In response to Cindy’s half-
mocking complaints—that Pete “hates everything,” that she doesn’t have time to think 
about politics, that “both Democrats and Republicans are crooks”—Pete suggests that 
such cynical resignation is exactly what power wants: “This is why revolutions are meant 
for the young.” In such ways, Pete (laughingly) tries to open up a sense of history as an 
unfolding process rooted in a historical calendar. 
Pete’s uncertain salvo, both ironic and deadly serious, mirrors the approach of the 
film itself, which also functions as a serious game of interruption in a bedeviled context. 
Like many of its allegorical characters, Linklater and Schlosser’s film is occasionally 
clumsy and not always successful, but it is audacious in its own way; it is an experiment, 
a low-budget film made on the run, a stab in the dark. As they point out in their 
commentary on the movie, Schlosser and Linklater barely managed to make the film 
because of low funding, and the cast and crew were often forced to squeeze many hours 
of filming into a single day. Finally, its controversial themes resulted not only in 
marketing difficulties, but in concrete filmmaking challenges: the film includes 





the “kill floor,” the nightmarish world of decapitation and the setting for the film’s 
resolution (the filmmakers could only gain access to a Mexican meat-packing plant, since 
American plants refused them entry; and even in the Mexican plant, their time was 
restricted, forcing them to film in a hit-and-run guerrilla manner, as it were). Thus if the 
filmmakers’ risks do not match the risks of the film’s immigrant characters, Fast Food 
Nation nevertheless affirms an ethos of resourceful and experimental energy captured in 
the Spanish term rascuache, best translated as “making do with what is available.” Its 
heroes are ambitious border-crossers, hemmed in by a structure of fear and obstacles, 
using experiment both as a potential way out and in order to create new collective 
formations. As audience-members, we are invited to join this clique of creative resistance 
modeled by a series of these formations: the filmmakers, the college activists, and the 
immigrant workers.   
   If we think in dialectical terms, then, we would be careful about ascribing some 
all-encompassing pessimism to Fast Food Nation, or even a fully coherent narrative of 
dominance and resistance; rather, as Fredric Jameson has put it, when we think 
dialectically we resist the urge to pin down a situation as unified or monolithic: “If at 
every moment in which we represent something to ourselves in a unified way, we try to 
undo that and see the contradictions and multiplicities behind that particular existence, 
then we are thinking dialectically” (“Marxism and the History of Theory” 160). Seen 
through such a lens, Fast Food Nation does not depict a hopeless situation—even if one 
of its most articulate characters (dialectically) cautions against hope itself (Uncle Pete: 
““Don’t just hope. You can’t just sit back and hope. You have to do something. In a town 





are partially undone by alternative affective currents. Francisco’s horrifying accident also 
reminds us of the man’s humor, physical expressiveness, and risk-taking openness toward 
the world. Even the scene’s surprising quality reminds us that grace or luck can surprise 
and intrude, just as violence can. And Sylvia’s trauma at the gut table (and at the hands of 
Mike) is not simply a one-way story of victimization; after all, she only undergoes these 
ordeals because of a fierce attachment to Raul, and because she hopes that her dance with 
the devil will open up unexpected doors. In sinking to the abject level of what Slavoj 
Zizek has called “subjective destitution”—in facing the excremental Real not only at the 
heart of a cow, but also at the heart of human subjectivity and social life—she perhaps 
finds an unexpected strength (The Ticklish Subject 161).  
We, as viewers, also sense this strength. Merely by surviving in this bedeviled 
space, Sylvia, Coco, Francisco, and Raul reiterate the appeal of the gothic mode, which in 
Steven Bruhm’s terms can enact a kind of “exorcism” on the reader/viewer by facilitating 
“survival by proxy” (272, 273); by identifying with the “traumatized subject” of gothic 
narrative, we can achieve an inoculation against fear, reaffirm the value of life in the 
midst of death and loss, and take courage from the very act of survival (272). He cites 
Cathy Caruth on the importance of narrating trauma as a way of moving beyond it: “To 
listen to the crisis of a trauma…is not only to listen for the event, but to hear in the 
testimony the survivor’s departure from it; the challenge of the therapeutic listener, in 
other words, is how to listen to departure” (cited in Bruhm 273). In this case, the trauma 
of proletarianization in a neoliberal U.S. urban space is not the end of the road, but the 
beginning—a point of departure that rings with the losses experienced across an entire 





Dragged to the Bottom: Biology and Spectrality in the New North 
As is the case with other feedlots (and slaughterhouses) across the high plains, the feeder 
cattle on the ground at Wilderado represent but a subset of an intricate, integrated global 
system of beef production, marketing and distribution. This system is enabled by certain 
trade agreements (GATT, NAFTA), by the flexibility of transnational capital, and by the 
mobility of the largely immigrant labor force staffing the feedlots and packing plants and 
trucking companies typically owned by multinational agribusiness corporations. It is a 
system whose feedlots and slaughterhouses are typically located in close proximity not 
only to supplies of grain but also to the interstate highway system that enables the cattle 
to be trucked efficiently from ranch, to feedlot, to slaughterhouse, and then to retail stores 
and to coastal ports for the export market. It is a system enabled by container shipping 
technology at these distant ports to which the highways lead, and it is an integrated 
system in that the same container shipping and interstate transportation corridors can be 
and are used to import as well as to export frozen beef. In short, there is the actual steer 
living on the ground and gorging on the hormone-laced feed at this place called 
Wilderado, and there is this actual steer’s spectral or virtual double, the “world steer,” 
an entirely fictive but nevertheless real bovine creature produced by the flow of the 
global commodity futures market—an abstract creature, in short, whose shifting 
exchange value overdetermines the actual steers and feeder cows on the ground and 
fouling the space of local places in, say, Texas, Nebraska, Australia, and Argentina. 
--Stephen Tatum, “Spectrality and the Postregional Interface” (5 my emphasis) 
Yes, everything is interconnected. And it sucks.—Timothy Morton, from The Ecological 
Thought (33) 
 
In rehearsing the details of a recent film in the contemporary West, I hope to 
indicate the guiding terms and principles of this dissertation, which revolves around three 
key themes: place and the regional (specifically the transnational U.S. West), the gothic 
narrative form, and the neoliberal. Specifically, I want to argue that in the past several 
decades, and especially since the collapse of Soviet communism in 1989, people across 
the planet have struggled with what is more or less a common problem: the difficulty of 
establishing meaningful narratives in an increasingly connected and hypercapitalized 
world. As George Lipsitz has put it, so-called globalization is often presented in 
triumphalist terms, but whatever its positive aspects, it also produces trauma:  
For millions of people around the world, the present moment may seem like 
midnight. The rapid movement across the globe of people, products, ideas, and 





and national identities, the value of personal and collective histories, and the 
solidity of social relationships and social networks. New forms of economic 
activity produce both astounding wealth and and appalling poverty—sometimes 
in the same locations. New technologies liberate us from tiresome tasks yet create 
unprecedented environmental dangers. In some respects global marketing brings 
the people of the world closer together than ever before, yet consuming the same 
products, enjoying the same entertainments or working for the same employers 
does not seem to make us any less divided, as old antagonisms and new enmities 
create violent conflicts on every continent. (3)   
 
Since the acid bath of capitalist production creates vast wealth, but also poverty and 
social disintegration, postmodern subjects are often hard-pressed to find a sense of 
meaning, home, place, and structure. Like the characters in Fast Food Nation, they often 
find themselves lost, despairing, or confused about their place in the world. But precisely 
because the regime of flexible accumulation destabilizes once-meaningful narratives and 
social networks, it also gives rise to compensatory counter-narratives, some quaint (local 
commerce movements, nostalgic marketing schemes) and some quite dangerous 
(fundamentalism, tribalism, and various forms of cultural nationalism). And although it 
reduces differences in some ways (people around the world shop at Wal-Mart), it also 
produces and profits from differences, since marketing to various niche groups can be a 
lucrative enterprise, and because people divided by market segments are less likely to 
band together in opposition to neoliberal hegemony.   
When it comes to contemporary U.S. cultural nationalism—and particularly, the 
nostalgia among many white citizens for a clear-cut moral narrative built on Anglo-
Protestant dominance—the imagined space of the West has played an important role. 
Faced with a series of trends since the 1970s (deindustrialization, the rise of global 
economic competitors, outsourcing and offshoring of jobs, national disgrace in places 





country), many white Americans have followed Ronald Reagan and looked to the frontier 
West as a nostalgic pastoral space: a day-lit and God-ordained fountain of freedom, 
reinvention, and innocence. Leave the gothic stories to the South and the East, such 
people might say. Those were the spaces of civil war, class conflict, and slavery. The 
frontier West, by contrast, was (and remains) the space of morning, the place to go in 
order to get away from the past and create a new Eden. It evokes the space where the 
jackpot was always around the corner, where conflicts and crowds (and repressive 
customs and hierarchies) could be escaped. As a result, the West is often the imaginative 
site toward which white Americans retreat in order to deny the globally interconnected 
spaces of the modern and the postmodern. Whether through movies and novels, 
wilderness backpacking trips, or rustic home décor, the West lives on, even if its 
celebration often betrays notes of melancholia, desperation, or fetishistic denial among its 
devotees. 
However, as others have registered, such an escapist fantasy cannot withstand the 
shocks of rapid global economic and cultural flows. Writing in 2000, in the wake of the 
NAFTA agreements, essayist Richard Rodriguez saw a situation in which “white” 
increasingly faced uncanny incursions of “brown.”  These terms do not signify some kind 
of transhistorical racial essence, but rather illuminate specific reactions to the trends of 
neoliberal uneven development. In Rodriguez’s hands, “brown” signifies impurity, 
blurred boundaries, and miscegenation: “Fugue and funk. Brown, the color of consort; 
brown, the color of illicit passion—not blue—brown, the shade of love and drawn shades 
and of love children, so-called…secret cousins; brown, the stench of rape and of shame, 





than transcendence. It is erotic and tactical, and not at all innocent. In contrast, “white” 
for Rodriguez implies a strained insistence on purity and separation: “every knuckle of 
America strained to accomplish an assertion: I am innocent” (200). With its desire for 
borders, whiteness feels itself besieged from without, its fiction of individual sovereignty 
inundated with the too-close proximity of encroaching bodies:
Biology is a metaphor for life at the bottom, or undifferentiated life…the stew of 
humanity…And every once in a while, Americans are dragged to the bottom. The 
jury room. The army physical. The department of motor vehicles. The emergency 
room. The United Airlines counter. The Last Judgement. Undifferentiated life is a 
test of the American I, whereby each must figure out the ‘system’ and seek her 
own advantage—must figure out a way to get the fuck out of here. (213-214) 
 
Rodriguez later helps explain the post-Reagan West (and the impulse to “get the 
fuck out of here”) through his unique geographical notion of the “New North,” a space 
toward which Anglo/Protestant cultural nationalism has presumably been retreating. If, as 
he argues, the “impulse of the Wild West was not wildness but domesticity” (150), the 
Northern part of the American West, the “New North,” has become an imaginary space 
of decontamination, an attempt to avoid the conflicts of history and the proximity of 
crowded biology. In the symbolic world signified by places like Idaho, Utah, Montana, 
and Alaska, we find a series of essentialisms: American exceptionalism, ecospiritual 
nature worship, racial difference, and fundamentalist Constitutionalism. The common 
denominator here is a desire for innocence and unfettered space: “The New North is 
where environmentalists seek a purer air or stream, a less crowded freeway…. where 
nostalgic skinheads pursue the American Normal Rockwell idyll, fleeing Hispanics who 
swarm the construction sites of L.A.” (157). The New North, then, is an imaginative site 
far from what Rodriguez calls “undifferentiated life,” and what Giorgio Agamben calls 





whatever form). It is fitting, then, that Rodriguez’s examples of confrontation with the 
“stew of humanity” involve both governmental agencies (the army, the DIV, the jury) 
and private companies (airline counters):  in all of these spaces, we find ourselves 
recognizing the power of sovereignty over our biological bodies. And this encroachment 
on the “American I” is what whiteness cannot abide, what opens up a space for the 
imaginary New North. In this fantasmic space self-sovereignty can receive its vital life 
support, whether in the form of a wilderness fantasy or a test of racial purity—or both.  
As a manifestation of the unsymbolizable Lacanian Real, then, Rodriguez’s 
biology evokes what Slavoj Zizek describes as the terrifying Neighbor: “what is toxic is 
ultimately the Neighbor as such, the abyss of its desire and its obscene enjoyment. The 
ultimate aim of all rules governing interpersonal relations, then, is to quarantine or 
neutralize this toxic dimension, to reduce the Neighbor to a fellow man” (First as 
Tragedy 46). The bodies (and desires, and enjoyments) of others, in their too-proximate 
quality, challenge the symbolic structure in which we would like to fit comfortably. But 
is not Rodriguez missing something here? In using the word biology—and focusing on 
physical intrusions into personal space—Rodriguez obscures the fact that today, many of 
the global flows that disrupt the sovereignty of bodies (individual and national) are not 
biological in any meaningful sense, but abstract. Or, to put it another way, they are what 
theorist Gayatri Spivak describes as spectral. For Stephen Tatum (who draws on Spivak 
here, but focuses on the U.S. West) even rural spaces have become spectralized, since 
they function as a staging ground for “the dematerialization of peoples and things that 
operates across the restructured landscape of multinational corporate capitalism.” In the 





transformed into virtual or simulated landscapes of grids and points, of circuits and 
networks through which capital, laboring bodies, images, and commodities flow” (15). 
Thus alongside the many physical manifestations of shock experience—Neighbors, 
migrants, shit, waiting in lines—we find another manifestation of the Real in the flows of 
finance: the disappearance of funds here, the intrusion of new factories there, the 
earthquake of a stock market crash or a liquidity crisis. 
Such spectrality can be difficult to trace, but is no less powerful for its immaterial 
quality. The shifting landscape of the rural West as described by Tatum, “with its 
maquiladores and factory farms and tribal lands and toxic landscapes and suburban edge 
cities”—not to mention “the pulsing, ghostly flow of immaterial capital and intellectual 
property through the electronic portals of…satellite, digital, and computer 
technologies”—is produced and reproduced according to abstract imperatives that seem 
designed to make physical confrontation difficult, unlikely (14, 15). How many of us 
have actually been to a factory farm, a maquila, or even a technological research center? 
But one might easily grant to this spectral form of the Real a driving force, such that the 
biological Real functions as its after-effect. In Fast Food Nation, the most traumatic 
manifestations of the biological Real emerge in a spectral framework which prioritizes 
throughput over people; from a purely economic point of view, Francisco’s accident is a 
mere blip, an instance of collateral damage in an otherwise efficient and profitable 
enterprise. Faced with what Schlosser calls “corporate indifference,” (186) Francisco may 
experience a powerlessness and invisibility as traumatizing as the accident, such that the 
corporation’s unassimilable operations appear as implacable and sublime as the whirring 





person to blame, but instead faces “something out of science fiction,” the logic of an 
auto-piloted machine that creates en masse but also destroys. As an Andean neophyte 
might put it, the true owner of the meat-packing plant is the devil. In Fast Food Nation, 
then, we see dramatized in disturbing fashion a contradictory meeting-point, where the 
supposedly toxic South (with its biology) and the New North cannot be effectively 
separated, but exist in the same dialectical contact zone.4  
Indeed, it is only because U.S. culture so often invests the West with utopian 
energy in the first place that it can function as a symptomal point of entry, perhaps the 
best place to deconstruct the tropes that have come to stand for U.S. cultural nationalism 
as such (individualism, autonomy, freedom, God-given power), especially given that 
neoliberal ideologues have deployed these same tropes in the new frontier of an ever-
expanding global economy. The contemporary West is characteristically a site of intense 
contradictions. To begin with, although it stands as a locus for narratives of national pride 
and power, the West is fully integrated into a global economy dominated by an 
increasingly off-ground, transnational ruling class. But we can point to further 
contradictions: Although it easily summons archaic images of cowboys and Indians, it is 
perhaps the most technologized and administered region of the country, since its 
development occurred latest; a space of great natural beauty, its people are often prodigal 
with resources, spewing carbon dioxide and nuclear fallout into the air; and if it is the site 
of luck and discovery, embodied in a number of “rushes”—not only the Gold Rush and 
related ore-induced frenzies, but oil and gas booms, land rushes, technology and real 
                                                          
4 Given that Fast Food Nation is partly filmed in Colorado Springs (and that Schlosser’s book makes much 
use of the city), it is perhaps noteworthy (if only in a metaphorical sense) that Colorado Springs is an 
ecosystemic contact zone as well. It marks the space in which three ecosystems meet: the Western rocky 





estate bubbles, and other potential jackpots that give rise to big winners—it is also the 
site of despair, destruction, disappointment, since most people were either excluded from 
the winnings or displaced by them. Finally, if the West reveres the individual (the lone 
prospector, the heroic cowboy, the solitary hiker), it is also the site of the individual’s 
undoing in a number of ways: through the centralized control of corporations aided and 
abetted by the federal government, through social-ecological disasters like the Dust Bowl 
and climate-induced wildfires, and through the impersonal quality of the boom-and-bust 
cycles in the first place.  
Perhaps above all, the West is contradictory because it is a place dedicated to 
constant mobility, and thus evasion. Critic Robert Seguin has called attention to the way 
two spatio-cultural tropes (the frontier and the pastoral) combine forces in U.S. culture to 
hide the reality of class confict
With frontier mythology, it is precisely movement and dynamism that are 
emphasized, a continual movement forward that keeps one ahead of the pressures 
of society, ahead of the inextricable webs of economic dependency and inhabiting 
an ‘empty’ space suitable for peremptory and often violent acts of self-creation 
(which inevitably set loose a free-market logic in their wake, which must be 
evaded yet again). Pastoralism, meanwhile, seeks a retreat from the 
market…through a strategic inertia, through a small-scale, self-maintaining, 
homeostatic production system. (11) 
 
Both tropes have been regular features in cultural representations of the U.S. West, and 
although seemingly different, they are profoundly connected. The symbol of the 
frontier—initially embodied in land available for settlement, but later imagined in more 
metaphorical terms—has ideologically functioned as a “safety valve” that mitigates class 
conflict by providing a space in which the supposedly “artificial” constraints of class can 
give way to a more “natural” field of opportunity. But such desires for dynamism often 





power, such that the West is often rendered as a simplified pastoral idyll defined by a 
“beautiful relation between rich and poor…a feeling of solidarity between classes” 
(William Empson, cited in Seguin 25). The West, then, can work as both pastoral and 
frontier; on the one hand, dynamism itself is pastoralized (treated as a smooth, egalitarian 
process of expansion and renewal), while on the other, the sentimental pastoral beckons 
as an imaginative retreat from the dislocating effects of actual capitalist expansion.      
  Insofar as we remain in the grip of a frontier mythology (or its uncanny flipside, 
the pastoral Eden), we remain incapable of developing places geared toward goals 
incompatible with such fantasies: not only class consciousness, but nurturance, 
reciprocity, and mutual responsibility. In an age of global warming, terrorist movements, 
drone warfare, financial crises, capital flight, and the traumatic breakdowns in social 
networks described by Lipsitz, Western contradictions can no longer withstand the 
pressures operating on them. No place can be seen as separate from any other. We in the 
First World are haunted not simply by crimes of the past (from colonialism and racism to 
war and class conflict), but by crimes of the present that emerge in uncanny ways from 
near and far: exploited service employees who make the system run, Chinese workers 
roused in the middle of the night from a company dormitory to rush in a quick order of I-
Phones for export, migrant workers picking lettuce from California to Chile. In response, 
we must pull a difficult trick; we must simultaneously rebuild places disrupted by 
capitalist deterritorialization and forge deepened connections across borders. We must 
deny the safety valve mentality of the frontier fully as much as the stasis of the pastoral. 
And we must assert the power of narrative to establish more durable forms of meaning 





My answer, then, to the contemporary need for reorientation is not to deny the 
trauma by clinging to a celebratory vision of a global village (or its perverse mirror-
image in the cult of the fragmented, schizoid subject of postmodernity), nor to hunker 
down in nostalgic localist fantasies of a simpler, less connected world. Instead, we must 
work through the traumas of postmodernity by developing new and more haunted (and 
haunting) narratives. We should be willing to dig through remains, pry into dark corners, 
and prod into the vulnerable places of memory and experience. And insofar as the West 
often functions as a fetish that enables U.S. cultural nationalists to evade their connection 
to a whole series of subjugated and invisible Others (both at home and abroad), we 
should insist on imagining the West as a gothic space. In sum, I argue for what I call a 
gothic quest for place, built on the premise that in a rapidly changing and interconnected 
world, no place can be separate, safe, or permanent. It is because we are uncomfortably, 
uncannily intimate with each other across global space, that any quest for place must be 
gothic; we will always be haunted by Others who will often seem too close, who will 
challenge our sense of psychic, physical, political, and ecological wholeness. And it will 
be gothic because some of these Others will testify to the fact that our interconnected 
world involves uneven access to power, visibility, and even claims to ontological being. 
It is these repressed figures who embody most intensely (and most frightfully) the 
position of everyone else in the system: permeable, vulnerable, acted upon. Thus in the 
face of a capitalist poetics of disattachment (the commodity fetish, the reification of 
social roles, its segmented spaces and invisible people), we must strive to produce a 
radically egalitarian version of what Bill Brown has seen in the phenomenon of 





mobilizing resistance across borders in order to produce durable and nurturing places 










SHOCK AND AWE IN THE GLOBAL MESH 
 
A state of shock is not just what happens when something bad happens to us. It is what 
happens to us when we lose our narrative, when we lose our story, when we become 
disoriented. What keeps us oriented and alert and out of shock is our history. So a period 
of crisis like the one we’re in is a very good time to think about history, to think about 
continuities, to think about roots. It’s a good time to place ourselves in the longer human 
story of struggle. 
--Naomi Klein, from the Michael Winterbottom film The Shock Doctrine 
Todo se mueve / La tierra se mueve / Las piernas se mueven / El agua se mueve / El 
tiempo se mueve / La sangre se mueve / Cuando yo recito tu te mueves. 
Everything moves / The land moves / Legs move / The water moves / Time moves / 
Blood moves / When I sing, you move. 
--Calle 13, from “Todo se Mueve”  
The modern age compels us to think big…Any thinking that avoids this ‘totality’ is part 
of the problem. 
—Timothy Morton, from The Ecological Thought (4) 
 
Postmodernity and Narrative 
It is my contention that postmodernity produces a number of shocks like the ones 
described by Naomi Klein in The Shock Doctrine: climate-induced hurricanes and other 
disasters, droughts, terror attacks, wars, mass migrations, instant slums, global financial 
crises (and ensuing austerity policies), and capital flight, to name a few. And to Klein’s 
shocks, we might add the psychic dislocations implied by what media theorist Douglas 





systematically prevented from stepping back from short-term, drive-inducing stimuli in 
order to access a sense of past and future. As Klein registers, what makes these traumas 
especially difficult is that they occur within a disorienting postmodern context in which 
meaningful, stabilizing narratives are either unavailable or severely challenged. I do not 
claim that the fact of trauma makes postmodernity new, since who could pretend that 
similar shocks have never happened before? Karl Marx, writing in 1848, famously 
described capitalist modernity as a storm of “everlasting uncertainty and agitation” in 
which “all that is solid melts into air” (38). And Walter Benjamin, writing in the early 
twentieth century, described “shock experience” (Chockerlebnis) as constitutive of 
modern life, as people flocked into cities, said farewell to archaic modes of production, 
and died in unimaginably violent wars. But although Benjamin used the word Erlebnis 
(“isolated experience”) to describe experience becoming increasingly difficult to narrate, 
people during his time nonetheless employed metanarratives that helped them explain 
their situations to themselves: nationalism, communism, tribalism, and religion, to name 
a few. Meanwhile, the culture industry and the science of marketing—though certainly 
powerful--were relatively new and rudimentary.  
In the era of late capitalism, however, we face the advanced fulfillment of both 
Marx’s prophecies about the chaotic structure of the global economy and the advanced 
development of what Bernard Stiegler has described as the psychotechnical management 
of consumption. On the production front, capital in recent decades has reclaimed the 
rights of flexibility that it briefly relinquished during the post-New Deal Fordist-
Keynesian window; in the so-called neoliberal economy, capital is free to go wherever it 





over the rapid flows on which their economic status depends, and must compete with 
each other to flatter global capital. And if capital has expanded its geographical reach in 
an attempt to penetrate new markets and exploit new workers, it has also increasingly 
colonized psychic space in a comparable expansion of what Stiegler calls “psychopower” 
(46). We no longer live in an economy based on production or contribution, but an 
economy based on consumption that seeks to evade the tendency of falling profits by 
ruthlessly monetizing libidinal energy (human desires and drives) through 
communications technologies and marketing. Both of these developments—geographical 
penetration and psychic saturation—disrupt previous structures that once facilitated 
meaningful narratives of identity over time. And they take place in a context defined by 
the unprecedented velocity of flows: of images, information, commodities, capital, and 
(some) people.   
The rise of this post-Fordist consumer economy parallels the rise of cultural 
postmodernism, in which what Jean-Francois Lyotard famously described as “grand 
narratives” have become unmoored. For many postmodernists, narratives of universal 
emancipation—communism, Christianity, modernism—no longer seem viable; instead, 
they have given up on the idea of large-scale social transformation and instead focus their 
attention on micronarratives that speak to a heterogeneous and complex world. And they 
deny the supposedly “natural” quality of any of them. Instead, they emphasize the falsity 
of a number of orthodoxies: the belief that the planet Earth is a self-balancing system 
conducive to life, the God-given quality of national and local peoples, and the essential 
reality of categories like race, ethnicity, and gender. And if in some ways this postmodern 





boxes prescribed by the category of the natural, the collapse of metanarratives also 
produced subjects particularly susceptible to the shaping efforts of capital. If capital 
entered a phase of flexible accumulation in the 1970s, its increasing dominance over the 
material, social, and psychic domains enabled it to foster similarly flexible human beings. 
Such people could be expected to move away from their communities of origin, adapt to 
new and contingent cultures continually reformulated to suit the accumulation of capital, 
and renege on once-binding attachments to others. Even the postmodern emphasis on 
heterogeneous micronarratives plays into the hands of capital, since “different” people 
could be sold different (and ever-shifting) products to suit their protean identities. And 
since emancipatory “grand narratives” could be labeled as oppressive and universalist, 
ruling class interests could rest easily in the expectation that a broadly based challenge to 
capitalist hegemony would never gain prominence.   
If any metanarrative has emerged in recent years, then, it is that prescribed by the 
Washington Consensus around free market capitalism, formal democracy, and liberal 
pluralism—what Francis Fukayama, writing in the wake of the collapse of Soviet 
Communism, called “the end of history.” Through the so-called Bretton Woods 
organizations that emerged alongside U.S. hegemony after World War II (the World 
Trade Organization, the World Bank, and the International Monetary Fund), the new 
global order has pushed nations around the world to submit to so-called structural 
adjustment policies: fiscal austerity (via the diminishment of government-supported 
social protection), the reduction of barriers to foreign trade and investment, privatization 
of formerly public services (and formerly public or common resources), and a preference 





neoliberal order—what David Harvey has described as a wager “that human well-being 
can best be advanced by liberating individual entrepreneurial freedoms and skills within 
an institutional framework characterized by strong private property rights, free markets, 
and free trade” (A Brief History of Neoliberalism 2) –picked up steam in the late 1970s, 
such that by 2005 one of its ideologues, the New York Times columnist Thomas 
Friedman, could announce “the irrefutable fact that more open and competitive markets 
are the only sustainable vehicle for growing a nation out of poverty” (cited in Harvey 
Cosmopolitanism 52). The role of government, in such a view, mostly involves creating a 
“good business climate” through incentives designed to attract financial investment and 
jobs (53). And culturally, the various peoples around the globe should adopt a set of 
neoliberal values: hard work, openness to change and new technologies, individual 
initiative and responsibility, and respect for equal rights (especially property rights). 
Since older forms of community reciprocity or social caretaking can easily contradict a 
culture built around the principle of mutual exploitation, they must be outgrown, or at 
least subsumed beneath market imperatives (52). 
Nonetheless, this neoliberal global capitalist narrative, however utopian at times, 
does not offer meaning in the same way that previous metanarratives did. Its supporters 
rarely present it as an ideology at all, but as a neutral machine that works in an abstract 
way to produce a given rate of growth, productivity, and so on; they feel little need to 
specify why such numbers might be desirable for specific people on the ground, and 
never guarantee that all people will benefit. Thus although the neoliberal gamble relies on 
an optimistic projection of endless gains, it does not prescribe what people should value, 





mobilizes them individually and commands them (tautologically) to pursue their own 
interest, as long as that interest coincides with the formal rules of the neoliberal structure. 
For that reason, theorist Alain Badiou has argued that global capitalism does not produce 
a “world” in the same way that other narratives (Christianity, Confucianism, communism, 
or the varieties of nationalism) have. Rather, in Slavoj Zizek’s summary,  
Capitalism is the first socio-economic order which de-totalizes meaning…(There 
is no global ‘capitalist world view,’ no ‘capitalist civilization’ proper; the 
fundamental lesson of globalization is precisely that capitalism can accommodate 
itself to all civilizations, from Christian to Hindu and Buddhist.) Capitalism’s 
global dimension can be formulated only at the level of truth-without-meaning, as 
the ‘Real’ of the global market mechanisms. (First as Tragedy 25).  
 
Because capitalism does not provide a way for individual subjects to relate to a 
meaningful social totality, it effectively outsources the production of meaning to other 
players, including the essentialisms officially disowned by cultural postmodernists (now 
recast in terms of diversity): to nationalist or localist patriotism, to art, to notions of 
cultural identity (often based on race and ethnicity), and above all to religion. There are 
no official monuments to capitalism, and no one volunteers to die for its functioning; its 
only justification lies in its efficacy, such that when it results in crises (like the most 
recent one), its defenders can only reassure them that the crisis will pass and all will be 
well. 
Not only does global capitalism fail to offer a “world” to its participants, but it 
resists narrative formulation because its operations are so complex, opaque, and wide-
ranging that no coherent story can be drawn from them. Fredric Jameson, in his classic 
work on postmodernism, described in 1984 the difficulty for postmodern subjects of 





surroundings. In his oft-cited analysis of Los Angeles, he describes the Westin 
Bonaventure Hotel as a “postmodern hyperspace” that  
has finally succeeded in transcending the capacities of the individual human body 
to locate itself, to organize its immediate surroundings perceptually…the symbol 
and analagon of that even sharper dilemma which is the incapacity of our minds, 
at least at present, to map the great global multinational and decentered 
communicational network in which we find ourselves caught as individual 
subjects. (44) 
 
In the ever-shifting world of flexible accumulation, keeping up with the network that 
connects capital, labor, and consumption becomes an increasingly daunting task. Faced 
with an object in my life world (a cup of coffee, say), I am hard-pressed to understand 
who produced it, under what conditions, and why I am buying it in the first place. Pitted 
against and within the sublime Real of capital flows, but unable to assimilate its complex 
patterns into their subjectivity, postmodern subjects end up seizing on various fragments 
of experience in an effort to construct a meaningful story. 
The fragmented quality of cognitive mapping matches the fragmented quality of 
the economy and culture that it tries to analyze. In “Culture and Finance Capital,” 
Jameson highlights the longstanding process of autonomization at work in capitalist 
modernity, through which “what were formerly parts of a whole become independent and 
self-sufficient” (264). This category of autonomization includes the older forms of 
reification identified by Georg Lukacs and others: the production of money, labor, and 
other commodities defined in terms of abstract exchange value and thus atomized 
equivalence; a segmented division of labor into separate spheres (like art, science, and 
manufacturing); and through Taylorization, the transformation of labor from an artisanal 
workshop context (where a worker might see a product through from start to finish) into a 





and are denied access to the whole picture of production. However, Jameson also draws 
from theorist Giovanni Arrighi to illustrate how the increasing role of finance capital in a 
digital information economy redoubles these effects of reification, leading to a volatile 
(and ultimately unsustainable) situation of “capital flight”:  
Capital itself becomes free-floating. It separates from the concrete context of its 
productive geography. Money becomes in a second sense and to a second degree 
abstract (it always was abstract in the first and basic sense), as though somehow 
in the national moment money still had a content. It was cotton money, or wheat 
money, textile money, railroad money, and the like. Now, like the butterfly 
stirring within the chrysalis, it separates itself from that concrete breeding ground 
and prepares to take flight. (259) 
 
The radical autonomization presupposed by finance capital (practiced as an abstract 
speculative game that loses contact with whatever “products” might underlay the trading, 
bundling, and betting) has cultural analogues in what Jameson sees as a culture of 
“extreme fragmentation” (265). The quick edits of TV commercials, for example, no 
longer have the alienating effects of older forms of surrealism, but simply comprise the 
banal form of lived experience in an advanced media culture powered by rapid digital 
transfers.  
Because neoliberal culture does not simply presuppose the continual implosion of 
any structuring metanarrative, but often positively revels in fragmentation, Slavoj Zizek 
has described our post-1968 period as “post-Oedipal” (The Ticklish Subject 334). The 
archetypal postmodern individual, no longer subject to the paternal law of symbolic 
authority (but still subject to the obscene Father’s sadistic law of compulsory pleasure), 
becomes a pleasure-surfing fetishist, what Zizek calls “the polymorphously perverse 
subject following the superego injunction to enjoy” (The Ticklish Subject 248). Like the 





between them willy-nilly in the pursuit of (now obligatory) enjoyment. And with paternal 
authority largely displaced, contemporary cultural voices rarely urge us to face the 
hysterical symptom, which causes doubt and anxiety, and nags us with a sense that things 
are somehow “out of joint” (The Ticklish Subject 224). Instead, in the post-Oedipal age, 
we can more often embrace the easier option of the perverse fetish, a part separated from 
the whole in such a way that clinging to its efficacious presence can suture the lack 
implied by the unavailability of that whole. For Zizek, the composer Schoenberg’s 
“extreme hysterical tension” typifies the symptomal mode, while Stravinsky’s “pastiche-
like traversing of all possible musical styles…with no real subjective engagement with 
any specific element or mode,” exemplifies the perverse mode (The Ticklish Subject 250). 
And such a transition has important political consequences. In Zizek’s description, 
politics proper is the domain of hysteria (an anxious desire to alleviate the symptom), 
while perversity is perfectly compatible with the carnival of late capitalism since it 
ensures certainty and enjoyment even in pain; even the most perverse pleasures can be 
incorporated into a market economy.5  Zizek’s project, then, involves breaking through 
                                                          
5Thus although the perverse subject often congratulates himself on escaping the symbolic mandate of the 
paternal law, in doing so he unwittingly subjects himself to an even more ferocious and insidious figure: 
the mocking superego, which exerts control not simply over his actions (“You must do this!”), but also over 
his experience of them (“You have to try this, and you must enjoy it!”). Zizek’s work is permeated with 
examples from a culture of obligatory enjoyment. Sometimes such superego injunctions appear in the most 
mundane environments; for instance, he points to a New York hotel sign as evidence of the unspoken 
power of these injunctions: “On the information sheet in a New York Hotel, I recently read: ‘Dear guest! 
To guarantee that you will fully enjoy your stay with us, this hotel is totally smoke-free. For any 
infringement of this regulation, you will be charged $200.’ The beauty of this formulation, taken literally, is 
that you are to be punished for refusing to fully enjoy your stay….The superego imperative to enjoy thus 
functions as the reversal of Kant’s ‘Du kannst, den du sollst!’ (You can, because you must!); it relies on a 
‘You must, because you can!’ That is to say, the superego aspect of today’s ‘non-repressive’ hedonism (the 
constant provocation we are exposed to, enjoining us to go right to the end and explore all modes of 
jouissance) resides in the way permitted jouissance necessarily turns into obligatory jouissance” (First as 
Tragedy, Then as Farce 58). With such a framework in mind, I would point to the “bucket list” 
phenomenon: a recent trend of books with titles that positively bludgeon the reader into a never-ending and 
obsessive search for enjoyment—or, more precisely, an admonition to enjoy as much as possible before 
death intervenes and puts an end to the search. Books like 1,000 Places to See Before You Die and 1001 





the certainty of the fetishist by instilling hysterical doubt in him: “The question of how 
we are to hystericize the subject caught in the closed loop of perversion (how we are to 
inculcate the dimension of lack and questioning in him) becomes more urgent in view of 
today’s political scene” (The Ticklish Subject 250).6 
Because the perverse subject can glide past experiences without subjectively 
engaging them—in Jameson’s terms, he can “soak up content and to project it in a kind 
of instant reflex” (“Culture and Finance Capital” 272)—his relationship to history 
becomes significantly transformed. The past becomes not a shaping process, not a 
                                                                                                                                                                             
waking moment not spent in enjoyment (or in the pragmatic utilitarian market practices that enable us to 
afford such enjoyment) is a moment wasted. Although such texts invoke the symptomal anxiety situated 
around death, they also strive to glide past such anxiety in a fetishistic attempt at denial (just as the term 
“bucket list” evokes the euphemistic phrase “kicking the bucket”). The superego anxiety here, then, is 
different from the symptomal anxiety that something is “out of joint,” the hysterical questioning of identity 
and desire; the authors of these books are perfectly certain about what brings enjoyment. The only anxiety 
lies in the impossibility of fulfilling the rigid superego demand.   
6In “Culture and Finance Capital,” Jameson puts forth a thesis virtually identical to Zizek’s diagnosis of 
contemporary society as rooted in the perverse fetish (as a form of autonomization) rather than in the older 
mode of the symptom. Jameson, in contrasting the older surrealist “symptom” (illustrated in Luis Bunuel’s 
films An Andalusian Dog [1928] and The Golden Age [1930]) with the logic of the fetish at work in Derek 
Jarman’s newer experimental film Last of England, echoes Zizek’s contrast between Schoenberg and 
Stravinsky. If Bunuel’s films create symptoms by portraying a traumatic encounter while withholding the 
larger narrative with which we might make sense of them, Jarman’s film provides us with a knowing sense 
of meaning by offering a fragmented jumble of stereotypes, each of which alludes to some other meaning 
in a playful game of reference. Like a movie preview that makes no narrative sense but nonetheless 
provides us with the spectacular “highlights” of a story that was probably a secondary consideration 
anyway, Jarman’s film provides us with perverse enjoyment and “meaning” in a way that the Bunuel film 
does not: “The image fragments in Bunuel are…forever incomplete, markers of incomprehensible psychic 
catastrophe, obsessions and eruptions, the symptom in its pure form as an incomprehensible language that 
cannot be translated into any other....In Jarman’s Last of England, however, about which words like 
surrealist have loosely been bandied, what we really confront is the commonplace, the cliché. A feeling 
tone is certainly developed here: the impotent rage of its punk heroes smashing about themselves with lead 
pipes, the disgust with the royal family and with traditional trappings of an official English life. But these 
feelings are themselves clichés, and disembodied ones at that…everything here is impersonal on the mode 
of the stereotype, including the rage itself….What happens here is that each former fragment of a narrative, 
which was once incomprehensible without the narrative context as a whole, has now become capable of 
emitting a complete narrative message in its own right. It has become autonomous…in its newly acquired 
capacity to soak up content and to project it in a kind of instant reflex…” (271). The perversion of Jarman 
here, through which various references achieve a fetish value that glides past anxiety in the “fun” pursuit of 
meaning, resembles the work of other postmodern pastiche artists, from Beck (in rock music) to Quentin 
Tarantino (in U.S. indie film). Like the day trader who plays mathematical games with the futures market, 
or a newscaster who casts a brief eye on devastating world events before moving on, these artists inhabit an 
autonomized sphere replete with clichés about the outside world. They know everything that is 
happening—and pride themselves on their vast breadth of reference--but refuse to engage subjectively with 





genealogy of struggle that exerts pressure on us in urgent ways, but a fragmented set of 
signifiers available for pillage. The past might simply be ignored, except that in a digital 
age nothing entirely disappears; as a result, accumulated images crowd the present in 
their chaotic, undead fashion, waiting to be soaked up and projected in pastiche forms 
that require attention only for a moment. In these readings, then, the post-Oedipal 
individual, denied a structuring narrative, subsists in an advanced version of Benjamin’s 
Erlebnis, a state of flat and “isolated experience” typified by the gambler who continually 
moves on to the “next card” in the pile (The Writer of Modern Life 195). And the mode of 
communication that corresponds to Erlebnis is not story (which haunts the listener with 
its generative properties, such that it cannot be fully exhausted), but information (which 
is rapidly consumed and discarded). This ascendancy of information over story—and thus 
drive over desire--results in the loss of a sense of meaningful experience across time, a 
phenomenon which Benjamin illustrates in terms of the calendar: “the man who loses his 
capacity for experiencing feels as though he has been dropped from the calendar” (The 
Writer of Modern Life 201). Fittingly, for Jameson Fukayama’s end of history involves a 
frenetic implosion of the calendar, resulting in a paradoxical situation of “change without 
its opposite” (9). It offers a model of permanent revolution as persistent monotony, since 
while the particulars change the form remains the same, like a mall in which new stores 
perpetually open up, offering new products to replace the vanished older ones (though the 
older products retain a ghostly, “retro” afterlife). Thus we have “a steady stream of 
momentum and variation that at some outer limit seems stable and motionless” (The 





The crucial point here, however, is not to assert a snobbish distaste for the 
rhythms of fashion or an elitist disregard for a popular culture of consumption. The point 
is that these cultural developments (the demise of paternal authority, the feeling of being 
dropped from the calendar, the lack of any ordering narrative, the enshrinement of the 
atomized individual consumer’s perverse enjoyment, the monetization of libidinal drives) 
combine with economic developments (the weakening of the labor movement, low wage 
jobs, heightened competition, persistent structural unemployment, the proletarianization 
of formerly rural inhabitants) to produce a toxic situation for those at the bottom of the 
social ladder. The much-touted “growing middle class” in so-called developing nations 
must be juxtaposed against those facing crises in their dramatic exposure to market 
discipline and its ensuing social dislocation: the farmer dispossessed of his land and 
crowded into chaotic slums, the woman sold into sexual slavery, the child raised in a 
situation of deteriorating social ties, the Beijing resident choking on the world’s worst air. 
And although we should not romanticize the precapitalist past, we might also understand 
why Taussig’s South American agricultural workers and miners would allegorize the 
capitalist form of production through the contradictory figure of the devil, who offers 
short-term gain at the expense of long-term sterility, death, envy, and social chaos. 
Taussig’s storytellers did not oppose development or growth across the board, but they 
also saw that in destroying older, communal cultures, the bourgeois revolution exacted a 
severe social cost. Is not this ambiguous devil figure still at work—in India, in Brazil, in 
Nigeria?    
In the U.S., too, we are compelled to “dance with the devil,” in Jose E. Limon’s 





Orleans) that evoke the Third World contrast between wealthy gated communities and 
slums, but we also face a situation that might have been foretold by a Bolivian miner: a 
culture of competition, disintegrating social ties, and low-grade violence incompatible 
with life. Such a dance with the devil is hardly new (as any glance at slavery, or the 
nineteenth century clash between robber barons and workers, would attest), but it 
nonetheless signals a shift: alongside the post-1970s neoliberal consensus we are 
witnessing the collapse of a New Deal structure based on ideals of equality and fraternity. 
Insofar as these ideals are treated as ancillary to liberty (narrowly defined as the “free” 
pursuit of economic self-interest in a contract economy), they lose salience and begin to 
atrophy. If the pre-1970s U.S. Fordist economy depended upon a sharply racialized class 
structure, at least it observed a social contract according to which the state bore an 
important responsibility for social welfare.7 And post-war U.S. culture, however 
oppressive in racial and gender terms, still featured prominent narratives that fostered 
transgenerational nurturance: a residual populist culture of mutual support left over from 
the 1930s and the Popular Front; networks of churches and unions; and ethnic 
neighborhoods, often rooted in a history of labor activism. Today, by contrast, not only 
do we see high degrees of social inequality in the U.S., but a culture in which almost 
everyone has come to accept urban violence, rampant drug use, the highest prison 
population on the globe, low wage jobs, failing schools, unemployment and 
underemployment, and a public health disaster in the absence of affordable health care. A 
                                                          
7 As many commentators have pointed out, until the 1970s U.S. (white) workers enjoyed high wages, 
generous benefits, and relatively high rates of social equality. To be sure, citizens in the post-war U.S. 
enjoyed anomalous competitive advantages which disappeared as Europe and Japan rebuilt their industrial 
infrastructure (and later, when the formerly Communist nations entered the global economy). Still, the 
advance of such global competition does not excuse the state of responsibility for ensuring social welfare 





global market society, then, has not been kind to everyone in the First World or the Third 
World; the neoliberal situation is characterized by inequality across the board and the 
distribution of wealth upward, such that David Harvey could characterize it as “a project 
to achieve the restoration of class power” (A Brief History of Neoliberalism 16).  
It does not require a socially conservative Moral Majority mindset, then, to argue 
that the collapse of any ordering social narrative beyond capitalist norms can easily result 
in catastrophe for those at the bottom, who now face the full brunt of capitalism’s 
regained flexibility in exploiting labor. To take one example, Jose E. Limon, writing in 
1994, describes a shift toward social fragmentation in Southwestern Chicano 
communities since the 1970s. In comparing the experience of elites in Los Angeles with 
the subaltern experience of Chicano laborers, he plays off of Jameson’s description of the 
Bonaventure Hotel’s cultural postmodernism to describe a kind of postmodernism from 
below: “It is the same fundamental cultural process, although what is lucrative and 
exciting among the upper and middle classes and the intelligentsia is deadly and 
enervating among those below….Each class sector, it might be argued, is…dealing with 
its own devil, struggling with its own version of a consumerist decentering 
postmodernism” (111-112, 114). If older generations of Chicano youth were often 
socialized within a patriarchal culture in need of significant reform—especially with 
regard to the treatment of women and gays--at least this culture established social norms, 
institutions, and practices that afforded a measure of protection from a “depthless” 
culture deprived of a calendar, and an economy predicated on financial gambling and 





In trying to explain a “crisis” situation in South Texas that he perceives as a 
smoldering war of position between class factions, Limon resorts to the work of David 
Harvey, who describes the regime of flexible accumulation in terms that Benjamin’s 
gambler would recognize. For Harvey, the liquidation of memory presupposed by a 
culture of “instantanaeity” and “disposability” is perfectly in keeping with the primary 
aims of a neoliberal economy built on “accelerating the turnover of goods in 
consumption”:  
It means more than just throwing away produced goods…but also being able to 
throw away values, life-styles, stable relationships, and attachments to things, 
buildings, places, people, and received ways of doing and being…This 
transience…creates a ‘temporariness in the structure of both public and personal 
value systems’ which in turn provides a context for the ‘crack-up of consensus’ 
and the diversification of values within a fragmenting society. (The Postmodern 
Condition 286) 
 
Although this diversification of values can easily be appropriated by a rhetoric of 
celebratory multiculturalism, it can also prevent the emergence of broad oppositional 
social movements. Commentators from Limon to Cornel West call attention to the way 
that such a decentered “fragmenting society” is both perfectly amenable to capitalist 
forms of deterritorialization and dangerous for vulnerable communities. As West puts it 
with regard to poor African-American communities, “We have created rootless, dangling 
people with no links to the supportive networks—family, friends, school—that sustain 
some sense of purpose in life….This culture engulfs us all—yet its impact on the 
disadvantaged is devastating, resulting in extreme violence in everyday life” (cited in 
Limon 115-116). Such dislocating tendencies afflict black and brown people 
disproportionately, but the issue here is one of class, not race; white poor and working-





The social failures of neoliberalism, then, lie partly in its tendency toward what 
Stiegler describes as a “dictatorship of short-term-ism” (57): an emphasis on narrow, 
immediate gain incompatible not only with narrative meaning, but also with care-taking 
as such. Rather than an economy and culture predicated on long-term investment—in 
young people, in intergenerational and spatial solidarities, in collective long-term 
desires—we have an economy and culture predicated on careless speculation. Resources, 
whether environmental, social, or psychic, are recklessly plundered in this post-Thatcher 
process of institutionalized carelessness, resulting in negative externalities: the 
destruction of environmental resources (like the climate), the liquidation of social 
resources (people, communities, intergenerational nurturing) and the decimation of 
psychic resources (motivation, desire, purpose). And crucially, although the poor 
certainly receive the worst impact of these negative externalities, in a marketing-saturated 
consumer society, the proletariat is not simply the “working class,” but everyone:  
the proletariat are those economic actors who are without knowledge because they 
are without memory: their memory has passed into the machine that reproduces 
gestures that the proletariat no longer needs to know—they must simply serve the 
reproductive machine and thus, once again, they become serfs. Today…it is 
consumers who are henceforth deprived of memory and knowledge by the service 
industries and their apparatuses. (35). 
 
Just as Taylorized production results in a proletarian class cut off from the full process of 
production (and thus a people deprived of savoir-faire, the knowledge required in 
creating and building), Taylorized consumption fosters a proletarianized people cut off 
from the full process of consumption (and thus deprived of savoir-vivre, the knowledge 
and techniques required in the art of living) (16).  
 For Stiegler, then, financial speculation is coterminous with a neoliberal niche 





addictions. The result is not “collective individuation,” but “disindividuation” and the 
production of “dissociated milieus” in which meaningful solidarities cannot emerge (58). 
In such a Taylorized consumer society, the chief forms of affiliation are not collective; 
instead, they resemble what critic Robert Seguin (after Sartre) describes as a pattern of 
serialized “anticollective collectivities,” paradoxically both atomized and homogenous: 
A series is a human grouping that effectively has its principle of unity outside 
itself (‘in the passive unity of the object’), such that, while each member of the 
series ignores all the others…a homogenous collective dynamic results. Sartre’s 
initial example is the line of people waiting for a bus, an analysis that then leads 
him to the effects of radio broadcasts (and mass media generally), and, finally 
(and perhaps unsurprisingly), to the free market itself….Seriality thus produces 
paradoxical anticollective collectivities, fundamentally passive groups that project 
an essentially statistical existence and that can then be polled as to what they 
believe, or what they will buy, and whose implicit response  will always be 
‘whatever you want us to.’ (140-141) 
 
In such ways, then, the neoliberal period signals a strange re-emergence of South 
American devil folklore: a paradoxical vision in which short-term production coincides 
with long-term barrenness, and in which massive social organization coincides with 
massive social disorganization. The relation here is something like what Stiegler 
describes as the pharmakon, a cure that is also a poison; mobility, flexibility, 
consumption, and novelty are beneficial in moderate doses, but deadly in large doses, 
resulting in a society in which the organizing principle is “detachment, that is, of 










The Destruction of Place 
In elevating the pharmakon of flexibility to a toxic level, the Taylorized society of 
consumption has fostered what historian William Leach has labeled “the destruction of 
place” in America. For Leach, place signifies not merely a location on a map, but rather a 
“meaning…bound to a geographical reality both historical and lasting.” Because it 
involves historical duration, place has a temporal quality that results in a “layered quality 
for those people who feel it” (7). According to Leach, two opposing forces in U.S. life—
one “centrifugal” and place-eroding, the other “centripetal” and place-building—have 
battled for centuries in U.S. history (8). Centrifugal forces have been dominant during 
most of that time, visible in the motion of migrant pioneers who often settled land only to 
abandon it for the next available opportunity, and perhaps more importantly, in the 
industrial powerbrokers who during the latter half of the nineteenth century moved 
capital across borders with a degree of freedom only recently revived in the 
contemporary economy. Industrialists (and their allies in government) fostered a 
dependent and mobile labor force, pioneered a mass consumer ethos based on the “cult of 
the new,” and continually reshaped the landscape in an effort to amass wealth (13). But in 
response to these developments, U.S. citizens have always mobilized counter-tendencies 
of place-building. Such centripetal tendencies became especially powerful during the 
post-New Deal period for some of the reasons I have mentioned: relatively high wages 
and good benefits (at least for white workers), long-term job contracts, and the continued 
salience of cultural narratives predicated on social obligation.  
Although Leach praises certain aspects of the 1950s and 1960s, he is careful not 





migration, unemployment, mass consumerism, and the atomizing effects of television, 
suburbia, and segregation. Some of these forces are worth dwelling on, because they set 
the stage for the less stabilized model of place that emerged in the 1970s and 1980s. 
George Lipsitz is particularly scathing about the way U.S. governmental policies in the 
1950s, which encouraged suburban homeownership and mass consumption through tax 
breaks and subsidies (including the funding of roads and infrastructure), helped to 
dismantle earlier forms of collective action built around an older sense of place. People 
who once lived, for example, in close-knit urban neighborhoods moved to suburbs, where 
they could easily opt out of many social interactions. Meanwhile, the continuing collapse 
of the family farm and its replacement by large-scale agribusiness contributed to a 
parallel deterioration in a rural sense of place. Television, too, fostered a culture in which 
families remained isolated within their own homes, and mass consumption encouraged 
people to think of themselves as consumers first and citizens a distant second. Through 
what Lipsitz describes as the “managed gaze” of television, suburbia, Disneyland, and 
shopping malls, post-war subjects were increasingly encouraged to tune out (or simply 
exclude) any experiences or people that distracted them from a life build around market 
imperatives (25).  
Meanwhile, the Treaty of Detroit in 1950, effectively a truce between labor and 
management in that it channeled productivity gains toward high wages and job security, 
fostered a quiescent labor movement which was ultimately unprepared to challenge the 
later onset of neoliberal labor discipline in the Reagan era. For Lipsitz, the legacy of the 
1950s lies in the collusion between big government and big business to channel public 





industries, rather than toward a national health care system, schools, public 
transportation, and affordable urban housing. The concessions (briefly) granted to 
workers helped to facilitate a population increasingly docile in its relationship to 
corporate power, self-focused in its preoccupation with consumption, and both ill-
equipped and ill-disposed to band together to support government or community action 
on behalf of economic equality: 
These state-subsidized improvements in material wealth…offered participation in 
a commodity-driven way of life as reparations, seeking to create a world in which 
people’s identities as consumers would become more important than competing 
identities as workers, citizens, or ethnic subjects. While relying on the power of 
the state, they also hid the state, privileging private acts of consumption over 
collective behavior, and presenting the carefully constructed world of commodity 
relations as if it were the product of democratic choices. (247) 
 
Although Lipsitz laments the demise of “ethnic” identities once associated with labor 
activism, ethnic identities did not disappear. Rather, as critic Walter Benn Michaels has 
argued, an agreement between both the left and the right to focus on identity issues of 
race, gender, sexual orientation often translated into a discourse of diversity that allowed 
Americans to avoid discussing economic inequality, except in identitarian terms. Despite 
the important civil rights and anti-war movements of the 1960s, then, by the 1980s most 
Americans had lost whatever class-conscious “chops” they may have once had, such that 
Ronald Reagan could pose as the successor to Franklin D. Roosevelt by selling populism 
with an elite corporate face.  
Whatever the legacy of the 1950s and 1960s, Leach is unequivocal in identifying 
a deteriorating quality of place in the U.S. that takes an especially important turn in the 
1970s. In the year 1980, 20 percent of the nation’s population moved to a different place, 





neoliberalism in the 1970s, we have seen a series of developments that have restored 
class power to the top even as they have ensured the smooth global flow of capital: the 
weakening of labor (through the decimation of unions, but also through guest worker 
programs, offshoring, automation, and the manipulation of both documented and 
undocumented immigrants), the deregulation of industries like transportation and 
shipping, and the consolidation of industries like banking, real estate, and the media into 
huge, multinational conglomerates. Thus Leach argues that the resurgence of centrifugal 
force in U.S. life is due primarily to structural economic changes:  
the return of the global economy with its cohort of transnational businessmen and 
businesswomen; the spread of a landscape of the temporary populated by skilled 
and unskilled people alike, willing or compelled to go anywhere to find work; and 
the expansion of a service economy (above all of tourism and gambling) that has 
replaced manufacturing as the primary employer of unskilled workers. (25 my 
emphasis) 
 
The landscape of the temporary can be seen in the way that downtowns have been 
replaced by fringe commercial developments at freeway intersections (though more 
recently, older downtowns have been gentrified to provide a “sense of place” and 
“community” for those who can afford it). It can be seen in the way that the consolidated 
network of temporary work agencies (dominated by one player: Labor Ready) farms out 
low-wage laborers to tech firms and service industries, in business executives who fly 
from meeting to meeting across the nation and the globe, and in the way that “temporary 
housing”--from trailer parks to expensive turnkey operations--have become increasingly 
common (60). 
Leach identifies a dominant metaphor for the temporary landscape in the 
“intermodal” infrastructure that emerged in the 1980s: the apparently seamless 





deregulation, container shipping, computerized organization, and a consolidated 
transportation infrastructure, the U.S. in the neoliberal period has become a space of 
“connections but not connectedness,” subjected to “a power poised and ready to make its 
way across all boundaries, to find its way, compel its way, push, push, and push, 
fashioning America, as it had never been, into a grid of terminals and highways, of ports 
of entry and ports of departure” (54). (Later the internet revolution added a digital layer 
to this network of flows.) And while the intermodal grid, with its “just in time” delivery 
of both commodities and workers, has resulted in an efficient and streamlined economy, 
it has also resulted in class polarization and labor insecurity. Using sophisticated 
software, for instance, employers can schedule (often part-time) workers only on an “as 
needed” (or even an “on call”) basis, such that workers cannot schedule other jobs or 
child-care, but must heed their managers’ every desire. Since so many of these laborers 
cannot afford the commodities that so efficiently flow within the intermodal economy, 
they have been driven to work more hours, to provide two incomes for their families, 
and/or to go into debt. But increasingly, multinational businesses no longer need to rely 
on American consumption, since rising elites in the developing world constitute new 
markets, even if their nations also contain the world’s most exploited workers. The trend, 
then, is toward a global polarization between classes, unevenly divided within nations, 
regions, and cities. A mall in Guatemala, with its megaplex theaters and armed guards, 
has more in common with suburban California than with the goat carts and shanty towns 
across the street. 
Seen from this global perspective, Leach’s vision of the “destruction of place” is 





economy is a critique of cultural cosmopolitanism that often threatens to slip into 
nationalism or nativism. In his desire to cultivate places defined according to common 
memory, habits, and customs, he often appears to look wistfully toward the 1950s, when 
apparently the national community was internally loyal. Because Leach prioritizes the 
problem of placelessness in the U.S., while largely ignoring people in other places, his 
emphasis on loyalty can often come across as calloused and narrow. And indeed, he 
ignores the structural factors that made the post-WWII U.S. economic growth the 
exception rather than the rule: by the 1970s and 80s, postwar Europe and Japan had 
rebuilt themselves and emerged as powerful competitors to U.S. economic power. 
Returning to 1950s America is neither desirable nor possible, and the U.S. inhabited a 
global economy long before the 1950s. But to dismiss Leach as a reactionary or a nativist 
would be to play into the hands of pro-market neoliberal ideologues who would use the 
suffering of non-Americans to justify labor discipline everywhere. The answer to these 
ideologues is more complicated than Leach wants to believe; it involves not simply 
admonishing them to be more loyal to their “places,” but rather implies the necessity of a 
global movement for the construction of nurturing communities, on behalf of the right of 
workers all over the world not simply to move where they want, but also to stay in place.  
The goal, then, should somehow involve building a structure of support to 
counteract the worrisome trends Leach sees in the U.S., but that obtain in various ways 
across the globe.  In other words, we need something like a globalized Popular Front 
culture, accommodating of certain differences but unified enough to challenge the baleful 
affects that accompany capitalist production. Unfortunately, far from highlighting class 





space, preventing differing social groups from finding commonality with each other 
across space and across generations. Divided according to niche market segments (by 
age, race, gender, sexual orientation, and nationality), pitted against each other through 
economic competition, distracted by commodity (and other) fetishes, postmodern 
subjects unsurprisingly have a difficult time developing social movements that go beyond 
local, micropolitical, or issue-based concerns: gay rights, protecting wilderness, 
defending the tribe, buying local food. As George Lipsitz puts it, such division does little 
to challenge the structure that produces barriers between the privileged and the invisible 
excluded:  
The failure of conservative economics to deliver the prosperity it promised to 
most Americans or to confront the consequences of the economic inequality it 
exacerbated leaves individuals with few options…The proliferation of new 
market identities and desires challenge us to search for sources of unity in an 
economy and culture increasingly dependent on generating new forms of 
differentiation and division. (257, 267) 
 
A focus on diversity as an end-in-itself, then, can combine with a throw-away culture to 
render huge groups of people disposable (and invisible) in the perpetually shifting 
carnival of a market society. And the problem with a consumer culture is not that its 
commodities often disappoint (though they often do), but that it helps prevent the 
emergence of alternative collective formations.  
 
The Gothic Quest for Place 
Part 1: The Mesh 
Deterritorialization implies that the average daily life, in the context of globality, is 
shaped by structures, processes, and products that originate elsewhere. From the food, 
clothes, and fuel we buy to the music and films we enjoy, the employer we work for, and 
the health risks we are exposed to, everyday routines for most people today are 





possible to ‘reterritorialize’ some of these dimensions by, for example, buying locally 
grown produce or supporting local artists, a more complete detachment from such 
networks is surely not within the average citizens’ reach. To say this is not in and of itself 
to question the desirability of reestablishing a sense of place, but it does limit its viability 
as a model for thinking about the future of significant portions of the population. 
--Ursula Heise, Sense of Place, Sense of Planet (54) 
Awareness of the mesh doesn’t bring out the best in people….We’re losing the ground 
under our feet at the exact same time as we’re figuring out just how dependent upon that 
very ground we are….Interconnectedness isn’t snug and cozy. There is intimacy, as we 
shall see, but not predictable, warm fuzziness. Do we will the hole with holism and 
Heidegger? Or do we go all the way into the hole? 
--Timothy Morton, from The Ecological Thought (31) 
Given the threatened status of durable narratives within the postmodern 
constellation, it is perhaps unsurprising that many (like Leach) take Naomi Klein’s advice 
too hastily: by elevating the search for “roots” to a fetish in itself.8 Faced with the 
absence of a world, these people are compelled to build an unassailable world around 
them in one form or another. The German cultural critic Ursula Heise, for one, has 
noticed an inordinately nostalgic focus on place, the local, and face-to-face 
phenomenological sensory interaction in the U.S. environmental movement. U.S. 
localists often act as if accumulating local knowledge (learning the names of birds in their 
backyards, growing their own gardens) can enable them to place themselves in an 
otherwise unmappable world. In doing so, they often ignore the extent to which terms 
like “local,” “artisan,” and “place” can be mobilized as niche commodities within the 
dominant system of a neoliberal global economy.9 But such a Heidegerrian focus on 
                                                          
8 In the wake of the recent financial crises, many free market ideologues have advocated a redoubled return 
to fiscal austerity, competitive values, and the suppression of state involvement. Just as, in Klein’s 
formulation, capitalists take advantage of, or even foment, crises in places like Chile, Iraq, and New 
Orleans in order to impose privatization policies on a traumatized public, they have attempted to use the 
financial crisis as a springboard for further neoliberalization. 
9 Here we might point to the word “artisan” as a symptomatic entry point. It is impossible to move through 
a typical U.S. city without encountering constant evocations of this term: artisan crafts, artisan breads, and 
similar cultural formations, from knitting to gardening. But because the surrounding context has changed, 





“dwelling” (on the cultivation of a holistic sense of home defined according to the 
concrete parameters of a supposedly organic community) is not simply the province of 
sentimental U.S. environmentalists. Heidegger also enjoys popularity among postcolonial 
scholars who hope to defend or resuscitate the supposedly bounded and coherent life-
worlds of indigenous groups and colonized peoples the world over.10 In their belief that 
they can reconstruct paternal authority as it once existed, Heidegerrian advocates of 
dwelling share a commonality with the more virulent forms of fundamentalism and 
cultural nationalism that react against a neoliberal ideology predicated on market 
cosmopolitanism. 
Contemporary narratives of meaning and identity are threatened, then, but they 
have not disappeared; far from it. Rather, narratives like religion, but also those that 
circulate around the notion of territoriality and place have become intensified in certain 
ways, even as their meaning has become transformed. Above all, such narratives have 
become defensive and compensatory in direct response to their waning legitimacy in a 
world of unstable borders.11 As many commentators have noted—and as developments 
                                                                                                                                                                             
artisan products and local food at the farmers market and convince myself that I am living in an organic 
community centered in place. But in doing so, I am ignoring a series of factors that enabled that person to 
make and sell those artisanal products: a spouse with a job in the information economy, a second job, 
inheritance money or property, and so on. More importantly, the fungible money used to buy these products 
comes from the postmodern economy, such that the word “artisan” becomes not simply a compensatory 
sign for the loss of an older system, but a highly sought-after commodity that can be sold within the 
postmodern economy. And again, what is being sold here is not so much the artisan product itself, but 
rather a narrative of meaning within a cognitively unmappable postmodern context in which stable 
narratives have become distinctly ineffective. 
10 See, for instance, the chapter “The Postcolonial Critique of Liberal Cosmopolitanism,” in David 
Harvey’s Cosmopolitanism and the Geographies of Freedom. Theorists like Dipesh Chakrabarty, Uday 
Singh Mehta, and Arturo Escobar revive Heidegerrian localist ideas (not to mention Edmund Burke’s anti-
imperialist tradition) in order to critique the universalist notions inherent in the liberal tradition.  
11 One can still obviously identify as a Christian or a Muslim, for example, but the meaning of that identity 
has changed along with the context in which it appears. A Christian today does not inhabit the same subject 
position that a Christian once occupied, since no matter how sincerely one professes Christianity, one is 
still affected by the hegemonic postmodern cultural situation in which such metanarratives have come 
under question. A Christian can’t help but be aware that other narratives exist, such that his narrative 





from the U.S. Tea Party to the European anti-immigrant backlash demonstrate--even if 
cultural nationalism is under siege, it still exerts a powerful force. More exactly, it exerts 
force because it is under siege. In his 1996 essay “Localism, Globalism, Cultural 
Identity,” Mike Featherstone argues that the nation, like capitalism itself, actually 
functions according to a model of crisis. The more the contours of the nation are 
threatened (whether from within or without, by immigrants or by foreign competition and 
investment), the more the nation attempts to strengthen its cultural boundaries by 
retreating to what Featherstone calls its “ethnic core.” In situations of perceived threat, 
the dominant group within the locality or the nation may “present an oversimplified, 
unified image of itself to outsiders” which conceals “social differentiation” behind an 
egalitarian “mask” (55). We should not be surprised, then, that the era of neoliberalism is 
also the era of resurgent cultural nationalisms, from the revival of the Confucian “Middle 
Kingdom” in China to Hindu nationalism in India. 
Alongside the rise of nationalist narratives, we have a revival of the localist 
discourse highlighted by Heise. Although many of these local fetishists would describe 
themselves as environmentalists, they sometimes ignore the key ecological principle: the 
interconnection of all things, not in some holistic or smooth sense of flows or natural 
balance, but in a way that is in principle unpredictable, discontinuous, and 
unrepresentable. Our environment (in which the social world and the so-called natural 
world have become impossible to entangle) is connected in this “out of joint” sense. 
Unfortunately, the terms we generally use to denote such interconnectedness (network, 
                                                                                                                                                                             
marketing demographic. He deploys Christianity within the terms of a pluralist framework that he is 
already compelled to accept. Accordingly, the very discourse of Christian fundamentalism as a theological 
salvo appeared most powerfully during the late nineteenth century and early twentieth century context of 
secular (Darwinian, Freudian, scientific) attacks on religious truth-claims. The marginalized resistance 





system, biosphere) carry connotations of smoothness that do not obtain in reality; even 
the highly technologized “networks” that enable global capitalist flows can be rendered 
as natural, sleek, and flowing. In response, Timothy Morton (who coined the phrase 
“dark ecology”) uses the term mesh to signify interconnectedness that does not fall into 
holism, but instead suggests a fraught quality, an uncanny intimacy that disturbs even as 
it beckons. On the one hand, the disorienting mesh can be a terrifying experience. On the 
other hand, the intimacy of the mesh compels us to work together, since our permeable, 
incomplete selves are dispersed within it: “Up close, the ecological thought has to do 
with warmth and tenderness; hospitality, wonder, and love; vulnerability and 
responsibility…. It must be personal, since it refrains from adopting a clinical, 
intellectual, or aesthetic (sadistic) distance” (76). The local, then, for Morton, is not 
reassuring, but uncanny, “strangely familiar and familiarly strange,” the site where we 
encounter the “strange stranger”—indeed, where we discover that we are the “void” of 
the strange stranger, not single but multiple, and not bounded but painfully open to 
ecological, social, and economic flows (The Ecological Thought 50, 80). 
Thus while some theorists, from Zizek to Morton and Jameson, see social and 
political potential in the hysterical subject who reacts to the mesh with troubled 
questioning, others tend to celebrate the polymorphous, schizoid quality opened up by 
deterritorialized fragmentation. If both types question the viability of narrative (and of a 
reified sense of place), these perverse theorists derive enjoyment from this impossibility 
by rendering the unmappable late capitalist landscape not a space of uncanny disturbance 
but a positive network of rhizomatic flows. Here I am referring to Gilles Deleuze and 





but who at times seem to cast deterritorialization and nomadism as fundamentally 
liberating. They have numerous followers today. Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, for 
example, attack all durable forms of identity (and place), and instead celebrate the 
networked movements of the “multitude,” conceived as an ever-shifting human and 
nonhuman alliance through which newly generative modes of life can be produced in a 
chaotic process of becoming. In Western studies, Neil Campbell has recently endorsed 
the notion of a “rhizomatic West.” Campbell fruitfully draws from Deleuze and Guattari, 
but also from scholars like J.B. Jackson and Robert Venturi, who valorize nomadic ways 
of being and seeing, and strike a populist pose by ratifying the supposedly vernacular 
culture of U.S. mobility: automobiles, trailer parks, and road trips. The problem with such 
neo-Deleuzian approaches, however, is that the rhizomatic world they trumpet is not only 
coterminous with deterritorialized capitalism, but has also become a smooth, Utopian, 
libidinized space of its own. Though officially endorsing disruption, the minor voice, and 
protean identities, these theorists often idealize rhizomatic flows to such an extent that we 
might ask a relevant question: Among all the disruptions, where is the disruption?  
Even theorists of place who do not employ Deleuzian terms often slip into such a 
perverse mode; Bruno Latour, for example, emphasizes a relational view of space in 
which any single place cannot be defined on its own, but must be imagined as a nodal 
point within a network of flows: “there is an Ariadne’s thread that would allow us to pass 
with continuity from the local to the global….To be sure, the innovation of lengthened 
networks is important, but it is hardly a reason to make such a great fuss” (121, 124). 
Latour emphasizes the hybrid quality of the “quasi-objects” and “quasi-subjects” that 





separating the two (51, 87). So far so good—except that contra Latour’s comic and 
reassuring rhetoric (nothing to be alarmed about, just a bunch of hybrids moving around 
in long networks!), there may be a reason to make a fuss. As Arif Dirlik points out, such 
analyses tend to evacuate place of any meaning whatsoever, stripping the dialectical 
tension away from territoriality and leaving us with a sterile vision of hybridity that, in 
practice, leaves most of the boundary-building to capital itself. As Dirlik puts it, anti-
essentialist notions of hybridity have value insofar as they confront oppressive local 
hierarchies; but what happens when power takes a rhizomatic form, such that mobility is 
imposed from the top down, and identity fragmentation serves the very mode of 
exploitation? In such a post-Oedipal context, the supposedly stable binary of “purity” and 
“hybridity” calls out for deconstruction, since it tends to ignore the crucial variable of 
power (Latour notably avoids discussing one of the most important hybrid/quasi-subjects 
of the last several centuries, the corporation!):  
Why do we not speak about contradictions any longer? Against hybridity, 
contradiction presents us with the problem of recognizing difference, but also 
demanding their resolution, since contradictions may not be sustained indefinitely 
without reconfiguring difference…Under conditions of ‘unequal exchange,’ the 
resolution is likely to be more in favor of space over place, of abstract power over 
concrete everyday existence, where the former may even produce the 
‘differences’ of the latter in a process of maximizing its power while mystifying 
its location. (38-39) 
 
With Dirlik’s concerns in mind, perhaps the best overview of the debates about 
place and space—and particularly about the tension between nomadism and place-
building, between identity and difference—comes from Marxist geographer David 
Harvey, who sees the matter in dialectical terms. Drawing from Alfred North 
Whitehead’s vision of place as a “permanence” or an “event” that acquires temporal and 





Lefebvre-ian vision of space as simultaneously real (built space, monuments, mountains), 
relational (imbricated within a network of flows), and representational (mediated by 
symbols, stories, and memories) (Cosmopolitanism 190). And with regard to these 
realms, neither the Heidegerrian focus on phenomenological space and holism, nor the 
Deleuzian focus on flows and mobility, adequately captures the dynamics of power 
involved, such that  
Everyone who begins at some point finds herself or himself drawn into an 
unavoidable dance of the dialectic across the terrain of complementary spatio-
temporalities. From this standpoint those who proclaim, with Aristotle, that there 
is some essentialist theory of place, that ‘place is the first of all things,’ or who 
hold, with Heidegger, that ‘place is the locale of the truth of being’ (though not of 
becoming) are plainly mistaken. The only concept of place that makes sense is 
one that sees it as a contingent, dynamic, and influential ‘permanence,’ while 
being integrally contained within the processes that create, sustain, and dissolve 
all regions, places, and spacetimes into complex configurations. (194). 
 
Neither hybridity, then, nor (relative) purity has absolute precedence, just as becoming 
has no precedence over being, and flows have no precedence over place. Each is 
dialectically intertwined with the other. 
Harvey’s dialectical approach is particularly helpful when it comes to another 
fraught term of recent cultural theory, the heterotopia, used in contrasting ways by two 
French theorists: Michel Foucault and Henri Lefebvre. In Foucault’s perverse approach, 
we find an emphasis on the separateness of “other spaces” in which non-normative 
practices can emerge. As Harvey points out, given the apparent freedom and 
heterogeneity available in such spaces, Foucault’s conception “appears attractive”:    
It became possible to identify absolute spaces in which difference, alterity, and 
‘the other’ might flourish or (as with architects) actually be constructed…It 
encourages the idea of what L. Marin calls ‘spatial plays’ to highlight choice, 
diversity, difference, incongruity, and incommensurability. It enables us to look 
upon the multiple forms of transgressive behaviors (usually normalized as 





list of heterotopic spaces such places as cemeteries, colonies, brothels, and 
prisons. Foucault assumes in this piece that heterotopic spaces are somehow 
outside the dominant social order….Whatever happens within them is then 
presumed to be subversive and of radical political significance. (160)
 
Ultimately, Harvey rejects Foucault’s notion of the heterotopia as an escapist fetish. It is 
no accident that Foucault singles out the seafaring “ship” as the “heterotopia par 
excellence,” since in highlighting “pirates” and “adventure” Foucault reveals the fairy 
tale quality of the heterotopia’s fragmented disarticulation from the social totality (cited 
in Harvey Cosmopolitanism 160). Furthermore, in celebrating any space in which 
“alternative” social arrangements occur, Foucault ignores the extent to which 
heterotopias might be used for a wide range of political purposes, not all of them 
progressive.  
Poised against Foucault’s relatively inert conception of the heterotopia, Harvey 
highlights Lefebvre’s comparatively ignored but more dynamic version. Lefebvre, in 
contrast to Foucault, “understood heterotopias as spaces of difference, of anomie, and of 
potential transformation,” but he did not envision them as “alternatives” to “the 
accomplished and rationalized spatial order of capitalism and the state” (161). Such 
spaces were not reified parts, like a sea-faring ship cut off from land. Instead, he saw a 
“dialectical…tension” in the interplay between the heterotopia’s space of desire and the 
restless colonization of the dominant order: “Anomic groups construct heterotopic 
spaces, which are eventually reclaimed by the dominant praxis” (cited in Harvey 162). 
The usefulness of the heterotopia lies not in what Harvey calls “segregation and 
separation, but about potentially transformative relations with all other spaces” (162 my 
emphasis). Only if the heterotopia can avoid becoming entirely reclaimed by the 





be an accomplice to an emancipatory politics.12 Against rhizomatic space, we have the 
uncanny dialectical space, not merely a constructed nodal point within a network of flows 
(though it certainly is that), but also a relatively durable permanance caught in the mesh. 
Such a space might be a place, insofar as it might persist through time and memory, but 
no matter how durable, it would remain an unpredictable and provisional salvo within a 
changing dialectical situation of power. 
Through such attention not simply to the interplay between local and global, but 
to the unequal power relations between them, Harvey’s work dovetails with the notion of 
critical regionalism, a term that has lately been up for grabs in critical circles. Although it 
has been given both Heidegerrian phenomenological inflections (by architect Kenneth 
Frampton13), and neo-Deleuzian inflections (by Neil Campbell14), critical regionalism 
always involves mediating between space and place, the local and the global, past and 
present, and between phenomenological experience and abstract structures. Critical 
regionalists, then, attempt to work through the past in order to move forward in the 
present, and seek to draw productively from past traditions without being dominated by 
them. Specifically, they try to learn from cultural forms that have grown over time in 
particular places (even if such places emerge as nodes in broader networks). But although 
                                                          
12 The point is worth underlining given the widespread preference in the contemporary American left for 
heterotopias of the Foucauldian sort: urban farms, gay/lesbian hangouts, the Burning Man Festival, 
intentional cohousing, and the like. In such spaces, the creation of a local, heterogeneous, “alternative” 
community is often celebrated as an end in itself—a logic which saw its culmination in the Occupy Wall 
Street protests in New York City (and across the nation), as if the whole point of gathering in places like 
Zuccotti Park was to experience an “alternative” sense of spontaneous community for a few weeks. In 
contrast, Harvey calls attention to the “houses of the people” formed in early twentieth century Italy, spaces 
which functioned as branching-off points for union activism, discussion, and concrete everyday 
interactions—and that crucially “served both practically and symbolically to shape the ideals and practices 
of radical socialist democracy in opposition to the dominant forms of class power” (Cosmopolitanism 158). 
In considering such spaces, we might deploy a Kierkegaardian irony, and ask: among all subversive spaces, 
is there a subversive space? 
13 In his 1983 essay “Toward a Critical Regionalism: Six Points For an Architecture of Resistance.” 





they highlight the phenomenological experience of place, critical regionalists generally 
avoid fetishizing places as parochial enclaves. Frampton, for instance, uses the term 
critical to distinguish his program from a primordial or culturally nationalist vision of 
place, and thus insists that even the most localized culture retain a connection to the 
“universal” network of flows in which it is situated. Or, as Zizek puts it, what is universal 
about us is not that we all participate in the broader world from a position of particularity, 
but that we are “uneasy” with that very identification—that we never quite succeed at 
local identification in the first place, because we are disturbed about its very coordinates 
(Violence 157). Anyone, no matter how ostensibly rooted in authentic place dwelling, is 
at some level uneasy with place-identification as a defining feature. It is this feature of 
uneasiness—of being torn—that constitutes the proper critical regionalist sense of place, 
and not a purely nomadic, free-floating consciousness. 
Instead, critical regionalists are only interested in place insofar as the production 
of “permanances” can help foster a deep, global democracy in which ordinary people can 
have the dignity of participating together to shape life rather than simply having it 
packaged for them from above. Gayatri Spivak, for example, uses the term in order to 
focus on the neoliberal threat to social protections; if she warns against reified and 
exclusive forms of cultural nationalism, she defends the state as a potential provider of 
social protections, and imagines a triangulating “critical regionalism combating global 
capitalism” that might “go under and over nationalisms” to produce a “robust citizenship 
for the people down below” (78, 94, 89). And a key part of this dialectical process of 
anti-capitalist place-building involves mobilizing memory as a resource in an effort to 





(necessarily) incomplete. As Walter Benjamin has put it, such memories and traditions 
are necessarily ambiguous, potentially useful for oppression, but also for liberation: “In 
every era the attempt must be made anew to wrest tradition away from a conformism that 
is about to overpower it” (Illuminations 255). Thus although critical regionalism is not 
opposed to change as such, it also insists on the value of honoring the best impulses of 
the past. It fights against a sense in which the modern person can feel dropped from the 
calendar, and instead searches for time-warps, such that significant historical moments 
can inspire present commitments. In short, critical regionalism struggles against the 
tendencies toward historical “depthlessness” and fragmentation that Fredric Jameson has 
seen as characteristic of stylistic postmodernism (Postmodernism 9).  
The most promising articulations of critical regionalism, then, do not see it simply 
as a formal aesthetic (as a way of constructing buildings, for example), but as a globally 
interlinked social movement directed toward establishing what Arjun Appadurai calls 
“globalization from below.” Such a movement would ideally recognize that in order to 
combat global capitalism, we cannot simply engage at one scale (the local, the regional, 
the national, the global). Instead, just as global (or glocal) capitalism operates on all of 
these levels simultaneously in order to produce uneven geographical development, any 
oppositional movement must engage the same terrain. Endorsing such a view does not 
imply ignoring local cultural, historical, and topographical differences, but it does entail 
keeping a constant eye on the social totality: the ecological mesh that makes 
identification with any single place untenable. Precisely because, as Alain Badiou puts it, 
“There is nothing more captive, so far as commercial investment is concerned, nothing 





community and its territory or territories” (St. Paul 10), it is not enough to focus on the 
local, which by itself is too weak to confront the power of capital—and which is never by 
itself anyway, since as Morton puts it, “Here is shot through with there” (The Ecological 
Thought 52). Instead, we must cultivate a degree of cheerful indifference toward many 
cultural differences, not to deny them or to flout local customs unthinkingly, but to open 
a space for the building of translocal, transregional, and transnational alliances.  
However promising this incipient dialectical mode of critical regionalism might 
be—and Spivak emphasizes its infancy, as a “fledgling project,” “not an analysis”—it 
remains haunted by a host of problems (114). If we hope to establish new narratives that 
can challenge a “worldless” global capitalism built on abstract autonomization and 
obligatory enjoyment over and above any communal ethic of reciprocity and 
responsibility, and if we hope to situate ourselves in the mesh, we must grapple with the 
problem of representational form itself, and particularly with the problem of narrative and 
narratibility identified by Jameson and others. If we emphasize the value of constructing 
place as a layered site imbued with memory that can motivate collective action and 
solidarity, we must not simply create new fetishes, but must somehow engage people at 
the symptomal level, evoking doubt where certainty once obtained. At the same time, 
however, we must not be paralyzed by doubt, but must mobilize critical regionalism in a 
regenerative project of networked place-building. If, as Naomi Klein puts it, our 
challenge involves overcoming the shock of postmodern experience in order to formulate 







Part 2: The Gothic and Trauma 
We crave the Gothic…because we need it. We need it because the twentieth century has 
so forcefully taken away from us that which we once thought constituted us—a coherent 
psyche, a social order to which we can pledge allegiance in good faith, a sense of justice 
in the universe—and that wrenching withdrawal, that traumatic experience, is vividly 
dramatized in the Gothic….As we confront the underlying terror of our times, after all, 
the Gothic provides us a guarantee of life even in the face of so much death…But the 
pleasantly terrifying thing may be that this life, this consciousness of being alive, is 
constantly shadowed by previous and imminent breakage and dissolution. Contemporary 
life constantly reminds us that we are moving toward death, or at least obsolescence, and 
that life we must continually strive to hold together….The Gothic’s basic investment in 
ravaging history and fragmenting the past meshes with our own investments now as we 
attempt to reinvent history as a way of healing the perpetual loss in modern existence. 
--Steven Bruhm, from “Contemporary Gothic: Why We Need It” (273-274) 
‘Awakening’ is a word that would be seen by most people today as equivalent to 
demystification: shedding light on obscure fields of knowledge, separating myth from 
reality, lies from truth, and so on. I think that is quite wrong. In terms of what Benjamin 
was doing, and more importantly how the world is put together in my opinion, it seems to 
me that awakening means piggy-backing, moving with the dream world. It is not a 
clarion call through the enlightenment to separate myth from reality. It is to enjoin myth 
to reality….So I’ve always understood his work as demystification and re-enchantment, 
in which that spark of hope you talk about presumably has an electrifying role to play. 
--Michael Taussig, from The Carnival of the Senses (53-54) 
If critical regionalism hopes to challenge neoliberal hegemony, it must not simply 
introduce a set of aims and principles (an intellectual justification), but must also deploy 
a rhetoric in the world that can foster what Raymond Williams has called structures of 
feeling. As Jane Bennett argues, when it comes to ethics, Western theorists have too often 
focused on developing some new law, some airtight philosophical framework, and have 
less often focused on the important matter of embodied practice—not only the necessary 
process of developing institutions (like places), but also the production of a sensibility 
(what she calls an “energetic of ethics”) that might animate our participation within those 
institutions (155). Bennett, for her part, insists on the value of “enchantment” within any 





offered by many Marxist scholars, she insists that “one must be enamored with existence 
and occasionally even enchanted in the face of it in order to be capable of donating some 
of one’s scarce mortal resources to the services of others” (4). And here it seems to me 
that the characteristically dark approach of the Gothic form paradoxically offers us hope, 
since as Bruhm puts it, insofar as Gothic texts confront death, trauma, and loss, they also 
highlight the power and possibility of life, healing, and (albeit in a distorted, haunted 
fashion) the reconstitution of narrative meaning. Furthermore, insofar as gothic texts 
explore the territory where the everyday and the impenetrable meet—and trouble the 
boundary between playful exaggeration and the “real” world—they provide a particularly 
potent source of the enchantment Bennett is looking for. There is room, I think, in the 
gothic form for wonder, humor, and the love of life described by Bennett. The gothic can 
be exuberant, especially insofar as it provides a space for grace, or what Bennett 
describes in terms of the “swerve” that cuts through negative repetition in order to 
inaugurate a positive and life-giving form of repetition (71). 
Even when gothic tales allow space for magic, imagination, and playful free 
association, they never lose sight of the symptom that renders our experience out of joint. 
As many commentators have noted, the gothic deals with frightful confrontations we 
would rather not face, with unwanted revelations and the secrets buried in the closet, the 
uncanny that is both familiar and unfamiliar. Above all, it thematizes the disintegration of 
the self as it faces disorienting knowledge; as Bruhm puts it, “Time and again the 
contemporary Gothic presents us with traumatized heroes who have lost the very psychic 
structures that allow them to access their own experiences….The self is shattered into 





Kristeva’s terms as the reduction of subjectivity to a recognition of its vulnerable, 
multiple, dependent state, best symbolized in the simultaneously embracing and 
engulfing space of the maternal body.15 Jerrold E. Hogle argues that “the repressed, 
archaic, and thus deeply unconscious Feminine is a fundamental level of being to which 
the Gothic finally refers,” and that at this level we find “both the ultimate Other and the 
basically groundless ground of the self” (11). In keeping with Klein’s formulation, 
trauma here is defined as that which escapes narrative or symbolic formulation. We may 
never finally put trauma to rest, since its very nature lies in the repetitive way the past 
haunts us, compelling us to revisit distorted images and fragments like the Post-
Traumatic Stress Disorder patients described by Cathy Caruth: “there is a response, 
sometimes delayed, to an overwhelming event or events, which takes the form of 
repeated, intrusive hallucinations, dreams, thoughts, or behaviors stemming from the 
event, along with numbing that may have begun during or after the experience” (cited in 
Bruhm 268). A gothic text can work in such a fashion, its narrative growing out of a 
disturbing engagement with repressed elements. 
Because the gothic form is fascinated with hidden crimes, some critics (notably 
the late pragmatist philosopher Richard Rorty) have attacked it as a gloomy practice that 
can block the free pursuit of a better future by enslaving us to a view of personal and 
social history as imbued with a spectral form of sin. Rorty urges us to forge cultural unity 
                                                          
15 As described by Jerrold E. Hogle, Kristeva’s mother-body, which must be thrown off since it reveals to 
us our ultimately lack of self-integrity and our dependence on others, sounds like Morton’s idea of the 
ecological mesh: “The Gothic often shows its readers that the anomalous foundations they seek to abject 
have become culturally associated with the otherness of femininity, a maternal multiplicity basic to us 
all…Here is the reason, a key factor, why Kristeva can link horrifying abjection with our throwing off of 
the memory that we have archaically been both inside and outside the mother whom we now fear and 
desire at the same time” (Hogle 10). The term “Mother Earth,” then regains all of its uncanny connotations, 
such that our relationship with the systems on which we are dependent—the social ecology fully as much 





by cultivating a “daylit” attitude, and by imagining our history in terms of a “romantic 
poem” that can inspire us to get beyond trauma (94, 29). But others have insisted that the 
gothic is not necessarily about mere terror or paralysis—or rather, that even insofar as 
gothic texts frighten us, they often do so because facing fear is a prelude to healing. In his 
essay, “The Nurture of the Gothic,” William Veeder draws on Michael Taussig’s 
description of Colombian shamanic practices to argue that gothic literature can produce 
“self-healing through terror” (34). In a typical Putumayan ceremony, a shaman leads 
patients in the ritual use of a hallucinogenic plant called yage. A patient might have to 
push through visions of terror (not to mention vomiting and diarrhea) in order to reach a 
beautiful vision that propels rejuvenation. Such healing sessions are serious and practical, 
but also improvised and full of jokes, as the impenetrable visions are constantly 
interrupted by everyday tasks: gathering wood, eating, laughing. Similarly, for Veeder 
the most sophisticated and imaginative gothic texts summon everyday visions of demonic 
possession, uncanny repetition, or haunting because in working through such images, we 
can face repressed fears, resentments, and acts of violence, and emerge with more vitality 
and agency: “I believe the nature of the gothic is to nurture. This belief derives from what 
I take to be a basic fact of communal life: that societies inflict terrible wounds upon 
themselves and at the same time develop mechanisms that can help heal these wounds” 
(20). And while Veeder acknowledges that all art and narrative provide a space of 
imaginative play in which to work through trauma, he argues that the gothic mode pays 
particular attention to repressed experiences that might not otherwise see the light of day.  
We might quibble with Veeder’s simplified view of the gothic as always positive 





healing in sight. Moreover, the act of healing itself can be ambiguous or even horrible. 
One can heal the wrong person, or “heal” a society by exterminating an innocent 
scapegoat. The anti-immigrant backlash in the contemporary U.S., for instance, is driven 
by gothic fears of the national body’s contamination. Still, to point out the ambiguity of 
the gothic is not to devalue its potential role in producing healing through terror, or in 
rendering experience in an urgent and powerful way. Indeed, many commentators see in 
the gothic (and its phantasmagoric relative, surrealism) the best way of representing a 
reality in which distortion is part of the weave of experience. Walter Benjamin, for one, 
in emphasizing that the historical materialist’s task does not necessarily involve telling 
the story of the past “the way it really was,” endorses the power of surrealism, allegory, 
and dreamlike montage as a rhetorical way of mobilizing subjects politically and 
personally (Illuminations 255). Rejecting a mimesis built on simple and transparent facts, 
Benjamin argued that only a phantasmagoric vision with its profane illuminations could 
adequately capture a modern experience permeated by complex built space, abstract 
finance, surprising encounters, and commodity fetishism: “No face is surrealistic in the 
same degree as the true face of a city” (Surrealism 73).  
The seminal defender of the gothic tradition in modern U.S. literary criticism, 
Leslie Fiedler, echoed Benjamin’s insistence that modern life can only be rendered in 
surreal terms—but he applied Benjamin’s insight not to European cities like Paris, but to 
U.S. frontiers, cities, and contact zones. Fiedler argued that the U.S., founded on the 
ambivalent repudiation of the British father-king but also through frontier violence, could 
not be approached through sentimental or realist forms. Instead, in his admittedly 





deliver on the “innocence” it purported to attain; the U.S. was a “world which had left 
behind the terror of Europe not for the innocence it dreamed of, but for new and special 
guilts associated with the rape of nature and the exploitation of dark-skinned people; a 
world doomed to play out the imaginary childhood of Europe” (xxvi). With these “special 
guilts” in mind, he maintains that the gothic form is the only “mature” form available to 
U.S. writers in their attempts to grapple with their society. He praises Ralph Ellison’s 
Invisible Man, for instance, as quintessentially gothic and thus more “realistic” than 
supposed realism: “To discuss…in the light of pure reason the Negro problem in the 
United States is to falsify its essential mystery and unreality; it is a gothic horror of our 
daily lives” (470). Indeed, Eric Savoy argues that the gothic confronts what Lacan 
described as the Real (a disturbing intrusion that haunts us precisely because its 
“traumatic ‘otherness’” cannot be directly symbolized in language), and that the 
American Real has a historical and social content: “Gothic images in America…suggest 
the attraction and repulsion of a monstrous history, the desire to ‘know’ the traumatic 
Real of American being and yet the flight from that unbearable and remote knowledge” 
(169).     
 Political scientist Bonnie Honig, too, rejects Rorty’s view that democracy 
requires a romantic notion of cultural nationalism. Indeed, in her view the very desire for 
such a unified peoplehood is the surest way to trigger gothic fears of an Other who can be 
blamed for ruining the “daylit” project. Instead, as she sees it, the experience of 
democracy is rarely daylit or transparent; in a democracy we find ourselves groping 
uncertainly in a largely “opaque” situation, unclear about the motivations of others and 





would resemble not the historical romance but the female gothic (sometimes described as 
the quotidian gothic). Drawing on texts like Daphne du Maurier’s Rebecca and Charlotte 
Bronte’s Jane Eyre, Honig describes the female gothic heroine as a woman protagonist 
who explores the mysterious spaces within a complicated world above her. Armed with 
“passionate ambivalence,” she is the model democratic citizen:  
the subjects best prepared for the demands of democracy are those who exist in an 
agonistic relation to a founder (or a father or a law) whose alienness is a poorly 
kept secret; subjects who do not expect power to be granted to them by nice 
authorities (fathers or husbands) with their best interests at heart (or, if they do 
harbor such an expectation, they are the sort that is able to rally after an initial 
disappointment); subjects who know that if they want power, they must take it. 
(114-115)
 
Honig distinguishes the female gothic from the “horror gothic”; in the horror gothic, 
structures of authority are reified as monstrously powerful and impossible to resist, and 
thus can only engender “paralyzing paranoia.” Rather, the female gothic subject’s restless 
exploration of the landscape of power doesn’t always yield obvious answers, but 
nevertheless leaves her more capable in the end: “Whatever they discover—it doesn’t 
matter what, really—the exercise of detection teaches them agency, and they become less 
vulnerable” (118). Yet even if the gothic heroine can learn agency, she can never “take 
total control” over her life; none of us can. Rather, the gothic mode “teaches us not only 
the powers, but also the limits of self-conscious agency,” a “lesson” that Honig sees as a 
“valuable” rejoinder to a naïve view of individualism and self-authorship (118). 
For Zizek, too, the hysterical subject (while necessary as a counterpoint to the 
certainty of the perverse subject), does not have the last word. Zizek does not endorse a 
mad, hysterical questioning that blocks the emergence of a new social order, since any 





differentiation between various discourses (the Master, the University, the Hysteric, the 
Analyst), he lays out a schema by which hysteria leads toward a new Master discourse, 
even if any new hegemony remains vulnerable to further hysterical questioning. The 
important distinction here lies in the way that different subjects react to the “act,” the 
intrusion of the traumatic Real (embodied, say, in Klein’s shock): if the agent of 
University discourse, “with his chain of knowledge…wants to reduce the consequences 
of the act to just another thing that can be explained away as part of the normal run of 
things,” and if the Master acknowledges the act but wants to ensure that it leads directly 
to an impregnable narrative, the hysteric, by contrast, does not reduce the act to the 
“normal run of things” (The Ticklish Subject 165). Nor does he remain content to call for 
a Master discourse that would be shielded from all doubt. Instead, he “insists on the gap 
that forever separates an event from its (symbolic) consequences”; the traumatic Real, by 
its nature, cannot be symbolized (165). But although this hysterical step is necessary, 
Zizek sees a step beyond it, in Lacan’s discourse of the Analyst. The Analyst 
acknowledges the unassimilable trauma of the confrontation with the Real and the 
“subjective destitution” (296) it creates, but nevertheless pushes toward a restructured 
symbolic order: “This position, while maintaining the gap between the Event and its 
symbolization, avoids the hysterical trap and, instead of being caught in the vicious cycle 
of permanent failure, affirms this gap as positive and productive: it asserts the Real of the 
Event as the ‘generator,’ the….core to be encircled repeatedly by the subject’s symbolic 
productivity” (165). Hysteria, then, is one deconstructive step toward the construction of 
a new reality. In the discourse of the Analyst, the hysteric’s sense of lack, uncertainty, 





In political terms, the Analyst asserts the power of negativity by cutting through 
the perverse loop of the fetish and zeroing in on the symptomal element of the social 
edifice: what Jacques Ranciere calls the part of no part. Whatever their number, these 
figures are defined by contradiction, since their place within the hierarchical social order 
is that of exclusion:  
The leftist political gesture par excellence (in contrast to the rightist slogan ‘to 
each his or her own place’) is…to question the concrete existing order on behalf 
of its symptom, of the part which, although inherent to the existing order, has no 
‘proper place’ within it (say, illegal immigrants or the homeless in our 
societies)….One pathetically asserts (and identifies with) the point of inherent 
exception/exclusion, the ‘abject, of the concrete positive order, as the only point 
of true universality….in our case, of saying ‘we are all immigrant workers.’ In a 
hierarchically structured society, the measure of true universality lies in the way 
parts relate to those ‘at the bottom,’ excluded by and from all others. (The Ticklish 
Subject 224)
 
For Zizek, then, any new and more just social order (the Christian notion of rebirth, taken 
up by Alain Badiou in left-political terms) must pass through a version of the death drive: 
via the “negative gesture” of identification with this “excremental remainder,” such that 
the road toward a new society lies in assuming the subjectivity of the abject, of shit (160-
161). And such an approach is inherently dialectical, in the sense that it involves seeing 
the potential for transformation in a situation of contradiction. The “proletarian,” who 
sells his soul (as it were) as labor power and thus becomes a functionally 
“disposable…piece of shit,” is also the fulcrum around which transformation might take 
place (157). In any given situation, the identification of such a (symptomal) “out of joint” 
contradiction opens up paths toward a new kind of development.  
Thinking in Zizek’s terms—about the value of a disjointed, symptomal fragment 
which stands in for the universal—helps us to clarify, if not finally to solve, the 





narration) in a postmodern situation. If representing such a situation in its totality is never 
achievable—if “the situation is not a realistic thing for us to make a simple representation 
of, even if we believe in narrative”—then we must rely on fragments (Jameson “Marxism 
and the Historicity of Theory” 160). And for Jameson, allegory is a provisional attempt to 
prioritize and organize these fragments, an intervention within an ever-shifting network 
of power relations, such that certain parts are taken to stand in for elements greater than 
themselves: “Allegory happens when you know you cannot represent something, but you 
also cannot not do it” (Jameson “Marxism and the Historicity of Theory” 161). And since 
allegory involves narrating what cannot be narrated (like trauma), it is a regular feature of 
gothic fiction. Zizek, then (drawing from Ranciere and Badiou) provides a gothic 
allegory in which a part (the “part of no part”) stands in for the whole, thus establishing a 
symptomal point of departure for analysis and intervention. Whatever else we must 
consider in the contemporary moment of capital, then, we must begin with this “point of 
exclusion,” which acts as a key to begin dislodging other elements of the existing edifice 
(Zizek The Ticklish Subject 224). 
 
Part 3: Negative Repetition, Positive Repetition 
What would life be if there were no repetition? Who could want to be a tablet on which 
time writes something new every instant or to be a memorial volume of the past? Who 
would want to be susceptible to every fleeting thing, the novel, which always 
enervatingly diverts the soul anew? 
--Soren Kierkegaard in Fear and Trembling/Repetition (131) 
If repetition is possible, it is due to miracle rather than to law. It is against the law: 
against the similar form and the equivalent content of law. If repetition can be found, 
even in nature, it is in the name of a power which affirms itself against the law, which 
works underneath laws, perhaps superior to laws…It puts law into question, it denounces 
its nominal or general character in favour of a more profound and artistic reality. 





What is dramatized in this embattled gothic process of analytic therapy is a 
tension between different forms of repetition, both negative and positive. Indeed, 
repetition is one of the most important tropes of the gothic, since uncanny experience is 
defined by the continual re-emergence of some repressed element. Trauma would not be 
trauma were repetition not involved; in the replaying of the painful memory, and in the 
often unhealthy repetition of defensive coping mechanisms, we can find ourselves 
trapped in behaviors and impulses that subjugate us with their power. At the same time, 
however, the healing process is defined by positive forms of repetition. As narrative 
theorist Peter Brooks has pointed out, any narrative (in literature, social life, or 
psychoanalytic therapy) deploys various kinds of repetition; a successful narrative is not 
simply a metonymic series of disconnected fragments or signifiers, but relies on 
“binding” moments (connections in the text that Brooks describes as “metaphorical”) that 
link elements of the text in order to produce meaning, all of which is mobilized toward 
some presupposed end (death, the wish, the end of the story, a cause) (101). These 
binding moments, which resemble what Soren Kierkegaard has called repetitions (and 
what Walter Benjamin called correspondances), involve connections between past and 
present—and between different elements of self and society—in a manner indispensible 
to the construction of a new critical regionalist poetics of attachment across time and 
space. In helping us narrativize our positions, however provisionally, positive repetition 
can help produce new forms of both agency, ritual, and place.     
The question of repetition comes into focus, interestingly enough, in Richard 
Rorty’s complaints about an unhealthy gothic fixation on sin. Rorty’s aim here is not 





imagination of sin—as a violation or moral stain that provokes the wrath of God--is 
extremely limited. Deeper and more productive understandings of sin are available that 
might help clarify the power of repetition in the gothic tradition. In the classic Christian 
understanding outlined by St. Paul, a gothic writer if there ever was one, sin appears not 
as a violation of a prescriptive law, not simply as “doing something wrong,” but as a state 
of spirit possession that limits a person’s capability for loving creation by compelling a 
morbid and unwanted repetition. In his recent reading of St. Paul, Alain Badiou describes 
Pauline sin as a state of metaphorical death insofar as it engenders negative repetition, 
while life involves an escape from this very slavery. And for Paul, sin is a structural 
component of the law itself (“the law is cursed”), such that the original trauma lies in the 
paternal imposition of the law. In turn, life is regained through a ritual repetition of 
Christ’s resurrection, through which a new law (that of love) is established; this new law 
does not negate the previous law but fulfills its original intention in a complex way.16 
Pauline sin is therefore an example of what Freud described as the uncanny, an 
experience that is disconcerting because it is both strange and familiar, and because it 
evokes or repeats a repressed experience and thereby provokes its return. More 
importantly, sin deprives us of agency, insofar as it makes us (in Paul’s terms) want what 
we don’t want to want. In its fascination with sin, then, we might say that the gothic is 
fascinated with negative repetition in its uncanny dimension, and with the lack of agency 
that is associated with being trapped by the past.   
Drawing from the same well of Christian narrative understanding, Kierkegaard 
was aware of the negative forms of repetition, but for him, genuine repetition involved 
                                                          






not an unconscious or automatic action engendered by a failure to work through the past, 
and not the endless appearance of the same. Instead, a true repetition leaves the past 
behind but draws from it in order to perform the new in the present. Kierkegaard 
distinguished between the terms repetition, recollection, and hope. Recollection, in his 
framework, is a melancholy orientation toward an irretrievably lost past; it is “repeated 
backward.” Hope, meanwhile, implies “restlessness” and a dalliance with the future, but 
is “cowardly” since it can be endlessly deferred. “Genuine repetition,” in contrast, 
requires “courage” since it does not take cover in the past or the future, but assumes full 
responsibility for the present; it is “recollected forward” because it lets go of the actual, 
external past but repeats its best impulses internally and spiritually: “it is not a question 
of the repetition of something external but of the repetition of his freedom” (131, 304). In 
attempting to explain the specific role of repetition, Kierkegaard resorts to metaphor: 
“Hope is a new garment, stiff and starched and lustrous, but it has not been tried on, and 
therefore one does not know how becoming it will be or how it will fit. Recollection is a 
discarded garment that does not fit, however beautiful it is, for one has outgrown it. 
Repetition is an indestructible garment that fits closely and tenderly, neither binds nor 
sags” (132). Both hope and recollection, then, are ways of evading the truly new; hope 
postpones it to a later date, and recollection can only pore over the “memorial volume.” 
We repeat only if we don’t cling to the past, but instead conjure it as an interlocutor, the 
spirit of which we might be able to re-perform on a new stage.  
Despite the cozy connotations of a garment that fits closely and tenderly, 
repetition is not necessarily snug and comfortable—or rather, it can be seen to fit only 





prospect of a genuine repetition can be a painful spiritual trial; in order to engage in a 
repetition of past freedom, one must sometimes make a risky leap into territory that 
seems absurd, because none of the external conditions seem favorable to it. Indeed, it 
might involve the “shattering” of one’s customary personality, and can thus require more 
than a person thinks is possible. Repetition occurs at a Benjaminian moment of danger, 
when, “From the point of view of immediacy, everything is lost” (Kierkegaard 212). And 
it might not work. For Kierkegaard, to repeat the movement of Abraham, Job, or Christ is 
a frightening prospect. (We might also mention the complexity of repeating the spirit of a 
founding act like the American or Mexican Revolution, or the spirit of a great work of 
art). The pursuit of repetition, then, involves the search for something to be faithful to, 
and the ensuing steadfastness that goes along with this assertion. As ironic and humorous 
as Kierkegaard can be, he is not deluded into imagining that it is truly possible to 
maintain a distance from one’s commitments. As Jonathan Lear notes, it is precisely the 
tension between ironic distance—a pulling away in which one questions a particular 
social role and the system that makes it possible—and the unavoidable necessity of 
commitment that characterizes Kierkegaard’s particular form of irony.17 Kierkegaardian 
repetition, then, implies not a homogenous flow of time, but a heterogeneous 
Benjaminian time characterized by loops, jumps, and pauses within an embattled 
situation. 
Such a “long practice” is exactly what writers like Baudelaire and Proust were up 
to when they evoked what Benjamin calls correspondances, through which (for example) 
                                                          
17 Or, as Kierkegaard wryly argues (via another pseudonym Johannes Climacus), “From the fact that irony 
is present, it does not follow that the earnestness is excluded. That is something only assistant professors 





an experience in the streets of Paris is linked and compared to a past experience (The 
Writer of Modern Life 202): 
What Baudelaire meant by correspondances can be described as an experience 
which seeks to establish itself in crisis-proof form. This is possible only within the 
realm of ritual. If it transcends this realm, it presents itself as the beautiful. In the 
beautiful, ritual value appears as the value of art. Correspondances are the data of 
recollection—not historical data, but data of prehistory. What makes festive days 
great and significant is the encounter with an earlier life….The images of caves 
and vegetation, of clouds and waves which are evoked at the beginning of this 
second sonnet rise from the warm vapor of tears—tears of homesickness….What 
is past murmurs in the correspondences, and the canonical experience of them has 
its place in a previous life. (198)
 
It is true that the “tears of homesickness” described here can devolve into the static and 
cowardly recollection described by Kierkegaard. But the “encounter with an earlier life” 
can also enable the repetition of spiritual impulses perceived to have been at work in the 
past. The proposal is this: in that earlier life, there “murmured” a freedom that may or 
may not have been achieved in reality, but with which we can nevertheless ally ourselves 
in an attempt to weather a “crisis.” Whether or not the experience so described is indeed 
“crisis-proof”—in the sense that it can withstand literally anything—is not the issue. The 
point is that through ritual, or through the manifestation of ritual in art (i.e., the 
“beautiful”) we have the opportunity to channel the vital spirits of previous struggles, 
previous discoveries, and previous desires. One is no longer dropped from the calendar, 
but uses the calendar to highlight qualitative meanings and significances that can be 
recuperated and repeated in an attempt to grapple with the “crisis” of life in capitalist 
modernity, and perhaps to change its conditions. 
Freud, too, confronted negative repetition through life-giving forms of positive 
repetition conceived as performance in the present. And, apropos of Kierkegaard, Freud’s 





jettisoning of it. For Freud, in the theater of psychoanalysis we revisit the past so that we 
can tell our life story in new ways. Through the process of transference, the analyst and 
the analysand work together to produce a new and more life-giving fiction that can 
disarm the power of negative repetition by confronting past trauma and producing a 
rhetorically persuasive counter-story, complete with powerful images that can crystallize 
in the analysand’s mind and supply her/him with tools to move forward. Drawing from 
Freud, Peter Brooks argues that all narrative functions according to a similar model of 
transference. If Freud argues that transference “creates an intermediate region between 
illness and real life, through which the transition from the one to the other is made,” then 
narrative does the same thing (225-229). The reader of a narrative does not approach 
“real life,” but a “dilatory space” through which real life can be imaginatively mediated, 
reconfigured, and worked through (102):  
Transference, like the text as read, becomes the peculiar space of a deadly serious 
play, in which affect, repeated from the past, is acted out as if it were present, yet 
eventually in the knowledge that the persons and relations involved are surrogates 
and mummers. The transference actualizes the past in symbolic form, so that it 
can be replayed to a more successful outcome….Disciplined and ‘subjugated,’ the 
transference delivers one back to a changed reality. And so does any text fully 
engaged by the reader. (235)
 
In the case of psychoanalysis, the analyst is not specifically concerned with whether the 
analysand’s narrated memories actually describe real events, or whether they are pure 
fantasies. The goal, in the end, is to construct a narrative in which past and present can be 
reconciled in such a way that the patient can thrive in the social world. 
The most powerful and compelling forms of the gothic, then—whether at work in 
Putumayan shamans, Zizek, Taussig, Freud, St. Paul, Benjamin, Honig, Brooks, 





remain attached to the root of the trauma, these thinkers instead seek ways out of negative 
repetition—not by setting out, Richard Rorty-style to come up with a nicer and more 
romantic story that will give us better self-esteem, but by engaging in the painstaking 
work of what Michael Taussig describes as “raking over the coals of events” (Shamanism 
394). The proper response to Rorty, then, is that moving on from the past, or from 
problems that are currently repressed, is easier said than done. Ongoing traumas like 
racism, class domination, and the patriarchy must be worked through and faced, and it is 
not always clear how to go about doing so. We cannot simply wave a magic wand and 
make past traumas disappear, especially since the material and psychic implications of 
that past haunt the present in fundamental ways. Thus if Rorty is correct to point out that 
a horror gothic outlook (in which the forces of darkness dominate everything) can lead to 
a sense of paralysis, commentators like Fiedler, Honig, and Zizek have pointed out that 
cheap horror gothic is not the only mode available to us as a way of confronting our 
various repressions, traumas, and fetishes. A more mature form of the gothic would 
recognize the necessity of working through the trauma of the past, and of keeping a 
suspicious eye on power wherever it is exercised, but it would never allow trauma the last 
word. Instead, it would allow room for grace and joy.  
At the same time, however, we must acknowledge the unstable, trickster side of 
the gothic, since part of what makes gothic texts (from Bram Stoker’s Dracula to HBO’s 
True Blood) attractive and popular in the larger culture is that they dangle before us 
images of terror that can be treated either as symptoms or as fetishes; if we choose, we 
can treat the images in gothic texts as overwrought nonsense, as histrionic, or as purely 





puts it, in confronting Gothic texts, “we are always poised on a fulcrum” between denial 
and confrontation:  
Do we let them mainly protect and justify us as we are (which most of them can, 
if we seek that through them) or do we let them arouse us to reconsider and 
critique the conventional norms of western middle-class culture, which can 
confront disguised challenges to them in the Gothic (if we let it) more vividly than 
anywhere else? Will the fear that Gothic works to arouse keep us from facing the 
longings and anomalies behind those terrors that the Gothic also depicts? (19)
 
Fiction, in this framework, emerges as a form of sorcery or magic. All literature is 
sorcery in that it projects visions into the world that have real effects, whether positive or 
negative (there is no guarantee that the text’s magic will be beneficial). It compels a 
hallucinatory trance and thereby possesses us with its unpredictable and unstable spirit. If 
it can result in danger and terror, it can also result in what Michael Taussig calls “the 
power of grace…the transformation of a bad situation into a good situation” (“Carnival of 
the Senses” 55). And if there is no necessary end to this process of revision and 
reworking, it is not always because we don’t want to be healed, but because healing and 
nurture is a perpetual way of life. 
What I draw from this constellation of gothic tropes, then, is a subaltern 
cosmopolitan critical regionalism that is gothic in its rhetorical approach, or more 
succinctly, a gothic quest for place. Here the past is given up for dead, since its paternal 
authority cannot be resuscitated in the same way, and nor should it. But despite such a 
loss, we can still draw from ghosts of the past (especially the ghosts of the oppressed, 
who continue to haunt us) as we forge our way into the future. In spatial terms, we assert 
that place still matters, since the construction of relatively durable permanances helps us 
in our project of transgenerational nurturance, but we do not allow such places to become 





access to the universal: the part of no part, the contradictory site of exclusion as a mode 
of inclusion. Because everyone is wrapped up in the same mesh together, we must 
recognize that, as Krista Comer puts it, “there is no shelter from the global storm” (15). 
Just as a stable sense of self is always threatened by the vulnerable multiplicity that we 
are tempted to throw off and deny, a stable sense of place, too, is unavailable. Even so, 
we must strive to produce provisional forms of place: not simply connections, but 
attachments. Whether in place or in motion, this sense of mutual reciprocity within the 
mesh must trump the protection of any single place. When it comes to the nurturance of 
the “part of no part,” the gothic quest for place imagines a logic that parallels the 
Christian maxim “Whoever shall seek to save himself shall lose himself,” but translated 
into spatial terms: “Whoever shall seek to save his place shall lose it; while whoever 
loses his place for the sake of the excluded, shall gain it.”     
 
Cultural Nationalism, Postcolonial Melancholia, and the Dialectical West 
The visionless legacy that all of these fallen cowboys hand on to the women in their 
lives….They walk home from the funeral, one foot in front of the other, mother and 
daughter holding hands….They keep going…no martyrdom here, no bid for the cultural 
satisfaction of white motherhood….But there is a grim and familiar kind of Western 
female stoicism in operation…where women at the day’s end, try to put together the 
pieces in order to give to their children at bedtime something other than a cynical story, a 
joyless kiss goodnight. 
--Krista Comer, from Landscapes of the New West (229) 
As we have seen, the neoliberal situation produces a crisis in narrativity, and as a 
result provokes a number of compensatory narratives (localisms, regionalisms, 
nationalisms, tribalisms, fundamentalisms) that offer to situate the subject within an 
unmappable totality. And Mike Featherstone, in calling attention to the defensive 





ethnic core as a structuring principle within such narratives. By mobilizing the ethnic 
core, we imagine (falsely) that we can batten down the hatches against the neoliberal 
global storm. Featherstone may be correct here, but it is still unclear what the U.S. ethnic 
core might be, or if it can be identified at all. Surely, even in what Featherstone describes 
as the older and more sedimented nations (Britain and France, for instance), the core is 
not a given, but emerges through a process of cultural contestation. Yet perhaps given the 
U.S. history of settler-colonialism, we might identify its ethnic core in the mythological 
West, conceived as the locus of Anglo-Protestant cultural nationalism, Manifest Destiny, 
and Empire. In doing so, however, we must recognize the unstable nature of the West as 
a site for primary identification. Because the West is not simply a pastoral, but a frontier, 
the dominant (male, white) settlers of the U.S. West have consistently displayed deep 
ambivalence about the very notion of settlement, with its attendant visions of 
domestication and feminization. Any orientation provided by the West is always already 
complicated by an individualist ambivalence to orientation as such. The hegemonic 
Anglo-Protestant’s aims are simultaneously domestic and expansionist; he does indeed 
long for home as a stable place, but he also longs for release from the restrictions implied 
by any such place.   
However complicated its dynamics, the frontier West as ethnic core is 
fundamentally connected to a U.S. imperial project that now appears both fundamentally 
flawed and unsustainable. Ever since Frederick Jackson Turner eulogized the close of the 
official frontier in 1893, Anglo-Protestant men have sought to rediscover its rejuvenating 
properties  in new imaginative and spatial frontiers: in cultural texts and practices 





colonialism of the Western frontier (the Indian wars, the dispossession of Tejanos and 
Californios, the mastery of nature) to the ever-expanding realm of the global economy. 
Having effectively subjugated the Indians, frontier enthusiasts like Theodore Roosevelt 
turned their expansionary virility to other pastures: to Cuba, the Phillippines, Hawaii, and 
gunboat diplomacy. And after World War II, the U.S. committed itself unequivocally to 
what David Noble has called the “sacred international marketplace,” but it did so without 
resorting to the old-fashioned forms of imperialist expansion (288). Instead, its gambit for 
global hegemony relied on more subtle, neocolonial strategies of domination; although 
the U.S. did not (usually) occupy foreign territories directly, it used economic, cultural, 
and military power (covert action, diplomatic pressure, sponsored coups, and especially 
“debt traps” and monetary policy) to push open global markets and install U.S.-friendly 
regimes wherever possible. Meanwhile, in concert with the rise of a Taylorized consumer 
society, it employed “soft power” to colonize psychic space the world over. During this 
Cold War period, for example, Western texts (and especially cowboy narratives) helped 
to establish legitimacy for both U.S. white masculinity and imperial power.  
Ronald Reagan, in particular, drew from such frontier Western narratives in his 
bid to revive a teetering post-Vietnam white masculinity, and in the process articulated a 
potent ideological brew based on contradictory notions of the “private”: the private 
individual participant in the (global) market, the private/domestic home space of the 
sentimental family, and the “domestic” sense of nation as expressed in Anglo/Protestant 
cultural nationalism. But Reagan’s contradictions could not ultimately be maintained, 
since the free-floating speculative capitalist individual inevitably chafes against both the 





neoliberal principle of flexibility is incompatible with these institutions, and indeed, leads 
to their active destruction. But in destroying them, the neoliberal economy destroys 
elements that it requires in order to function, such that Reaganite cultural nationalism 
(embodied today in the guise of the Tea Party) runs up against a contradiction that lies 
first and foremost in the neoliberal relation to the state. In theory, neoliberals urge the 
state to stay out of economic matters, and to reduce its interventions in the social world; 
but in practice, they need the state (and other institutions) to manage the chaotic effects of 
capitalist deterritorialization, to enforce property rights and trade, and to provide 
meaningful identitarian narratives for citizens across the globe. Neoliberals demand open 
borders (at least for capital), but they secretly rely on borders as well. They want it both 
ways.  
Thinking in these dialectical terms helps clarify the importance of President Bill 
Clinton’s rise to power in 1992; when Clinton enraged white supremacists by challenging 
Reaganite cultural nationalism, he was trying to cover over the contradictory relationship 
between neoliberalism and the state. In celebrating America’s multicultural heritage and 
articulating a global cosmopolitan vision, he hoped to embrace neoliberalism on its own 
“borderless” terms, and in the process make economic and diplomatic connections around 
the world, especially in growing Third World markets. But he did not get rid of the 
contradiction between nationalism and the transnational ruling class; instead, he simply 
delayed a reckoning with it by coasting on a high-growth, speculative (and unsustainable) 
technology-based economy. In his own way, then, Clinton too kept promise with the 
Western U.S. ethnic core. In his fundamentally optimistic view of the global economy as 





embodied in Western spaces like Silicon Valley, and in his continuation of U.S.-led 
neocolonial practices (like the structural adjustment policies of the International 
Monetary Fund), Clinton helped keep the pastoral/frontier ideology alive. Americans 
could open up to the world economy and retain their fated sense of exceptionalism.  
However, as in the boom/bust cycles of the Western past, the bubbles of the 1990s 
(and later the 2000s) eventually burst. Faced with a downturn in the technology economy, 
President George W. Bush doubled down on the real estate market, hoping that new 
construction and speculation would make up for other economic losses, but this practice, 
too, led to more shocks. The neoliberal era of foreign investment and rapid capital 
movement is characterized by financial crises (which have popped up from Argentina and 
Sweden to Mexico and Thailand), and by 2007 the U.S. faced its own housing-based 
collapse, which soon spread throughout the world financial system. Earlier, on 
September, 11, 2001, another bubble burst: the common sense among Americans that 
they were impregnable from the mass civilian casualties that had been widespread in 
other parts of the world. The muddling, bloody, and uncontrollable wars in Afghanistan 
and Iraq—combined with the relative rise of nations like China, Brazil, and India on the 
world stage—laid bare a problem with American power. Only in the presence of threats 
to its hegemony (both terroristic and economic), it seems, could U.S. commentators 
finally begin talking about U.S. Empire, such that a book like Fareed Zakaria’s 2003 The 
Post-American World and The Rise of the Rest rattled many (white) Americans who 
imagined U.S. power as a God-given privilege. Though U.S. hegemony has been 
declining since at least the early 1970s, U.S. citizens (especially white citizens) had not 





Carter’s more straightforward acknowledgement of “malaise,” resource shortages, and 
uncertainty. But facing a floundering war on terrorism, along with problems like global 
warming, financial collapse, economic inequality, and low rates of social mobility, no 
one could ignore the idea of U.S. decline any longer. Meanwhile, the demographic 
decline of the white population (and continuing immigration from Latin America and 
Asia) continued to rattle many Anglo-Protestant cultural nationalists who felt that “their” 
country was slipping away from them.       
Although U.S. citizens must increasingly face their imbrication in history, and 
thus in an unpredictable and uneven social and ecological network, intellectual awareness 
of the mesh does not necessarily translate into emotional acceptance, or into a 
proportionate grief, shame, and atonement about the role played by U.S. empire. Instead, 
it is fair to say that most U.S. citizens have been evading a reckoning with the false 
promise of the postwar American Century for decades, since perhaps the Watts riots in 
1965, if not before. In that sense, the U.S.’s recent travails appear as the uncanny return 
of repressed problems that crested most visibly in the 1970s, but that Reaganite and 
Clintonian forms of frontier/pastoral utopian thinking obsessively swept under the rug. 
Bill McKibben, writing in dispiriting terms about the looming, slow-motion apocalypse 
of global climate disruption (now not a threat to future generations, but simply a present 
fact of life), describes from an environmental point of view a sentiment that could be 
extended to social life more generally: 
The problem was not that Reagan’s sunny optimism somehow masked a fascist 
soul; the problem was his sunny optimism. He really believed it was morning 
again, and when the economy turned up, so did the rest of the country; the 
ambivalence about growth vanished, and with it our last real chance to avert 





the years when we pumped the carbon dioxide into the atmosphere and the oil out 
of the ground. (94-95).
 
This disaster is not only an environmental one, but (for those at the bottom), a broadly 
social one: of wasted human potential and atrophied infrastructure, of mass incarceration 
and hopelessness.  
What U.S. citizens have faced over the past few decades, then, is analogous to the 
disorientation British subjects have experienced in the wake of their own imperial 
decline. British cultural critic Paul Gilroy has identified “postcolonial melancholia” as a 
desperate and “neurotic” obsession with a more “comprehensible and inhabitable” past, a 
“hunger for reorientation,” and an inability to acknowledge connections to those affected 
by a history of colonial domination (89-90). If Britons have not been able “to face, never 
mind actually mourn, the profound change in circumstances and moods that followed the 
end of the empire and consequent loss of imperial prestige,” it should not be surprising 
that many white Americans face a similar struggle letting go of a narcissistic “fantasy of 
omnipotence” (90, 99). Gilroy further argues that the “possibility of healing and 
reconciliation” lies in an honest appraisal of the national past:  
Before the British people can adjust to the horrors of their own modern history 
and start to build a new national identity from the debris of their broken 
narcissism, they will have to learn to appreciate the brutalities of colonial rule 
enacted in their name and to their benefit…to transform paralyzing guilt into a 
more productive shame that would be conducive to the building of a multicultural 
nationality that is no longer phobic about the prospect of exposure to either 
strangers or otherness. (99)
 
In other words, the route toward a new, more just, and less neurotic collective lies in a 
new way of telling stories: in a Gothic process of digging through remains, prying into 





As contemporary artists and critics are increasingly willing to face, the West was, 
and is, a gothic space and not simply a sun-lit one—not just a fetish, but a potential 
symptom of trauma. What Patricia Limerick called the “legacy of conquest” in the 
West—Indian removal, war with Mexicans, prostitution, lonely pioneer women, 
rapacious boom-and-bust cycles, labor violence, lust for land, and class stratification—
surely calls for a gothic approach, just as the twin forces of the biological and spectral 
Real compel us to face uncanny skeletons in the closet like the workers in Fast Food 
Nation. Krista Comer, in particular, documents the rise of a new Western regionalist 
literature in the 1970s and 1980s that paralleled the rise of the new Western history 
exemplified by Limerick and her colleagues. Taken as a whole, the new Western 
regionalist literature has had mixed results, since it often slips into untenable modes of 
localist celebration or Heidegerrian holism (especially insofar as it remains fixated on a 
desire to return to the precommodified world of the preconquest Indian). But as Comer 
points out, much of this literature is commendable because it is largely characterized by 
an attempt to grapple with modernity (and postmodernity) rather than to simply repudiate 
it. Led primarily by women and minority writers, from Barbara Kingsolver to Gloria 
Anzaldua, the new Western regionalism has generally rejected Reaganite narratives of 
Western masculinity, militarism, individualism, and anti-government autonomy in favor 
of different ideals: community, reciprocity, mutual nurturance, doubt, egalitarian sexual 
pleasure, and a protective social order governed by some form of state apparatus. Even its 
focus on the preconquest Indian often reveals—as does Taussig’s work in South 





learn from this precommodified social world must be balanced against our need to dance 
with the devil in today’s transformed conditions.   
In advocating such values, such writers struggled not merely against Reagan’s 
revival of cultural nationalism, masculinity, and white supremacy, but also against the 
Western literary tradition presided over by Wallace Stegner, who challenged frontier 
rapaciousness (especially on the ecological front), but who largely excluded women and 
minorities from his work, clung to what Comer calls a bourgeois anti-modernist outlook, 
and retained a fetishistic vision of the West as a geography of hope (130). In that sense, 
the post-Reagan (and post-Stegner) Western imaginary owes a great deal to the growth of 
feminism and multiculturalism in the West. But as I have indicated, the postmodern 
legacy described by Comer—with its “fragmented, non-universalist, evolving ontologies” 
and its “multiple, bastard, miscegenistic, gender-bent, hybridized” identities (4-5)—is rife 
with problems of which Comer is fully aware, since the very fragmentation implied by 
postmodern life is easily exploited by the rhizomatic power of global capital, making 
coherent class-based narratives of struggle that much more difficult to develop. Indeed, in 
her many qualifiers and back-tracking moves, her defense of place and her warnings 
against it, Comer in Landscapes is moving toward a dialectical vision of the West more 
indebted to the notion of the contradiction than to smooth hybridity (and such moves 
presage her more recent work on translocal surfing communities and critical regionalist 
theory). Again, the answer does not lie in the reassertion of primordial and essentialist 
narratives of ethnicity and nation, in a resurgence of paternal authority, or in the rejection 
of hybridity. Nor does it lie in Foucauldian micropolitics, or in a weak bourgeois 





Instead, the answer involves dancing with the devil: acknowledging our 
imbrication within this contradictory system, but also confronting the symptomal 
elements that haunt it and provide the levers with which we might trouble and transform 
it. And it involves not reveling in the absence of paternal authority, but making up for this 
loss through nurturing forms of place and narrative grounded in the abject (female, 
castrated, excremental) figure of the excluded. Within this constellation of new Western 
regionalism, then, I find the most compelling texts among those which participate in the 
gothic tradition I have tried to outline here. Recent texts, among them HBO’s Deadwood, 
but also the work of Sherman Alexie, Cormac McCarthy, Annie Proulx, Charles Bowden, 
Richard Rodriguez, Walter Kirn, Ruben Martinez, Luis Alberto Urrea, Richard Linklater, 
the Cohen Brothers, and Sandra Cisneros strike me as both gothic and progressive in their 
outlook: haunted by nightmarish crimes, but motivated to work through trauma in order 
to move toward a more just society. Although I do not examine all of these writers in the 
dissertation, I try to capture the spirit of this gothic Western critical regionalism, in which 
healing teeters so eerily on the border of fear. Finally, all of these texts I examine—from 
Cisneros, Alexie, and Rodriguez to Kirn, Krakauer, and Bowden--are vibrantly alive 
when it comes to the problematic of space; in theorist Doreen Massey’s terms, they help 
us come to terms with a world in which space is not inert or given, but is as “equally 
challenging and equally lively” as temporality (For Space 13).18 
                                                          
18Such texts participate in what Stephen Tatum has described as a “forensic aesthetic” in the West, built 
around an exploration of “material artifacts” that register haunting evidence of trauma: “loss,” “death,” or 
“pain” in “a cordoned off or framed topography of ruin or contamination…material traces mutely 
registering that once upon a time something existed, something happened in this place” (127). In turn, they 
exemplify his notion of “spectral beauty,” a form of beauty that does not maintain a stable aesthetic 
distance from the Real of trauma, but instead remains haunted by it. Spectral beauty is compatible with the 
gothic quest for place, since it involves creating ritual spaces of relative permanence in which healing can 
take place; these spaces do not devolve into fetishistic denial, since they never lose sight of the symptom 





I have chosen to focus on the post-1989 period, rather than tracing the new 
regionalism from the 1970s onward, because I am interested in the way that the 
Fukayaman “end of history” hypothesis plays out in Western literature, especially insofar 
as that utopia is disrupted by a number of factors: memories and visions of precapitalist 
modes of production, the uncanny return of history in the 9/11 attacks, the haunting 
quality of our distant connections in the ecological and social mesh, and ultimately, the 
recent financial crises. Slavoj Zizek puts the matter succinctly: “Fukayama’s utopia of the 
1990s had to die twice, since the collapse of the liberal-democratic political utopia on 
9/11 did not affect the economic utopia of global market capitalism; if the 2008 financial 
meltdown has a historical meaning, then, is as a sign of the end of the economic face of 
Fukayama’s dream” (First as Tragedy, Then as Farce 5). But even if the Fukayaman 
dream is dead, we have learned nothing from the gothic form if we forget that the dead 
are never truly dead, but live on in many different forms. As we continue to face a host of 
shocks and specters, the ensuing years will involve a contest in which competing 
narratives, from fundamentalist revivals to reassertions of the Fukayaman dream, will 
battle for the allegiance of people across the globe. In this context, perhaps the tales we 
must ultimately tell our children, in Comer’s terms, should be gothic fairy tales: 
enchanted, strange, often humorous—but with a haunting core of vulnerability, intimacy, 
                                                                                                                                                                             
about the permeable but protective character of ritual ceremonies: “only when someone was in a sacred 
situation, at a sing or ceremonial…was harmony restored, and even then, residue remained outside the 
ceremonial membrane usually in the form of ghosts, so you had to keep singing, all your life” (cited in 
Tatum 140). Such rituals enable participants to grab hold of a place on the calendar, not in a permanent or 
closed-off sense, but through Kierkegaardian repetition of a provisional harmony that acknowledges ghosts 
but strives to keep them at bay. In similar fashion, the texts under discussion here imagine place as 
simultaneously haunted, joyful, and playful, however rooted in a recognition of the traumatic sublime. A 
quest is not an adventure, not a permanent epistemological or ethical solution; instead, it requires us to keep 





and perhaps even hope. And although these stories must always resonate on the small, 














SHAKING AWAKE THE MEMORY: THE GOTHIC QUEST FOR 




With the ravages of the unconscious continually interrupting one’s perception of the 
world, the protagonist of the contemporary Gothic often experiences history as mixed up, 
reversed, and caught in a simultaneity of past-present-future. History has made a 
promise—that one will grow from a fragile, vulnerable child to an autonomous, rational 
adult—but it is unable to keep that promise in the twentieth-century. It can only offer a 
future that is already suspended between present and past. 
—Steven Bruhm, from “Contemporary Gothic: Why We Need It” (267-268) 
In the first season of HBO’s True Blood—a contemporary vampire series set in 
small-town Louisiana—a young black woman named Tara Mae Thornton visits a local 
conjure woman who offers to expel her demons. Though she still questions this 
supernatural diagnosis, Tara bears psychic scars from abuse at the hands of her alcoholic 
mother, and is willing to try almost anything to move beyond the past. Besides, she has 
visited Miss Jeannette before: this conjure woman cured her mother Lettie of alcoholism. 
Earlier in the season, Lettie surprised Tara by insisting that she was not to blame for her 
drinking; instead, a “demon” occupied her and determined her decisions: “All those 
terrible things I did to you—it wasn’t me who did them. I have a demon inside of me… A 
demon, living and breathing inside me—eating me up….Don’t you laugh at the devil, 





money to pay Miss Jeannette, Tara had accompanied Lettie to see the shaman-like healer 
(who appears to live in an old, abandoned bus, and who wears a raggedy dress out of the 
nineteenth century). During that visit, Miss Jeannette explained that she lives in the 
woods to escape “all that pollution and technology.” She tells the two women that she 
doesn’t use “cell phones” and “microwaves” because “That’s how the demons travel. 
That’s why I stay out here in the woods—away from civilization.” Using her seemingly 
old-fashioned methods, Miss Jeannette miraculously exorcises the demon from Lettie, 
who stops drinking and professes that she no longer needs alcohol.  
After curing Lettie, the conjure woman gives Tara some unexpected guidance: she 
warns Tara that her mother’s demon is nothing compared to the devil that lives inside of 
Tara. Miss Jeannette’s implication is that letting go of resentment, especially when one 
has faced real abuse, is even more difficult than giving up alcohol. And in fact, Tara’s 
sense of victimhood and injury haunts her and makes her incapable of maintaining 
fruitful connections with others. She fights constantly, loses jobs, and sabotages potential 
love relationships that come her way. To top it all off, Tara is puzzled—even vexed and 
disappointed—by her mother’s recovery, since it forces her to confront the possibility 
that she might not have continued cause for resentment. Is it possible that she might have 
to forgive her mother now—to give her a chance to make up for what she has done? 
Compounding this problem is Tara’s skepticism regarding the whole matter of exorcism. 
In response, her cousin (a gay, drug-dealing short-order cook named Lafayette Reynolds) 
urges her to rethink her skepticism, at least enough to give her mother some credit: “This 
world is filled with things we will never understand.” (In a subsequent season, Lafayette 





man named Jesus who learned shamanic secrets from his grandparents). Finally, Tara 
decides to visit Miss Jeannette herself. The exorcism is more intense than her mother’s: 
after taking a mysterious medicine, Tara sees a young version of herself imploring her 
with tearful, terrified eyes. Miss Jeannette urges her to destroy the girl. Tara balks, but 
Miss Jeannette pushes her, and finally Tara attacks the conjured hallucination. Tara then 
begins to vomit, as if purging herself of the ghost of her younger self. She is tired and 
sick, but soon begins to feel better. She, too, has been cured, and tearfully tells her 
mother the good news; for the first time ever, the two women embrace in joy. Lettie 
rejoices: “We’re saved! Both of us saved. You did a brave thing, Tara Mae. I am so proud 
of you, my baby.” 
However, Tara’s journey is not over; instead, she remains plagued by doubts 
about the efficacy of the exorcism. When she enters a pharmacy in a neighboring town, 
she looks suspiciously at the clerk in the store; finally, she pulls off the woman’s wig. It 
is Miss Jeannette, talking on a cell phone just like the one she claimed she never used. 
Tara angrily confronts her, and attacks her as a fraud. And indeed, it turns out that Tara’s 
vision was brought on by hallucinogens, and her vomiting by ipecac syrup. But the 
pharmacist defends herself; she points out that she needs the money to raise her children, 
and argues that “Miss Jeannette” accomplishes real good in the world: “Just because Miss 
Jeannette ain’t real doesn’t mean she doesn’t help people. You saw how it worked for 
your mama.” She begs Tara not to tell her mother about their confrontation: “Faith’s a 
powerful thing.” Thus Tara faces a question: does she tell her mother about Miss 
Jeannette’s fictional identity and risk allowing Lettie to fall back into alcoholism, or does 





demons, she fears her own demons even more; if Miss Jeannette is not “real,” then how 
can Tara still maintain faith in her own cure?19 Soon enough, although Tara does not tell 
her mother about Miss Jeannette’s pharmacist alter-ego, she falls off the wagon and 
returns to her self-destructive patterns; the despair continues, and Tara must figure out 
another way to conquer her inner demons.  
 In imagining Tara’s confrontation with shamanic healing, the creators of True 
Blood conjure up a gothic vision that enables them to consider the role of fiction in 
healing. Miss Jeannette, after all, is fictional—not only in the sense that she has been 
created for the purposes of an HBO television series, but also because within the world of 
the series she is a performed character. The pharmacist, otherwise immersed in the 
contemporary world of technology and official medicine, dons the woodsy dress of Miss 
Jeannette because playing this archaic fictional role yields results: not only money for her 
family, but also (sometimes) healing and joy for her patients. In this sense, the 
community surrounding Bon Temps (and especially, we are given to believe, the black 
community) has conjured her, interpellated her as a projection of their own fantasies of 
slave-era folk magic and healing. Tara, for example, doesn’t really think there are 
demons in the world, at least not intellectually. And yet, in some deeper sense, she does 
believe in them. It is only because these demons do exert force--because Tara is trapped 
                                                          
19 Indeed, it turns out that killing off the vision of a victimized young Tara is not so easily accomplished: in 
the second season of True Blood, Tara is visited by a strange and beautiful white woman who takes her into 
her home, gives her everything she wants (delicious food, dips in the pool, drugs, dancing), and reassures 
her that she is justified in hating her terrible mother. Yet the hedonistic Maryann turns out to be a nodal 
point of chaos. She hypnotizes almost every citizen of the town, seduces them into committing violence 
against each other, and fosters constant destruction. Her first crime: she kills Miss Jeannette. And why did 
Maryann come to visit Tara? Because, she says, Tara called her to come when she conjured up the vision of 
her young, frightened self. Maryann, it turns out, is yet another uncanny return of that vision; in pampering 
Tara and assuring her of her victim status at the hands of her mother, she nourishes the young, terrified 
Tara and keeps the demon alive. The season ends in tragedy, as Tara loses a young man with whom she has 





by clinging to them in the guise of her young and traumatized self--that Miss Jeannette 
can function as an efficacious character. Like the demon of alcoholism, Tara’s resentment 
and bitterness are “as real as cancer.”   
Just as the fictional Miss Jeannette serves as a reflecting mirror for the fears and 
desires of her audience, the show True Blood works in gothic fashion as an 
overdetermined projection of the fears and desires of a U.S. audience deep in the throes 
of challenges both personal and political: terrorism, cultural battles regarding religion and 
sexual orientation, war, class polarization, unemployment, and an economic crisis 
brought on primarily by malfeasance among a globalized elite of financial players. (And 
like Miss Jeannette, it reaps commercial profits in grappling with these fears). Here is not 
the time and place to impose a coherent order on True Blood’s jumble of social and 
cultural references, but even a brief sketch reveals that its world of vampires and 
werewolves is also a reckoning with eruptions in the twenty-first century U.S. political 
unconscious. The show’s premise gestures toward the movement for GLBT rights: 
vampires have come out of the closet--or in this case, “out of the coffin”--by openly 
announcing themselves as a presence in American life. And the chief opponents of their 
assimilation, evangelical bigots like Reverend Steve Newlin, resemble both right-wing 
militias and Taliban-style terrorists in their violent training camps and religious fervor. 
Meanwhile, the show continually gestures toward U.S. wars in the Middle East. When 
Lafayette is captured by vampires, detained in a dank cell, and chained to a metal pole 
along with other prisoners, the images of torture and fear are no less gothic than the ones 





Iraq war veteran in Bon Temps who battles post-traumatic stress disorder) finds an 
unexpected kindred spirit in Bill Compton, a vampire and veteran of the Civil War.  
Finally, through the contrast between small-town Southern iconography and 
cosmopolitan global economic and cultural flows, True Blood confronts the 
contemporary situation of planetary uneven development. Although the show’s action 
takes place in what otherwise seems an unassuming Southern town, Bon Temps 
somehow becomes the epicenter for century-spanning global clashes between vampires 
and humans (not to mention factional feuds between humans and humans, and between 
vampires and vampires), thus indicating a preoccupation with the way that local and 
regional spaces have become increasingly roped into global economic and cultural 
affairs. In the opening scene of the series, Tara reads a copy of Naomi Klein’s The Shock 
Doctrine: Disaster Capitalism, a tale of the way vampire-like capital swoops in on 
disaster areas like Iraq and post-Katrina New Orleans and exploits chaos to impose 
neoliberal privatization policies. Later, it turns out that certain vampires—many of them 
aristocrats and banking magnates who have been around for centuries—are behind any 
number of global problems, from financial crises to Nazism. Like Bram Stoker’s original 
Dracula, who is characterized by his mobility (on trains and boats) and whose expansion 
from Eastern Europe into Britain provokes the novel’s panic, these vampires are savvy 
travelers and border-crossers.  
Yet—also like the contradictory Dracula who, as Jerrold E. Hogle puts it, “can be 
extremely aristocratic and [yet] cavort among homeless gypsies” (12)--the True Blood 
vampires are unstable signifiers. They are globalized and cosmopolitan (Bill casually 





order is built on respect for age and experience, and the antebellum-born Bill speaks in 
stilted nineteenth-century diction. World-weary and eminently cultured, most of them 
look down on relatively inexperienced humans as a lower species; and yet their hyper-
refined tastes and rigid codes coincide with animal-like physical appetites: unbridled 
sexual lust and a hunger for human blood that can’t always be satiated by the synthetic, 
over-the-counter “Tru Blood” that gives the show its title. In terms of class, then, these 
creatures come across as an unsteady oscillation between high-class power and the lowest 
of lumpenproletariat disorganization: a curious amalgam of street bikers and CEOs, their 
spaces a mash-up of seedy sex clubs, classy hotels, and decaying mansions. And on the 
most abstract level, these vampires are contradictorily associated with both life and death 
in ways that can be difficult to untangle. On the one hand, they are “dead”; but in the 
persistence of their drives (they are sexual dynamos) they have unending prowess that 
ordinary humans yearn to acquire for themselves. Vampire blood becomes a black market 
drug precisely because, as Lafayette puts it, it distills pure life itself: “Our blood sustains 
life…this blood is life.” Who are these creatures that are both old and new, civilized and 
barbaric, life and death? The show titillates by continually withholding a clear answer to 
the question. 
In exploring these contradictory social poles, True Blood reminds its viewers of 
problems they might otherwise want to forget. And yet like many other gothic texts, it 
introduces such tensions in a way that the viewer can ambiguously disown them if he or 
she so chooses. Just as Tara can believe in demons without really believing in them (even 
as she remains tormented by real evils), the viewer of True Blood can uneasily dismiss 





always positioned itself unsteadily on a division between high and low culture, between 
serious art and silly entertainment, and between phantasmagoria and reality—and this 
ambiguity is a crucial part of its fascination, since if we can disavow the terror provoked 
by the gothic we can flirt with uncomfortable subjects without needing to face them 
squarely. There is much to laugh at in True Blood, and purposely so—and much absurd 
spectacle, beginning with the constant nudity for which the show is famous. And yet 
certain of its moments can haunt with their power: Miss Jeannette rescuing an alcoholic 
woman through shamanic theater; Lafayette and his lover Jesus drinking vampire blood 
and taking hallucinatory journeys through the past (and subsequently committing 
themselves to continuing their grandmothers’ healing traditions); the erotic vulnerability 
of human characters who submit to the vampire’s bite. In these moments, True Blood 
achieves what Walter Benjamin calls the “profane illumination”; the show does not 
simply wallow in “the fanatical stress on the mysterious side of the mysterious,” but 
instead achieves a “dialectical optic that perceives the everyday as impenetrable, the 
impenetrable as everyday” (“Surrealism” 78-79).  
True Blood fascinates because like many other gothic texts preoccupied with 
images of claustrophobia and entrapment, it is particularly interested in the everyday 
experiences of women. One of the classic images of the gothic (going back to the British 
novelist Ann Radcliffe) is that of a girl trapped in a haunted house, or attempting a 
furious escape from the forces that try to keep her stuck within it. In the third season of 
True Blood, Tara is kidnapped by a strange and disturbing vampire named Franklin 
Mott—strange, because although he holds Tara against her will in an old plantation 





fragile and sadistically violent, believes that he and Tara have a loving relationship even 
as he lords his power over her and punishes her for any thoughts of disloyalty. He even 
dresses her up in an old nineteenth-century style dress and plans to marry her. The 
subsequent image of Tara, running on the plantation house lawn, wearing a white dress, 
is both quintessentially gothic and resonant with American historical significance. Like 
many slave women who were not only treated as property by male owners—exploited 
both economically and sexually—but also expected to appreciate it and to radiate 
thankfulness toward their masters, Tara’s predicament uncannily penetrates the shadowy 
truth behind what Eric Savoy calls the impenetrable “otherness” of the past (169). The 
sheer absurdity of Franklin’s character is precisely what makes him convincing as a 
comment on America’s past and present (after all, even today U.S. citizens are expected 
to trumpet love and appreciation for their supposedly exceptional nation, no matter what 
their experience of it). And the show’s main character Sookie Stackhouse (Tara’s white 
best friend) also finds herself in claustrophobic and dangerous situations, unsure of who 
to trust and groping for the right path forward. If Tara finds in vampires only horror, the 
orphaned Sookie falls in love with the vampire Bill Compton, who provides for her an 
ambiguous but promising love as she struggles to find her place in the world.  
However, if Sookie and Tara both search for the possibility of a different future, 
they do so partly by looking toward memories of the past (a tendency formally 
emphasized in the show’s frequent flashbacks). Specifically, they share memories of 
Sookie’s dead grandmother Adele, who took care of them when they were young, and 
who emerges as a beacon pointing toward a nurturing social order that is otherwise 





performance as a reliable and stable nurturing presence was complicated by some 
incongruous element—it does not impede her ability to inspire Tara and Sookie. During 
her life, she was always there to provide some delicious Southern dish for the girls, to 
take Tara in when her mother was on a binge, to accept and protect Sookie despite the 
odd gift of mind-reading that makes her suspect in Bon Temps. Even when Sookie fell in 
love with a vampire, Adele invited him over for dinner and asked this Civil War veteran 
to speak at a gathering of her historical society. Her interest in history, her willingness to 
face what the ambiguous Bill has to offer, her acceptance of the strange and rejected—all 
of these elements marked Adele as a safe haven of sorts within the show, but one unfazed 
by darkness and uncertainty. However, opening up to darkness has its price: it is precisely 
because Adele accepted vampires that she was murdered by an antivampire zealot. 
Subsequently, the grandmother is signaled in the show by a repeated, gospelstyle refrain 
that emerges whenever Tara or Sookie need reassurance, often accompanied by Sookie 
rummaging through the traces of her grandmother’s belongings. Thus, the show seems to 
imply, no safe haven is absolute, since even the most trusted figure can become the 
victim of sudden violence and chance.  
Yet Adele also represents the show’s incipient regionalist impulse, an elusive 
sense of place rooted in history but not determined by it. Together, Tara, Sookie, and 
Adele’s ghost constitute a female collective that must make its way in a context notably 
devoid of positive male authorities.20 And their path lies not in a rejection of history and 
                                                          
20 True Blood depicts no analogous grandfather presence, and neither Tara nor Sookie has a father to speak 
of. Male politicians, religious leaders, and policemen are either corrupt or inept. Meanwhile, Sookie’s 
brother Jason supplies the show with its most sustained vehicle for exploring what emerges as a pathos-
ridden crisis of masculinity on the show, since as a hypersexual but immature young man he is comically 
hapless in his desire for masculine gravity. Precisely because Jason has a masculine self-image but no sense 
of direction, he is easily manipulated by the absurd male figures the show does provide: the opportunistic 





place, but in a gothic confrontation with these elements in the aim of producing a more 
just, fulfilling, and open sense of place. True Blood, then, is perhaps emblematic of a 
certain kind of U.S. gothic regionalist text that has emerged in a contemporary, post-
1970s period of neoliberal hegemony. This period is defined, first and foremost, by 
deterritorializing flows (of capital, images, people, and commodities) primarily controlled 
by a hegemonic transnational class that attempts to exploit, shape, and destabilize 
existing places and cultures for purposes of capital accumulation. If U.S. texts like True 
Blood, but also (as I will show) Sandra Cisneros’s 2002 novel Caramelo and Sherman 
Alexie’s 2007 novel Flight, are preoccupied with questions of nurturance and place, then, 
it is perhaps because a need for enduring, durable, and nurturing institutions (whether 
cultural, social, or economic) has become more pronounced during the past few decades. 
During this period, the U.S. has acted in concert with neoliberal ideology to increasingly 
farm out social functions away from communities and governments, and toward the 
volatile private market—a path which has resulted in intensified class inequalities and a 
more precarious situation for workers.21 True Blood both registers these shocks and 
                                                                                                                                                                             
only male characters who emerge with any sense of integrity are “queered” in some way. Lafayette and 
Jesus are gay, and immersed in shamanic magic. And Sam Merlotte, the owner of the restaurant/bar where 
Sookie and Lafayette work, is a (closeted) shape-shifter who can transform into various animals, but who 
was traumatically abandoned by his adopted family when they discovered his strange gift. Finally, Bill is a 
vampire, and Terry is marked as different by his struggle with PTSD.            
21 Whether it has involved “right to work” laws, the privatization of prisons, or the “welfare reform” of the 
Clinton ‘90s, the trend since the late 1970s in the United States has meant lower taxes, fewer social 
provisions, the demise of organized labor and other community organizations, and the ascendance of a  
hegemonic neoliberal ideology. According to this ideology, the state should avoid intervening in the so-
called efficiency of the market, since its actions would inevitably benefit unfairly those political 
constituencies who could gain the ear of the state. But although many constituencies (from corporate 
farmers to huge oil companies) do rake in subsidies from the government, women, young people, and 
families have been largely abandoned. Thus in the United States today, though every politician talks about 
the sanctity of the family, none of the important provisions a family might need (living wages, childcare, 
preschool, medical treatment, public transportation) are ensured by the state. Instead, in a nod to Margaret 
Thatcher’s famous dictum (“There is no such thing as society, only individual men and women…and their 






imagines fantasies of mutual support that can counter their disorienting affect, or at least 
keep the chaos at bay for a moment.   
True Blood, then, exemplifies what I call the gothic quest for place. And yet, in 
some ways it stays within familiar bounds because its gothic images circulate around the 
region of the South, a space which Americans have become accustomed to viewing in 
gothic terms. From William Faulkner’s novels to Anne Rice’s pulpy vampire tales and 
Seth Graeme-Smith’s postmodern pastiche Abraham Lincoln: Vampire Hunter, Southern 
texts often imply the weight of racially motivated historical crimes—so much so, in fact, 
that it is fair to say that the South has been scapegoated in an effort to let other U.S. 
regions off the hook for their complicity (and indeed their central role) in any number of 
horrors. What follows in this chapter, then, is an attempt to trace the trajectory of the 
gothic regionalist text not merely in True Blood’s bloody South, but in the often-
romanticized landscape of the U.S. West. Sandra Cisneros’s Caramelo and Sherman 
Alexie’s Flight, novels by authors renowned in the multicultural literary set, are more 
high-brow than True Blood (although each in its way uses humor, spectacle, and pop 
culture references to interrupt and complicate its graver gothic revelations). But like the 
creators of True Blood, Cisneros and Alexie dive into history, driven by an urgent desire 
to foster nurturing for characters who find themselves adrift in a confusing and terrifying 
structure of power. And both texts involve phantasmagoric confrontations with the dead.  
Thus, if True Blood follows the well-worn path of the Gothic South, Caramelo 
and Flight remind their readers that the U.S. West, too, is haunted by crimes both past 
and present, and cannot be quarantined from transnational global flows. Caramelo, in 





Mexico border, and by a racialized division of labor in which Mexican-Americans often 
toil in the service sector of an increasingly post-Fordist economy. Flight, appearing 
several years later in a post 9/11 environment, faces up to urban poverty, a historical 
legacy of Indian subjugation, and international terrorism and war. And notably, in a 
prefiguration of True Blood’s focus on the struggles of a younger generation to find faith 
and purpose, both Caramelo and Flight find in the experience of child narrators a way of 
thematizing the problems of institution-building and social responsibility in a context 
dominated by the creative destruction of contemporary capitalism. 
 
The Politics of Memory in Sandra Cisneros’s Caramelo 
In times of terror, when everyone is something of a conspirator, everybody will be in the 
position of having to play detective. Flanerie gives the individual the best prospects of 
doing so…His indolence is only apparent, for behind this indolence there is the 
watchfulness of an observer who does not take his eyes off a miscreant…The hero of the 
book decides to go in search of adventure by following a scrap of paper which he has 
given to the wind as a plaything. No matter what traces the flaneur may follow, every one 
of them will lead him to a crime. 
--Walter Benjamin, from The Writer of Modern Life (72) 
 
To articulate the past historically does not mean to recognize it ‘the way it really was’ 
(Ranke). It means to seize hold of a memory as it flashes up at a moment of 
danger….The danger affects both the content of the tradition and its receivers. The same 
threat hangs over them both: that of becoming a tool of the ruling classes. In every era the 
attempt must be made anew to wrest tradition away from a conformism that is about to 
overpower it…Only that historian will have the gift of fanning the spark of hope in the 
past who is firmly convinced that even the dead will not be safe from the enemy if he 
wins. And this enemy has not ceased to be victorious. 
--Walter Benjamin, from Theses on the Philosophy of History (255) 
At one point in Sandra Cisneros’s 2002 novel Caramelo, the narrator—a teenaged 
girl named Celaya who attends a public vocational high school in San Antonio, Texas—
flees (in classic gothic style) from the rocks and insults of her female classmates. These 





family, holds herself above them (“Think you’re so smart because you talk like a white 
girl….You think you’re better than us, right?”) (356). In her attempt to escape their 
attacks Celaya plunges headlong onto the interstate. It is in this moment of danger--
paralyzed by fear in the “middle strip” of the freeway, “puking up tears,” pelted by 
gravel, surrounded by roaring semitrucks, and bemoaning her lack of place in the 
world—that Celaya first hears the ghostly voice of her dead Mexican grandmother 
speaking to her. “Celaya. The voice is so sharp and clear and close to my ear, it hisses 
and sizzles and makes me jump. Celaya” (357). 
It is thus in the middle of a multifaceted crisis, and amid the disorienting motion 
of a high-speed transportation artery, that Celaya’s surreal dialogue with her 
grandmother’s ghost begins. And this Day of the Dead-like summoning enables Cisneros 
to work through the novel’s central theme: Celaya’s fear of repeating the grandmother’s 
failures, and hence of being trapped by the past. In a climactic visitation the Grandmother 
pleads with Celaya not to “repeat” her mistake of marrying in a desperate hope to escape 
confinement, since in escaping her father’s house she can so easily fall into a new and 
equally dependent confinement: “Me? Haunting you? It’s you, Celaya, who’s haunting 
me. I can’t bear it. Why do you insist on repeating my life?” (406-407). A whole series of 
maladies plagues Celaya and links her to her Grandmother’s story in Mexico City: her 
lack of options as a girl in a Mexican-American family, the trauma of moving to a new 
and forbidding place, the danger of aspiring to outclass her peers, the lack of private 
space, the financial and social pressures of poverty, institutional racism. Surrounded by 
all of this dark magic, Celaya scrambles for any avenue of escape, and finds death 





the mob of tormentors, she offers a despairing answer: “Take me, dangle me from the 
bumper. I don’t care, I never belonged here. I don’t know where I belong anymore” 
(356). The space of the interstate—the image of the open road so dear to mythological 
visions of the U.S. West-- is fundamentally ambiguous in this scene. If Celaya yearns to 
escape her noisy and chaotic house, to have peace and quiet, friendship, love, “to do 
something interesting…to design houses, or teach blind kids to read, or study dolphins, or 
discover something,” the interstate and the mobility it represents is exactly what she will 
need to master (352). In this sense, it represents possibility, transformation, motion. And 
yet this space is also confusing, dangerous, cutthroat, as vehicles jostle for position—so 
fast-paced that it might easily swallow up a lone girl fleeing across it, and turn her into 
yet another piece of roadkill.  
While Celaya’s problems are uniquely shaped by her female position within a 
patriarchal culture, her father Inocencio faces his own moments of danger. Soon after 
Celaya flees onto the interstate, Inocencio, a Mexican immigrant who fought for the U.S. 
Army in Korea, is forced to scour his house in search of legal documentation. In response 
to being made to feel unwelcome in his adopted country, he too summons an ambivalent 
image of the road as a metaphor for a motion that is both alluring and disorienting:  
Nogalitos. Old Highway 90. Father remembers too clearly the route south, and it’s 
like a tide that tugs and pulls him when the dust rises and the cedar pollen makes 
him sneeze and regret he moved us all to San Antonio, a town halfway between 
here and there, in the middle of nowhere. That terrible ache and nostalgia for 
home when home is gone, and this isn’t it….In less than three hours we could be 
at the border, but where’s the border to the past, I ask you, where?  
–Home. I want to go home already, Father says. 
–Home? Where’s that? North? South? Mexico? San Antonio? Chicago? Where, 
Father? 





San Antonio, then, emerges here not as a final destination, not as “home.” Instead, it is a 
“town halfway between here and there, in the middle of nowhere,” as if by living in San 
Antonio, the Reyes family is merely at a way-station en route to somewhere else. But 
while Celaya flees onto the Interstate, which in the novel’s 1960s setting had only 
recently been built, Inocencio looks nostalgically toward the “old highway” that might 
carry him back to Mexico--except that any final destination is unclear, because home is 
impossible to find, unless one can find a border to the past. As a result, Inocencio takes 
refuge in his family, over whom he exercises a certain authority (his last name means 
king), but also who he can nurture and provide for.  
The U.S. West in this passage emerges less as an uncomplicated beacon of youth 
and possibility, and more as a fearsome and ambiguous borderland, promising what it 
cannot always deliver even as it provides a space for the pilgrimage to continue. In Jose 
E. Limon’s terms, it is a “bedeviled” colonial space, not separate from Mexico, but 
haunted by a history of low-grade war between ethnic groups, genders, and classes (187). 
In Celaya’s revised grid, the U.S. West largely figures as a forlorn outpost distant from 
the novel’s geographical navel: Mexico City, “the center of the universe” (384). But 
precisely because it is so haunted, the West also presents an opportunity for a 
reconsideration of that intertwined history, just as Celaya’s dialogue with her 
grandmother’s ghost provides the possibility for a healing renewal. In such a context, 
motion emerges as a line of flight, a way out, but also as a between-space of death, terror, 
and loss. No one in this novel wants to remain in motion forever. As playful as the novel 
is in its narrative form (with its humorous interludes, flash-backs, imagined scenarios, 





zagging, its jumping back and forth in time and space, its humor, is governed by a gut-
level emotional imperative that doesn’t let go—Celaya’s desire, not only for privacy, but 
for commitment, and for nurturance at the social and familial level: for healing. But if 
Inocencio looks to his family for such nurturance, for Celaya, the family itself, while a 
nurturing space, is also one of subjugation. She must find a way out—and in this novel 
preoccupied with history and memory, her way out is through a reconsideration of the 
past. 
Because Caramelo leaps through space, time, and memory in an effort to work 
through trauma, and because its search for healing involves an urgent, phantasmagoric, 
and sometimes nightmarish path through the surreal quality of the everyday, this novel 
exemplifies the gothic quest for place in contemporary regionalist literature. The novel is 
chatty, humorous, and magical, to be sure, but it would be a mistake to read it as an 
unambiguous celebration of Mexican-American culture in the U.S., or as a quaint and 
quirky family saga. Rather, underneath its vibrant humor lies deep uneasiness and dread, 
such that the novel’s tone resembles what Mary Pat Brady calls “a constant dance along 
the spine of pain and pleasure”; behind its cumbia bounce is an abyss of blues (153). In 
fact, it is Caramelo’s gothic quality that helps Cisneros avoid serious pitfalls in the genre 
of magical realism, a mode which for Michael Taussig is often rooted in “a long-standing 
tradition of folklore, the exotic, and indigenismo that in oscillating between the cute and 
the romantic is little more than the standard ruling class appropriation of what is held to 
be the sensual vitality of the common people and their fantasy life” (202).22  Celaya 
                                                          
22 Cisneros’s narrator often enchants the reader with funny asides, and then—abruptly—interrupts the 
audience with pointed questions that dispel the chatty mood and force a Brechtian distance. To take one 
example: in a historical footnote about Maria Sabina, an indigenous Mexican healer who introduced 





Reyes is not simply “cute,” but is caught in the uncanny repetition of poverty, patriarchy, 
and national exclusion. Trapped between U.S. and Mexican forms of cultural nationalism 
and haunted by the subjugation of women in her family, Celaya (like Tara and Sookie) 
struggles to determine her place in the world. But precisely because the history of 
subjugation has been building for many generations, confronting it requires a spirited 
dialogue with the dead that delves into the wounds of history. 
Drawing from Benjamin’s linkage between memory and resistance, Brady sees a 
“politics of memory” in Chicana literature, and argues that “memory fuels resistance” 
because “dominating systems cannot force people to forget entirely that they are 
dominated” (138). And for Brady as for Benjamin, memory is not simply a storehouse of 
images and facts; rather, at key moments memories can surge forward, reminding people 
of buried desires that challenge official memory. Memories of joy, painful complicity, 
and longing can all function in ways that are unacceptable to the dominant signifying 
system, and if these memories could see daylight, they would alter the terms according to 
which we understand that system. In the Chicana context, Brady notes that the most 
dangerous (and potentially liberatory) memories might be simple images of women 
loving women—and in particular, mothers loving daughters. Because patriarchy places 
men first, any memory in which “male referents drop out” can disrupt the entire edifice; 
rather than burying their mutual desire for each other in an effort to secure the affections 
                                                                                                                                                                             
“strangers who did not understand that the mushrooms were medicine and, like any medicine, only to be 
taken when ill, and therefore muddied their purpose on this planet, which in turn lessened Maria’s powers,” 
Maria asks: “Was it all right that I gave away the mushrooms?” Immediately, Celaya interjects: “Tu, what 
do you say? Tu, reader, she is asking you” (195). In forcing the reader to reconsider the questionable 
appropriation of vision-inducing mushrooms, Cisneros also forces the reader to question his or her uses of 
the novel Caramelo itself, since its phantasmagoric images are also a form of “medicine,” and not simply a 
“cute” and “romantic” toy testifying to the “the standard ruling class appropriation of what is held to be the 
sensual vitality of the common people and their fantasy life.” At least Cisneros hopes they aren’t; in this 
passage about Maria Sabina, Cisneros is also interrogating herself: Am I too appropriating and dispensing 





of sons and husbands, women might be able to offer each other crucial resources in order 
to gain a foothold in a hierarchical world (164). Or, as Brady puts it, “refusing this 
complicity and tackling the injunction to put the man first means gaining freedom and 
also breaking away from ‘la procesion de mujeres, sufriendo.’” She thereby replaces the 
old injunction with a new one: ‘Free the daughter to love her own daughter’ (Loving vii). 
(160). In Caramelo, Celaya’s memories always function politically in Brady’s terms by 
provoking “dangerous revelations” that challenge the structure under which she lives. 
Specifically, Cisneros’s images of women loving women aim to disrupt ‘la procession de 
mujeres, sufriendo.’ Although the Celaya-narrator spends more time in the novel 
reworking her relationship with her father, her most profound images reimagine her 
relationship with her mother. Thus although she affirms her love for her father in the 
novel, she often revolts (both covertly and openly) against his wishes. 
However, Celaya does not choose her mother over her father in some clear way; 
instead, in David J. Vazquez’s terms, she “triangulates” according to their known 
positions. For Vazquez, post-1960s Chicano/a writers often steer toward new places by 
employing (and accepting or rejecting by degrees) existing binaries, starting with the 
black and white terms of U.S. race relations: “Navigators relate an unknown position to 
the known location of two others by mapping an imaginary triangle….Triangulation is a 
dynamic technique that engages multiple way points, distances, and recalculations in the 
process of navigation” (3). Thus Celaya uses her parents’ strengths and weaknesses in 
order to orient herself; she respects her father’s attempt to uphold some form of social 
order, but revises that hegemony in terms more favorable to women. Cisneros 





does not jettison tradition but instead employs it. While Caramelo looks backward—
toward childhood, history, and ancestors—it is never nostalgic, but uses compass points 
of the past while moving beyond them. Similarly, Cisneros triangulates between Mexico, 
the U.S., and an increasingly globalized contemporary system. In the age of NAFTA, she 
mediates between nationalist discourse (Inocencio’s nostalgia for Mexico) and a 
destabilizing postmodern discourse of hybridity and transnational identification; as 
Vazquez puts it, “Cisneros attempts to triangulate a new sense of the social that is free 
from static conceptions of the national, but that doesn’t dissolve into the hybridity of the 
transnational” (177). And Vazquez is correct to argue that she does so partly because, like 
many other Latina/o authors, she believes in the “matrixed subject” and thus rejects a 
dominant “liberal individualist” cultural model rooted in the autonomous self. First-
person “political autobiographies,” even fictionalized ones like Caramelo, “represent the 
self as inextricably linked with larger social structures like community and national 
identity” (6). And I would note--given Celaya’s flight from the clutches of Chicano/a 
nationalists—Cisneros’s triangulation is perilously gothic.  
In groping toward an “unknown” course that evades both the stasis of nationalist 
essentialism and the flux of global flows, Vazquez might usefully consider recent 
discussions of critical regionalism. As I have indicated in Chapter 1, the best articulations 
of critical regionalism attempt to evade the tendencies toward “depthlessness” in 
postmodern culture by triangulating between the global and the local, the past and the 
present, and the individual and solidarity. In resisting these tendencies in cultural 
postmodernism—and in articulating a dialectical form of critical regionalism--I take issue 





The Rhizomatic West. While I sympathize with Campbell’s celebration of a version of 
regionalism that proceeds in a constant and open state of becoming, brimming with “lines 
of flight” (7) and minor trajectories, I worry that a full-scale endorsement of motion can 
play into the hands of a globalized capitalism that uses destabilization to shape the world 
according to private market imperatives. Indeed, in the U.S. West “deterritorialization” 
(72) is hardly a straightforwardly anti-hegemonic trope, since it resembles so closely the 
frontier ideology of restless expansion and social avoidance at work in dominant Western 
narratives. An open state of becoming is a good thing, but in my view must be balanced 
by cultural and political institutions that enable commitment and nurturing as well. Thus 
in Cisneros’s properly critical regionalist novel, she deploys a sense of place that, 
although wandering and open in its approach (and carnivalesque and earthy in its humor), 
is not reduced to pure flux or ephemerality. Instead, however desperate, contradictory, or 
bedeviled Celaya’s situation becomes, commitment remains a crucial vector within it and 
thus renders a facile celebration of nomadism insufficient. In Caramelo a permanent 
home conceived as a reliable refuge from the outside storm is impossible—and yet the 
need for nurturance remains acute.  
We might say, then, that Campbell’s regional framework—exciting as it is—
suffers from a lack of Cisneros’s gothic sensibility. The gothic, with its emphasis on 
working through repressed crimes, is useful for Western studies because it highlights the 
role of trauma (and thus of memory and nurturing) in a hegemonic Western imaginary 
that often buries dark impulses in a pioneering drive toward an ostensibly sunny future. 
And since many of these traumas have especially affected so-called “minority” peoples in 





more friendly to the gothic—and to its potential healing properties--than their dominant 
counterparts.23 Latino/a literature, in particular, adds a crucial element to the U.S. West 
because its authors have often drawn from gothic traditions in other regions that 
implicitly criticize the West as a Stegner-ian “geography of hope.” From Hawthorne’s 
gothic romances to Faulkner’s swampy tangles, and from European surrealism to Latin 
American and Carribbean magical realism, the roots of Latino/a literature challenge the 
confidant, common-sense masculine ideal projected by hegemonic Western writers. 
Cisneros’s relation to the U.S. Northeastern regional imaginary provides a case in point. 
Krista Comer is correct to point out that post-1970s female Western regionalists often 
turn toward the Northeast because it supplies an antidote to the anti-modernist and white-
male-centered impulses of traditional Stegnerian Western regionalism, and because 
Northeastern versions of masculinity “tolerate self-doubt” and “some bending of the 
heterosexual imperative” (24). But although her comparison between Sandra Cisneros 
and Walt Whitman is justified because both authors imagine nurturing homosocial 
communities (Cisneros turning to female community where Whitman turns to a male 
one), the reference to the anti-gothic Whitman obscures Cisneros’s literary debt to other 
Northeastern voices—not only to the solitary and imaginative Emily Dickinson , but also 
to the gothic lineage of Hawthorne and Melville, for whom the ghosts of the past 
                                                          
23 Gothic elements are widespread in Latino/a culture, even if the Latino/a gothic has not always been 
highlighted by gothic-minded critics. Anthropologists like Taussig and Limon, for instance, see gothic 
tropes in Latino/a folk practices, especially in the tension between grass-roots appropriations of Christian 
images and the top-down power of the Catholic hierarchy (indeed, early European gothic novels used 
images of secretive Catholic cabals to represent decayed feudal authority). In her article “Learning From 
the Dead: Wounds, Women, and Activism in Cherrie Moraga’s Heroes and Saints,” Linda Margarita 
Greenberg argues that Moraga uses Chicano/a folk Catholicism (la Virgen de Guadalupe, the crucifixion, 
the day of the dead, the ritual display of corpses) to forge a socially conscious gothic text. In Caramelo, 
too, Cisneros “learns from the dead” by narrating the story of the Awful Grandmother, and employs la 





persistently encroach on the present, and for whom sin is very real.24 She may entertain 
Whitmanian fantasies, but these fantasies are couched in a gothic frame. 
 
Caramelo: La Procesion de Mujeres Sufriendo 
It seems to me little attention has been paid to the half-awake world—and call it what we 
will—this world of daydreaming, the world of reverie and, more complicated still, the 
world of free-floating attention that Freud wanted from his patients….And, it also seems 
to me, it is that state of mind that many people get in ritual—healing rituals, religious 
rituals, the sort of experience of being in and out of a situation at the same time. Now this 
state of mind just fascinates me. We call it trance….And, you know, since the beginning 
of time and across all human cultures there’s this capacity to…live a huge amount of 
one’s life in this in-between state. For one reason or another in the West we’ve been 
pretty bad at either taking advantage of it or giving it a name. It may be that the movies 
have filled up that space for modern people. In other cultures—many, many 
cultures…perhaps the majority of the world’s population, although it’s the poorest people 
in the world—spirit possession fills that, trance and spirits come into that 
space….Perhaps thinking about hope in terms of spirit possession would be a shoe-horn 
into thinking about hope and healing, hope and miracle, or hope and metamorphosis. As I 
understand it, spirit possession often implies being possessed with the power of grace, the 
transformation of a bad situation into a good situation.  
—Michael Taussig in Carnival of the Senses (54-55) 
In Chapter 1, I called attention to the importance of repetition within the gothic 
tradition, and to Bonnie Honig’s notion of the “female gothic heroine,” who crosses 
limits by investigating a mysterious world of power that presses on her in frightful ways. 
Appropriately enough, repetition plays an important role in the female gothic novel 
Caramelo, beginning with its negative manifestations; driven by their subjugation in a 
patriarchal system, lonely and confined Reyes mothers lavish attention on sons, ignore 
daughters, and help create the conditions for the neurotic social complex to begin again. 
But Celaya emerges as a female gothic heroine because she courageously investigates the 
                                                          
24The haunted social warfare in Caramelo evokes the way that Thomas Maule, the carpenter cheated by a 
wealthier man, haunts the Pyncheon descendents in Hawthorne’s The House of Seven Gables. Cisneros’s 
earlier fiction, too, from Mango Street (1984) to “Never Marry a Mexican” and “Eyes of Zapata” (in 





past in ritual dialogue with her Grandmother, and through “free-floating” forays into 
memory. In following the traces available to her, Celaya becomes a flaneur in 
Benjamin’s sense: “No matter what traces the flaneur may follow, every one of them will 
lead him to a crime” (The Writer of Modern Life 72).  
However, because the flaneur’s wandering through public space is officially 
reserved for men, her investigations must take place primarily in her mind, and in female 
gothic terms. In order to probe her gothic world, Celaya must be willing to be labeled 
illegitimate by powerful voices, and must therefore grow beyond her innocent 
expectation that authority will always function in her best interest. She must recognize 
that if she wants power, she must take it. And her investigations lead her into an agonistic 
relationship with her father, with patriarchy, with U.S. and Mexican cultural nationalism, 
and with essentialized notions of race and class. They transform her into a “Busybody, 
Ogler, Liar/Gossip/Troublemaker, Big-Mouth—in Other Words, Storyteller” (351). 
Through her narrative, Celaya engages in principled nosiness by prodding the limits of 
her world, sees what she shouldn’t see, tells “healthy lies” for strategic purposes, and 
sabotages the secrets of others. And although the novel never wraps up all of its loose 
ends—some of its stories and crimes remain unclear or concealed—Celaya emerges less 
vulnerable as a result of her explorations. She becomes a taker who refuses to succumb to 
paralysis, but instead learns agency through betraying the powers that structure her life, 
even as she acknowledges her vulnerability within (and complicity with) those structures. 
In particular, Celaya’s search reveals memories that Mary Pat Brady would 
describe as liberatory because in them male referents drop out, and because they unveil a 





comes to light during the first part of the novel, as Celaya recalls an early trip to Mexico 
City during which she experiences a rare opportunity to connect with her mother Zoila. 
Caramelo depicts female space-time as hemmed-in and controlled, and Zoila’s 
experience at her mother-in-law’s house in Mexico City is especially confining. She 
complains bitterly: “Everytime we come to Mexico it’s the same old crap. Nothing but 
living rooms, living rooms, living rooms. We never go anywhere” (68). In order to escape 
the endless repetition of “living rooms, living rooms, living rooms,” Zoila sneaks out of 
the house with her only daughter Celaya (she has six sons) and furtively enjoys a lunch 
with her daughter at a decent restaurant. This memory of mother/daughter love, separated 
from male referents, surges out for Celaya as an image of glamour and enchantment: “I 
think to myself how beautiful my mother is, looking like a movie star right now, and not 
our mother who has to scrub our laundry….And I’m so happy to have my mother all to 
myself buying good things to eat, and talking, just to me, without my brothers bothering 
us” (66). There is a jouissance in Celaya’s recollection of this anomalous encounter, in 
which Celaya does not have to compete with her brothers for her mother’s attention (or 
worry about spending money), such that she describes it as a “magic spell” (66). On this 
rare occasion, she and her mother become flaneuses, loose in the city.  
However, Celaya’s naivete about patriarchal surveillance and class realities 
results in the shattering of this spell. When she innocently blabs to the others about their 
lunch date, her mother turns on her, calling her a “big mouth,” and initiates a dramatic 
confrontation with the father. In response, Celaya experiences a range of emotions: guilt 
upon understanding that her mother is screaming “because of [her]”; grief for the loss of 





image of her mother throwing her shoe is powerful enough that it becomes mythologized 
in her mind as a dialectical image, a negative fairy tale picture of conflict: “Later when I 
think about it, how I’ll remember it different, outdoors, against the night sky, even though 
it didn’t happen like that. A Mexico City twilight full of stars like the broken glass on top 
of the garden wall and a jaguar moon looking down at me, and my mother’s glass shoe 
flying flying flying across the broken-glass sky” (66). Although Celaya is aware of the 
tricks of memory (history didn’t “really happen” this way), the image nonetheless reveals 
a powerful relational truth. The “glass shoe” makes the mother into a Cinderella figure, 
trapped inside doing housework and deprived of wandering flaneur privileges under the 
exotic “jaguar moon” of a beautiful city. Meanwhile, images of “broken glass on top of 
the garden wall” mirror Celaya’s interior fragmentation and confusion, and remind the 
reader of defenses against the possibility of violent intruders, as well as of the barricades 
and barriers of class segmentation. What shatters here is not simply a glass slipper, but 
Celaya’s formerly innocent view of the world. 
Images of desire for a repetition of jouissance between mother and daughter 
reappear throughout Caramelo. The novel is replete with lost objects of affection, but one 
of the most important is Candelaria, the Indian servant girl who later turns out to be 
Celaya’s sister, the concealed outcome of a past affair. And since eventually Celaya 
discovers her father’s secret, her memories of Candelaria are tinged with mourning for a 
sisterly connection cut off at the root. Candelaria appears in Celaya’s memory as 
beautiful and dark, a mother-substitute associated with play, laughter, and love: “She 
likes to carry me and pretend she is my mama. Or I can say,--Caw, caw, caw—and she 





Candelaria evokes a maternal eros of the body that is figured on an animal level; Celaya 
sits on her lap and accepts food from mouth to mouth, like a nourishing kiss. But like her 
other fantasies of mother-connection, Celaya’s friendship with Candelaria collapses 
under the weight of social structure. Candelaria’s ambiguous animal status, the bodily 
unselfconsciousness that Celaya experiences with her, is stigmatized as dirty and 
“Indian” by her family and others. Under pressure, Celaya gives her up, but not without 
ambivalently evoking their bodily closeness: “I’m not allowed to play with Candelaria. 
Or even talk to her. And I’m not going to let her hug me, or chew the little cloud of gum 
she passes from her mouth to her fingers to my mouth, still warm with saliva, and never 
let her carry me on her lap again as if I was her baby….Her skin a caramelo. A color so 
sweet, it hurts to even look at her” (37). The conflagration of pain and pleasure that is 
associated with Celaya’s memory of Candelaria recalls the prohibition against female 
desire that also prevents Celaya from receiving her mother’s full affection. Indeed, 
Celaya’s physical connection to Candelaria communicates Celaya’s fundamental desire 
for physical and emotional closeness with her own mother.25 
The novel’s conclusion confirms that although Caramelo spends more pages 
agonizing over the father-daughter relationship, its heart lies in the repressed mother-
daughter relationship. Cisneros’s final chapters feature a thirtieth anniversary celebration 
                                                          
25 Does Candelaria here repeat the stereotype of Indians as primitive Others, close to nature and therefore 
possessors of special powers that can rejuvenate supposedly overcivilized moderns? I don’t think so, for 
two reasons. First, Candelaria’s power lies less in her race and more in her age; because she has not yet 
reached puberty, she retains the bodily unselfconsciousness that Cisneros imagines as wild and free, but 
also as doomed to die with adult socialization. Granted, such characteristics of wildness and freedom are 
exactly what colonists have imposed on New World Indians, such that Indians represent for them the 
childhood of modern civilization (which must regrettably be given up). But Celaya seems to understand 
that such projections are unreliable as a guide to approaching actual Indians. Elsewhere in the text, she is 
deeply suspicious of authenticity, Indian or otherwise. For example, in narrating the story of Panfila, she 
describes a middle-class white woman who plays the role of indigenous folksinger so well that it achieves 





that places the father in a starring role. In these chapters, Celaya pledges her love to her 
father, but this official father-celebration, though important (Celaya does love her father), 
is undercut in the novel’s final dialectical image, a surreal montage in which male 
referents drop out. This supplementary “Pilon,” an extra chapter thrown in as an aside at 
the end, features Zoila, Candelaria, the power of female-female connection, and the way 
popular culture (in this case the old Mexican tune “Farolito”) can unleash memories 
redolent with a powerful desire for a different world. Through this song, people can sift 
through the past in search of what they have lost: “Out of a happy grief, people give coins 
for shaking awake the memory of a father, a beloved, a child whom God ran away with” 
(433). For Celaya, “Farolito” conjures a “state of being” that she can no longer inhabit: 
the 
music stirred up things in a piece of my heart from a time I couldn’t 
remember….In this case, I’d forgotten a mood. Not a mood—a state of being, to 
be more precise…girls somewhere between the ages of, say, eight and puberty, 
girls forget they have bodies….She doesn’t look in mirrors. She isn’t aware of 
being watched. Not aware of her body causing men to look at her yet. There isn’t 
the sense of the female body’s volatility, its rude weight, the nuisance of dragging 
it about. There isn’t the world to bully you with it, bludgeon you, condemn you to 
a life sentence of fear. (434)
 
The mood evoked here—of the intoxicated transcendence of the body—may never be 
recaptured, since (as any gothic heroine knows) innocence can never be fully regained. 
Celaya is a brown female body in a system divided according to class, race, and gender 
hierarchies. At the same time, though, one might wonder whether Celaya (or anyone else) 
can manage to repeat the spiritual impulse implied by such a state of bodily 
transcendence: the conquering of fear. While acknowledging that the past is gone, Celaya 
might be able to regain a semblance of its freedom through the “healing rituals” of 





which would imaginatively bind her to others in a temporary forgetting of the individual 
body, is what Cisneros has been searching for all along in her work.26   
Indeed, Cisneros’s subsequent montage, the final passage of the novel, brings 
together distant figures—her mother and her lost sister—in order to dramatize a 
repetition of the conquering of fear implied by the bodily transcendence of girls before 
puberty. This dialectical image intoxicates by summoning visions of female bodies that 
Celaya associates in her memory with play, freedom, and nurturing: 
The caramelo color of your [Candelaria’s] skin after rising out of the Acapulco 
foam, salt water running down your hair and stinging the eyes, the raw ocean 
smell, and the ocean running out of your mouth and nose. My mother watering 
her dahlias with a hose and running a stream of water over her feet as well, Indian 
feet, thick and square, como de barro, like the red clay of Mexican pottery. And I 
don’t know how it is with anyone else, but for me these things, that song, that 
time, that place, are all bound together in a country I am homesick for, that 
doesn’t exist anymore. That never existed. A country I invented. Like all 
emigrants caught between here and there. (434) 
 
In this imagined country the mother no longer wears glass Cinderella slippers, but allows 
water to run freely over her bare feet as she nourishes the life around her: an image of 
both pleasure and nurturing. And although Candelaria feels the “stinging” of the ocean 
flowing from her face, she is emerging from its clutches rather than being overwhelmed 
by them. This “Pilon,” then, collects the loose ends that are left unresolved in the 
preceding chapter’s narrative of father-triumph. Although Inocencio is labeled “King” of 
the Reyes family, this celebration is misleading, a healthy lie. Instead, the last word is 
given to those elements which trouble his mastery: the unfulfilled mother, the abandoned 
Indian sister, the hierarchies repressed by a nostalgic rendering of Old Mexico. And we 
are reminded that while Celaya promised her father not to tell the story of his own 
                                                          
26 When Esperenza in Mango Street dreams of clouds, or when the good witch Ines in “The Eyes of 
Zapata” transforms into an owl and flies above the revolution-haunted Mexican landscape, each enters into 





illegitimate birth, this “promise” was a healthy lie too, since she has spilled his secrets to 
the reader. In cleaving to the mother, she betrays the father.   
 
The Ritual Space of Freedom 
Critics have highlighted Cisneros’s preoccupation with privacy, an experience 
often denied to poor women who must so often spend their lives caring for children.27 
And indeed, any ethic of nurturing, like the one I have endorsed here, must not place an 
outsized burden on women, but must acknowledge the importance of ritual spaces in 
which nurturers of all genders can find rejuvenation through the kinds of free-floating 
activities described by Taussig. Cisneros’s work can be a key resource in developing such 
an ethic, because she has sought for so long to triangulate between private dream-states 
and public commitment. Indeed, despite her desire for privacy, Cisneros sees storytelling, 
writing, and imagining in fundamentally social terms.28 Thus in Caramelo, Celaya 
participates in a free-floating trance with her dead grandmother to create a narrative that 
also draws from the voices of others.29 And while this narrative is exploratory and 
wandering, it is not merely indolent, but mimics the way a patient and analyst retell the 
past in order to ameliorate a stubborn illness. 
                                                          
27 Geoffrey Sanborn argues that critics often downplay Cisneros’s celebration of Emily Dickinson-style 
privacy. But even Sanborn acknowledges that Cisneros does not exempt herself from social obligation; her 
vision of privacy differs from Dickinson’s in that she recognizes both how fragile an achievement privacy 
can be, and how important it is to help subaltern subjects achieve it: “Cisneros revises Dickinson’s 
relatively elitist conception of privacy in two ways: by insisting on its contingency and by opening it to 
nonelite practices of identification” (1336). 
28 And Cisneros’s writing has often functioned in this therapeutic sense. Her fiction has seldom strayed far 
from re-working her family experience, even to the point of repetitive obsession (like Celaya, Cisneros has 
multiple brothers, a Mexican upholsterer father, and a Chicago-born Chicana mother). 
29 Because the female gothic Celaya’s recuperation of her grandmother’s story is perceived as illegitimate 
by others, Heather Alumbaugh describes Celaya as a “narrative coyote,” analogous to smugglers who help 
people cross from Mexico to the U.S. Like me, she views Celaya’s storytelling as inherently social and not 
simply private. Still, where Alumbaugh sees Celaya’s desire to recuperate memory as a response to the way 
literal migration can disrupt historical knowledge, I would argue that the erosion of historical memory is a 





The object of the caramelo rebozo provides a suitable image in the text for this 
social narrative process in the pursuit of positive repetition. But the rebozo is an 
ambiguous symbol, since it can be used productively or counterproductively. Soledad, for 
example, uses the rebozo in her own private moments; by unraveling and reraveling its 
complex strands, she reminds herself of her mother’s love and of her link with previous 
generations of women. But in doing so, she allows the rebozo to become a fetish, a vain 
attempt to hold on to a past that has departed from her; just as she later clings to her son’s 
love although he has grown up and married, she clings to the rebozo in order to avoid 
facing the present. Such a habit of Kierkegaardian recollection is precisely why Soledad 
ends up as a ghost trapped on earth, why she relies on Celaya to redeem her story. And 
Celaya makes progress toward redeeming that story by transforming the rebozo into an 
object not of recollection, but of repetition. Rather than repeating her grandmother’s 
failures, she repeats a positive spiritual impulse that Soledad could rarely access: the 
rebozo not simply as an as an aide to private dreams, but as an agent of communication. 
Earlier in the novel, Celaya describes the way that the rebozo once functioned as a way of 
talking with others, a “language” that was denied to Soledad because her mother died 
before she could teach it to her daughter:  
Because she didn’t know what else to do, Soledad chewed on the fringe of her 
rebozo. Oh, if only her mother were alive. She could have told her how to speak 
with her rebozo. How, for example, if a woman dips the fringe of her rebozo at 
the fountain when fetching water, this means—I am thinking of you…But who 
was there to interpret the language of the rebozo to Soledad? (105) 
 
Because Soledad cannot “speak with her rebozo,” but instead uses it as a nostalgic fetish 
by childishly chewing on its fringe, it is up to Celaya to translate for Soledad and thereby 





network of labor and talk: in the process of rebozo-weaving, “it was as if all the mothers 
and daughters were at work, all one thread interlocking and double-looping, each woman 
learning from the woman before, but adding a flourish that became her signature, then 
passing it on” (93).  
If in the above passage the rebozo functions as a common labor for women that 
fosters individuality because it involves variation within a shared (if changing) tradition, 
later the rebozo attains a universal status, a symbol of the way everything and everyone is 
connected, not in a holistic conflict-free sense, but in the sense that sociality involves an 
ecology of interdependence and mutual co-authorship: 
I look up, and la Virgen looks down at me, and, honest to God, this sounds like a 
lie, but it’s true. The universe a cloth, and all humanity interwoven. Each and 
every person connected to me, and me connected to them, like the strands of a 
rebozo. Pull one string and the whole thing comes undone. Each person who 
comes into my life affecting the pattern, and me affecting theirs. (389) 
 
Above all, people are connected by their common need for nurturance: “Everybody needs 
a lot. The whole world needs a lot” (389). The fact that Celaya achieves this epiphany 
immediately after visiting her grandmother’s former house in Mexico City while she 
wears her grandmother’s caramelo rebozo, indicates how memory can work not only to 
provoke nostalgia, but also to engender renewed fidelity to ongoing work in the present. 
La Virgen de Guadalupe, too, is an ambiguous and powerful symbol in the Chicana 
context: alternately an official stand-in for the patriarchal Catholic Church (earlier, 
Celaya’s boyfriend Ernesto uses his devotion to la Virgen as an excuse for abandoning 
Celaya) and a folk symbol for the endurance and faith of “the most wretched of the earth” 
(388). Thus a line of flight—Celaya’s trip to Mexico City, site of past revolutions--





Celaya’s momentary healing, such as it is, does not come easily. Instead, her 
redemption follows Taussig’s template of healing through terror; Celaya can only 
become re-energized and reconnected by passing through the horrifying gauntlet of the 
Real. Immediately before Celaya’s ode to the rebozo, she confronts disgusting images of 
decay that have haunted her throughout the novel: “The old cathedral collapsing under its 
own weight, the air ruined, filthy, corncobs rotting in the curb, the neighborhood pocked, 
overpopulated, and boiling in its own stew of juices, corner men hissing psst, psst at me, 
flies resting on the custard gelatins rubbing their furry forelegs together like I-can’t-wait” 
(388). This surreal and disturbing urban imagery is connected for Celaya with the body 
(overpopulation, the “stew of juices”), with the “weight” of the past (“the old cathedral 
collapsing”), and above all with an insistent male power that intrudes on her youthful 
sense of self. The phallic “filthy corncobs” and flies “rubbing their furry forelegs 
together” echo a previous trip to Mexico City, during which Celaya first experienced 
menstruation and confronted a drunk man exposing himself: “I try not to think, but the 
things I try not to think about keep bobbing to the surface like drowned people. A green, 
white, and red gelatin with a dead bug curled on it. A corncob in the gutter. A hairy 
mango bone.  A fly on a drunk man’s pipi. A thick wad of cotton like a tamal sandwich 
between my legs” (262). Here too we find flies, corncobs, death, and the body: a 
symbolic distillation of Celaya’s traumatic Real, the uncanny return of the repressed that 
she would rather not “think about” and that she struggles to put into words. And it is the 
negative repetition engendered by such traumas that Celaya’s later trip to Mexico City 





prelude to the beautiful images to follow: the rebozo, la Virgen, her grandmother’s 
struggle to communicate. 
Despite the phallic imagery operating in these scenes, it would be a mistake to 
imagine the traumatic Real exclusively as a confrontation with the male realm. Rather, it 
is only insofar as these male penetrations impress upon Celaya a characteristically 
feminine sense of castration that they result in trauma, hysteria, and disorientation. 
Especially in her early trip to Mexico City, Celaya’s disgust with the “drunk man’s pipi” 
coincides with disgust at her own unstable borders as she grapples (for the first time) with 
the uncanny menstrual eruption from her body. Facing this loss of blood that is both 
intimate and alien (and yet at the same time a precondition for fertility and birth), Celaya 
begins to see herself as an abject figure: as a permeable self who cannot keep it together, 
as it were. Facing her grandmother’s death, too, Celaya is reminded of “all these things I 
shouldn’t think about” in “this world of rotten pain and stink” (349). Her grandmother in 
this scene is less a bearer of meaningful stories and more a disgusting piece of meat 
reflecting the inevitable decay of death. And fittingly, the grandmother’s mortal 
vulnerability here—the contingency of her body, its permeability as it faces the world’s 
ravages—reminds Celaya of a strange confluence of meat, insects, and birth, all leading 
up to a consideration of her mother. She recalls an odd story: “When I was born Mother 
said she needed two things after getting out of the hospital—Please, a pork chop 
sandwich from Jim’s Original Hot Dogs on Maxwell Street, and a barbacoa taquito just 
down the street at La Milagrosa. And me just wrapped in my new flannel blanket, hair 
wet as a calf…Don’t look!” (349). Celaya’s grotesque self-image here (as a human 





of her mother devouring meat; here we have a juxtaposition of birth and death (the 
creation of new life and the devouring of a dead animal), of disgust and desire, that 
Celaya hardly knows how to symbolize.    
If Celaya sees the grandmother’s death in this horrified way, and thus yearns to 
abject it (to throw it off), it is precisely through her subsequent dialogue with her 
grandmother that she can learn to see death in a different way—not as an overwhelming 
or disgusting event, but as a positive fulfillment of desire and thus an anchor of meaning 
in the midst of the unmappable, overdetermined situation of life. Seeing through her 
grandmother’s eyes after she has begun to speak with her ghost, Celaya as 
narrator/medium channels Soledad’s death, redescribing it as a positive repetition of a 
rare moment of quiet in Soledad’s past. Death here becomes not merely disgusting, but 
peaceful, since it evokes a brief temporal window at a Yucatan beach when Soledad’s 
husband and children left her to rest in the sand:  
Soledad fell asleep for a little, the water licking her earlobes, saying things she 
didn’t need to understand. A peace and joy she would remember forever after 
whenever she needed to feel safe. That’s what she felt now as she was dying and 
her life was letting her go. A saltwater warmth of well-being. The water lifting her 
and her self floating out from her life. A dissolving and a becoming all at once. It 
filled her with such emotion, she stopped thrashing about and let herself float out 
of her body, out of that anchor her life, let herself become nothing, let herself 
become everything little and large, great and small, important and unassuming. 
Puddle of rain and the feather that fell shattering the sky inside it, votive candles 
flickering through blue cobalt glass, the opening notes of that waltz without a 
name, the steam from a clay bowl of rice in bean broth, and the steam from a 
fresh clod of horse dung. Everything, everything. Wise, delicate, simple, obscure. 
And it was good and joyous and blessed. (348)
 
In much of the novel Celaya fears water and the ocean, since they threaten to suffocate 
her-- but here she accepts that water (like the mother-body) can be delightful as well as 





Soledad into nothingness, does not horrify her, but instead involves a profoundly restful 
permission to let go, “a dissolving and a becoming all at once” that is trance-like in its 
free-floating quality, such that it gives rise to a whole series of free-associations 
summoning the most common and transient details in a lyrical procession. Even “horse 
dung,” in this free-floating sphere, can be beautiful in its everyday impenetrability. The 
mother-body, then—and by extension, the life-giving ecological mesh in which we live 
as dependent and partial beings—can be not only terrifying, but intimate, “delicate, 
simple, obscure,” and perhaps even “good and joyous and blessed.” 
Ultimately, Soledad and Celaya’s dialogue produces the novel. The novel 
Caramelo is a repetition of the rebozo: a labor of love and a way of communicating with 
men and women, but also a way of affecting (even if slightly) the broader social weave. 
By writing, Cisneros inserts herself into a tradition, grapples with the traumatic past, and 
puts her signature on a specific reweaving of it. An important aspect of that signature is a 
devotion to Moraga’s law: “Free the mother to love the daughter.” And if in Caramelo, 
Celaya can only find imaginary moments of mother-connection, in her 2009 introduction 
to the twenty-fifth anniversary edition of The House on Mango Street Cisneros highlights 
a brief moment in which such freedom has been achieved in reality. Here she describes 
bringing her mother to her new office in San Antonio: 
Stars come out shyly, one by one. You lie down next to me, and drape one leg 
over mine like when we sleep together at your home. We always sleep together 
when I’m there. At first because there isn’t any other bed. But later, after Papa 
dies, just because you want me near. It’s the only time you let yourself be 
affectionate….The moon climbs the front yard mesquite trees, leaps over the 
terrace ledge and astonishes us. It’s a full moon, a huge nimbus like the prints of 
Yoshitoshi. From here on, I won’t be able to see a full moon again without 
thinking of you, this moment. But right now, I don’t know this….‘Good lucky 
you studied,’ you say without opening your eyes. You mean my office, my life. I 





(It is important to note that while Cisneros’s father opposed her desire to write, her 
mother supported it.) Here Cisneros’s peaceful space is not simply her own, but a space 
open to others. In this case, the father’s death, however mourned, results in a space free 
of “male referents”; if her father’s ghost hovers nearby, it does not disturb the reverie of 
mother and daughter. In the repetition of sleeping with her mother, Cisneros finds a 
semblance of the free, bodiless quality of play and nurturance at work in Caramelo. The 
imagery in this homage—sky, stars, clouds, moon, art—highlights the free-floating, 
dreamlike character of their ceremonial sojourn together. Later, in the trance of writing 
about the episode after her mother’s death, and in the periodic promptings of succeeding 
full moons, Cisneros can repeat the moment and access its power. Like Tara and Sookie 
in True Blood, she finds provisional sanctuary in the memory of nurturing solidarity 
between women. 
However, this passage, written after Caramelo, also tells the story of a return to 
the U.S. West. Here San Antonio is not pure “hell,” even if the seemingly Edenic 
precincts of Cisneros’s office are still bedeviled by poverty and conflict (and even if 
Cisneros still can’t quite imagine a fulfilling male/female relationship). Rather, it is a 
West transformed, even if slightly, by Cisneros’s role as a ceremonial leader on behalf of 
others. The younger Cisneros in 1980 was fundamentally afraid, spooked: “She’s afraid 
of ghosts, deep water, rodents, night, things that move too fast—cars, airplanes, her life. 
She’s afraid she’ll have to move back home again if she isn’t brave enough to live alone” 
(xxi). If the older Cisneros is no longer afraid in the same way, it is partly because she 
doesn’t actually live alone—she is surrounded by the presence of others, by supporters, 





with the help of others like her mother, a ceremonial space that can keep the devil at bay. 
And this quality of what Stephen Tatum calls “spectral beauty” can only be maintained 
through continual and ritual performance; as Ellen Meloy writes, in a passage cited by 
Tatum, “the crucial point about such ‘ceremonial membranes’ is that ‘only when 
someone was in a sacred situation, at a sing or ceremonial…was harmony restored, and 
even then, residue remained outside the ceremonial membrane, usually in the form of 
ghosts, so you had to keep singing, all your life” (cited in Tatum 139-140). For Cisneros, 
“residue” is always left over—in Caramelo, the rejected Indian sister Candelaria hangs 
over the book like a ghost. But Cisneros has also learned to “keep singing” toward a 
remapping of the U.S. West. 
 
Lifeguards on the Shore of Lake Fucked: 
Carnival and Grace in Alexie’s Flight 
“What year is it?” I ask. 
That makes them laugh, too. 
“Dude,” Paul says, “you are way drunk.” 
“Just tell me what year it is,” I say. “Please.” 
“Two thousand seven,” he says. 
“It’s now,” I say. 
“Well, no matter where you are, dude, it’s always now, ain’t it?” 
Great, a fucking philosopher. (134) 
The above first-person narrator in Sherman Alexie’s 2007 novel Flight is 
confused not simply because he is drunk (though he is), but because he has spent several 
days moving from body to body, rocketing through historical eras like a spirit adrift in 
time. In zigzag fashion, the fifteen-year-old boy Zits has already seen through the eyes of 
multiple figures: a white policeman in Idaho’s Red River Indian Reservation in the 





white soldier participating in a massacre in a nineteenth-century Indian village; and a 
middle-aged white male pilot during the recent past. In the above scene, Zits attempts to 
determine his whereabouts, and soon discovers more than he wants to know: he lives in 
the body of his fifty-year-old father, an alcoholic Indian man who left him when he was 
young, and who now lives on the streets of Seattle. If in Caramelo, Celaya speaks with 
the ghost of her dead grandmother, and realizes the “terrible truth” that in her devotion to 
her father she has “turned into” a repetition of her (“I am the Awful Grandmother. For 
love of father I’d kill anyone who came near him to hurt him or make him sad”), in Flight 
Alexie takes Cisneros’s conceit one step further (424). Zits, a foster child who has 
endured and inflicted years of abuse, and who turns to alcohol just as his father did, 
literally becomes his hated father. This gothic trope, in which one looks in the mirror and 
sees the terrifying Other, puts Zits in an uncanny and disturbing situation: “I am my 
father….Who can survive such a revelation?” (150-151)  
Yet like Celaya, Zits does survive these terrifying revelations, specifically by 
exploring the hidden crimes of the past. In doing so, he resembles Honig’s gothic heroine 
in that his efforts to overcome negative repetition (and thus to assert agency) take the 
form of illegitimate investigations into the structures that determine his life. The female 
gothic form, then, is not the exclusive province of women caught within the net of the 
patriarchy, but provides a useful template for any artist who seeks to illuminate a 
subordinate subject’s efforts to situate herself (or himself) within a complex network of 
power. Like Celaya’s search, Zits’s quest for nurturance and commitment emerges in 
response to a moment of danger: Zits (called so because his face is disfigured by acne) is 





himself kicked out of a serial list of foster homes. Abandoned by his father at a young 
age, he lost his mother to cancer when he was only six years old. From then on, his life 
has become a numbing history of negative repetition. He has been abused by many men, 
and moves through so many houses that he describes himself as a “flaming jet, crashing 
into each new foster family”: “I often wake in strange rooms. It’s what I do” (11, 1). And 
like Tara in True Blood, he worries that he will never escape this cycle of self-loathing, 
resentment, and distrust. He has been told by experts that he will always be 
“programmed” for dysfunctionality: “I’m fighting and kicking because that’s what I do. 
It’s how I’m wired. It’s my programming. I read once that if a kid has enough bad things 
happen to him before he turns five, he’s screwed for the rest of his life” (17). In St. Paul’s 
gothic terms, Zits is enslaved by sin—not simply because he continually hurts himself 
and others, but because he repetitively wants what he doesn’t want to want. He doesn’t 
want to want alcohol, or to set fires. Rather, he is “dying from about ninety-nine kinds of 
shame” (4).    
However, Zits manages to dig himself into an even deeper pit—one that leads him 
into a gothic and phantasmagorical trip through time and space. Thrown into jail yet 
again (this time for pushing his newest foster mother), Zits discovers an odd and beautiful 
young white man who calls himself Justice, and who emerges as his only friend. Justice 
is remarkably well-read for a teenager, and sympathizes with Zits’s predicament. He cites 
Nietzsche, laments the U.S. history of Indian dispossession, and gives Zits a gun. 
Together, they consider the history of the Ghost Dance—the belief among certain Indians 
in the 1880s and 1890s that if enough Indians would participate in a ceremonial dance, 





Zits believes that a successful Ghost Dance would require the concerted action of many 
Indians, Justice begs to differ: “I think you’re strong enough to Ghost-Dance all by 
yourself. I think you can bring back all the Indians and disappear all the white people” 
(31). Justice, then, works on behalf of nostalgic Kierkegaardian recollection, since he 
believes that the past can be restored in all its supposed glory. Rather than helping Zits to 
destroy his traumatized younger self (as Miss Jeannette does with Tara in True Blood) 
and move on toward new forms of solidarity, Justice nurtures Zits’ sense of resentment 
and flatters him with dreams of absolute power. Zits isn’t sure that he wants all white 
people to die, but he does want his mother to come back. Prompted by Justice, Zits enters 
a bank with a gun and—in a dreamlike sequence—opens fire on the people in the 
building. The result is surprising: Zits is lifted out of his body, and wakes to find himself 
inhabiting the body of a white FBI officer in 1975, engaging in a secret mission at an 
Indian reservation. 
 
Fighting Terrorism Since 1492: Flight in the Bush Era 
I did a vision quest for five years. And one of those years, it was a beautiful night. Stars 
were out, and it was calm, just beautiful. It was around midnight, and I got up and I 
prayed. I sat down, and sat there for a while, and all of a sudden I had these, like 
flashbacks of Sand Creek, Wounded Knee, and every policy, every law that was imposed 
on us by the government and the churches hit me one at a time…one at a time, and how it 
affected my life. And as I sat there I got angrier and angrier, until it turned to hatred. And 
I looked at the whole situation, the whole picture, and there was nothing I could do. It 
was too much. The only thing I could do, to me, was when I come off that hill, I’m going 
to grab a gun and I’m going to start shooting…. Maybe then my grandfathers will honor 
me, if I go that route. I got up, and I came around, and I faced the East direction. And it 
was beautiful, I mean, it was dawn. And it was light, enough light to see the rolling hills 
out there, and right above the blue light in that darkness was a sliver of the moon and the 
morning star. And I wanted to live. I want to live. I want to be happy. I feel I deserve 
that. But the only way that I was going to do that was if I forgive. And I cried that 
morning, because I had to forgive. Since then, every day I worked on that commitment. 





have to deal with that at some point in your life. You have to address that, you have to 
make a decision. If you don’t, you’re gonna’ die on the road someplace, either from being 
too drunk, or you might take a gun to your head, if you don’t handle those situations. So 
this isn’t history. I mean, it’s still with us. What has happened in the past will never leave 
us. For the next 100, 200 years, it’ll be with us. And we have to deal with that, everyday.  
--Albert White Heat, Lakota, interviewed in Stephen Ives’ PBS documentary The West 
(1996) 
 
Caramelo emerged against a late 1990s, post-NAFTA backdrop defined by 
Clinton’s official discourse of multiculturalism, the integration of “developing” nations 
like Mexico into the global economy, and the retrenchment of economic inequality across 
the globe. Its ghosts emerge from the conflicts and terrors lingering in this U.S-Mexican 
nexus: patriarchy and racism on both sides of the border, migrants anxious about being 
deported, and the fear of proletarianization.30 Alexie’s Flight, in contrast, is a document 
                                                          
30 As I argue in the Introduction, the Clinton period in the U.S. involved a shift from Reaganite cultural 
nationalism and Cold War American exceptionalism toward an official state ideology of multiculturalism 
more suited to a globalized economy in which “developing” countries like Mexico would play a more 
important economic role. In this sense, Caramelo and other Mexican-American cultural texts (from 
Cisneros’s Chicano/a literary cohorts to the films of Robert Rodriguez) served to introduce a broad 
American public to Mexico as a rising cultural and economic power in its own right. And what did this 
Mexico look like? It was hard to tell, since so many important and complex transformations were afoot, and 
because even promising changes (like the end of the PRI dictator-party) seemed pregnant with negative 
implications. The PRI, which Mario Vargas Llosa had described as the “perfect dictatorship” because it 
relied not on a single overweening leader but on a deep network of corruption and political power, finally 
lost an important election, as PAN candidate (and former Coke executive) Vicente Fox assumed the 
presidency in 2000. But the collapse of PRI’s absolute authority over the country coincided with the 
intensified collapse of Mexican civil society itself, as drug money increasingly began to infiltrate not 
simply the economy, but also the coffers of government officials at all geographical levels. And NAFTA 
played an important role in the increasing power of this drug economy, since in opening up more shipments 
between the U.S. and Mexico, the trade agreement made Mexico a more effective conduit for the trade of 
guns and drugs than older drug-producing states like Colombia. Thus if the decline of PRI and the rise 
NAFTA empowered some in Mexico (from manufacturers and drug cartels to foreign investors and well-
positioned businesspeople), it threatened others. The establishment of “free trade zones” along the U.S.-
Mexico border, for example, led to rapid expansion of the well-known maquiladoras, special factories free 
from U.S. tariffs and duties. Most of the workers at these factories have been women who have hoped to 
earn money in an effort to achieve independence and upward mobility, but they have often faced abusive 
bosses, low wages, environmentally unsafe working environments, and crowded, makeshift living 
conditions outside the factories. Many farmers, too, lamented the post-NAFTA dumping of cheap grain into 
the Mexican market, and were forced to find work elsewhere—especially in the United States. Most 
conspicuously from an international point of view, a group of revolutionaries reacted to NAFTA by 
asserting regional autonomy in a Kierkegaardian attempt to repeat the revolutionary efforts of Emiliano 
Zapata. Fronted by Subcomandante Marcos, the Zapatistas scrambled the coordinates of the Mexican state 
not by storming the capital as Zapata had done, but by asserting rights over the southern state of Chiapas, 





of the era that emerged after September 11, 2001, when a Texan president once described 
by an optimistic Jose E. Limon in 1998 as “pro-Mexican and pro-Mexican American,” 
and who once eschewed nation building as imperial overreach, shifted his focus away 
from domestic priorities and toward a global battle for revenge against foreign, barbarian 
hordes (Limon American Encounters 145). The U.S. wars in Afghanistan and Iraq have 
produced one gothic trope after another. On the one hand, U.S. citizens were treated to 
the mesmeric sorcery of head vampire Osama Bin Laden, medieval-style beheadings on 
the internet, and the global specter of bomb attacks from Spain and England to Iraq and 
New York City. But on the other hand, Americans got in on the gothic act as well, 
through bizarre images of torture that emerged from the dungeon bowels of Abu Ghraib 
and Baghram, fear-mongering red and yellow alerts of U.S. officials, and the increased 
surveillance of private life in the United States. And even if television stations and 
newspapers often preferred to sanitize the violent images of dead and wounded bodies 
produced by the war, the sense of death hovered in the background as U.S. citizens 
focused on other activities. Meanwhile, ghosts walked the streets in the form of damaged 
veterans who could not so easily tune out the violence.  
 These wars, waged on the often lawless frontiers of Pakistan and Afghanistan 
(though also in the urban jungles of Fallujah and Sadr City) unearthed ghosts from the 
U.S. past that still linger today: not only Vietnam and Somalia, but also the Indian wars 
of the nineteenth century. Richard Slotkin has highlighted the way that many white 
people in the late nineteenth century saw themselves as victims of Indians who raided 
pioneer settlements, and who defeated General Custer at the Little Bighorn battle of 
                                                                                                                                                                             
coincides with a period of change and possibility in the U.S.-Mexico nexus, but also one of anxiety and 





1876. Enraged by these provocations, these resentful whites adopted a furious rhetoric of 
race hatred and extermination. And colonialism at home could easily be adapted for 
colonialism abroad: because U.S. leaders exulted in the dominance of virile and virtuous 
white U.S. men over and above barbaric heathens, they could justify colonial wars in 
places like Cuba and the Philippines even after most Indians had been thoroughly 
subjugated. In 1893, the year that Turner declared the frontier’s demise, Buffalo Bill’s 
Wild West Show explicitly linked the Indian wars with the new U.S. foreign imperialism; 
the Wild West’s program “declared that the warfare of the future would primarily engage 
civilized nations with barbarian races, and that therefore the American Indian-fighting 
cavalry would become the ‘pattern of the cavalry of the future’” (80). Buffalo Bill’s 
prophecy has been remarkably far-sighted. Many U.S. soldiers deposited in the Afghan 
highlands have imagined themselves in a mythic space of cowboys and Indians, trapped 
(like Zits) in soldier-bodies and in a dimly comprehended pattern of skirmish and 
revenge. Just as most whites saw themselves as the wounded (and thereby innocent) party 
after Little Bighorn, most Americans saw themselves as innocent victims of foreign 
terrorists after the September 11 attacks. Encouraged by political authorities to see 
themselves as agents of civilization in barbaric outposts, many soldiers imagined that 
they were repeating Manifest Destiny by facilitating the triumphant spread of the 
American way in the Middle East.  
 Alexie’s Flight intervenes in this cultural landscape of gothic repetition to assert 
that whatever terror might emerge from Islamist sources in the contemporary context of 
U.S.-led global empire, one can find ample evidence of terror that has been operating as a 





frontier, on Native American reservations, inside foster homes and jails, and on the 
streets of U.S. cities. While wandering the alleys of rainy Seattle, Zits’s father wears a 
shirt that satirizes Bush’s war on terror by turning the terms against the president; next to 
a picture of Geronimo and his forces, the shirt reads “FIGHTING TERRORISM SINCE 
1492” (133). But although Alexie would likely endorse the spirit behind such a T-shirt, 
he is less invested in exacting revenge against white America (and in celebrating 
something called Indian America unambiguously) than in cultivating a space of 
caretaking and commitment on behalf of ghosts like Zits who fall between the cracks of 
officially sanctioned forms of national/cultural identification and privilege. No one—
neither Zits nor the novel’s white characters—is either entirely innocent or guilty in the 
struggle over the legacy of violence implied by the continuing line from the frontier of 
South Dakota to that of Afghanistan. Rather, the cycle of revenge created by terror 
(whether perpetrated by Islamist radicals or U.S. soldiers) is yet another variety of 
negative repetition that leaves little room for a swerve that crosses official lines of 
division and produces nurturance and healing. Like Albert White Heat, then, Alexie 
wants to register the way that past trauma continues to affect the present, but he also 
wants to find a way to put the pain to rest through a healing narrative process.  
Flight, then, is a transnational story of healing through terror. Just as Albert White 
Heat cannot help but imagine that grabbing a gun and exacting revenge will gratify his 
ancestors and secure him a place of honor in their eyes, Zits is easily drawn toward 
violent dreams of remasculinization and cultural revival. And in the figure of Abbad, 
Alexie somewhat clumsily renders another man acting in blind revenge after the 





Muslim refugee who, with his wife, commandeers a Chicago-bound plane and plunges it 
into the city) finds himself without a place, and in a repetition of Zits’s imagined shooting 
spree at a bank, channels his dispossession into an act of resentful violence against people 
who bear no direct responsibility for his predicament. But while Abbad’s action feels 
heavy-handed and forced in the course of the novel’s narrative progression (an 
opportunity for Alexie to say something important about a hot-button issue of the day), it 
is completely plausible in real life, since people have committed such acts. Alexie’s key 
point, then--that people deprived of a place in the emerging global order are likely 
sources for continuing violence--is relevant because it highlights the way that today, 
places cannot remain isolated from each other even when they are thousands of miles 
apart. In the novel’s ecology, the excluded (whether they are from Idaho or Ethiopia) do 
not simply disappear, but threaten to emerge in uncanny ways. Thus if Caramelo helps us 
achieve what Stephen Tatum describes as “postnational and transnational ways of 
knowing” (“Spectrality and the Postregional Interface” 6) through its provisional 
centering of Mexico City in the geographical matrix of the U.S. West, Flight highlights 
transnational flows as well, both in its treatment of international terrorism and in its 
rendering of conflict within U.S. political borders between Indian reservation-nations and 
the sovereign U.S. per se.  
With regard to this last division, Alexie rejects mystical notions of cultural 
identity and instead highlights the primacy of class inequality that cuts across borders of 
national sovereignty. Just as Celaya triangulates between the United States and Mexico 
(and retains no unalloyed identification with either), Zits is a refugee too: a self-described 





counted as an Indian by the U.S. government, since his father’s paternity was never made 
official. He finds no respite in a pure version of cultural identity, Indian or otherwise. 
Rather, although the haunted history between Indians and whites in the U.S. West 
permeates his current self, Zits often criticizes other Indians who refuse to count him in 
their ledger-books. At one point, he explicitly bemoans his ghostly invisibility in the eyes 
of defensive Indians who don’t want to face the gothic threat he represents: “The rich and 
educated Indians don’t give a shit about me. They pretend I don’t exist. They say, The 
drunken Indian is just a racist cartoon. They say, The lonely Indian is just a ghost in a 
ghost story” (7).31 Thus the prevailing fault line in Flight is not that between ethnic 
groups facing off against each other like unified teams, but the class line between the 
excluded and the included, between what Richard Rodriguez calls “biology” and those 
who hope to transcend its uncomfortable proximity. Zits’s overweening feature—his 
prominent acne—is but one way of symbolizing the fact that Zits lies at the bottom of this 
novel’s social heap, and thus has no reliable way of escaping what Rodriguez calls 
“undifferentiated life”—no way to “get the fuck out of here” except through self-
destructive violence and incessant running (Brown 213-214). His acne is a marker for his 
class status, not for his race or culture: “These days, you see a kid with bad acne, and you 
know he’s poor. Rich kids don’t get acne anymore. Not really” (21). So when his final 
foster-mother, Mary, honestly offers to help him heal his skin, Zits receives it as a chance 
to escape from his subordinate class position—and he doesn’t mind that his new foster 
parents are not Indian, but white.   
 
                                                          
31 See for example, Kathy Dobie’s “Tiny Little Laws” on the epidemic of ignored and unsolved rape cases 





Degradation and Renewal: Flight and Carnival 
In the world’s structure dream loosens individuality like a bad tooth. This loosening of 
the self by intoxication is, at the same time, precisely the fruitful, living experience that 
allowed [the European surrealists] to step outside the domain of intoxication….These 
experiences are by no means limited to dreams, hours of hashish eating, or opium 
smoking….The true, creative overcoming of religious illumination certainly does not lie 
in narcotics. It resides in a profane illumination, a materialistic, anthropological 
inspiration, to which hashish, opium, or whatever else can give an introductory lesson. 
(But a dangerous one; and the religious lesson is stricter.) 
--Walter Benjamin, from “Surrealism: The Last Snapshot of the European Intelligentsia” 
(71) 
 
In order to capture the uncanny quality of negative repetition that characterizes 
the U.S.-Indian trajectory from Columbus to Bush, Alexie turns to a phantasmagorical 
narrative device. Zits does not commandeer a time machine in an authoritative effort to 
explore history (like The Time Traveller in H.G. Wells’ The Time Machine). Instead, in a 
nod to corny but entertaining television shows like Quantum Leap, he is bandied about by 
time, thrown into new situations as if stuck in the malfunctioning digital memory of a 
national computer. Just as no one has individual control over the strange glitches and 
skips of the U.S. historical legacy, Zits has no control over his time-travel, which merely 
recapitulates the serial shock experience and disorientation that already characterizes his 
life. If Zits—with his succession of foster-families-- has become resigned to waking up in 
strange rooms, unsure of what will come next and who to trust, his new vocation as time 
traveler is in some ways another stage in the same game.  
Zits’s time travel, though distressing, also eerily expresses a fundamental fantasy 
that he has already entertained for a long time: the desire to escape his body and become 
a new human being. Zits often indulges this desire for escape through reading and 
watching television; he has already informed us of his “addiction” to books (12). But his 





Earlier in the novel, when Zits escapes from his latest foster family, he pictures himself 
as a super hero:  
My zits give me superpowers. After I cuss out my new foster father, I put on my 
cape and fly right through the roof of the house. I am Zit Man, master of the 
Universe! Okay, I don’t fly. I dodge the foster father’s angry slap at my head, 
shove my foster mother against the wall, and run out the front door. I run the city 
streets, randomly turning left and right and left and right, because it just feels 
good to run. I used to dream that I could run fast enough to burn up like a meteor 
and drop little pieces of me all over the world. (16)
 
Zits is driven here by hope for a line of flight, a way out of his negatively repetitive 
situation. And through his imagination, he transforms himself into phantasmagoric 
beings: first into a flying superhero, then into a flaneur running through the city streets, 
and finally into a meteor. This last image is telling; rather than a vision of integration into 
some redeemed form of society (a family or a collective, for example), Zits can only 
imagine a violent (if aesthetically glorious) spectacle of disintegration, as if for him 
conquering the world involves splintering himself into tiny parts over the face of the 
globe. This fragmented sense of place accords with Zits’s belief that he has nowhere on 
the earth to stand; more exactly, he doesn’t want to stand in any single place for long, 
because he fears that he will be hurt if he does: “I’m never in any one place long enough 
to care” (8). 
 Thus if Zits has already practiced body-hopping in an attempt to escape a self of 
which he is profoundly ashamed, his new historical body-hopping does not let him off the 
hook in the same way. When he finds himself transformed into an FBI agent, he cannot 
simply run away from the situation. Facing the gun of his partner, he must enter more 
deeply into the strange world in which he finds himself if he is to find a way out. And if 





cannot choose which bodies he will inhabit. Since these lines of flight promise novelty, 
learning, and self-transformation, but also fear and trauma, their effect is ambiguous. On 
the one hand, he often expresses exultation at the benefits and privileges his new bodies 
confer on him. As an FBI agent, he marvels at his new muscles (and penis size!), 
enjoying the full measure of a white masculine status that has heretofore been denied 
him. Later, he experiences love, nurturance, and skill in new ways; as an Indian boy he 
finally experiences a father’s embrace, and as a pilot he flies through the air with 
confidence. But on the other hand, he must also grapple with undesired aspects of these 
embodied subject positions. On the Indian reservation, he witnesses venal Indians who 
betray their cause in service to the FBI, and reluctantly participates in the torture and 
murder of a young Indian man; at the Little Bighorn, he sees Indians murder hundreds of 
white soldiers and subsequently desecrate their bodies; as an old white soldier, he 
grapples with the massacre of an entire Indian village; and as a pilot, he inhabits the body 
of a man driven to suicide. Finally, as we have noted, while dwelling in the body of his 
father, he wallows in vomit and blood in a rat-infested urban alley. If the overall effect of 
this shamanic journey through time and space is one of healing through terror, the terror 
implied by the Lacanian Real plays a key role. 
 By penetrating and enlivening the history of the U.S. West—with a focus on the 
experience of Indians—Alexie, like Cisneros, imagines the West as a haunted landscape 
and a colonial space of violence. While caught in a net of gothic intrigue between the 
anti-colonialist group Indigenous Rights Now and the double-crossing Indians who work 
with the murderous FBI, he echoes Celaya’s confusion and pain in San Antonio: “I did 





1975” (47 my emphasis). This view of the West as a bedeviled space is further 
corroborated as Zits inhabits other bodies in the nineteenth century. At first overjoyed by 
a visit to an Indian camp in South Dakota, Zits (in the body of a small boy) soon realizes 
that this world is doomed to destruction. His lament about the oncoming history reads as 
a brief chronicle of native North America, with its legacy of negative repetition, death, 
and loss:  
All these old-time Indians are doomed. They’re going to die of disease. And 
they’ll be slaughtered by U.S. Cavalry soldiers. They’ll be packed into train cars 
and shipped off to reservations. And they’ll starve in winter camps near iced-over 
rivers. The children are going to be kidnapped and sent off to boarding schools. 
Their hair will be cut short and they will be beaten for speaking their tribal 
languages. They’ll be beaten for dancing and singing the old-time Indian songs. 
All of them are going to start drinking booze. And they children will drink booze. 
And their grandchildren and great-grandchildren will drink booze. (66)
 
The fact that Zits can recount this history before it has happened only adds to the 
poignancy of the passage. To begin with, it points to a sense of history as inexorable, an 
unpreventable cycle of death that Zits is powerless to stop even though he can see from a 
future vantage point. Just as Zits feels he is “programmed” for dysfunction, this world, 
too, operates according to a fatalistic logic of doom. But this moment does not simply 
dramatize the strange interjection of a future perspective into the past; it also dramatizes 
the brutal repetition through which the past interjects itself into the future. While 
describing this litany of disaster, Zits is literally forced to live through it again. Like any 
trauma, the catastrophic history of native North America is uncanny in the way its effects 
ripple outward like a curse that refuses to alleviate its grip on succeeding generations.   
Despite the despair implied by such passages, Flight is not merely a dirge. Rather, 
like a Putumayan yage ceremony (and like True Blood and Caramelo), Zits’s experience 





mysterious side of the mysterious” is always undercut by the intrusion of everyday life, 
such that the novel is never merely ethereal or spooky, but deeply infused with the 
ordinary, the humorous, and the fallible quality of the body. Zits’s situation is at heart 
comedic; since others do not realize that the ghost of a twenty-first century adolescent 
boy occupies the body of their partner, friend, or son, Flight is rife with dramatic irony 
and the humor of misunderstanding. Moreover, in its elevation of the inept and wounded 
Zits to the heroic status of time traveler and narrator, the novel draws from the topsy-
turvy world of the carnival, in which the limited human body is revealed as a universal 
condition. In the carnival, we are all fools, particularly those of us who deny our 
foolishness and vulnerability. Accordingly, Zits’s narratorial position is that of a 
clownish “fish out of water” who stumbles through history and receives a number of 
figurative pies in the face. Narratively, too, Zits’s storytelling voice is not straightforward 
or authoritative; rather, just as the shamanic yage ceremony is constantly “interrupted” by 
mundane tasks, jokes, and bathroom breaks, Zits’s narration is interrupted by practical 
problems, wandering digressions, humorous asides, and degraded physical comedy 
(Taussig Shamanism 344). When Zits (as an elderly U.S. soldier) emerges from his tent, 
he realizes that he has no clothes on, only to dive back into his bed. Earlier, deposited in 
an Indian encampment, he is taken aback by the stench of meat and humanity: “I never 
read anything about this smell. I never saw a television show that mentioned it. I don’t 
mean to be disrespectful, but it smells like the Devil dropped a shit right here in the 
middle of this camp” (61). Zits’s attention to bodily fluids, his profanity, and his 
undercutting of the romantic image of the Indian camp takes an otherwise “mystical” 





heavy tone and mystical authority of the official voice of the past is brought down to 
earth and familiarized with gentle and sometimes saucy wit” (202).   
Later, dwelling in his father’s body, Zits encounters the nadir, the deep pit of what 
Taussig describes as the carnival’s wellspring of “degradation and renewal” (201). As a 
homeless man in Seattle, he becomes a darkly comic clown, “shambling” through the city 
demanding respect, getting himself beaten up, and engaging in free-floating 
conversations with others on the street. As deeply sad as this experience of homelessness 
is, it is also humorous, partly because for one so low on the social scale, anything can 
happen. The anarchy afoot in this world helps to loosen the individuality of all involved, 
such that secrets emerge into the open. When the father demands that a white man on the 
street “respect” him by telling him a story, the man tells him a strange tale in which his 
daughter’s pet bird falls into a pot of boiling water on the stove, and dies at an animal ER 
despite being attached to an oxygen machine. Zits’s father responds with uncomfortable 
laughter, and says, “I’m sorry. I don’t mean to laugh. It’s not funny”—to which the white 
man responds, “Oh no, that’s the whole thing. It is funny. It’s horrible too. But it’s 
hilarious at the same time. And when I saw that bird hooked up to those tiny little 
machines, I laughed” (148). But the humor of this moment is undercut yet again, by the 
painful secret that this white man will only tell a man this low on the social scale: that 
because he laughed, his wife and daughter left him, and have still not come back.  
Thus if many of these moments are funny—and some horrible and funny at the 
same time—they can also be simply devastating. And if humor is an inseparable part of 
Alexie’s novel, this humor crashes up against a deeper imperative for care and nurturing 





we maintain a certain distance from it, but in abruptly collapsing this distance, Alexie 
forces us to encounter an uncomfortable truth: that for the wife and daughter, the life of 
the bird matters so deeply that in laughing, the man loses them. This oscillation between 
a distanced view of events and a more immersed one is typical of the novel, since in 
occupying different bodies, Zits must empathize with people caught in a dizzying variety 
of situations while still retaining his own point of view. And as he moves into new 
bodies, the border between himself and the host-body increasingly diminishes, such that 
he begins accessing the memories, feelings, and abilities of other selves. While inhabiting 
Gus, the elderly white soldier and Indian tracker, he feels the man’s painful memories of 
an attack (by a particular group of Indians) on a white pioneer settlement, and feels the 
desire for revenge. And while in his father’s body, he accesses his father’s memories of 
his own alcoholic father—and specifically of the negative repetition of being forced to 
say, as if in a ceremonial chant, the same words over and over again: “I ain’t worth a 
shit” (155).  
The permeability of selves at work here--the way that Zits occupies different 
bodies, and is in return occupied by them--emerges as something more than “the 
mysterious side of the mysterious” precisely because this magical interpenetration is also 
thoroughly ordinary. In the novel’s model of the self-caught-in-the-mesh, spirit 
possession emerges as a guiding metaphor; whether we are shaped by the incantatory 
words of our fathers, or whether we shape others by telling them our stories, the self is 
characterized not by absolute self-determination, but by a gothic process of mutual 
interpenetration that can be alternately terrifying and salvational, depending on the nature 





predicament of spirit possession. Through literary sorcery Alexie deposits us in the body 
of Zits, a first person narrator whose thoughts we can hear, and poses us with the question 
of how we will react. Ultimately, Zits is as helpless and pathetic as the bird who fell into 
a pot of boiling water—and as unlikely to emerge alive after his scarring. Thus although 
Zits’s story is funny in many ways, Alexie dares us not to take his story seriously. 
 
Not Some Mystical Bastard: the Eruption of Secular Grace 
The Resurrection…is not, in Paul’s own eyes, of the order of fact, falsifiable or 
demonstrable. It is pure event, opening of an epoch, transformation of the relations 
between the possible and the impossible. For the interest of Christ’s resurrection does not 
lie in itself, as it would in the case of a particular, or miraculous, fact. Its genuine 
meaning is that it testifies to the possible victory over death, a death that Paul 
envisages…not in terms of facticity, but in terms of subjective disposition. Whence the 
necessity of constantly linking resurrection to our resurrection….In contrast to the fact, 
the event is measurable only in accordance with the universal multiplicity whose 
possibility it prescribes. It is in this sense that it is grace, and not history. The apostle is 
then he who names this possibility (the Gospels, the Good News, comes down to this: we 
can vanquish death). His discourse is one of pure fidelity to the possibility opened up by 
the event. It cannot, therefore, in any way (and this is the upshot of Paul’s 
antiphilosophy) fall under the remit of knowledge. The philosopher knows eternal 
truth….The apostle, who declares an unheard-of possibility, one dependent on an evental 
grace, properly speaking knows nothing.  
--Alain Badiou, Saint Paul: The Foundation of Universalism (45) 
 
The de-dialectization of the Christ-Event allows us to extract a formal, wholly 
secularized conception of grace from the mythological core. Everything hinges on 
knowing whether an ordinary existence, breaking with time’s cruel routine, encounters 
the material chance of serving a truth, thereby becoming, through subjective division and 
beyond the human animal’s survival imperatives, an immortal.  
-- Badiou (66) 
Like Celaya’s story in Caramelo, Zits’s gothic quest for place looks to the past 
for a source of positive repetition built on a core value of nurturing in a context of mutual 
interdependence. Key to both Cisneros’s and Alexie’s vision is a sense that history 





exercise in the same—or, as Badiou would put it, of death within time’s cruel routine. 
Instead, what Zits discovers in his hallucinogenic investigation into history is that some 
form of grace can operate, such that it is possible to swerve toward healing and away 
from a negative repetition that is all too expected. Specifically, Zits encounters an event 
that, in Badiou’s terms, inspires his fidelity and thereby colors all of his subsequent 
decisions: during a massacre of an Indian village, Zits (as the white soldier Gus) 
witnesses a young white soldier saving a five-year-old Indian boy from an otherwise 
certain death. And after struggling to control Gus’s body, Zits too joins the young soldier 
(who he names Small Saint), thereby becoming a “traitor” in the eyes of the company. 
That their fellow soldiers accuse Small Saint and Gus of “going Indian” has a layer of 
irony here, given that the white Gus is literally possessed by the spirit of a twenty-first 
century Indian boy. But Small Saint, too, is possessed by some unknown spirit, since he 
is compelled to save the boy even though the act endangers his own safety and estranges 
him from his expected social role. The accusations of betrayal underscore the sense in 
which a swerve away from the sanctioned negative repetition (enshrined in the “laws” of 
racial and national loyalty, revenge, and what Jacques Ranciere would describe as the 
official account of who counts) can cut against the grain of legitimacy in exactly the way 
described by the female gothic. The female gothic heroine is never granted power; 
instead, she must take it.  
In this nineteenth-century frontier context, the idea that a U.S. soldier would 
“count” Bow Boy within the human domain is so unexpected and illegitimate that it 
defies belief and provokes official retaliation—but also hope. Zits responds with 





saint, is trying to save Bow Boy. I wonder if the other escaping Indians see this. I wonder 
if it gives them hope. I wonder if this act of love makes it easier for them to face death” 
(93).  And while this event is hard to believe, its grace is not mystical, not shrouded in the 
mysterious side of the mysterious. Instead, it is simply part of the process of life, and 
thereby describes any event (for example, Tahrir Square in Egypt) that could not be 
predicted by knowing experts, but that nonetheless happens. In describing the escape of 
Small Saint and Bow Boy, Zits revisits and revises his earlier fantasy of flying. He no 
longer offers us an image of a meteoric disintegration, but one of a nurturing rescue built 
on the integration of a militant collective:  
Faster, faster now, faster than I thought possible. I wonder if the pony will catch 
fire. If the pony has caught fire. If the pony is leaving behind hoofprints that spark 
and smolder….The pony leaps into the air. It grows wings and flies into the 
forest. No, of course not. It doesn’t grow wings. How can a horse grow wings? 
That kind of extraordinary magic is not permitted here. No, the only magic here is 
ordinary. It’s so ordinary that it might not be magic at all. It might only be luck. 
But I’ll take luck. (96)
        
This image is resolutely “ordinary” because for Zits grace does not arrive at the behest of 
an omniscient power, but arrives as a lucky and contingent breath of air. And Small 
Saint’s revolt, though inexplicable, is ultimately mundane since such unpredictable 
events happen all the time. It is precisely because such an event could not be predicted 
beforehand, and because Zits already rejects intuitively the idea that it could be predicted, 
that for Zits knowledge is such a suspect category. Earlier, while inhabiting the FBI agent 
and faced with the “smile” of the double-crossing Elk, Zits reacts viscerally against the 
sense that this Indian “knows” him: “I hate that smile. He knows me” (52). Zits hates the 





tells him that he will always react violently, because knowledge, as a rule, precludes the 
possibility of the graceful swerve away from bare repetition. 
 Thus in Flight, as in Caramelo, the healing line of flight—in this case, Small 
Saint and Gus whisking Bow Boy away from death—does not simply destabilize an 
existing hegemonic relation (though it certainly does that), but also establishes a new 
master-signifier that makes a new hegemonic relation possible. The event of Bow Boy’s 
rescue becomes a model for future Kierkegaardian repetition, such that fidelity to it 
involves later attempts to reperform not the external facts of the rescue, but rather a 
spiritual freedom at work in the act. And in both novels the new master-signifier is that of 
nurturance: the care-taking of (especially) the young. Later in Flight, figures who 
resemble Bow Boy appear several times; sometimes they are rescued, and sometimes 
they die. When Zits is finally transported back to the bank and decides anew whether to 
open fire on its customers, he notices a five-year-old boy in line with his mother and 
decides to give up his guns. But not every story in Flight ends happily. Later, a 
policeman named Officer Dave tells a gothic story in which grace fails to intervene; after 
breaking into a house, Dave is horrified to discover the dead bodies of two young 
children, drowned to death in the bathroom as their drug-addled parents lie unconscious 
in the front room. But although Officer Dave arrives too late to save the children in the 
apartment, he later performs a successful repetition of Small Saint’s act. In arranging for 
Zits to live with Dave’s brother Robert and sister-in-law Mary, Dave treats Zits as a 
version of Bow Boy, and an Indian boy bereft of a nurturing community becomes part of 
a new and promising (if uncertain) collective. Whereas earlier in the novel Zits 





and Dave as true foster fathers: “That makes sense, I suppose. I need as many fathers as 
possible” (6, 176). 
The conclusion of Flight, with its “It takes a village to raise a child” motif, 
implies an affirmation of an activist state, but also of nurturing cultural practices and 
institutions beyond the state. Notably, Dave and his two brothers all work for the state in 
some capacity—Dave as a policeman, Robert as a fireman, and another brother as a 
postal carrier. As Zits puts it: “You guys are like the civil servant hall of fame or 
something” (174). Even before Zits is swept into his phantasmagorical flight through 
history, he expresses “respect” for police officers as a group. Although he acknowledges 
that “plenty of cops just like to be assholes” (19) he nevertheless insists that many of 
them are motivated not simply by a desire to wield power over others, but by a desire to 
create a nurturing sense of stability in the face of chaos: “I don’t like cops, okay? I just 
have respect for them. A tiny bit of respect. I think a lot of them had drunk, shitty, or 
missing fathers, just like I did. I think many of them endured chaotic and brutal 
childhoods, so they became cops because they want to create order in the world….Good 
cops are like lifeguards on the shores of Lake Fucked” (18). Thus although Flight aims to 
disrupt a hegemonic vision of the U.S. West in which vulnerable young people like Zits 
remain unaccounted for (and in which Indians—at least poor ones--still remain largely 
uncounted), its final aim is not disruption for its own sake. Rather, just as Celaya’s 
ongoing “respect” for her father indicates not an endorsement of patriarchal rule but an 
acknowledgement of his attempt to care for her, Zits’s respect for police implies not an 





an affirmation of the principle of social order, and thus of hegemony, as such. Even if the 
lake is “fucked,” as Zits implies, someone must be its lifeguard. 
 Critical regionalism, too, should affirm the idea of “lifeguards on the shores of 
Lake Fucked.” Even if we recognize, in gothic fashion, that place is an unstable category, 
we should strive to create institutions and practices built around a practice of positive 
Kierkegaardian repetition that allow sustainable nurturing to occur. In the fictional case 
of Flight, Officer Dave only takes an interest in Zits because he repeatedly comes into 
contact with the boy during police exercises that are bounded within the space of urban 
Seattle (as Zits puts it, Officer Dave had arrested him “a few dozen times”) (17). If Zits 
never stayed in one place long enough to care, Dave clearly did. And although in his 
shamanic visions Zits wanders through time and space, these disorienting visions enable 
healing precisely because they draw on images from the past that underscore the 
importance of commitment over time. The dialectical image of two flaming horses, flying 
over the forest and away from pursuing cavalry--one horse bearing a young white man 
and a five-year-old Indian boy, the other a grizzled white soldier possessed by a lost soul 
from the future--swerves away from the typical iconography of the “Wild West” and 
revises it according to the terms of an undesired but unavoidable interdependence. Small 
Saint notwithstanding, there are no heroic, individual cowboys here. Rather, its gothic 
model of the permeable and haunted self--built on spirit possession and everyday sorcery-
-loosens the dominant model of Western individualism like a bad tooth. In Alexie’s West, 
enemies are thoroughly intertwined with each other: Indians with whites, Muslims with 
Christians, ghosts with the living. And in the face of these uncomfortable pairings, Flight 





However, all of this deterritorialization operates in the service of a new form of 
territorialization; its irony does not remain in play ad nauseum, but is tripped up by a 
form of commitment that is rooted in an imaginative, enchanted, but nonetheless 
everyday form of memory. In recalling the love he once received from his mother, Zits 
puts it this way: “She used to sing…to me when I was a baby. I remember her singing it 
to me. I know I’m not supposed to remember it. But I do. My memory is strange that 
way. I often remember people I’ve never met and events and places I’ve never seen. I 
don’t think I’m some mystical bastard. I just think I pay attention to the details” (2). In 
engaging in the gothic quest for place, we are well-advised to avoid becoming “mystical 
bastards.” But in “paying attention to the details,” we might discover that memory and 
experience (and thus pain and loss, healing and solidarity) cannot best be approached in a 
linear, just-the-facts manner. Instead, they require us to flow with, rather than to deny, the 
dreamworld that is reality. And it is precisely because reality is a dreamworld that our 












THE GRAVITY OF THE SITUATION: WALTER KIRN’S UP IN THE AIR,  
FLIGHT, AND THE LIBIDINAL ECONOMY IN THE  




The gravity of the situation / Is hard to focus and harness.  
--Vic Chesnutt, “The Gravity of the Situation”  
To live’s to fly / Low and high / So shake the dust off of your wings / And the tears out of 
your eyes.  
--Townes Van Zandt, “To Live is to Fly” 
I’m part pagan—I believe in breakthroughs, in bursts of astrological beneficience. Things 
rise and fall, but sometimes they rise and rise. 
Ryan Bingham, from Walter Kirn’s Up in the Air (96) 
In the first chapter of the Montana-based writer Walter Kirn’s 2001 book Up in 
the Air, the narrator Ryan Bingham describes the last vacation he (reluctantly) took. 
Bingham has no fixed address, since he has largely given up life on the ground to wander 
through “Airworld”: a dizzying network of plane flights, hotel stays, and business 
engagements. When his financial services company (a conglomerate called ISM) pushes 
him to take some time off “for health reasons” (8), Bingham enrolls in two classes at the 
university: a creative writing course, during which he writes a “short nostalgic sketch 
about delivering propane with my father in a sixty-mile per-hour blizzard,” and a 





writing class likes his regionalist sketch. And the literature class largely depresses him, 
“worsening the low mood and mental fuzziness that ISM had ordered me to correct” (9). 
Still, he can’t quite shake the thoughts that occurred to him during this enforced pause: 
about his father, who once ran a local business before it collapsed in the face of outside 
competition; about his happy childhood in Minnesota, where he remembers a “golden 
Mark Twain boyhood of State Fair corn dogs and station wagon vacations to 
Yellowstone” (54); and about the meaning of country music. As he recalls, the instructor, 
“a transplanted New Yorker in a black Stetson,” theorized that country music grew out of 
a need to grapple with U.S. urbanization during the early twentieth century; he “believed 
that great country lyrics share a theme: the migration from the village to the city, the 
disillusionment with urban wickedness, and the mournful desire to go home” (9).  
Prompted by “dozens of examples” of this theme, Bingham begins to see his 
travels as a country song come to life, similar to the old pattern but enlivened by new 
iconography. Bingham’s vision is a mournful tour through the landscape of the post-
Fordist economy of the new U.S. West, evoking the architectural sublime of the Denver 
International Airport but also the ordinary tasks of proletarian service workers and laid-
off office managers:  
I saw my travels as a twangy ballad full of rhyming place names and neon 
streetscapes and vanishing taillights and hazy women’s faces. All those corny old 
verses, but new ones, too. The DIA control tower in fog. The drone of vacuum 
cleaners in a hallway, telling guests that they’ve slept past checkout time. The 
goose-pimply arms of a female senior manager hugging a stuffed bear I’ve 
handed her as we wait together for two security guards—it’s overkill; the one 
watches the other—to finish loading file cubes and desk drawers and the CPU 
from her computer onto a flat gray cart... (9)
 
In this passage, nothing quite comes into focus because everything is in motion. The 





are similarly “hazy,” not clearly remembered--as if they too have passed only for the 
moment. The Denver airport is (uncharacteristically, for the Mountain West) shrouded in 
fog. Meanwhile, the hotel’s low-wage janitors achieve only a ghostly, disembodied 
presence. Rather than speaking with their voices, they communicate through machines 
(their mobile vacuum cleaners) to lingering guests, who, like the taillights and the 
women’s faces, are urged to continue moving. The “female senior manager,” too, is 
something like a ghost. She is packing up the tools of her trade because she has been let 
go from her job. Whatever “senior” status she may have once had, she now finds herself 
adrift, displaced, nervous with goose pimples, and (like the hotel worker) overseen by 
surveillance. None of these memories are particularly welcome for Bingham. Thinking of 
his life as a country song will not help him return to his work. As a result, he attempts to 
erase these memories and move on: “I pulled out of it—barely. I cut that song off cold. It 
took a toll, though” (9). It does take a toll, as his health worsens; despite his intentions, 
Bingham cannot cut these memories off cold, since as narrator he compulsively revisits 
them. 
The stuffed bear, too, returns to haunt Bingham later in the novel. Since his job 
involves “pep-talking the jobless,” he had sometimes used a bear named Mr. Hugs as a 
“grieving aid,” or (more colloquially) a “squashable”: “As in, ‘The poor lady was 
hysterical, ripping out drawers from her filing cabinet, screaming, so I gave her a 
squashable and she calmed down.” (233). As he enters a Las Vegas hotel, Bingham 
receives Mr. Hugs in the mail, this time shot through the heart with a bullet, 
“assassinated” (233). Like his college courses, the bear unearths gothic memories that he 





which “some menopausal former manager” breaks down from stress and “begins to spout 
red gore from her left nostril”: “Stress is the killer, they say, and I believe it. I’ve seen the 
eruptions. I’ve Kleenexed up the fluids. It progresses nine tenths of the way in stealth and 
silence, until the tenth tenth, when it wails. It roars” (233). Because Mr. Hugs testifies to 
years of built-up tension, rage, sadness, and finally violent explosions, his material return 
is uncanny, as if Bingham has been visited by an undead corpse or a lost child. The 
“mangled” bear, pummeled by unemployed workers, increasingly begins to mirror back 
to them their own battered condition, such that they “embrace” him all the more. But 
although the bear comforts the jobless, Mr. Hugs proves too disturbing for Bingham. If 
he can forget about his clients after the session is over, the bear lingers and becomes 
strangely animate in his ability to evoke story and memory: “I couldn’t look at him 
anymore. Two years of rough handling had given him a soul, an expressive face and 
figure all his own. ‘Sad’ doesn’t capture it…Martyred. Forlorn. Unconsolable. 
Woebegone. Baby Jesus left out in the rain” (234). Now that he finds himself face to face 
with the voodoo bear, returned from the grave yet again, Bingham sees himself in Mr. 
Hugs—and tries to forget once more. His method is precise: he downs a medley of 
prescription drugs and embarks on a hallucinatory, raucous bender through the city that 
he has earlier described as a slayer of memory: Las Vegas “really isn’t the city for 
history” (229).    
Because the uncanny return of repressed memories drives Bingham to imagine a 
nurturing sense of place that is largely absent in the Airworld frontier, but because the 
novel suggests that returning to the past is both impossible and undesirable, Up in the Air 





gothic form helps us to work through disturbing elements of the personal and social 
psyche, the gothic quest for place presses us to work through the fact that in an 
increasingly mobile world dominated by consumer capitalist institutions, dreams of a 
more stable sense of place (and a more meaningful social narrative) continue to haunt us. 
In response to our unfathomable interconnectedness in a world of uneven power, it can be 
tempting to imagine quiet corners disconnected from the larger world: art for art’s sake, 
the farmer’s market, the gated community. In response, the gothic quest for place argues 
that no such pastoral space can be established. But the gothic quest for place also rejects 
the myth of the frontier, which enables the evasion of social conflict through constant 
motion. Since gravity always operates on us, eventually we must come down to earth. 
But coming down to earth is not as simple or forthright as it may seem; try as we might, 
we can’t stay still either, because time, change, and flows constantly defamiliarize the 
ground on which we stand. If the alternative country singer Vic Chesnutt is right, then, to 
claim that “The gravity of the situation / Is hard to focus and harness,” his predecessor 
Townes Van Zandt is equally right when he sings, “To live’s to fly.” Insofar as we face 
such a dialectical push-and-pull between gravity and flight, the gothic quest for place 
presses us to prioritize, to decide what deserves weight and what doesn’t, and to honor 
the struggles of the past by fostering durable places that nonetheless remain open to the 
strangeness of an outside world that is never entirely “outside,” because it lives within us.  
The gothic form departs from traditional realism because in doing so, it suggests 
that everyday experience is not straightforward but dreamlike and strange, sometimes 
even nightmarish. True to form, Up in the Air is not a realist rendering of the business 





capitalist culture. This Kafka-esque fable is simultaneously enchanting and unnerving, 
funny and sad, and with its own mode of grace. At one point, Bingham gives us a clue 
about what he is up to: “In a fable, you find new resources, new powers. Pick an animal, 
then take its shape” (302). Faced with waning desire and a deadening life on the ground, 
Bingham takes flight by taking the shape of an airplane, as it were, where he can (in 
Whitmanian fashion) pursue a wide-ranging democratic friendship in the place where “it 
all connects” (41). The novel’s epigraph from Whitman’s “Song of the Open Road” 
(“You shall not heap up what is call’d riches, You shall scatter with lavish hand all that 
you earn or achieve…You shall not allow the hold of those who spread their reach’d 
hands toward you”) helps illustrate Ryan Bingham’s modus operandi; his movement 
through Airworld, we are given to understand, is not driven by greed, since in fact 
Bingham owns hardly anything, and shows little interest in money. Bingham certainly 
wants power over his life (and even revenge), but he is also driven by a frontier desire to 
embrace movement, to be “everywhere at once,” to create himself anew, and above all, to 
flee an on-the-ground world presented in gothic terms as stale and controlling. 
Bingham, then, implicitly identifies with Whitman’s speaker, for whom houses 
are particularly suspect: “Whoever you are, come forth!...You must not stay sleeping and 
dallying there in the house / though you built it, or though it has been built for you. / Out 
of the dark confinement!” (Part 13). In “Song of the Open Road,” Whitman rails against 
“indoor complaints,” “parlors,” “schools,” and the stasis of the “stale cadaver” in favor of 
the imagined autonomy and “fluid and attaching character” made possible by constant 
motion: “Afoot and light-hearted I take to the open road, / Healthy, free, the world before 





speaker formally acknowledges the rough edges of mobility—if he insists that any 
traveling companion “goes often with spare diet, poverty, angry enemies, desertions”—
Whitman has his own way of spiritualizing even this dust and toil, rendering it so 
abstractly that it emerges as a smooth dream of unfettered circulation. For Whitman here, 
the open road promises goodness, happiness, and health, at least for those with the 
fortitude to travel it (he implies jolly contempt for those who don’t): “I think whatever I 
shall meet on the road I shall like, / And whoever beholds me shall like me, / I think 
whoever I see must be happy” (Part 4). And just as many during his time idealized the 
connections that would result from the telegraph and the railroad, Whitman imagines a 
myriad of “adhesive” social contacts between travelers on the open road: in temporary 
stops in cities and hubs, at “wedding-parties” and funerals. Still, any “fluid and attaching” 
quality experienced by Whitman’s speaker is fleeting, a temporary contract. His traveling 
companions come and go, such that his final passage—“Will you give me yourself? Will 
you come travel with me? / Shall we stick by each other as long as we live?”—rings 
perhaps more tragically than the author intends. Why, if the speaker consistently rejects 
the entreaties of his friends to stay with them, would his friends be motivated to remain 
with him?        
 As if in answer to “Song of the Open Road,” Up in the Air ruefully suggests that 
Whitman’s frictionless frontier vision cannot be maintained indefinitely, but must 
ultimately come down to earth. Compared to the popular and effective 2009 film by 
director Jason Reitman, in which George Clooney plays Ryan Bingham with his 
trademark cool, the book is more desperate: ragged around the edges, a country blues 





desire as gravity tugs at him, forcing him to recognize the limits of autonomy and motion. 
Bingham is a mess: his body throttled from constant travel, his mind riddled by guilt and 
anger, his soul lonely and lost. In moving from place to place, he begins to forget things, 
and becomes increasingly desperate as his life drains of purpose (indeed, at novel’s end 
we discover that Bingham is afflicted with actual blackouts, after which he remembers 
nothing). But Bingham is also distraught because he cannot repress a sense that his search 
for wisdom and democratic friendship is thwarted by the cutthroat and chaotic milieu of 
casino capitalism in which he has immersed himself. In Kirn’s novel, the topography of 
business circulation is not a rational world of straight lines and grids, but a mystical and 
superstitious (almost medieval!) terrain full of sages, penitents, clowns, magicians, and 
dragon-slayers. It is not a scientific universe, but a strange world replete with folklore and 
legends. Las Vegas emerges as the geographical center of this pagan business carnival of 
the postindustrial frontier: a hallucinatory site of gambling, peppy motivational speakers, 
and mysterious tips. It bustles as a city largely devoid of memory, devoted to the next big 
thing, as airborne as any plane. Like an apprentice in search of a master, Bingham travels 
there to meet his heroes: business writers, celebrities, and motivational speakers. But as 
in Kafka, these father-figures appear as obscene and disillusioning characters.  
Bingham’s belief in the power of the market makes him paranoid, but also 
reassures him because in capitalism he finds a structure that seems to embody the 
governing principles of the world and thus provides him with a provisional (if unstable) 
sense of meaning.  At the same time, however, he recognizes the way it fosters 
rapaciousness and inequality. He is torn, then, between opposite impulses; if in the film 





various intrusions), in the novel Bingham emerges as contradictory from the beginning, 
since he both loves and hates Airworld. On the one hand, he often professes devotion to 
capitalist business culture and the ordered “good life” it supposedly makes possible. At 
one point, he announces that the gods have ordered the world correctly:  
I know of no pleasure more reliable than consuming a great American brand 
against the backdrop featured in its advertising. Driving a Ford pickup down 
brown dirt roads. Swigging a Coke on the beach in Malibu. Flying Great West 
over central Colorado. It’s a feeling of restfulness and order akin, I suspect, to 
how the ancient Egyptians felt watching the planets line up above the Pyramids. 
You’re in the right place, you’re running with the right forces, and if the wind 
should howl tomorrow, let it. (40) 
 
Here Bingham is not free from anxiety (after all, the wind might howl tomorrow, and 
ancient Egypt was not exactly a classless society), but he nevertheless tries to convince 
himself that capitalism can foster “restfulness and order” and align the planets properly. 
But on the other hand, if the market presents itself as a natural order (blessed by the neo-
classical economists), it is a paradoxically disordered order: chaotic, mercurial, 
inhospitable. He sees on-the-ground America—itself distinctly shaped by the economic 
forces he otherwise celebrates--as yesterday’s news: “I look down on Denver, at its malls 
and parking lots, its chains of blue suburban swimming pools and rows of puck-like oil 
tanks, its freeways, and the notion of seeking shelter in the whole mess strikes me as a 
joke” (25). Instead, Airworld is the new frontier: “This is the place to see America, not 
down there, where the show is almost over” (42).  
For Bingham, then, the mythical frontier West (with its connotations of freedom, 
self-creation, and masculinity) has disappeared. More exactly, the frontier has left the 
ground, such that Bingham searches for possibility not in the Western landscape, but in 





images leap from portal to portal with speed and flexibility. But although he believes that 
the material West is dead, Bingham still visits its grave sites, if only to mourn its loss. 
While driving through the Great Basin, he muses about long-dead Utah pioneers, and 
concludes that their bold exploration is no longer possible on the ground: “The West gave 
people so much trouble once, mostly because they couldn’t see over its ridges, but now 
we can, and it’s just another place” (191). In Airworld, then (and in the creative 
destruction of postmodern capitalism) Bingham hopes to become a new pioneer. But 
even in Airworld, Bingham struggles to keep pace with Western ideals of masculinity and 
autonomy, and often doubts them. At one point, he buys a pair of Western boots, but later 
rues the purchase and blames the salesman: “The man was sharp, mocking my credentials 
as a Westerner after I mentioned I came from Minnesota. Instead of buying the boots I 
should have told him that there are no westerners, just displaced easterners, and that 
includes most of the Indian tribes—read history” (13). Here he imagines the West as a 
commodity to be sold on the market: a signifying “credential” that no one can be equal 
to. More to the point, he becomes increasingly disillusioned with the frontier promise and 
the perpetual displacement it seems to require. The more he launches himself into the 
Airworld frontier, the more he pines for a pastoral space in which he can be at peace—
and for something harder to name, an alternative and more nurturing way of life.  
Thus Bingham’s discontent with on-the-ground America soon spreads to 
Airworld. Provoked by memories of his small-town youth, he dreams not merely of the 
capitalist market, where the only liberty is rooted in the economic contract, but also of the 
fraternity and equality that are in short supply there. Indeed, Bingham’s world is 





enormous power over the serfs below them. He is convinced that marketers control our 
very movements; as he puts it, “The decisions we make—I don’t think they’re really 
ours. I think we’ve been figured out” (22). Democracy, in Up in the Air, is fast dying: 
“Sure, today we live in a democracy, and yes, for the most part, it leaves us to ourselves, 
but there are ambitious people who’d like to change this, and some who boast that 
they’ve already succeeded” (25-26). Because Bingham can’t imagine a world outside of 
corporate capitalist mesmeric domination, he adopts a strategy based on the motto “If you 
can’t beat them, join them.” Bingham’s only revenge—and his only protection, as he sees 
it-- involves climbing as high as he can up the ladder of power before they can solidify 
their control over him. He describes his search for a job with a mysterious and powerful 
new company (appropriately called MythTech) as a desperate attempt to transcend the 
role of serf-like underling: “I want to be in on that thing, whatever it is. To be safe from 
them one must be one of them.…It’s not a job I’m seeking, it’s citizenship, a seat inside 
the Dome….unless I get in before the structure’s dedicated, I’ll be a spectator. A mark” 
(282-283). Bingham’s view of MythTech, then, exposes the extent to which he desires to 
find someone in the pilot’s seat over and above this chaos; in MythTech’s Big Data 
empire, he sees the glimmering hope that a cognitive map of postmodern life might be 
found. Capital might be in the process of becoming mafia in Up in the Air, but for 









Libidinal Economy: B Vitamins Straight to the Heart Muscle Itself 
Yet Bingham resists recognizing that MythTech’s coordinated attempt to 
monetize the human libidinal economy might be self-subverting, since in Bernard 
Stiegler’s terms, such efforts to manage human drives and desires can have the negative 
side-effect of draining the psychic resources upon which any economy depends. Indeed, 
Bingham’s confessionals read as a virtual primer on the way that a bedeviled consumer 
capitalism can sabotage purpose and meaningful narrative, resulting in the kind of 
spiritual crisis that drives Bingham to the air in the first place. Echoing Michael Taussig’s 
description of South American devil pacts, Up in the Air is replete with images of 
infertility and associated paradoxes: sleep that does not rejuvenate, food that does not 
nourish. At one point, Bingham frets about the probability that even during sleep, he is 
“all over the mattress”: “You think you’re resting, but actually you’re expending as much 
energy as a marathon runner. Every night” (119). And he speculates in paranoid fashion 
about whether his body is receiving any nutrients, since (as a wild Airworld rumor has it), 
the “overuse of fertilizers” has created soil “incapable of yielding even minimally 
nutritious food” (163). If for Stiegler the consumer economy tends to deprive life of its 
“savor” (30), Kirn seconds him in humorous but unnerving ways. Bingham’s marriage, 
which collapsed partly because they were unable to conceive a baby, illustrates in comic, 
poignant fashion how the economization of the libidinal economy can sap the desire that 
it so fervently tries to stoke. In describing his sexual relationship with his ex-wife, 
Bingham complains that it seemed driven by some outside, Taylorized superego 
injunction to enjoy: “Now and then I’d catch her in the middle of a particularly far-





theory. Maybe she’d come across it in a magazine, or maybe in a college psychology 
class” (26).  
The world of marketing, then, as presented in Up in the Air, quantifies just about 
every sphere of human life (from sexuality to human solidarity) in monetary terms, 
thereby threatening their foundations. When one of Bingham’s acquaintances (who sells 
class rings to high school alumni) complains that Americans don’t like to acknowledge 
their debt to the past, Bingham points to “research” indicating that people will soon be 
buying class rings again:  
You’ve heard of ‘linking’? Linking is part of identity formation. The drive is to 
attach. To join with larger forces. The opposite is the urge to be yourself. The 
surveys show people are feeling out of balance here—people of higher income 
levels, that is. They’re getting tired of going it alone, and that’s predictive of 
certain behavior changes. Take Orthodox Catholic churches. They’re in a boom. 
(21)
 
However, when communal desire becomes reduced to measurable (and predictable, and 
lucrative) “linking,” does it not begin to fade? More exactly, does it not devolve into a 
vague itch (as Bingham rightly calls it, a “drive”) that can be scratched by buying a class 
ring, or hopping into a Catholic church for a moment before swinging back toward the 
opposite urge? Bingham’s seemingly knowing attitude toward these matters—his 
apparently blasé recitation of the marketing data—conceals the extent to which he is 
disturbed by such power/knowledge. If he tries to treat marketing discourse as a fetish by 
adopting its tone of certainty, he nevertheless cannot shake a sense of anxiety about the 
calculated laws it would decree for the libidinal economy. In worrying that marketing 
makes him—in St. Paul’s terms—want what he does not want to want, Bingham 
ultimately approaches marketing not as a fetish, but as a symptom of something stranger 





to authority and the paternal law, and is circumscribed by fear: “much of my fascination 
with marketing stems from my fear of being the big boys’ patsy” (25).    
If Bingham is dialectically caught between two impulses—to accept this world of 
psychopower and roll with it, or to fall into full-fledged hysteria in response to its 
demands—in practice he has become firmly lodged in the psychotechnical apparatus of 
the consumer economy, since in his job he rockets around the nation attempting to pump 
recently unemployed workers full of motivational energy. And he is distinctly 
uncomfortable with this role, as if sensing that his pep talks may simply prop up short-
term drives rather than foster long-term and viable social and psychic desires. At one 
point, he describes himself as nothing less than a sinner: “My sharpest fear when I travel 
is bumping into someone I’ve spoken to about ‘free agency’ and ‘self-directed 
professional enhancement.’ If such a person slapped me, I wouldn’t fight; I’d drop on all 
fours and bow my sinful head” (23). And Bingham’s sin here is his contribution to a 
speculative gambler economy that profits by leaving negative externalities hanging all 
over the place. In describing his serial relationships with women, Bingham acknowledges 
that he “owes” them something, but externalizes the debt by passing the cost to other 
institutions: “It’s a matter of rolling over one personal debt into the pooled, collective 
debt that’s the business of governments and churches. Or I could refinance, amortize over 
centuries” (121). Bingham’s role as motivator, too, leaves him feeling as though he has 
short-changed people; as in his description of his motivational heroes, the rush of 
libidinal energy only lasts for a moment before disappearing. In lionizing “motivational 
mainstay” General Norman Schwarzkopf, Bingham insists that the man “delivers…B 





collapse: “You stand up afterwards ready to thump someone, just name the 
cause…though this wears off and leaves a startling thirst not even gallons of Vigorade 
could quench” (226). The jittery, manic-depressive quality of Schwarzkopf’s infusion of 
drive here testifies to a turbulence that mirrors the speculative financialized economy 
itself. 
In his treatment of the libidinal dynamics in a post-Oedipal, post-Fordist 
economy—particularly through his presentation of Ryan Bingham as an unstable 
compound of Dale Carnegie, Soren Kierkegaard, and Willie Nelson—Walter Kirn 
suggests that a serial abandonment of the past cannot lead to a meaningful life narrative 
and durable motivation. Bingham describes his increasing memory loss this way: “My 
fast-forward functions, but my reverse is stuck. I can’t even remember when I started 
forgetting things” (70). A narrative cannot emerge from such a template; it requires both 
forward and reverse gears, since (as Peter Brooks puts it) the very idea of narrative 
functions according to a logic of “anticipation of retrospection” (23). As we read a story, 
we expect that at its end we will be able to enter into reverse gear and revisit previous 
scenes to evaluate their significance. Similarly, in everyday life we can only find purpose 
if we expect that later we will be able to incorporate past moments into a narrative, such 
that from a later point these moments will appear as stepping-stones, repetitions, or key 
developments. If this reverse gear is stuck, there is (in Kierkegaard’s terms) no repetition. 
Instead, we live in Benjaminian Erlebnis, the isolated experience of the gambler fixated 
solely on the next card.  
Kirn’s affinity for the lowlands of postmodern culture—the business self-help 





out this dynamic of memory, narrative, and motivation, since in these uncanny sites we 
find the theme of libidinal economy raised to a high pitch.32 Like other gothic texts which 
                                                          
32 Just as other forms of gothic literature employ low strategies of spectacle and draw from popular forms 
(folk legends, science fiction, fantasy), Walter Kirn in Up in the Air seizes on inspirational business 
literature as a low form that nevertheless contains a kernel of wisdom. Indeed, he suggests that high-brow 
artists ignore its lessons “at their peril.” Unlike the art world or the academy, which for Ryan Bingham 
seem to look down on ordinary people and make them feel small, at least the Las Vegas motivational 
powwow of GoalQuest XX makes people feel important, like they can be Gods one day too. Ryan’s 
description of a conversion to commercial discourse is a St. Paul moment of transformation: “The 
sophisticates may sniff, but it’s all true: in the course of certain American lives, way out in the flyover 
gloom between the coasts, it’s possible to arrive—through loss of love, through the long, formless shock of 
watching parents age, through inadequacies of moral training, through money problems—at a stage or a 
juncture or a passage—dismiss the buzzwords at your peril—when we find ourselves alone in a strange city 
where no one lives any longer than he must and all of our neighbors come from somewhere else, and damn 
it, things just aren’t working out for us, and we’ve tried everything, diets, gyms, jobs, churches, but so far 
not this thing, which we read about on a glossy flyer tucked under our windshields: a breakthrough new 
course in Dynamic Self-Management developed over decades of experience training America’s Top 
Business Leaders and GUARANTEED TO GET YOU WHERE YOU’RE GOING! And we go. And feel 
better. Because there’s wisdom there, more than we gained at our lousy college, at least, and more 
importantly there’s an old man’s face—beamed in from California by satellite—which appears to be 
looking at us alone, the ninety-eight pound weaklings, and not laughing! A miracle! Not even smirking! 
Beholding us!” (276-277). Such a passage helps to explain why former New Deal supporters like Ryan’s 
father would turn toward the gospel of Ronald Reagan: because the tenets and modes once associated with 
the Left, the championing of the weak (at least the weak white man), have been appropriated more 
effectively by the dominant ideology of commerce, just as the fireside-chat populism of Franklin Delano 
Roosevelt was appropriated rhetorically by Ronald Reagan. For Bingham, denizens of universities, as well 
as the (corporate-funded) art world, belittle people and condescend to them: “Art. It always makes me feel 
diminished. There’s something smug about it. Cocky. Cold” (14). What we might describe as the 
“hermeneutic of suspicion,” a cold, formalist ethos of demystification that often appeared English 
departments in the 1980s and 1990s, does not give people a sense that their concerns are important. In the 
face of what Cornel West describes as “disease, despair, and death,” people understandably search for 
wisdom. And they look for people who will not “laugh” or “smirk” at their weakness, but will instead 
encourage them to develop their “core competencies,” to find their own power.   
Crucially, Bingham’s resentment is couched in regional terms; the wisdom of the motivational world is 
geared not toward the elites of New York City and Los Angeles, but toward those “way out in the flyover 
gloom between the coasts.” Bingham, then, like Reagan himself, mobilizes a resentment associated with 
the marginalized and colonized position of rural and small-town America, but ironically, in the service of 
the colonizers themselves. Thus, if so-called ordinary people between the coasts can complain about 
“money problems” or about communities in which no one knows each other, they do not blame policies 
that have led to stagnant wages and profoundly expensive health care, and they don’t blame a global 
economic system characterized by creatively destructive restructuring and a redistribution of wealth toward 
the top. In short, they don’t blame neoliberalism itself and its associated culture. Instead, they search for 
possibilities, for ways out of their predicament, for a sense of relief that is built into the very idea of such 
motivational seminars: that the way out is within, and that if they work hard and trust in their inner “core 
competencies,” they will succeed. It may be obvious now to point out that the left has failed in its core 
mission here: that if it cannot offer people a sense of their own dignity and importance, and if it persists in a 
one-sided “hermeneutic of suspicion” unbalanced by a sense of grace or affirmation, it deserves to fail.  
And yet if Bingham’s commercial heroes address the resentments and desires of the U.S. “flyover” 
population, which, we must add, is primarily oriented toward white males of a certain age, it is also 
important to note that they also cater to and flatters those resentments and desires. If people feel weak and 
vulnerable, one avenue involves telling them that, in reality, if they truly work hard enough, they will not 





disturb boundaries between high and low, Up in the Air is a potboiler with a disturbed 
heart, perhaps especially relevant to the postmodern reader, for whom literary novels may 
not be the first choice of reading material. Its zippy narrative, enlivened by exaggerations 
and carnivalesque humor, seems designed to be read by the very people who lack the 
time and inclination to focus for long—and thus to people like Bingham himself, stuck in 
fast-forward.33 Such readers might glide over its haunted themes—if they choose to. But 
in reality, Bingham is not stuck in fast-forward; he just wants to be. Although he is 
beginning to lose his memory, and although he keeps his schedule so packed that new 
challenges and tasks always appears on the horizon, he still faces intrusive memories that 
push him to develop a more comprehensive narrative for himself. Such memories point 
him toward the past, toward alternative possibilities, and toward dreams both terrifying 
and healing. If Bingham at one point insists that coping with his job (and forgetting his 
clients) requires him to “leapfrog mentally,” some of this leap-frogging takes him to 
places he may not intend to go (102). And in doing so, he may take his readers to places 
that they didn’t intend to go either: toward painful reconsideration, and thus toward a 
recognition of the gravity of the situation.      
                                                                                                                                                                             
standing in their way. Such a strategy leads directly to the attitudes of Ryan’s father: that ever since the 
Progressive movement, the U.S. government has conspired with the coastal cultural elites to destroy small 
businesses and farms. But there is another way to approach the problem—not to minimize weakness, but to 
recognize it with all seriousness. And this is what a leftist approach must do: acknowledge, without 
smirking or laughing at the ordinary person, that individually we are weak, that rural and small-town 
America has been colonized (along with many other corners of the globe), and that there is no individual 
way to address the problem. Rather, we can challenge the disruption of communities, the lack of purpose, 
the “inadequacies of moral training,” and the “strange city” only by challenging reigning assumptions about 
the freedom of capital and the supremacy of market forces as a barometer for the good life. 
33 In this sense, Up in the Air (a literary novel for people who can no longer focus on literary novels) echoes 
what Benjamin asserts about Baudelaire: that Baudelaire was writing lyric poetry for people who could no 
longer focus on lyric poetry, because they were trapped in spleen: “Baudelaire envisaged readers to whom 
the reading of lyric poetry would present difficulties…. Willpower and the ability to concentrate are not 
their strong points. What they prefer is sensual pleasure; they are familiar with the ‘spleen’ which kills 
interest and receptiveness. It is strange to come across a lyric poet who addresses himself to such readers—
the least rewarding type of audience. There is of course a ready explanation for this. Baudelaire wanted to 





The Demise of the Nation, the Rise of the International Marketplace 
The black hole opened by the decline of the paternal figure and the loss of belief in 
metanarratives marks out a final limit and then substitutes a plunge into limitlessness, an 
ultimate meaning as meaninglessness. This is the black hole of postmodern culture and 
the ultimate horror of postmodern Gothic. Nothing escapes from a black hole, not even 
light. 
--Fred Botting, from “Aftergothic: consumption, machines and black holes” (296) 
Many of those who have a fear of flying are haunted by a particular thought: that is, how 
many parts of such a complicated machine as a modern plane have to function smoothly 
in order for it to stay in the air? One small lever breaks somewhere, and the plane may 
spiral downwards. When you start to think how many things could go wrong, you cannot 
help but panic. The people of Europe have experienced something similar in the past few 
weeks. That a cloud from a minor volcanic eruption in Iceland--a small disturbance in the 
complex mechanism of life on earth –can bring to a standstill the air traffic over almost 
an entire continent is a reminder of how humankind, for all its power to transform nature, 
remains just another living species on the planet.  
--Slavoj Zizek, from “Up in the Air” in The New Statesman (33) 
It is most extraordinary that humans should fly. They have done so only recently, and 
they do so only clumsily, with a ludicrous hooferaw of noise and fire. Human flight, after 
all, is only a false and pathetic argument against gravity, which has the upper hand and is 
the greater fact. All will come down. And some will fall. 
--Andy Catlett, in Wendell Berry’s 1988 novella Remembering (201) 
Ryan Bingham’s dilemma—about how to find meaning and gravity in a world 
that seems to thwart solidarity, long-term social nurturance, and durable desire--mirrors 
the broader dilemma that we face in the postmodern situation. The world in which Ryan 
Bingham lives is one in which (to use American Studies scholar David Noble’s terms) the 
“sacred international marketplace” (288) has effectively squeezed out other possible 
forms of symbolic paternal authority, and in some ways presides over the demise of 
paternal authority as such. In this historical process of usurpation, Noble identifies a key 
moment in the 1940s, when academic historians largely gave up on an older “bourgeois 
nationalist” view (represented by figures like Charles Beard and Frederick Jackson 





entities, each with a definitive ethnic makeup (xxvii). The vast destruction of two world 
Wars (along with the totalitarianisms of the early twentieth century) laid bare the military 
and economic interconnection between nations, such that many U.S. intellectuals had to 
face the collapse of once sacrosanct national metanarratives. Where the nativist-minded 
Beard and Turner celebrated Anglo-Protestant men at the expense of other groups, new 
historians like Arthur Schlesinger, Jr. and Richard Hofstadter embraced Jews, Catholics, 
and urbanites. (In the process, they helped open a door for a multicultural discourse 
predicated on an ideology of cultural identity and diversity). And where Beard and 
Turner criticized capitalism as a chaotic and un-American enterprise that submerged 
fraternity and equality (for Anglo-Protestant men) beneath a narrow conception of liberty, 
Hofstadter and Schlesinger, Jr. championed the marketplace as a realm for the relatively 
peaceful clash between various interests. And in doing so, they gave up on any vision of 
America as a land of liberty, equality, and fraternity. Instead, Hofstadter “saw capitalism 
as the necessary foundation for liberty. He no longer valued fraternity and equality” 
(Noble 49).  
However, it would be a mistake to imagine that after WWII everyone simply 
joined up to support the new global capitalist hegemony. In destabilizing previous 
metanarratives, the 1940s period also opened up new debates. What, if anything, should 
replace the nation as the new sacred space? Were we left with the international 
marketplace as the primary locus for identification and loyalty? Historian William 
Appleman Williams, for one, deviated sharply from the new postwar consensus fostered 
by his contemporaries. He agreed with their critique of bourgeois nationalist nativism. 





highlighted the extent to which the proliferation of the market system depended on 
military force and political power; in fomenting the rise of a global “free market,” the 
U.S. had not simply hastened a natural process. Instead, through a series of actions--
colonizing the frontier, stifling alternatives in the Soviet and Mexican revolutions, 
forcing open markets around the world--the U.S. had participated in a violent project to 
impose market institutions on subjugated peoples. After flirting with a Marxist 
framework in the 1960s, Williams later identified with a branch of the growing ecological 
movement and argued that limited resources necessitated a return to smaller scales of 
social organization. Inspired by traditional indigenous cultures, “He…asked [Americans] 
to understand that the frustration of their personal lives came from the fact that they were 
uprooted from their families, neighborhoods, and geographic localities and forced to be 
abstract units who fitted the demands of the marketplace” (Noble 61).  
With the “aesthetic authority of bourgeois nationalism” weakened, then, the 
newly crowned authority of the international marketplace still faced challengers: 
international Marxists, advocates of decentralized localism, not to mention residual 
bourgeois nationalists and nostalgic republicans (xxvii). The critical regionalist project 
has emerged within this constellation of dissensus regarding the emergent post-WWII 
hegemony. Gayatri Spivak, for one, rejects both bourgeois nationalism and hegemonic 
neoliberal capitalism (not to mention William Appleman Williams’ late-period embrace 
of decentralized localism), and instead endorses “a critical regionalism combating global 
capitalism” (78). Such a critical regionalism “goes under and over nationalisms but keeps 
the abstract structure of something like a state. This allows for constitutional redress” 





U.S. moment of relative social equality (at least for white men), Spivak’s project is not 
nostalgic or reactionary; she affirms that the world is one interconnected place. But like 
Leach, she does not see in late capitalism an answer to the problem of citizenship. 
Instead, she advocates a “robust citizenship for the people down below,” (89) implying 
that the answer lies not in submitting to a race to the bottom in deference to a 
transnational ruling class, but rather in painstakingly creating globally interlinked 
coalitions of workers, families, and excluded people, all of whom have an interest in 
building their places in concert with others, rather than in mere competition. As such, her 
notion of critical regionalism resembles what political theorist Bonnie Honig has 
described as a “rooted cosmopolitanism”: “rooted not…in a national ideal but rather in a 
democratic ideal, one that seeks out friends and partners even (or especially) among 
strangers and foreigners” (13).34 (And because for Honig democracy involves not a 
romantic interaction between homogenous and transparent citizens, but an uncertain 
groping between people who are often opaque to each other, she sees its practice as 
fundamentally gothic).     
I suspect that Spivak knows that the term “critical regionalism” is not new; in 
fact, it was coined in the 1970s by architectural theorists like Alexander Tzonis and 
Kenneth Frampton who hoped to resist what they saw as the top-down, homogenizing 
control of global capitalism and the dominant midcentury modernist “international style” 
                                                          
34 Honig uses “democratic cosmopolitanism” and “rooted cosmopolitanism” interchangeably; both refer to 
the process of forging democratic alliances across borders, but not jettisoning state institutions and 
practices: “Democratic cosmopolitanism is a name for forms of internationalism that seek not to govern, 
per se, but rather to widen the resources, energies, and accountability of an emerging international civil 
society that contests or supports state actions in matters of transnational and local interest such as 
environmental, economic, military, cultural, and social policies. This is a democratic cosmopolitanism 
because democracy, in the sense of a commitment to local and popular empowerment, effective 
representation, accountability, and the generation of actions in concert across lines of difference, is its goal. 





of architecture. And a key trope for the critical regionalist architects is precisely that of 
gravity. In his classic 1983 essay on critical regionalism, Kenneth Frampton described an 
architectural aesthetic that (in its symbolic and thus rhetorical way) made us particularly 
aware of gravitational force, and by extension, the materiality of buildings. This focus 
might sound obvious—after all, who thinks that buildings are not made out of materials, 
or that gravity does not operate on them? The point, though, is that Frampton, like many 
in his time, was reacting against modernist architects like Mies Van der Rohe who 
devised all kinds of aesthetic (equally rhetorical) ways to transmit an impression of 
weightlessness. These architects, at least in his view, wanted their buildings to come 
across as light, disembodied, and self-contained, and hence immune both to history and to 
the influences and counter-influences of the spaces and objects around them. Blithely 
ignoring (or, in many cases, defying) the contexts in which they appeared, these 
modernist works were designed to appear as worlds on their own. Thus Henri Lefebvre, 
in 1974, would write of modernist architecture that it strove for an “impression of 
weightlessness,” and that this impulse began well before the twentieth century, that in 
fact it stretched back at least as far as the Italian Renaissance. Such architecture, by 
obscuring the cause and effect relationship of gravity, led to the exaggerated impression 
that the world could be composed and recomposed “arbitrarily”: “Once the effect of 
weightiness or massiveness upon which architects once depended has been abandoned, it 
becomes possible to break up and reassemble volumes arbitrarily according to the 
dictates of an architectural neoplasticism” (146). 
Frampton and the other critical regionalists wanted to correct this “impression of 





buildings were also weighty), but by constructing buildings that gave off an impression of 
weight—that emphasized their materiality, that made joints and beams visible, that 
radiated a suspenseful pull of gravity against which the building provisionally fought. 
And in fact, this rhetorical insistence on gravity, the implication that no matter what else 
you do or how you think about it, something somewhere is pulling on you and thus 
limiting your movements (if not always obstructing them) has always been a component 
of the varieties of regionalism, critical or otherwise. The focus on gravity is emblematic 
of a regionalist focus on limits, and also of a regionalist discourse in which claims 
necessarily operate on the individual, who is always already defined socially—that is, as 
a participant in some material and social context, with its various pushes and pulls. 
Gayatri Spivak, by attempting to imagine a state form that doesn’t devolve into an 
exclusive territorial nationalism, is trying to thread the same needle that Frampton and 
Tzonis were trying to thread: she wants to acknowledge our imbrication as vulnerable 
human beings in social and material contexts (such that we need durable, communal 
forms of affiliation in order to survive), but she refuses to succumb to the pastoral vision 
of the isolated space, separated from global interconnection and motion. She rejects the 
weightlessness of the frontier (implied by the international style), but also the grounded 
stasis of the pastoral (implied by parochial or traditional architecture, by a regionalism 
that is not critical). 
These critical regionalist themes—gravity and flight, inflation and deflation, 
weight and weightlessness, frontier and pastoral—are particularly apt for the post-Cold 
War period, because the neoliberal information economy has often been erroneously 





in the year 2000, both a high-point of euphoria concerning the international marketplace 
and a marker of a careless and wasteful period. In the 1990s, the neoliberal tendencies 
toward frontier-style short-term speculation only increased, and along with them negative 
externalities in the ecological, social, and psychic domains. During the Clinton years, we 
saw the increasing financialization of the global economy in the form of unprecedented 
consumer debt, rapid capital flight across borders, and the deregulation of the financial 
industries, all of which led to high degrees of risky speculative activity. Meanwhile, 
psychotechnologies like the internet, cell phones, and digital devices facilitated attention-
capture, especially among the youth, while the deregulation of communications industries 
(in the Telecommunications Act of 1996) enabled monopoly consolidation in the culture 
industries. Many of the most definitive cultural texts of the 1990s, too, could be said to 
lack gravity; the TV show “Seinfeld” purported to speculate about “nothing,” while the 
films of Quentin Tarantino made light of extreme violence and torture. All of these 
developments were symptoms, in a way, of an absent culture of caretaking that led to vast 
negative externalities: mass shootings, declining schools, and rising economic inequality, 
among others. During the Clinton ‘90s, Americans put thousands of people in privately 
owned prisons-for-profit, dumped carbon dioxide into the atmosphere, pushed Russia into 
economic “shock therapy,” and supported their oil addiction through careless policies in 
the Middle East. Meanwhile, reckless speculation in the financialized economy resulted 
in rounds of debt crises in Sweden, Argentina, and Asia, not to mention the collapse of 
the technology bubble at the end of the decade. 
Although President Clinton reassured voters that the neoliberal frontier would 





accepted his promises at face value. In 1999, for example, thousands of protestors faced 
tear gas, rubber bullets, and police repression in their efforts to disrupt a meeting of the 
World Trade Organization in Seattle. The loose and varied coalition that gathered there 
urged greater caretaking with regard to a number of issues: the undemocratic power of 
international institutions like the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, the 
privatization of formerly common resources (from medicines to genes), the squeezing out 
of small farmers under a regime of export agriculture that could easily decimate long-
term regional food security, and the exploitation of global workers through intensified 
capital flexibility. Up in the Air registers both the euphoria and anxiety of this period that 
preceded the gravitational events to follow: the fall of the Twin Towers, the implosion of 
authority in the Middle East, and the financial mega-collapse of 2007. And although Kirn 
suggests that turning back the clock and restoring the paternal authority of bourgeois 
nationalism is not the answer, neither is he content to cede aesthetic authority purely to 
the international marketplace. Instead, he struggles to answer the questions faced by 
critical regionalists like Frampton and Spivak: what should a new sacred space look like? 
What is our responsibility to each other when it comes to fostering places, given that any 
such places exist in an intermodal hub society profoundly linked in a global network? 
What does it mean to live in a society in which any authoritative metanarrative is both 
threatened and (in its virulent forms) threatening? And finally, given the power of a 
digital consumer economy to capture attention and harness the libidinal energy of human 
beings, what would a new critique of libidinal economy look like? 
Ultimately, Kirn in Up in the Air takes a complex, dialectical view toward these 





uses the metaphor of jet travel to allegorically comment on a number of speculative leaps 
in postmodernity: digital technology, environmental manipulation, Taylorized social and 
psychic engineering, consumer debt, and the turbulence of a financial economy 
predicated on short-term bets. But unlike the Heidegerrian Berry, who rejects most new 
technologies and fantasizes about restoring an older model of paternal authority, Kirn 
follows Zizek by insisting that staying out of metaphorical airplanes does not solve the 
matter. Whether in a plane or not, we are careening through space absent a reliable 
paternal ordering of the system; nothing (Mother Nature, God, the markets) can guarantee 
the safety of the human and ecological social project. And while many technologies can 
be dangerous in important ways, we nevertheless may need to rely on whatever we can in 
order to support each other going forward. Zizek’s conclusion, then, is dialectical; on the 
one hand, since the global turbulence of financial markets, climate disruption, and blind 
chance will probably lead to a more destabilized world, “Humankind should get ready to 
live in a more nomadic way” (Zizek “Up in the Air” 34). But on the other hand, we need 
to develop global structures of caretaking—simultaneously beyond and below the level of 
the nation—that will soften the blows of this nomadism, whether it is enforced or chosen. 
Unlike Berry, who pushes for the restoration of place (in opposition to motion) as the 
end-all, be-all of human existence, Zizek suggests that place must operate in a gothic 
landscape that perpetually denies it closure and fearfully exposes it to gravity’s vertigo. 
We can struggle against disorientation, and we can strive to protect each other within the 
mesh, but we do not face a zero-sum choice between nomadism and inhabitation; rather, 
we face a choice between taking care (of people, societies, and environments) and 





The narrative structure of Up in the Air, appropriately enough, is a careening one, 
both entertaining and disturbing; its suspense depends on the notion of gravity, since as 
we read through the text, we constantly wonder whether Bingham will collapse entirely, 
whether he will be able to continue his manic flight by securing a job at MythTech, or 
whether he will somehow land safely and face his fear of life on the ground and all that it 
entails about grappling with the past, paying his debts, and (possibly) assuming a 
caretaking role. And this narrative is anchored by a binding endpoint that Kirn has 
promised us from the beginning; his metonymic motion and Attention-Deficit leap-
frogging from place to place (and idea to idea, and self to self) is only held together by 
his devotion to a single achievement: reaching one million frequent flier miles. After he 
crosses this “crucial horizon,” Bingham assures us he will pause and make a decision: “I 
swear, I’ll stop, sit back, and reconsider everything” (10). But this endpoint is 
fundamentally ambiguous. In frequent flier miles, Bingham compiles not simply money, 
which could in principle be exchanged for any commodity, but rather the abstract 
promise of motion itself—a promise that he will never be required to pause and stay still. 
But depending on how things go, Bingham may find himself with a million frequent flier 
miles and nowhere to go. In other words, he may have all the choice in the world, and no 
desire. Although he tells us that—like an addict—he will reconsider everything after this 
last binge, we also sense that he lives in terror of this moment of reckoning, after which 
he will have to decide where he wants to go—in other words, when he will have to settle 







We’re All God’s Children Here: The Name of the Father 
Gothic fiction is bound up with the function of the paternal metaphor. Since Walpole, 
Gothic has emerged as an effect of and an engagement with a crisis in the legitimacy and 
authority of the structured circulation of social exchanges and meanings over which the 
father figure presides.—Fred Botting (282) 
 
Humanity has nowhere to retreat to: not only is there no ‘big Other’ (self-contained 
symbolic order as the ultimate guarantee of Meaning); there is also no Nature qua 
balanced order of self-reproduction whose homoeostasis is disturbed, nudged off course, 
by unbalanced human interventions.--Slavoj Zizek from In Defense of Lost Causes (442) 
 
Toward the end of Up in the Air, Ryan Bingham finally meets a man with whom 
he has been obsessed for the entire novel: Soren Morse, president of Great West Airlines. 
Up to this point in the novel, Bingham has convinced himself that Morse is responsible 
for the slackening service on Great West, and hence for many of Bingham’s 
inconveniences in the air: “Great West just can’t be trusted anymore, it lies to its most 
loyal customers….There was a time, not all that long ago, when I thought of Great West 
as a partner and an ally, but now I feel betrayed” (17). He even becomes convinced that 
Morse and Great West are tracking him, following his movements and thwarting his 
progress. Feeling personally hounded by the company which should have been sheltering 
him as he flies from coast to coast, Bingham pictures his revenge. If he can reach one 
million frequent flier miles, company policy dictates that he will be able to meet with 
Morse one-on-one, and Bingham will be able to give Morse “an earful” (18). Bingham, it 
seems, is fixated on Morse because in the CEO he sees a physical embodiment of a 
power structure that he feels is controlling his life. He sees the corporation the way anti-
clerics once saw the Catholic Church, as a hierarchical and secretive order. And he 
imagines Morse not as a human being like anyone else (or as a cog in the corporate 





“Does Morse ever do that walk-among-the-peasants bit, strolling through the airport, 
shaking hands, patting workers’ backs? Is that a thing of his? The Pope-in-disguise-
among-his-children stunt?...The humble act?” (198).  
However, when Bingham finally earns a million frequent flier miles and meets 
Morse in person, he does not find a God. Instead, it turns out that although Soren Morse 
is still carrying out the company’s duties, he has been officially fired. In response, 
Bingham is struck by the man’s frailty and lowly humanity, such that he can’t help but 
associate the CEO with his own father. As Bingham speaks with him, Morse’s voice 
unearths memories of his father’s decline, the loss of his business and his eventual 
divorce and death: “It’s a voice I’ve only heard in dreams, where it was usually half an 
octave lower and transparently that of my father at fifty….The worry lines around the 
eyes are new, though, and there’s an acrid top note in his breath—of failure and drift and 
working for one’s self” (297). Until now, Bingham has sought revenge against Morse not 
because he reminded him of his father at the end, but because he reminded him of his 
father before the end—the successful version of his father. For Bingham, the hot-shot 
Morse can only be an impostor, a usurper, and Bingham’s Hamlet-like revenge is 
directed at this fake father. But here, when Bingham actually meets Morse, he finds that 
he has sympathy for him; he discovers that everyone is subject to the possibility of being 
replaced by someone else, even when they are at the top: “Everyone knows the service 
has fallen off and no one, not even the chief, knows what to do. More money, and a 
shower in his office, but on the whole he’s in this with the rest of us” (298). 
Whether or not Bingham is on track here—whether or not failing CEOs (often 





Morse helps Bingham to recognize that no one is truly in the pilot’s seat; no one can 
successfully run the show and guarantee the course of the world. As such, his interaction 
with Morse mirrors his interactions with other authority figures in the novel. The pattern 
goes like this: Bingham invests tremendous power in motivational leaders who inspire 
him with their narratives, but when he meets them in person they confound and unsettle 
him with their merely human (and often absurd) qualities. In this novel, power is 
constantly linked to the obscene, the tawdry, the most vulgar kind of laughter and 
enjoyment—even when it remains powerful. What Walter Benjamin wrote of Kafka also 
applies to Up in the Air; in Kafka, all of the “holders of power” are always disappointing 
in person: “no matter how highly placed they may be, they are always fallen or falling 
men, although even the lowest and seediest among them, the doorkeepers and the 
decrepit officials, may abruptly and strikingly appear in the fullness of their power” 
(Illuminations 112). Up in the Air is full of such seedy authority figures. When he meets a 
trusted TV financial advisor on the plane and receives a financial tip from him, Ryan 
describes the moment as one of “grace,” and notes the man’s generosity (46). Later, 
though, he sees the man receiving a table dance at a strip club, and receives another 
inside tip: the advisor’s preferred dancer is also a prostitute who specializes in sexual 
urination. Later, when he sees the “superman” Norman Schwarzkopf on a plane bound 
for Las Vegas, Bingham is unnerved when Schwarzkopf spends too much time in the 
bathroom: “We understand, sir; we’re all God’s children here. Still, as his visit lengthens, 
I feel a shift as all of us stop thinking about ourselves and wonder why that closed door is 
staying so closed. A hand-washer? Normal travelers’ diarrhea? It’s painful to picture the 
Big Guy so confined” (227-228).35 
                                                          





Soren Morse emerges as yet another Kafka-esque figure of decrepit authority. He 
also provides further evidence of what Bingham has been looking for all along: not 
revenge, but the reassurance embodied in what Jacques Lacan called the Name of the 
Father. He has not been rebelling against the corporate world, but probing the heights of 
its hierarchy for a reassuring sense that the Big Other is indeed keeping an eye on things 
(even if he can take the Big Other to task for betrayal or tyranny). Since his father could 
not protect him, Bingham searches for a new father, ambivalently giving his allegiance to 
the most powerful force he can find: the upper echelons of the corporate universe. Seen in 
this light, his quest to achieve one million frequent flier miles is not rebellion, but an 
instance of hysterical acting-out, since it plays into the hands of the Big Other. As 
Bingham realizes at one point, from the perspective of Great West Airlines he is the 
“optimal outcome” because in spending his life earning air-miles, he simply offers more 
and more business to the corporation (165). Bingham’s attachment to the corporate Name 
of the Father is further revealed in his attitude toward MythTech, the company with a 
                                                                                                                                                                             
of business, Sandor “Sandy” Pinter, and discovers that his idol is (in person) small, somewhat disgusting, 
and thoroughly ridiculous. He lives a bizarre and contradictory mix of high ideals, tough talk, esoteric 
knowledge, idiosyncratic rules, low-brow cheapness, and lust. Pinter believes in polygamy and calls his 
lover a “co-domestic,” yet becomes palpably jealous of her sexual encounters; won’t eat at restaurants 
because they “screw up the protein chains,” and yet refuses to wash his hands after going to the bathroom, 
and eats the most tawdry processed foods, from canned fried onions to “plastic tubs of pre-made onion 
dip”; practices the most ingenious forms of consumer manipulation, even as he complains that the world is 
becoming a “hive” of control and surveillance; and is tapped into a worldwide network of business contacts 
(he makes much of his money distributing copies of his speeches), even as he professes hatred of modern 
“gadgets” of communication. When Ryan presses him about being “implicated” in all of the manipulation 
he despises, Pinter assents: “Of course…I’m in on the ground floor. I’d prefer it if there was another ‘they’ 
to join, but this is the ‘they’ that history offered me. Advice: if you hear there’s a ‘they,’ get in on it, if only 
to be pro-active and defensive” (134). When Ryan notes that Sandy’s attitude appears “passive” (and in 
contradiction with his official exhortations for “accountability”), Sandy shrugs him off: “The seminars are 
for psychic adolescents, not vigorous whole realized beings with perspective” (134). Apparently, though, 
Pinter’s version of being a “vigorous whole realized being” is a perfect illustration of Zizek’s pagan 
capitalist. The painting hanging in his decadent, half-finished house (patterned after the Roman 
Colosseum), wildly depicts Bacchanallian lust: “some mythical scene of a semi-naked virgin being chased 
through a dappled glade by randy goat-men” (130). Yet Bingham hardly has a leg to stand on in criticizing 
his idol: Pinter’s curious mix of defensive passivity and “pro-active” self-assertion is a philosophy shared 





grand plan to develop the marketing equivalent of the human genome map, a final 
epistemological coup that would grant it power over all humanity. But as the MythTech 
employee Lisa tells him, the point is not that the company is capable of developing such a 
Master Discourse. They are not selling the code itself, but rather “fear of the code”: “The 
fear there is a code and that someone else is going to crack it, so you’d better just cough 
up your energy right now….It’s all a racket. It’s extortion, Ryan. Sheer extortion. The 
code is a bluff. It’s all Beware of Dog. It’s Daddy’s deep loud voice” (249). For Lisa, 
then, MythTech is the Name of the Father: a fiction that is nevertheless real in its effects, 
that wields authority because we want it there to make sense of the world. It is the Big 
Other that protects us, that we fear to disappoint, and yet that we act out in front of, just 
as Bingham fears that MythTech is watching his every move as it weighs the decision of 
whether to hire him or not. His paranoia with regard to Great West functions in a similar 
way: he wants these companies to have omnipotent power. 
Ryan Bingham’s agonistic relationship with corporate capitalism, then, is best 
explained in Oedipalized gothic terms. For critic Steven Bruhm, the gothic form 
fascinates its readers partly because it grapples with processes of trauma, loss, and 
mourning. Faced with a “lost object” (classically, the mother’s body), we wrap ourselves 
in various knots in an attempt to deal with the traumatic loss. And one coping mechanism 
involves (paradoxically) identifying with the person who has ostensibly stolen the object 
from us: the father. We can thus find ourselves in the strange position of simultaneously 
hating the father and yearning to become him: 
In the contemporary psychological schema, we desire not only the lost object but 
the approval of the tyrant who took that object from us…In order to kill the father 
and thus establish their own autonomy, they first have to assume the father’s 





transgression: the son adores the father to the degree that he must kill him in order 
to become him. (265)
A better explanation of Ryan Bingham’s “can’t beat them, join them” strategy would be 
hard to find; after corporate capitalism hastens his father’s decline, Bingham both desires 
the lost object (his childhood sense of security) and the “approval of the tyrant” who took 
away that object. And in order to take revenge against corporate capitalism—and to 
establish his own autonomy--he must first assume its strength by becoming it. 
At the same time, in Julia Kristeva’s terms, the subject must “abject” the object 
that has been lost; precisely because the primal mother-connection entails a blurring of 
boundaries, a radical vulnerability, and an indistinct self, the subject must throw off the 
protecting mother. In order to assert his own autonomy, he must (as Bruhm puts it)  
discard or jettison the primal connection to her, deem her dangerous and 
suffocating…We come then not to be mere victims of the lost object—the 
mother—but active agents in the expulsion of that mother. We are creatures of 
conflicted desires, locked in an uncanny push-me-pull-you that propels us toward 
the very objects we fear and to fear the very objects toward which we are 
propelled. (266)
 
The attempt to achieve autonomy through identification with the tyrant father, then, is 
also an attempt to rid oneself of the dependent, in-between state of mother-connection. 
And the Name of the Father helps us to ward off a hysterical sense of incompleteness that 
is associated, first and foremost, with the feminine. In images of claustrophobia, 
enslavement, paralysis, and futile running, the specter of feminine vulnerability lurks in 
the background. In Up in the Air, Bingham’s continual motion (like Whitman’s) is such a 
gothic fleeing; his short-term girlfriend Alex outlines his motto: “The line I remember 
was, ‘Change them before they change you.’ Autonomy, right? It’s all about autonomy” 
(95). Bingham’s failed marriage, his serial abandonment of women, and (as we will see 





what Anne Williams calls the “unruly female principle” (cited in Hogle 10). And yet, as 
expressed in Bingham’s embarrassed wish to recapture his youth, he also desires the lost 
object. Thus Bingham’s search for a paternal authority with which he can identify is an 
attempt to ward off a hysteria that always threatens to erupt in him. 
Because Bingham wants so deeply for the Big Other of Great West to remain in 
force, he is less startled by the turbulence that begins to shake their plane than by the fact 
that Soren Morse can do nothing to stop it: “The sight of a man of his stature, or former 
stature, strapped in across the thighs and struggling to feed more belt through for a 
snugger hold, disorients more than the turbulence” (299). This scene, during which the 
plane’s passengers momentarily lose their equilibrium, echoes Andy Catlett’s airborne 
disorientation in Wendell Berry’s Remembering by hinting that however powerful 
modern technologies might be, gravity is the greater fact. When faced with a teetering 
aircraft, Morse and his fellow passengers desperately try to repress any sense that the 
plane could go down. But Bingham is more equivocal:   
Our keel evens but it’s a trick and no one’s buying and yet it remains even, and 
normal is our most usual condition, so why question normal? Normal’s what got 
us here…Morse unbuckles to show us all the way, back in the lead and 
comfortable again, because during normal his orders must be obeyed and his 
moods are the collective rudder. The episode is over, his face declares, and 
already he’s revising its severity and telling a little story to himself of 
uninterrupted control. His airline not only lies to customers, it deceives itself. 
We’re steady on now and we always have been. ‘Christine, two new glasses. 
These ones spilled,’ he says. ‘Take them away, please.’ Already concealing 
evidence….Not me, though. I know when I’ve come through a rough patch and 
voiced silent prayers that promised deep reforms—the same reforms everyone 
else was pledging, too, with the full knowledge that we’ll dishonor them the 
moment we’re done and safe. (300-301)
 
Here Soren Morse, as Name of the Father and hence the representative of the Big Other’s 





threat of crisis, he tries to revise history as continuous, as if everything was always on the 
right track all along. It is specifically because Ryan is sitting next to Morse that he can 
see through the charade--and yet can’t see through it at the same time, because he is still 
in thrall to Soren Morse as fetish. He sees that Morse is diminished, that he is simply 
human, but at the same time recognizes that all of his pledges for “deep reform” will be 
thrown away the minute they land. So Ryan knows very well that Soren Morse is no God, 
but at the same time doesn’t believe it. He wants to believe that everything is safe, and 
that everything had always been safe.  
Kirn here, like Zizek and Berry, is after the allegory. The way the passengers 
react to the plane’s turbulence mirrors the way that we react to financial catastrophes, to 
wars, to outbreaks of disease, and (perhaps most clearly) to ecological problems and 
resource limits.  Climate disruption, after all, can be described as global turbulence for an 
earth hurtling through space. But too often, such threats are not processed as evidence 
that things could seriously go off the rails—or that they already are off the rails. Instead, 
they are momentary blips, and the Big Other can reassure us that everything has always 
been moving in a heroic, progressive direction (or alternatively, that the old, sacred Earth 
was in “balance” before we threw it off). But what happens when we sense—as Bingham 
does, for a brief second—that there is no telos, that running with the right currents cannot 
stave off the howling winds? Or even worse, when we sense that (in Walter Benjamin’s 
terms) from a certain perspective the crisis is occurring right now? As Benjamin puts it, 
“The tradition of the oppressed teaches us that the ‘state of emergency’ in which we live 






Muscles Store Memories: Up in the Air’s Dialectical Images 
Such moments of disequilibrium resemble Benjamin’s profane illuminations: 
cracks in the symbolic edifice that reveal the surreal nature of life in the midst of 
catastrophe and turbulence, but also the persistent desire for something better. Like the 
upended glass before it has been taken away and erased, the profane illumination sheds 
light on the nakedness of humanity, on what we would like to conceal about our 
individual and collective fragility—and thus on the unruly female principle that we would 
like to throw off. And for Benjamin, the profane illumination emerges in what he calls 
dialectical images: distillations of repressed desire that take from bits and pieces of the 
political unconscious, popular culture, and religious iconography to produce 
phantasmagorical montages that do not explain themselves right away, but that instead 
haunt the viewer with their visionary power. In Up in the Air, dialectical images emerge 
from Ryan Bingham’s memory, and from moments of free-association in which he 
allows his mind to roam unencumbered. These profane illuminations reveal both 
catastrophe and the possibility of redemption, desire and disappointment. Visible only for 
brief moments, these images grow out of traumatic childhood losses (of a sense of safety, 
of boundedness, of intimate love). And they help us diagnose why Bingham has taken to 
the air in the first place. 
  The first image I would like to examine emerges in Bingham’s memory of his 
younger sister Julie, whose life has been an unmitigated mess--though I will have to 
outline the curious history of Ryan and Julie before the image will come into focus. An 





describes what he calls the “case history, starting with the bogus model search when Julie 
was fifteen”: 
Like the other local girls caught up in the fraud, she stopped eating. She ran. She 
gorged on laxatives. When the promoters vanished with her entry fee, she and a 
few of the other dupes kept dieting. They started shoplifting, formed a little crime 
club. The school called in social workers from St. Paul. There was a drug bust, a 
suicide attempt. Eventually, something turned the girls around, though. They 
filled out. They got educations. The learned some sense. Except for my kid sister. 
So much grief. The teenage marriage. The teenage divorce. The year in massage 
school. The food fads and the pills. The racist second husband who went to 
Sandstone for forgiving sales bonds on a color copier. And only lately, in the last 
two years, a kind of peace for Julie, a new purpose, rehabilitating injured animals 
on a Humane Society rescue farm. (44-45)
 
Though Julie is engaged to be married to a new man, Bingham is understandably 
skeptical that it will work out this time. Although he hopes that her new job working with 
animals will help her form more permanent attachments, he recognizes that Julie has 
(barely) gotten by in life by refusing to maintain strong relationships: “This is a girl who 
assumes all bonds are temporary, who’s famously well-defended against loss. Her 
divorces were strangely painless” (89).  
The plot thickens, however. Drawing from a long tradition of gothic flirtation 
with sexual taboos, Kirn indicates that Julie’s resignation to loss partly stems from the 
demise of an attachment that could only be temporary, because it violated a core social 
norm: a passionate and mutual romantic attachment to her brother Ryan. Although the 
two never seemed to have engaged in sexual activity, the twelve-year-old Julie developed 
a powerful crush on the college-age Ryan, and her brother reciprocated. (Or was it the 
other way around? Do we trust Bingham here?). In any case, this “romance” was doomed 
to fail; after a neighbor spies Julie’s head on Ryan’s shoulder at an R-rated movie, their 





seminal take on the gothic tradition in U.S. literature, describes the role of brother-sister 
incest in the gothic novel as a multifaceted one. On the one hand, brother-sister incest can 
indicate a desire for a utopian and prelapsarian world of purely natural and spontaneous 
passion, since it involves love within the small and known circle of the same. But such a 
love also expresses a rebellion against parental and social authority. As a result, Fiedler 
sees such images of brother/sister incest (rife within gothic literature) as emblematic of 
the guilt of the revolutionary, who feels damned by his rejection of status quo social 
norms and paternal authority. The pursuit of brother/sister incest, then, can also result 
from a masochistic search for self-punishment; in defying social norms, the incestuous 
partners find themselves caught in a maelstrom of chaos that ultimately leads to death: “it 
projects not only the desire to revolt but also to die; that is to say, beneath the yearning 
for rebellion lies hidden the wish to be punished for it” (399).  
True to form, brother/sister incest in Up in the Air appears as both the loss of a 
utopian connection and a death wish. Neither Bingham nor Julie is capable of recovering 
from the loss of their partnership, since neither is able to maintain fruitful relationships; 
each continues living, but as a zombie. And each is trapped by the past. Bingham in 
particular retains an abiding hatred of his (castrating) mother—and even hints at one 
point that in taking to the air, he is running from her (150). Not only did Bingham’s 
mother take away their romance; her parenting style involves continually forcing her 
children to give up the things they loved. Bingham bleeds resentment as he describes the 
way his mother forced her daughters to give up riding horses “to stimulate their interest 
in boys”:  
They hated her for it. My mother was a scientific parent; she taught third grade 





system, keyed to crucial birthdays, teddy bears disappeared when kids turned 
eight, replaced by clarinets or swimming lessons. She had us baptized at ten, 
confirmed at twelve, and bought us subscriptions to Newsweek at fourteen. How 
she settled on Newsweek I don’t know. (57)
 
Bingham’s mother, then, embodies social authority and enforces a bourgeois “scientific” 
order on her children. In place of the rustic and archaic fantasy of horse-riding (and the 
even more archaic fantasy of incest), she follows a modern psychological regimen of 
social adjustment: not only timed religious rituals, but also access to ideological pressures 
in the form of that bourgeois icon, Newsweek magazine (now, alas, only available on the 
web!). Bingham spends the novel resenting the way his mother left his father when he 
was down. Instead, she remarries (a usurper) and spends her life driving around the 
country in a recreational vehicle. Bingham’s mother is paradigmatically mobile, and 
forces her children to leave things behind. Ironically, then, Bingham’s rejection of the 
grounded life is a rejection of the world endorsed by his mother, a world in which his 
“modern” and mobile mother is the supreme authority—yet his rebellion takes a similar 
form of mobility. He, like Julie, is so “well defended against loss” that he avoids holding 
onto anything. 
 If Bingham’s mobility involves a flight from his mother, it also involves a flight 
from the abjected female principle as such. What seems to bother him most about his 
relationship with his sister—a relationship about which he tells no one in the novel, 
except us, his readers—is that in deviating from the law (here embodied not by the 
castrated father, but by the scientific mother) he finds in himself the chaos associated with 
the abjected mother-connection. In cleaving to his sister and butting up against the 
castrating force of the mother, Bingham was forced to confront his own incomplete 





standard middle-class life—his failed attempt to marry and have children, his job with a 
respectable corporation, his ostentatiously “moderate politics” (3)-- seem a desperate 
attempt to live down this hysterical moment of transgression, castration, and loss. 
Otherwise, he might have to confront the hysteria that lies underneath his otherwise 
standard self. What Bingham seeks to throw off is “the otherness of femininity, a 
maternal multiplicity basic to us all,” since “all ‘abnormalities’ we would divorce from 
ourselves are a part of ourselves, deeply and pervasively (hence frighteningly)” (Hogle 
10, 12). When Bingham finally reveals his memory problems to the reader, he tellingly 
refers to himself as a multiple (and therefore unstable) self: “It turns out that we’ve been 
together this whole time, all of the Ryans. We just got separated. This has happened 
before. I’ve never told a soul. I’ve met myself coming and going. It’s a secret” (151-152). 
Julie, for Ryan, is hysteria: where the law distintegrates, where the stable self falls apart 
and fragments, where sheer need intervenes.     
 Julie’s downfall may be linked to the loss of her relationship with Ryan, but it is 
also rooted in the predatory culture of consumer capitalism. As described by Ryan, the 
“start” of her decline began with a “bogus model search,” in which unscrupulous 
marketers draw young girls into a mad scramble for fame, attention, and money, driving 
them into anorexia in the process—not to mention crime and drugs. Julie, in fact, is 
specifically impressionable and thus vulnerable to the ventriloquistic voices around her, 
especially the psychotechniques of an exploitive commercial culture. When Ryan visits 
Julie at his sister Kara’s house in Utah, he insists on turning the TV off because it has an 
inordinate impact on Julie: “It’s always wise, in my experience, to turn off any nearby 





bad thoughts, of lobbing idea grenades into the room” (143-144). Julie seems 
hypersensitive to these “idea grenades.” Later, when he takes Julie with him on a 
business trip, he is startled by her compulsive shopping: “My sister feels ill at ease, I’m 
learning, if she goes for more than an hour without a purchase” (177). And her 
susceptibility to insistent cultural voices is not limited to the commercial realm; she is 
also drawn to the emotional outpouring of U.S. religious culture (itself imbued with a 
commercial ethos). Bingham describes a period during which she took a job at a “St. Paul 
religious gift shop” and became born again; he recalls a Christian rock concert—“a 
spectacle of fog and laser lights and colored scrims”—which draws Julie in completely: 
“The band released white doves during the encore, and afterwards Julie and others rushed 
the stage and dropped to their knees before a neon cross next to the drum kit. It shook me 
to see such need in her, such thirst” (65). Yet although Julie is drawn in so easily, she 
also nervously pulls herself out just as easily; more exactly, it is precisely because she is 
so vulnerable to short-term drives that she feels the need to protect herself against loss by 
flitting from one thing to the next. 
 The Julie back-story culminates in one of the strangest images in the novel, the 
dialectical image to which I have been building. And this image emerges from Bingham’s 
memory during a rare moment of pause, as an erstwhile girlfriend Alex rubs his back. In 
response to Alex’s admonition that “muscles store memories,” this moment of touch 
provokes Bingham’s memory of attending the Minnesota State Fair with his sister. And 
we soon sense that this is a memory Ryan would rather not revisit. As Ryan and Julie 
enter a tent, they see a mysterious block of ice with something in it, supposedly an “ice 





body, wrinkled, dark, and hairy, curled on its side like a newborn calf. Convincing. 
Julie’s hands squeeze my skull and I feel a drip. She’s weeping. I twist to leave, but she 
holds me. My neck is wet. ‘It’s a her,’ she says. ‘It’s a girl. They killed a girl’” (99-100). 
(Soon after, Bingham recalls other memories: that Julie, working as a masseuse, was 
assaulted by “the CFO of a major retail shoe chain,” and that the police ignored her 
accusation.) Finally, the memories peter out, as Alex’s touch evokes only a negatively 
repetitive fog of travel in which no particular moments stand out: “no memories…just 
pain. A thousand plane seats” (100). 
Why is this scene so strange and sad, beautiful and horrifying? We could unpack 
the associations: First of all, we have the erotic overtones of Ryan’s love for his sister, 
since the memory emerges during a massage, and Ryan carries Julie on his shoulders. We 
also have the theme of being frozen, stuck in place—and both Julie and Ryan are 
emotionally frozen insofar as they are still stuck in the past, haunted by the loss of their 
relationship. Equally importantly, however, at this grotesque State Fair we are presented 
with an image of the predations of a consumer culture: in Julie’s eyes, this girl has not 
only been murdered, but exploited for commercial gain and displayed as a spectacle for 
others to gawk at. (And in remembering what Julie sees as victimization, Bingham recalls 
Julie’s abuse by the CFO, and especially by the modeling scam built on the lure of 
displaying young women for profit). Finally, if the hairy calf suggests a strange parody of 
the womb, in which an uncanny proto-human creature lies claustrophobically encased in 
an icy membrane, it also suggests the mistreatment of animals and the replacement of an 
older, smaller form of agriculture with large-scale industrial agribusiness. All in all, this 





which people would kill and freeze a girl, and charge people money to see her. It is 
Ryan’s inability to protect his sister Julie from such a world that motivates his sadness 
and rage, and his mad scramble for power within it. And in a parallel way, he is also 
unable to protect his father (and by extension, the world of small businesses and small 
farms) from the humiliations and predations of a larger economy. In this cluster of 
associations, Ryan Bingham faces his own lack of autonomy; whether pummeled by 
psychic forces or by social ones, he cannot fortify boundaries against the intrusion of the 
Other. 
 
The Garage vs. the Madhouse: Dreams of a Republican Pastoral Space 
I learned to live from the present forward only, and I don’t regret it. One must these days 
if one is to stay in business, and it’s all business now. 
—Ryan Bingham, from Up in the Air (205) 
    Indeed, although Bingham often tries to convince himself that contemporary 
capitalism brings “restfulness and order” to its grateful beneficiaries, he just as often 
pictures the capitalist landscape as one of chaos and fear. At one point, he has a dream in 
which participants in capitalism—here imagined in terms of the popular game 
Monopoly—take deadly risks that pan out badly: “I dreamed abstractly, of multicolored 
grids unfurling to the horizon, a giant game board. The game pieces were familiar from 
Monopoly—the cannon, the shoe, the Scottie dog, the iron—but they floated over the 
board like space debris. Every few moments, a thin blue laser beam would arc from the 
board and turn a piece to ash” (121). In this disorganized, free-floating capitalism, 
potential destruction is always around the corner. Later, while attempting to block out the 





riddled with mendacity and chaos: “It’s the little deceptions that no one catches that are 
going to dissolve it someday. We’ll look at clocks and we won’t believe the 
hands…Feeling a need to halt the swirl, to stabilize, I dial Great West’s toll-free mileage 
hotline to check the running tally” (86). In this scene, Bingham’s compulsive mile-
counting serves as an attempt to “stabilize” what he sees as a volatile “swirl” of lies, 
tricks, and distrust. Thus oddly enough, Bingham’s jeremiad about U.S. decline leads him 
to further embrace Airworld’s replicable pleasures. His attraction to modular, Lego-like 
chain restaurants and hotels, and to countable air-miles, reflects a desire for order that he 
hopes will compensate for the “madhouse” that he otherwise sees around him. As 
Bingham puts it, in collecting one million air-miles he imposes narrative order on a life 
(and a novel) otherwise bereft of limits and ends: “It’s a boundary…I need boundaries in 
my life” (11). And this desire for stabilization echoes the regionalist desire for a more 
coherent society, such that Bingham can come across as both a fervent nomad and a 
regionalist prophet at the same time, the two tendencies co-existing tensely in the same 
person. 
 Bingham’s contradictory feelings regarding capitalism result in another dialectical 
image, which grows out of his free-associative attempt to write an inspirational book for 
the business demographic. In his manuscript The Garage, which he composes during 
moments of lag time by dictating into a recorder, Bingham imagines a surreal world, the 
hero of which (a man named M) retreats to his work space in order to control his own 
“biorhythms” in the pursuit of business innovation. This genius is the epitome of the 





(“at one with his core competencies”), such that he cannot be rushed by outside demands 
(175): 
Notes for book: hero floats outside time in The Garage. The progress of his 
projects is all he knows. Self-management means nothing if not this—the task-
centered governance of one’s very biorhythms. If not for the quarterly financial 
statements that come to him through the Communications Portal, which he shreds 
unread, then burns for heat, my hero would not even know what year it is. The 
man who makes history is a living calendar, his beating heart his only pendulum. 
(109)
 
For some reason, this free individual, so cut off from any social existence that he burns 
the mail science-fiction style to keep himself warm, is unstoppably devoted to a “project” 
which miraculously happens to coincide with the most fervent desires of the market. Thus 
it turns out that being a “living calendar,” rooted in the very rhythms of the body, means 
being precisely attuned to the calendar implied by the quarterly financial statements he 
otherwise ignores. Indeed, M’s Zen-like knack for producing “value-adding genius” 
makes him a hero to the masses who throng outside his garage, urging him to emerge and 
reap the fruits of his glory (175). 
 The Garage, which Bingham describes as a “gestalt” (176), is what J.G.A. Pocock 
would describe as a republican vision of a “timeless space” of order and rationality 
(Noble xxxv). And appropriately enough, Bingham posits the world of the garage as a 
challenge to the chaos and excess of contemporary capitalism, which he sees as 
irrationally wedded to a dangerous and unnatural pursuit of growth for the sake of 
growth:  
For years it has been the same message: Grow or die. But is this necessarily the 
truth? Too often, growth for its own sake leads to chaos: unsustainable capital 
expansion, ill-timed acquisitions, a stressful workplace. In The Garage, I propose 
a bold new formula to replace the lurching pursuit of profit: ‘Sufficient 
Plenitude.’ Enough really can be enough, that is. A heresy? Not to students of the 





consumption and activity, but by functioning within certain dynamic parameters 
of diet and exercise, work and leisure. So too with the corporation, whose core 
objective should not be the amassing of good numbers, but the creation and 
management of abundance. (66)
 
Bingham hardly knows where such a message comes from; he worries that “the book is 
just the overflow of a brain so stuffed with jargon that it’s spontaneously sloughing off 
the excess,” and admits that “some of the ideas felt foreign to me, with no connection to 
how I actually operate” (66-67). Yet it is precisely because this book flows from a trance 
state that it can capture so effectively Bingham’s confused desire. And this desire is 
contradictory: to have capitalism without “stress” and “growth,” a creative “team” 
without conflict or even interaction, and a flowering of creative production that is 
simultaneously unmotivated by market considerations and perfectly in line with them. 
Here indeed is a pastoral vision of material abundance and a beautiful relation between 
classes: a world of pure use value in which power does not operate. Above all, it 
expresses a desire for a world in which no father operates; M is not compelled to produce 
by a paternal law, and yet somehow does not devolve into hysterical chaos. Instead, he 
manages himself—perfectly. 
The Garage also depicts a world of geographical stasis, since its hero M never 
emerges from the garage, even when his fans press him to show his face. It thus reveals 
the extent to which Bingham’s feverish motion through Airworld is motivated not simply 
by a desire for the new, but also by a desire for stability, for a safe refuge in which he can 
escape the pressures of sociality altogether. And he can only do this by becoming a 
machine, in a sense—by renouncing all conscious decision about what the social world 
should look like and instead achieving a state in which the natural inclinations of his 





wants to orbit continuously, in harmony with the flows of a natural social order, such that 
absolute motion is indistinguishable from absolute stasis—which is why he wants so 
desperately to imagine that capitalism can be that natural social order. Such an order 
would not operate by paternal compulsion, but through some seamless and impersonal 
mechanism of value-production. But in the end, he cannot endorse capitalism as it 
actually expresses itself in the world. Instead, the vision he presents in The Garage is so 
different from existing capitalism as to be unrecognizable. A capitalism in which 
“enough really is enough” is no longer capitalism, since the capitalist system depends on 
constant growth and expansion. And the hero of The Garage, with his unalienated labor 
that comes directly from “within,” rather than being imposed on him by outside forces, is 
the exact opposite of the real Ryan Bingham—who is subject to the imperatives of 
capitalist time, who is pinned directly to a calendar that continually keeps moving, and 
whose work is alienated.  
 
Don’t Tell Me We Can’t Be Everywhere at Once:  
Globalization from Below 
Contemporary life constantly reminds us that we are moving toward death, or at least 
obsolescence, and that life we must continually strive to hold together. Paradoxically, we 
need the consistent consciousness of death provided by the Gothic in order to understand 
and want that life….The Gothic’s basic investment in ravaging history and fragmenting 
the past meshes with our own investments now as we attempt to reinvent history as a way 
of healing the perpetual loss in modern existence. 
--Steven Bruhm, from “Contemporary Gothic: why we need it” (274) 
What is missing in the timeless space of The Garage is a sense of history as 
unfolding according to a social dynamic that includes conflict and decay, loss and 





becomes hard to identify what motivates his activity in the first place. But if Ryan 
Bingham yearns to escape a social world in which motivation is tapped (and potentially 
depleted) within a social system infused with power, he cannot manage to forget the 
history in which he is enmeshed. Dropped from the calendar in Benjamin’s terms, he tries 
to imagine other temporalities which render the past irrelevant (capitalist gambling time, 
the natural biorhythms in The Garage), but he is haunted by memory, and thus by the 
sound of Benjamin’s church bells. His description of small-town Minnesota is tinged 
with nostalgia and loss:  
By five I was riding shotgun in the propane truck, learning a business that, if it 
had survived, I’d still be in today, with no regrets. The secret was providing added 
value with every refilled tank—carrying the news from farm to farm, adjusting 
and reigniting pilot lights, delivering packages for snowbound widows. My 
apprenticeship secured a spot for me in my father’s everyday routine and in the 
larger life of the community. (148)
 
While in The Garage Bingham’s description of “demand-based value-adding genius” 
(175) is entirely abstract and tautological, with no concrete referent (whatever is 
demanded has value!), here “added value” appears clearly as embodied within a local 
network of social connection. Bingham’s father did not work in isolation according to his 
own supposedly biological clock, nor did he abandon himself to the dictates of a global 
market. Instead he worked within “the larger life of the community”; his relationships 
with customers were not simply speculative and short-term, but long-term investments in 
a network of mutual caring.   
However--and here’s the rub--Bingham’s father could not maintain life within 
such an imagined pastoral community; he lost his business to outside competition, as well 
as his motivation and his marriage. Whatever his misgivings, then, even Bingham 





truly want to, especially given that this world, too, existed in history, caught within a 
network of power, conflict, and inequality. It was only later that Bingham recognized the 
extent to which his home-town existed not as an entity unto itself, but as one node within 
a larger and more mysterious network. And it is in this moment that we find the last 
dialectical image I would like to examine: a brief hint at the possibility of redemption in 
the novel. At one point, as Bingham speaks to his mentor, the business guru Sandy Pinter 
rails against the intermodal hub society as a “sinkhole”: “This wireless wired hive of 
ours….No one can be everywhere at once, and why should they want to be? We’ll come 
close of course. We’ll come within a hair, then half a hair, then half of a half. But we’ll 
never ring the bell. And that’s their plan, you see. Progress without perfection. The 
endless tease” (134). As the novel bears out, Pinter makes an important point here: 
Bingham’s search for perfection, for a seamless and harmonious system of circulation 
governed by natural rhythms, is never attained.  
Nevertheless, Bingham refuses to relinquish his utopian energy. In response to 
Pinter, a memory surges up for him that indicates a hope in the healing power of 
industrial technology as a pharmakon, if the mobility it makes possible could be properly 
channeled: as a teenager, he fell through a frozen Minnesota lake and lay in suspended 
animation for fifteen minutes before being rescued by a helicopter. For Bingham, the 
incident revealed the limits of his own particular place, and pointed him toward the 
possibility of human connection on a scale grander than the local or even the national:  
I was a country boy once….We were proud of Polk Center. Its farmers fed the 
world….It wasn’t until the first time I flew, in a medevac helicopter to 
Minneapolis, that I realized how confined I’d been….I could see all the 
Minneapolis skyscrapers, some of their floors lit up and others dark, as well as the 
antennas on their roofs that transmitted our radio stations and TV ball games. I 





crossed by bridges sparkling with late-night traffic. The landscape looked whole 
in a way it never had before; I could see how it fit together. My parents had lied. 
They’d taught me we lived in the best place in the world, but I could see now that 
the world was really one place and that comparing its parts did not make sense or 
gain our town any advantage over others….Just thirty minutes. To reach a city I’d 
thought of as remote, halfway across the state, a foreign capital….Don’t tell me 
this isn’t an age of miracles. Don’t tell me we can’t be everywhere at once. (139-
141)
 
In this lyrical passage, Bingham complicates his professor’s country music narrative; 
though disillusioned by urban wickedness, Bingham sees a utopian kernel in the magic of 
modernity, and healing power in its miraculous technologies.  
Indeed, Bingham has been so entranced with this magic that when life on the 
ground becomes confusing, he attempts to return to this remembered world of flight. Just 
as the helicopter saves him from the stasis of a frozen lake, Bingham refuses to become 
frozen again, to treat one place as the end-all, be-all. Although he has since become 
trapped in a paradoxical frozen-in-motion stasis—deceived by the belief that he could 
simply go with the flow--this remembered moment of emergence from ice still offers an 
original vision of inspiration that might help him change shapes yet again. Even in 
pursuing MythTech, Bingham hopes to recreate the sense of wholeness that he feels in 
the helicopter—to see the world fitting together as one place. But although the world is 
indeed interconnected, it is not whole in the way Bingham wants to imagine. MythTech 
notwithstanding, it cannot be made to “fit together” from above; instead, it remains out of 
joint in important ways. Ultimately, it is not possible to be everywhere at once in some 
smooth sense. Nor is it possible to create a fail-safe cognitive map of the postmodern 
conjuncture. The helicopter, then, can only become an image of a critical regionalist 
gothic quest for place—a mobile structure of critical regionalist architecture rather than 





allegorizes a provisional fight against the pull of gravity in a contingent effort of 
caretaking. The helicopter, like other contemporary technologies of transportation and 
communication—from fiber optic cables and digital devices to jets and bullet trains—is a 
pharmakon, potentially toxic but also potentially healing. And harnessing the gravity of 
the situation involves finding ways to prevent such technologies from destroying the 
ecological, social, and psychic resources through the reckless proliferation of negative 
externalities and what Stiegler calls “dissociated milieus,” autonomized spheres of 
activity in which caretaking is lost (59). Instead, somehow we need to deploy these 
technologies not simply to stave off the tendency toward falling profit in the short-term, 
but to aid us in creating long networks of long-term nurturing: of the planet, the social 
world, and the individual human libidinal economy.      
However, in embracing capitalism, Bingham does not find a model of citizenship 
rooted in mutual care-taking and equality, or in the “sufficient plenitude” of The Garage. 
Instead, citizenship for Bingham is for the few, only available for those at the top of 
MythTech, or who have achieved some comparable level of power. In the novel’s 
conclusion, however, Bingham fails to get a job with MythTech. He even fails to find 
MythTech, which has supposedly moved from Nebraska to Canada, but in principle could 
move anywhere. As a low-level flunkie indicates, any number of enticements might bring 
MythTech away from the U.S.: “Tax breaks. Lax accounting standards. Who knows? 
Strict banking privacy laws. Skilled immigrants. It’s not like we’re quarrying Nebraska 
sandstone—we can run this shop from Djakarta” (287). Thus Bingham, no longer in the 
air, must face life excluded from what he sees as citizenship. Like many others, he is left 





exclusion explains why, earlier, when he shows up at the headquarters of his company en 
route to Las Vegas, his sneering colleague Craig Gregory associates him with the 
indigenous Third World: “Listen, you look like hell. Nice boots, but from there on up 
you’re Guatemalan. If I was a fag I’d reach over and fix your hair….That may go over 
fine among the Navajo, but this is white America” (187). Bingham’s western boots mark 
him as both masculine and “white,” but everything else about him signals that he has 
been eclipsed or ground under like a global Indian. And there is no fraternity here, lest 
Craig Gregory be labeled a “fag”—and therefore as insufficiently masculine. Whichever 
way you slice it, even if the privileges of whiteness have been spreading to the four 
corners of the earth (including elite Navajos and Guatemalans), capitalism is built on 
inequality, haunted by the excluded. And if Bingham retains many of the privileges of 
white manhood at the novel’s end, he nonetheless feels like a refugee: homeless, and with 
an unclear path forward on unfamiliar ground.  
Thus Up in the Air depicts a man haunted by memories of a contradictory sort, of 
Mr. Hugs and market stresses—“baby Jesus left out in the rain”—but also of a miracle 
helicopter that saves lives from rigid ice and connects the whole world. And it leaves us 
hanging at the end. Ryan Bingham doesn’t know what he is going to do when he stops 
flying. His plan, in the short-term, is to go to his sister’s wedding, get drunk, and “walk 
the surface of the earth” in his cowboy boots (274). That at the end of the novel Bingham 
is on his way to Julie’s wedding is potentially a hopeful sign—an opportunity for him to 
work through the past, come down to earth, and confront social pressures rather than 
evading them through speculative leaps into The Garage. (Unless, of course, he is too 





her marriage, Bingham would face the strange stranger within himself: the abjected 
female hysteria from which he otherwise flees. Doing so would not necessarily involve 
renouncing the validity of their mutual love; Bingham does not need to punish himself for 
his past, and indeed, he may insist on some level that while giving up Julie may have 
been necessary, their unlawful love was—and is—based on an irreducible kernel that 
cannot be reduced to law. Indeed, perhaps this irreducibility is what characterizes love as 
such, which emerges here as an abyss which cannot be counted or corralled. In 
recognizing as much, perhaps both Ryan and Julie might open themselves up to the world 
and the strange strangers who populate it. In other words, they might live. 
The wedding also represents an opportunity for Bingham to imagine a way 
beyond the serialized anti-collectives with which he has become enmeshed—the market, 
the line at the airport, the haggle of competition. As a powerfully Taylorized laborer in 
tune with the demands of capital, Ryan Bingham is defined first and foremost by his 
failure to affiliate with others on the basis of solidarity. Perhaps, if he were to follow 
Gayatri Spivak’s advice, he would give up on his dreams to beat the hierarchy by chasing 
the frontier and finding a “seat inside the Dome” (282), and instead ally himself with 
those outside the Dome, outside of Airworld. Perhaps he might give up on the dream of 
autonomy and recognize his own interconnection with others and the impossibility of 
permanent barriers. In doing so, he might see that he has something in common with the 
Guatemalan and the Navajo, such that he might identify with a movement to achieve a 
“robust citizenship for the people down below” (89). How could he do this? The answer 
is unclear. As Spivak notes, “Critical regionalism is not an analysis. It is really a kind of 





in the way U.S. news services are finally beginning to pay attention to the Chinese 
workers who produce the I-phones sold at American Wal-Marts, in globalized anti-
austerity riots and Occupy protests, in outrage over economic inequality and crumbling 
infrastructure (ecological, social, psychic), and in the growing sense that U.S. workers are 
no longer sheltered from global conditions of competition and precarity, such that a 
planetary labor movement is beginning to become more imaginable.  
At the end of Up in the Air, Bingham (who has been flying across the country for 
years, but not outside of it) is surprised to learn that MythTech would move to Canada, 
let alone Djakarta. He seems unprepared for the idea that the frontier has not only left the 
landscape of the U.S. West, but also the airspace of the U.S. nation. Indeed, the very fact 
of Bingham’s physical mobility renders him a dinosaur in some ways. (As the film makes 
even more clear, in the future people like Bingham might not be flying around in the 
flesh, since they will simply do their work on-line from Nebraska. The intermodal hub 
society increasingly lies in cyberspace.) If Bingham has survived the manic terrain of 
Airworld, then, he now faces an even tougher challenge: what Benjamin called the “open 
air of history” on the gothic terrain of a grounded earth that is also in flight, criss-crossed 
by leap-frogging flows and discontinuous grids of mobility (Illuminations 261). 
Bingham’s landing, then, is simultaneously the end of a confessional narrative (built on 
an obsessive and repetitious reworking of a fragmented past), a departure from trauma, 
and the beginning of a new struggle. In leaving Bingham’s future “up in the air,” Kirn 
suggests that any quest for place (Bingham’s or ours) will not come easily, since the 
gothic quest for place is no picnic. Any conviviality we can find in it will be difficult to 





hope to “reinvent history as a way of healing the perpetual loss” in a haunted and 











LOVE THY NEIGHBOR: RICHARD RODRIGUEZ’S BROWN, 
INTO THE WILD, AND THE NEW NORTH 
 
During the summer of 2006, I studied Spanish for almost three months in the city 
of Quetzaltenango, Guatemala—affectionately known as Xela. Like many language 
students in the area, I worked one-on-one with a local instructor; my teacher Veronica 
would spend about four hours a day teaching me grammar and vocabulary, quizzing me, 
and leading me in stilted cross-language conversations. Since I studied with Veronica for 
several weeks, we learned a few things about each other. At one point, in the middle of a 
Spanish-language question and answer session, I told a story about my neighbors in 
Colorado Springs, where I lived from about 1996 to 2001. After I graduated from college, 
I lived and worked at a hospitality house for people off the street (and often, out of 
prison), modeled on the work of Catholic Worker founder Dorothy Day. The quasi-
anarchist Bijou House, as it was then called, had no paid employees, but we were fairly 
busy nonetheless. In addition to a 24-hour shift managing the house during the week, I 
also attended weekly and monthly meetings, attended protests, wrote for and designed the 
layout for an affiliated newspaper, and worked at a local wood oven pizza restaurant. 
Like many of the people affiliated with the Bijou House, I was not Catholic (or even 





with Veronica—especially since my Spanish didn’t quite reach that level--but I did tell 
her about our neighbors. Next door to the volunteer house where I lived with my 
girlfriend (and sometimes as many as nine other people, including a family with a one-
year-old child, and a sixty-eight-year-old priest facing prison-time for protesting nuclear 
weapons), lived a very different kind of family. 
This couple also worked at restaurants in Colorado Springs. But they had pit bulls 
in the yard. They did meth, and they most certainly abused their young children and each 
other. We could often hear screaming and mutual accusations throughout the day and 
night, and sometimes their children (two girls and a boy) would wander over to our house 
and knock, or just stand in the doorway. Occasionally we took them to movies. Later, 
they attended some of the neighborhood homework sessions we helped organize, and to a 
Bijou-related summer youth camp. Eventually, the owners of the house took on boarders, 
a couple who also took meth. At one point, the male boarder attempted to run over his 
girlfriend with a car as we peered through the window. Luckily, he didn’t succeed. Later 
on, though, another problem emerged: the pit bulls started to get out of the yard. We 
talked with our neighbors about keeping the dogs inside, and they told us that, yes, they 
would keep control over them. But we could see them training the pit bulls to attack a tire 
hanging from a tree in the backyard. We called Animal Control a few times, but the dogs 
still occasionally escaped their enclosure. Our friends—the ones with the one-year-old—
no longer felt comfortable allowing their child outside. Then it happened: one of the pit 
bulls chewed a leg off of another pit bull. I don’t remember how we reacted, but I do 
know that the volunteer couple living with us decided to leave. They had a few reasons 





volunteers), but the terrifying neighbors next door partly explained their decision. For 
whatever reason, this is the story I told Veronica. Perhaps we were talking about the 
many stray dogs that walk around Xela, eating garbage in the streets.  
Her reaction surprised me. She could not believe that such things happened in the 
United States. She had always heard from others that the U.S. was, in her words, 
“perfect”—not morally perfect, but streamlined, modern, and clean. Its airports, shopping 
malls, and libraries simply couldn’t be believed, because they were so “perfect.” She 
confessed to me that, if she could, she would like to move to the U.S., and that she might 
even be willing to do so illegally if she could be assured a safe path. (At one point, she 
asked me if I could teach her some English. I went to her house and helped her conjugate 
irregular verbs, just as she had taught me).  How could I be describing los Estados 
Unidos? Most of all, she could not believe that these people were white, Norte 
Americanos. Mexicans, maybe, or blacks. But white people acting like this? Veronica 
was different from some of the other teachers at the school, most of whom were young 
men (some of them gay). These other teachers were, in Veronica’s words “politically 
conscious,” but also partiers who enjoyed getting to know the European and U.S. women 
(and men) who came to Guatemala to study Spanish. Many of them had girlfriends (or 
boyfriends) from out of the country. Veronica didn’t fit in with this crowd. She was older, 
had a daughter, and did legal consultation out of a small home office. A single parent, she 
was teaching Spanish to make ends meet, but she didn’t consider herself “politically 
conscious.” At one point, she told me that she sympathized with those who endorsed 
“social hygiene,” the practice among Guatemalan authorities of unofficially killing 





nightmare she had the night before: of being trapped on a bus by bandits. She imagined 
these men as animals or monsters. The United States, in contrast, seemed to her an escape 
from such violent men. So she resisted my story.  
She also resisted my judgment of Guatemala as a “beautiful country” with “nice 
people.” Of course, I was trying to be polite—but I was also a middle-class tourist from 
the country that Guatemalan writer Miguel Angel Asturias described as “Papa Verde”—
the Green Father (referring to the color of U.S. money). I didn’t have to live in 
Guatemala forever, and I had access to the privileges of a visiting American. I could 
travel to interesting, novel, and even dangerous places, knowing that it was all part of a 
temporary adventure. So, in a way, each of us was more attuned to the difficulty of our 
own neighbors: the ones with whom we were stuck on an everyday basis. And although 
we would like to imagine a world in which all neighbors are unobtrusive, or even helpful 
fellow men and women (all of the things the word neighborly is meant to connote)—and 
not at all like Veronica’s image of violent gangmembers, or my experience with 
dysfunctional troublemakers—in some ways all neighbors are too intrusive. Slavoj Zizek, 
for one, describes the Neighbor as above all “terrifying,” since in facing the Neighbor we 
face “the abyss of its desire and its obscene enjoyment” (First as Tragedy 46). I was 
definitely privy to a fair amount of “obscene enjoyment” during my time in Colorado 
Springs. But we can’t take refuge in our own little walled-off worlds, since ultimately, we 
are the Neighbor, too: “the subject as such is toxic in its very form, in its abyss of 
Otherness” (46). Since the consistency of any person hinges on a certain void at the 





if Christians, like the founders of the Bijou House, are commanded to love their 
neighbors, such a task is easier said than done.  
What is true on a personal level is also true (in some ways) on an international 
level. Especially in Europe and the United States, the question of immigration has 
reached a high pitch of hysteria in some circles. The ironic truth is that although Veronica 
imagines running North as a way of getting away from her own neighbors, many in the 
U.S. would view her as an unwelcome and toxic Neighbor, a contaminating force from a 
South conceived as riddled with problems. In this chapter, then, I would like to examine 
questions that circulate around the figure of the Neighbor, and about the desires for 
separateness and purity--for an impermeable body, whether personal or cultural-national. 
In particular, I look at these questions through the filter of the American West conceived 
broadly as imbricated within the Americas, and through the geographical coordinates of 
North and South as these terms have accumulated meanings, both positive and negative. 
In the postcolonial melancholiac U.S. West, it turns out, many have still not worked 
through a neurotic desire to escape their Neighbors—not only those to the South, but any 
Neighbors whatsoever, including themselves.     
 
Biology and Spectrality 
After Governor Jan Brewer of Arizona signed the recent and controversial Senate 
Bill 1070 in 2010, it seemed that nearly everyone had something to say about this 
particular intersection of border matters, citizenship, and race. Some Arizona landowners 
demanded a stop to people crossing their land in the middle of the night, while others left 





legislation specifically prohibited racial profiling, even as many Hispanics (or simply 
those with dark skin) feared that their appearance made them suspect in the eyes of the 
state: impure citizens at best, outcasts at worst. Amid such discussions, the lyrical, 
mercurial, and occasionally curmudgeonly writer Richard Rodriguez appeared on a radio 
panel with Boston’s Tom Ashbrook. Rodriguez described the standard discourse on 
immigration as misleading and shallow, and maintained that the issue was more about 
“morality and poverty” than about “illegality and criminality.” In his view, we needed to 
rethink the fiction of the border entirely. Toward the beginning of the broadcast, he made 
a plea for us “to see the Americas whole” and called on the continent to submit to a 
sociogeographical revolution in consciousness by recognizing the continuities and 
interpenetrations between the United States, Canada, and the Southern countries. He 
questioned designations like “Latin America” or “the United States,” both of which 
absurdly try to contain spillage within leaky containers. In order to illustrate his point, he 
relayed an image, familiar from U.S. weather broadcasts on television, of the U.S. 
represented with “no reference” to Canada and Mexico: “The United States of America is 
portrayed as a balloon that floats—rather like [in]the Macy’s Day parade in New York—
without any land connection to its neighbors, so that there’s never any weather in Canada, 
there’s never any weather in Mexico. This notion that the United States exists 
independently of its neighbors…leads more deeply to a kind of innocence of our place in 
the world” (“America’s Law, America’s Dilemma”). 
By advocating such a hemispheric geographical awakening, Rodriguez, like many 
recent critics of cultural nationalism, proposed that we transcend our “innocence” by 





affiliation, and citizenship.36 To Rodriguez, it is as “ridiculous” to imagine the United 
States as a coherent “balloon” distinct from its neighbors as it is to imagine that 
Guadalajara has no weather. And of course, weather is not the only thing flowing 
between nations these days; given the increasingly borderless quality of global capital, 
with its many concurrent flows of migration, ideas, images, products, and money, many 
have argued that the nation-state itself can no longer sustain the boundaries it needs in 
order to function, except in a mode of crisis. Neoliberal capitalism threatens nationalist 
enclaves in a number of ways (even if it also depends upon and provokes cultural 
nationalist feeling). As Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri argue in their magnum opus 
Empire, global capitalism in the post-Fordist era poses a significant challenge to the 
nation-state as the hegemonic form of political sovereignty: “The primary forces of 
production and exchange—money, technology, people, and goods—move with 
increasing ease across national boundaries; hence the nation-state has less and less power 
to regulate these flows and impose its authority over the economy” (xi). But we need not 
consult a contemporary theorist to see the ways in which capitalism erodes traditional 
boundaries; in The Communist Manifesto, Marx and Engels famously articulated a 
prescient vision of decentered and deterritorialized global capitalism that seems even 
more appropriate today than when he outlined it in 1848: “All fixed, fast-frozen relations, 
with their train of ancient and venerable prejudices and opinions, are swept away, all 
new-formed ones become antiquated before than can ossify. All that is solid melts into 
air, all that is holy is profaned, and man is at last compelled to face with sober senses, his 
real conditions of life, and his relations with his kind” (38). And even if this process of 
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deterritorialization proceeds hand-in-glove with a parallel process of reterritorialization, 
such that capitalism builds boundaries even as it destroys them, it is hard to miss the 
unstable nature of boundaries in the contemporary context.   
Beyond these powerful economic and cultural transformations, by which “all that 
is solid melts into air,” many white U.S. citizens feel threatened by the demise of 
whiteness as a hegemonic demographic category. As Hua Hsu reports in The Atlantic, by 
2042 the nation will likely be categorized as majority nonwhite. The election of a 
multiracial president, the offshoring of jobs to places like India, the threat of mainly Arab 
terrorists, and the demographic changes of the past half-century (through both 
immigration and birth-rates) have combined to produce a siege mentality among some 
white cultural nationalists. Thus we see a rise in assertions of “real American-ness” and a 
paranoia about national borders that is only partly explained by fears of terrorism and the 
escalated drug war in Mexico (though somehow these critics rarely challenge the free 
movements of capital). And although Hsu predicts that demographic and cultural changes 
will eventually lead to a multicultural America in which whiteness loses its hegemonic 
edge, he nevertheless predicts that white cultural nationalists will not go down without a 
fight: “it’s possible to imagine white identity politics growing more potent and more 
forthright in the future, as the ‘real America’ becomes an ever-smaller portion of, well, 
the real America.” He warns of a “yearning for American ‘authenticity,’ a folksy realness 
that rejects the global, the urban, and the effete in favor of nostalgia for ‘the way things 
used to be’” (54). 
As I have argued in the Introduction, such a “yearning” for a golden past-- 





cultural nationalism in today’s context. And in the case of the U.S., the frontier West 
provides much of the mythology that might shore up a (threatened) Anglo-Protestant 
ethnic core in an age of imperial decline. U.S. postcolonial melancholia, then, is visible 
above all in cultural texts rooted in the frontier imaginary, since it was in this space that 
God ostensibly ratified Anglo-Protestant power and identified them as His chosen people. 
But this West has changed. Now facing a West inundated with all of those things from 
which pioneers fled (urbanism, social fetters, dependence, power), many of these cultural 
nationalists have run away, either in reality or in imagination, toward what Rodriguez 
calls the “New North”—the Northern part of the West—where they can evade both the 
biological Real of the “stew of humanity” and the spectral Real of the rapid financial, 
labor, and commodity flows that typify the neoliberal economy. Instead, in the New 
North one can find no Neighbors at all, but only what Zizek calls the “fellow men” (the 
right sort of person) and nature in all its purity, each tamed of all hints of trauma (First as 
Tragedy 46). 
In imagining the New North as a space of whiteness, U.S. cultural nationalists 
follow in the footsteps of their ideological predecessors: Frederick Jackson Turner, Owen 
Wister, and Theodore Roosevelt. If Turner’s model of Western development could be 
understood as relatively immigrant-friendly, since in his geographical determinist 
framework the frontier creates Americans (out of whatever they were before), in practice 
the Turnerian frontier was usually imagined as fundamentally white. And Wister and 
Roosevelt’s influential version of the frontier myth further rigs the game in favor of 
Northern Europeans. Wister in The Virginian sees the West not as an egalitarian 





ness. People go West for rejuvenation, but what they discover is not that they can be 
changed, but that they can learn who they really are. More exactly, they learn their place 
on a seemingly organic hierarchy that (conveniently enough) is weighted toward white 
upper-class Protestants. Appropriately, the poster figure for much recent U.S. nationalist 
activity is a wealthy, white and Protestant Westerner: the former Alaskan governor (and 
one-time vice-presidential candidate) Sarah Palin. Key to her public persona is a hyper-
republican code of pioneer producerism; her moose-hunting, guns, and “hockey mom” 
style of self-sufficiency all play into a powerful historic mythology of what it means to be 
a real American. And yet, in the Republican Party, such down-and-dirty rural metaphors 
co-exist with images of the quintessentially urban businessman. What often unites these 
seemingly disparate icons is precisely the Wister-ian Social Darwinist hierarchy, defined 
according to the maxim of Wister’s narrator: “All America is divided into two classes—
the quality and the equality….Let the best man win! That is America’s word…and true 
democracy and true aristocracy are one and the same thing” (108). The real Americans 
(Wister’s “quality”) rise above the rest (the “equality”) on the natural ground of the 
frontier, after which they are justified in acquiring wealth and property to their heart’s 
content. Thus in the New North we have a strange amalgamation in which two different 
fantasies can merge: Inuit-style primitivism and a capitalist ideology of millionaire 
success. But this vision is always haunted by Others: foreigners, nonwhites, people who 
don’t know their place. Biology. The stew of humanity.   
A prime cultural example of the melancholiac New Northern fear of biology can 
be found in the 2009 romantic comedy The Proposal, starring Sandra Bullock and Ryan 





publishing executive Margaret Tate, played by Bullock) overstays her visa, and in an 
attempt to avoid deportation pretends to be engaged to her long-suffering assistant 
Andrew Paxton (Reynolds). To deceive U.S. immigration authorities, the would-be 
couple travels to Sitka, Alaska to visit Andrew’s family, who turn out to be local barons; 
they are the town’s chief citizens and own every local business. But although these 
“Alaskan Kennedys” wield tremendous power in Sitka, the town is remarkably free of 
class antagonism. In Sitka, every (white) person shares the same Reaganite frontier 
values of self-reliance and down-to-earth folksiness, and the upper-class Paxtons merge 
imperceptibly with ordinary folks, culminating in an image of all drinking (local) beer 
together at the tavern. It is in this degenerate utopia that the Canadian Margaret learns not 
simply how to be an American, but rather that by virtue of her rule-breaking 
aggressiveness she has been an American all along.37 The sticking point, however—and 
the eruption of the biological Real into the film—lies in the character of Ramone (Oscar 
Nunez), apparently Sitka’s only Mexican. Ramone notably (and comically) performs 
every service job in the town (waiter, male stripper, store clerk, and more). Pathetically in 
love with Margaret, he emerges as an intrusive presence in Sitka; as a stripper, he bumps 
and grinds against Margaret in a way that goes beyond comedy into the realm of the 
uncanny. The film, then, casts the Mexican as a too-proximate Neighbor; though he is not 
malevolent, but innocent and bumbling, his very innocence becomes dangerous insofar as 
                                                          
37 And in an absurd twist on the perennial Anglo-Protestant desire to imagine indigenous support for their 
usurpation of the land (a wish for the Indian blessing that goes back at least as far as James Fenimore 
Cooper’s The Pioneers), Margaret Tate receives a seal of approval from Andrew’s grandmother Annie 
Paxton, who claims to be part Klingit and engages in what she presents as indigenous ceremonies. One of 
these ceremonies reveals Margaret—the corporate “witch” and terrifying boss—as the true heir to 
American legitimacy. The catch, however, is that she must balance her cut-throat capitalist/expansionist 
tendencies with cultural nationalist frontier values; in marrying Andrew, she not only submits to a 
partnership with a man, but also recognizes the importance of loyalty: to nation, to family, and to an 





he does not know his place. His position is fundamentally contradictory, since he is 
needed to perform servile labor, but cannot ever make his way into the heart of society. 
Margaret’s “capitalist” aggressiveness, then, is celebrated, while Ramone’s subaltern 
aggressiveness is vilified and lampooned.     
Here, then, we have a clear vision of the biological Real in the New North. Like 
my neighbors’ pit bulls or Ramon’s bumping and grinding, biology is visceral, intrusive, 
and concrete. But this physical form of the Real obscures the spectral power that lies 
behind it: deterritorialized capital flows, commodity exchange, and the abstract 
imperative to fend off falling rates of profit. My neighbors, for example, may have been 
disturbing in a direct phenomenological sense: the eyes of traumatized children gazing at 
us through a closed screen door, the threat of being hit by a meth-crazed driver, the sight 
of pit bulls leaping at a tire hanging from a tree in a grassless yard. But behind these 
terrifying Neighbors lay another grid, their long hours and low wages conditioned within 
a labor/capital relation that was not immediately visible and certainly not operating in 
their interest. When these people train their pit bulls to attack, what are they afraid of? 
What is driving them, and from where? The Proposal provides one allegorical answer: 
the film’s true geographical center is not Alaska, but the financial node of New York 
City. Andrew ultimately flees from Sitka, refuses to marry a (perfectly nice) local girl, 
and instead merges with Margaret, such that the true marriage is between the cultural 
nationalism embodied in Alaska and the financial power embodied in New York City. 
The latter needs the former for legitimation, but the upper hand lies in New York, not in 
Alaska. Ramone, then, can run to Alaska in order to avoid the long arm of federal law, 





managed in a way that is detrimental to his security and well-being. If we see past his role 
as a biological intruder, we might notice the anxiety in his face (during the closing 
credits), as he is questioned by an immigration officer; his fear is in this sense universal, 
since it is shared by anyone who faces the risk of displacement in a fast-moving regime 
of flexible accumulation. And when Andrew (as if in a slip of the tongue) labels his boss 
Margaret a “terrorist,” he reveals that the primary source of terror in neoliberal times is 
not Al Quaida, but a political economy that is functionally terroristic, since it pits people 
and places against each other in relationships of mutual fear.    
 
Peter’s Avocado: Hybridity and Purity 
In his focus on biology in Brown, however, Rodriguez misses many of the 
spectral aspects of today’s cultural context. He has much to say about “poverty and 
morality,” but precious little to say about the abstract structures of the postmodern digital 
economy as such. Poverty is an intrusion from the South, whose people come to the 
North for a better life—by which, presumably, Rodriguez implies a kind of hybrid 
between what he sees as Southern cultural patterns (family, religion, a recognition of 
tragedy) and Northern ones (individualism, pragmatism, the comedy of upward mobility): 
“Perhaps Americans will be rescued by the South...the climate of the inevitable…Down, 
down to the netherworld of biology…But also of faith” (165). Thus although he takes a 
kind of schadenfreude in the violation of the prissy individualist “American I,” which 
naively imagines that it can remain separate from the rest of the world, Rodriguez takes 
an almost entirely cultural attitude toward the conflict between North and South. He does 





produce the South as we know it, even as Southern workers helped produce the North.38 
Instead, Mexicans play the role of giving Anglo-Americans a dose of reality, as it were—
of reminding them of their limitations, of mortality and biology. Rodriguez’s admonition 
in an essay like “Peter’s Avocado” is accordingly a cultural one: get used to hybridization 
and impurity, celebrate the loss of boundaries by affirming the strange and complicated 
mixtures that result from global flows, and recognize that we cannot protect ourselves 
from the encroaching world of biology. In other words, Rodriguez urges us to embrace a 
risky cosmopolitan venture built around an uncomfortable but fecund confrontation with 
Neighbors. And he conflates this cosmopolitan openness with love, both sexual and 
religious.               
In repeating his friend’s dictum—that “We are entering an era of biology rather 
than the state”--Rodriguez deflects attention away from the spectral financial operations 
that exert such force in the world, and toward the immediate physical manifestations of 
that world. And he ignores the extent to which the state (and not merely cultural 
nationalism) still plays a vital role in a global economy that does not simply break down 
boundaries, but also builds them up. In his haste to declare the end of boundaries and the 
eclipse of the state by biology, Rodriguez misses the complications at work in this “state-
finance nexus.” Because he sees in the near future simply a borderless anarchy (that is 
nevertheless pregnant with lucrative cultural possibilities for hybridization), he obscures 
the extent to which a transnational oligarchy presides over this anarchy, benefits from it, 
and largely protects itself from the “stew of humanity” faced by those at the bottom. 
                                                          
38 He does not mention, for example, the role played by the U.S. in shaping the stunted outcome of the 
Mexican Revolution in the early part of the twentieth century.  And he does not describe the U.S. role in 
fomenting the 1982 Mexican debt crisis and subsequently exacting tribute from the Mexican state through 
enforced austerity policies that then become de rigeur maneuvers in the U.S.-led neocolonialism of 





What we find, then, is not a borderless world, but a world of shifting borders largely 
controlled from the top. The key question, then, is not about whether we should be (in 
principle) open to others and their differences—about whether we should batten down the 
hatches and erect boundaries that will protect us from the “biology” of the poor—but 
about power: about who has the right to control boundaries that are deployed as a matter 
of course in an ongoing project to redistribute wealth upward. With regard to Mexican 
immigration to the U.S., for instance, the question should not simply focus on the matter 
of cultural hybridity and tolerance, but also on the matter of economic power—on the 
way immigrants are used as a pawn in a larger game to discipline labor on both sides of 
the border. Accepting them (or even celebrating their tremendous sacrifices, as many 
liberal politicians do) does not change the fact of their exploitation.39  
Given that contemporary neoliberal capitalist ideologues are all for hybridity (at 
least insofar as they can manage it for their purposes), that they scramble the coordinates 
of place with one hand while constantly erecting new boundaries with the other, Arif 
Dirlik’s assertion of a “place-based politics” makes more sense. As Dirlik puts it, those 
who would celebrate a “borderless world” not only ignore existing borders, but deprive 
oppositional political movements of borders as a chief means of counteracting capitalist 
deterritorialization: “Place as metaphor….calls for a definition of what is to be included 
in the place from within the place—some control over the conduct and organization of 
everyday life, in other words—rather than from above, from those placeless abstractions 
                                                          
39Such “tolerance” is exemplified in the statements of Democratic Arizona Senator Robert Menendez, who 
rhapsodizes about the intense exploitation of Mexican immigrants in the U.S.: “If you got up this morning 
and had fruit for breakfast, it was probably picked by the bent back of an immigrant worker. If you in fact 
had vegetables or chicken for lunch, you probably had it de-plucked by the cut-up hands of an immigrant 
worker. If you slept in a hotel or a motel of the nation, you probably had your room done by an immigrant 
worker.” Although this litany is intended to draw attention to the often unappreciated work performed by 





such as capital, the nation-state, and their discursive expressions in the realm of theory” 
(22-23). And on this unequal playing field, hybridity (the myriad cultural collisions and 
crossovers celebrated by Rodriguez) tells us little about the power relations between the 
different groups and individuals involved. The answer involves not simply forging more 
and more hybridities and cross-overs—a process perfectly compatible with the 
exploitations of contemporary global capitalism--but developing egalitarian forms in 
whatever fashion. Such forms might involve hybridity, insofar as the term implies 
openness to penetration and merger, but they also might involve relative purity, insofar as 
the term implies a refusal of entry or the establishment of a relatively durable border, 
credo, or social practice. The question, again, is a matter of emphasis: on whose behalf 
are these borders created? 
 For Rodriguez in “Peter’s Avocado” any such attempt to forge a durable border—
indeed, any attempt to impose undue regulation on flows into the body—is immediately 
suspect. He takes as his overriding metaphor the story of Peter (the vegan son of his 
friend Franz), who asks his father to buy him an organic avocado. The occasion provides 
Rodriguez with the conceit for his essay, a meditation on purity and the body which calls 
the integrity of borders into question. The epigraph for the essay comes from the Book of 
Mark (7:14): “Can’t you see that nothing that goes into someone from outside can make 
that person unclean, because it goes not into the heart but into the stomach and passes 
into the sewer?” (cited in Rodriguez 193). In the course of the essay, Rodriguez adroitly 
questions Peter’s motives, finding in him an untenable “dream of purification…a dream 
of reconciliation”—a desire to live in an ethereal place “where the wind dies” (229). In 





“a scandal against straight lines and deciduous family trees” (203). And in doing so, he 
makes a valid point, that despite the intense desire among many Americans to carve out 
an “inviolate space” for themselves, all individuals are penetrated by a number of 
ambiguous forces: social, biological, parental. We cannot remain separate, and in that 
sense, we cannot entirely control our borders. As a result, any attempt to create a purely 
“clean” body or society is destined for a finicky Puritanism at best, and fascism at worst. 
Rodriguez powerfully draws on his own experience as a gay Mexican man to highlight 
the life patterns of those who do not fit into the purifying programs of others: “I lived my 
life in fragments. For I knew nothing was so dangerous in the world as love, my kind of 
love” (206). Keenly aware of his own anomalous position, he celebrates anomaly, 
miscegenation, and scandalous mixture. And insofar as Rodriguez’s essay functions in 
this queer studies vein—as an illustration of the situation of the abject, and as a 
condemnation of the violence often meted out toward those who remind others of their 
own incompleteness or vulnerability—he makes crucial contributions.  
However, if in celebrating brown Rodriguez rightly condemns the cultural 
nationalist obsession with social hygiene--the fascist model of pure self and community 
that (inevitably) finds a contaminant in the archetypal anti-Semitic formulation of the 
“Jew”—his relentless insistence on ferreting out and condemning any desire to draw 
boundaries masks crucial omissions, and sets up the untenable binary between purity and 
hybridity that Dirlik challenges. The key symptom of Rodriguez’s evasion is his 
reluctance to discuss Peter’s dilemma in specific, historical terms.  It is strange that in an 
essay ostensibly about “Peter’s Avocado,” Rodriguez devotes so little space to discussing 





life, right out of the pages of Sunset Magazine. He says nothing about its origin, its 
production, and its history, but instead treats Peter’s decision as a springboard for 
theological and theoretical points about mixed motives, impurity, and so on. The reason 
is apparent enough: the finicky Peter makes an easy target. Like many other people who 
insist on eating only organic food, he is probably motivated by some combination of bad 
faith and blind self-congratulation. Insofar as people like Peter imagine that by buying 
organic, they are washing their proverbial hands of the system that produces 
conventional/industrial food, they are kidding themselves. People like Peter often seek to 
absolve themselves of the sins of a capitalist society by paying a supplemental price (for 
example, more money for organic food), such that a clean conscience is included in the 
price of the commodity. And insofar as people are consumed by a religious desire for 
their own health above all, they do indeed deny the “spiritual guilt” to which Rodriguez 
justifiably calls our attention (218).  
Despite articulating the blanket statement that “Ah! We are deeply impure. 
Because our environment is impure,” Rodriguez never describes the relevant ways in 
which our socially constructed environment is impure (218). As a result, he reifies 
impurity as an abiding feature, such that challenging any particular impurity is treated as 
an exercise in Puritanism. The mesh, however, demands more complicated responses. He 
doesn’t describe the pesticides sprayed on crops in places like the Central Valley in 
California (or Mexico or Chile), or the migrant farm worker who is not only exposed to 
these pesticides but receives a subminimum wage for his efforts. He doesn’t describe the 
way treaties like NAFTA empower corporate farmers in the U.S.—already subsidized by 





land and into proletarianization (and often, into dangerous migrations to the U.S.). He 
doesn’t describe Wilson Popenoe, the wealthy white U.S. horticulturalist who travelled to 
Guatemala and found what he called “alligator pears” (later called avocadoes) which he 
then began to market in the U.S. Although a fawning biography describes Popenoe as a 
“friend to Latin America,” he was actually an appendage to U.S. colonial exploitation.40 
Funded by his father’s mines in Costa Rica, he was subsequently employed by the United 
Fruit Company, a corporation implicated in widespread exploitation of Guatemalan 
workers, and in the U.S.-led coup in 1954 which deposed the democratically elected 
president Jacobo Arbenz after he promised to confiscate UFC-owned land and distribute 
it more fairly among Guatemala’s poor Mayan majority.41 The value of the plants 
fostered by Popenoe—the avocado in Guatemala, the banana in Honduras—largely ended 
up benefiting U.S. companies, along with elite Latin American managers. Such an 
anomalous figure (a white U.S. citizen living in Guatemala, with a foot in multiple 
worlds) is nothing if not a hybrid and a border-crosser. But the power in the situation is 
all his.42  
                                                          
40 See Fredric Rosengarten, Jr.’s Wilson Popenoe: Agricultural Explorer, Educator, and Friend of Latin 
America. 
41 Today you can visit Popenoe’s ostentatious house in Antigua, Guatemala, which, according to 
www.popenoe.com, is a “must-see on every tourist’s itinerary.” 
42 If Peter thinks that buying an organic avocado absolves him of any involvement in this mess, he is indeed 
mistaken. Rather, in his preoccupation with his own health and purity, he is taken up by a contemporary 
version of what Biblical scholar Marcus Borg describes as a “politics of holiness” operative in the Roman-
occupied Palestine of Jesus’s time (see, for example, Conflict, Holiness, and Politics in The Teachings of 
Jesus, reprinted in 1998). The Roman occupiers made it difficult and costly for Jews to follow Jewish 
Sabbath and kosher laws, and the famous Pharisees thought that since they could afford to follow these 
laws, they could pat themselves on the back and demonize those who didn’t meet their rigorous standard. It 
was these ostensibly “holy” Pharisees whom Jesus addressed when he proclaimed that nothing eaten defiles 
a man--that merely following the kosher laws did not make one pure, since so many other glaring 
impurities lurked in the background, unaddressed by these rigorous devotees of their own purity. Today’s 
ostentatious consumers of “local food,” the people who can afford to spend weekends making sausage out 
of grass-fed pigs—and who think that somehow such actions earn them a privileged position in the eyes of 
the Big Other—are indeed the descendants of Pharisees. Rodriguez, then, could have called attention to 
other passages in the New Testament: for example, Matthew 23:23: “Woe to you, scribes and Pharisees, 





 Rodriguez, then, chides Peter for wanting an organic avocado (and for not eating 
meat), but he never considers the notion that Peter—however afflicted with false 
consciousness about his own implication in these matters—might point toward 
phenomena worth considering: pesticide use, resource management, worker exploitation, 
and an entire colonial history. In doing so, Rodriguez misses the kernel of critique in the 
desire for purity. He calls attention to poverty, but seems content to note our impurity 
(and the impurity of our environment) and move on. The poor, apparently, will always be 
with us. And though he describes the Sermon on the Mount—“that plein-air toss of 
ambiguous bread”—as “the brownest rendition of love I can summon,” and as a “divine 
paradox,” he does not see that the Sermon on the Mount (like much of Christian 
philosophy) does not lead to mere ambiguity or paradox, but to contradiction and 
upheaval (25). The notion that “the poor shall inherit the earth” coincides with another of 
Jesus’s sayings: “Do not think that I have come to bring peace to the earth; I have not 
come to bring peace, but a sword. For I have come to set a man against his father, and a 
daughter against her mother, and a daughter-in-law against her mother-in-law; and one’s 
foes will be members of one’s own household” (Mathew 10: 34-36). Jesus here is 
resolutely opposed to cultural nationalism, to notions of affiliation based on kinship or 
tribe; this is why the familial bonds must be broken. But he is certainly willing to draw 
borders. This “sword,” as it were, operates not in service of a pure community that can 
                                                                                                                                                                             
and mercy and faith. It is these you ought to have practiced without neglecting the others. You blind 
guides! You strain out a gnat but swallow a camel.” In these passages, Jesus rails against the Pharisees who 
“tie up heavy burdens, hard to bear, and lay them on the shoulders of others,” who “love to have the place 
of honor at banquets,” and who “lock people out of the kingdom of heaven.” Do these passages not 
describe many of the contemporary adherents to the “foodie movement,” who obsess about every little herb 
(and who pay extra tithes for them), but who neglect the weightier matter: that whether organic or 
conventional, the capitalist agricultural system rapaciously exploits workers and destroys environments for 
the profit of a few? But although Rodriguez is wise to these modern-day Pharisees, he does not adequately 
move beyond them; he, too, remains fixated on the tithes of mint and dill, and not on the weightier matters 





only achieve unity by excluding a scapegoat, but in the service of a universal community: 
that of the excluded themselves. Rather than simply celebrating hybrids like Wilson 
Popenoe for their interesting border-crossings, such a cleansing violence would take the 
side of the Mayan peons who do his work. And it would be unapologetic about drawing 
such a boundary.  
 Rodriguez’s mapping of North and South, then, is both valuable and limited. In 
his attack on cultural nationalism, in his defense of the abject (the ambiguous, the 
composite), and in his recognition that the self is imbricated in a number of social and 
material forces, he is headed in the right direction. His celebration of brown is in many 
ways a defense of the hysterical subject, who is never satisfied with answers to the 
question, “Why am I who you say that I am?” But all of this multiplicity leads nowhere—
or more exactly, plays into the hands of capital—if we celebrate hybridity in any form, 
and if we point only to the biological Real and not to the spectral Real of capital. Zizek, 
in contrast, imagines a hysterical subject who, like Rodriguez, appreciates his or her 
incompleteness and vulnerability, but who nevertheless deploys an active defense of the 
proletariat, here conceived as the embodiment of that universal vulnerability. In Alain 
Badiou’s terms, these “invisible” people, whose ontological being is less than that of 
others, are the basis of any emancipatory revolution: “In any world there are inexistent 
beings who are alive, but on whom the world confers minimal intensity of experience. 
Any creative affirmation is rooted in identification of the inexistents of the world” (68). 
In “Peter’s Avocado,” the migrant workers (and indeed, the avocadoes themselves!) 
remain inexistent, excluded from Rodriguez’s full analysis. But it is these people with 





  Rodriguez, then, is correct when he argues that there is no permanent escape from 
“impurity,” from our imbrication in an impure society and environment. But he seems all 
too willing to allow that society and environment to remain largely as it is. The larger 
danger, for him, lies in the desire for a smoother and more harmonious world. His chief 
foil, the Utopian New Northerners, seek such a world by excluding people like him. In 
response, he rejects all Utopian thinking and instead encourages us to learn to tolerate the 
new and shifting neighbors of an era defined by a collapsing distance between global 
players. But in doing so, he unwittingly embraces the Utopian rhetoric of neoliberal 
capitalism itself. Is there no hope, then, for a Utopian vision that is not grounded on 
abjection and exclusion, but on a defense of the excluded? Is it misguided to strive for a 
space of critical distance from which to transform society and the environment—what 
Alain Badiou calls a “politics of subtraction”--or should we simply make our lowly way 
through an impure world? By examining the New Northern impulse more closely through 
a look at John Krakauer’s 1996 book Into the Wild, perhaps we will find some answers. 
       
Outside in Society: The Politics of Subtraction at the End of History 
Escaping from society is not the best way of changing it. On the other hand, radical 
disassociation from society as it is may be inevitable as a first step before any meaningful 
reconstruction of society even appears on the horizon as a possibility. 
--Arif Dirlik in “Place-Based Imagination: Globalism and the Politics of Place” (39) 
 
Ironic disruption is…a species of uncanniness: it is an unheimlich maneuver. The life and 
identity that I have hitherto taken as familiar have suddenly become unfamiliar. However, 
there is this difference: in an ordinary experience of the uncanny, there is mere 
disruption: the familiar is suddenly and disruptively experienced as unfamiliar. What is 
peculiar to [Kierkegaardian] irony is that it manifests passion for a certain direction.…An 
experience of standard-issue uncanniness may give us goose bumps or churn our 
stomachs; the experience of ironic uncanniness, by contrast, is more like losing the 
ground beneath one’s feet: one longs to go in a certain direction, but one no longer knows 





point, then, is not about leaving the social world behind, but about a particular way of 
living in relation to it. 
--Jonathan Lear in A Case for Irony (19) 
 In a 2012 article about the recently disbanded alternative rock band REM, 
Atlantic writer James Parker describes mishearing a lyric from a 1978 Patti Smith song. 
Although the words of “Rock n Roll Nigger” actually read, “Outside of society / They’re 
waiting for me! / Outside of society / That’s where I want to be!,” Parker didn’t realize 
until years later that he was hearing them backwards: not “outside of society” but 
“outside in society.” Parker ultimately prefers his version of the words, since, as he puts 
it, the “real” lyrics simply repeat the predictable Romantic desire for a space outside 
society where the self can discover freedom; his own misheard lyrics, on the other hand, 
present the exhilarating—and much more dangerous—picture of confronting or meshing 
with (some form of) society in an effort both to discover its pleasures and to challenge its 
structure: “My lines…to break the spell of self and plunge into the processes of life, the 
roiling human designs—to get out there, into society: the idea is intoxicating!” But as 
Parker (who happens to be British) suggests, Patti Smith’s romantic version of 
“rejectionist” rebellion is the more typical path in U.S. culture (44). From Huckleberry 
Finn to Peter and his avocado, and from Daniel Boone to the libertarian tech 
entrepreneurs of Silicon Valley, U.S. cultural heroes have often yearned to go it alone, to 
flee the structures of society in search of a self supposedly grounded in authentic nature.  
Such an escape, moreover, often implies a desire for innocence, and thus an 
escape from authority and power. The American Adam of U.S. folklore and literature 
desires to be free of social imbrications, to float in the clouds of innocence without being 





voice of the “American I,” he outlines a desire for an “inviolate space”: “My space 
should not be violated by smoke or scent or chemical fume, by sound or sight or touch or 
sexual innuendo or prayer or immigrant. My space, moreover, should not be violated by 
authority—by parents, doctors, clergy, teachers” (217).  As Leslie Fiedler noted in 1960, 
such a figure fears settling down into a social order or a domestic home life, but thereby 
remains perpetually committed to a desexualized boyhood; in strenuously insisting on his 
own impenetrability, he allows no room for adult love and social commitment. But 
although he would like his rebellion against paternal authority to result in a free world of 
equal relations, the father’s uncanny specter inevitably comes back; not only does the 
American Adam feel guilty about killing the father, but he cannot shake off the fact that 
he has usurped his role. As a result, despite the best efforts of the American Adam to 
create what Fiedler calls a “sunlit, neoclassical world,” (128) the gothic form reappears, 
demanding an answer to the questions: What will you do with the question of power? 
What new society will you create? As a result, the questions raised by Arif Dirlik, not 
simply about the “escape” from society, but about the coordinates of its reconstruction, 
cannot be avoided. 
Yet as Dirlik also registers, the prospect of actually transforming contemporary 
life (rather than simply adding more fluctuations to the already-regimented series of 
continual changes that operate in a neoliberal market society characterized by constant 
innovation and creative destruction) is difficult to imagine if we cannot establish some 
form of critical distance from that hegemonic social world. Dirlik’s proposal, then, 
echoes what Jonathan Lear describes as the Kierkegaardian ironic question. For Lear, the 





performance of a given social role, struck by a sense of ignorance about what she should 
do; but crucially, she does not deny the importance of social reality or ethical 
commitment. She does not cling to a neutral or innocent form of indecision by throwing 
up her hands at the undecideability of it all. Instead, even if the ironic question 
(quintessentially for Kierkegaard, “Among all Christians, is there a Christian?”) disrupts 
because it has no clear answer, it resonates in such a way that opens up renewed and 
urgent commitment within a social matrix. Dirlik similarly asks fundamental questions 
about the neoliberal situation: Among all changes, is there a change? Among all escapes, 
is there an escape? And finally, among all choices, is there a choice? And these questions, 
ideally, would lead not simply to more questions, but to new narratives, new attachments, 
new forms of agency, and new boundaries. Perhaps most importantly, such narratives 
might enable us to mourn, not simply for the losses associated with postcolonial 
melancholia (the fantasy of omnipotence, innocence, autonomy, nature), but also for the 
loss of stable narrative meaning itself.    
How do we mourn, then? Fredric Jameson, for one, suggests that the Fukayaman 
recipe of perpetual innovation within a static frame transforms the very notions of loss 
and mourning, such that “change without its opposite” easily becomes loss without its 
opposite (The Seeds of Time 9). As the dynamics of capitalism eliminate residual spaces 
of past modes of production, we become deprived of viable historical reference points 
that might anchor a long-term calendar of structural change and help us measure progress 
(and register loss) in the first place.  Bereft of any metanarrative of emancipation from 
current dynamics, mourning becomes both perpetual and perpetually stalled; in the 





prototype for a type of experience in which loss becomes indistinguishable from daily 
life, heading in no particular direction. Whatever we experience, it is always-already 
passé, outmoded, disappeared, such that we can’t experience anything without registering 
its incipient ruin. The very banality and constancy off such change results in a numbing 
quality that Thomas de Zengotita has called “culture as anasthetic.” For de Zengotita, the 
symptomatic gesture of such a culture can be found in the TV news anchor’s 
characteristic shift from one topic to another (“A hint of a sigh, a slight shake of the head, 
eye down-turning; the note of seasoned resignation”) and the ensuing edit, as if to say, 
“‘If it were up to me as a human being, I would never leave this coverage of thousands of 
dying innocents, but, as a newscaster, of course, I have to” (39). De Zengotita’s point, of 
course, is that the news anchor’s tic is not hers alone, but ours: “That’s the one real 
reality. Moving on” (39). Like Benjamin’s gambler trapped in Erlebnis, we follow de 
Zengotita’s news anchor by discarding the past at every step. 
To be sure, Jameson exaggerates for rhetorical purposes: he is trying to disturb us, 
to highlight the depthless character of much of contemporary experience. But not every 
place has been colonized, and in the gothic margins we still register losses of a more 
profound order. To begin with, we still face the crucial intervention of “death and the 
passage of the generations”--not simply the particular deaths we experience more or less 
directly, but also a general sense of decay and violence that belies the smooth dream of 
the flickering digital world: “not even bodies rotting off stage but rather something 
persistent like an odor that circulates through the luminous immobility of this world 
without time” (Jameson The Seeds of Time 19). Benjamin, too, saw a suppression of the 





process in the life of the individual and a most exemplary one…in the course of modern 
times dying has been pushed further and further out of the perceptual world of the living” 
(Illuminations 93-94). But it is precisely death that provides “authority” (94) to an older 
kind of storyteller, since it represents the prototype for an irrevocable transformation—a 
trace of finality that haunts the TV anchorperson’s shift to a new topic—and because the 
veil of death mediates the storyteller’s reliance on an entire structure of cultural memory 
that links him to the past, to ghosts, to ancestors. Death stands as the quintessential 
binding moment that enables narrative to emerge from chaos. Thus the primacy of death 
continues in the tradition of the novel, in which death (whether the literal death of a 
character, or the figurative death of the novel’s ending) provides the basis for 
hermeneutic interpretation as such, retroactively enabling speculation about the novel’s 
meaning—and by extension, “the meaning of life” (99). The novel’s narration, then, 
“yields us the warmth which we never draw from our own fate”: “What draws the reader 
to the novel is the hope of warming his shivering life with a death he reads about” (101).  
In such gothic images of a deathly odor largely repressed within utopian capitalist 
rhetoric, we find the return of Benjamin’s “long experience” [Erfahrung]. Through 
storytelling and novel-reading, through ritual and memory, through confronting the 
significant and irrevocable moment of death, we can register the strangeness of time 
passing and envision interventions that might derail the serial reshuffling of cards 
inherent in spleen. Benjamin therefore highlighted “the revolutionary energies that appear 
in the ‘outmoded’…the objects that have begun to be extinct…the dresses of five years 
ago” (“Surrealism” 73). In turning our attention toward these objects—the cards tossed 





pause to consider the losses that we experience as a matter of course. And registering 
these losses can be a prelude to growth and transformation. In terms of historical 
consciousness, then, we can find ambiguous critical potential in even the most 
reactionary and archaic social worlds, since in these abandoned worlds we often find an 
implicit critique of contemporary conditions. This process of reconsideration is what the 
gothic quest for place means: digging through the ruins of the social world in search of 
clues, not simply to indicate the presence of a bygone crime, but to orient us in a process 
of social reconstruction.     
 
Christopher McCandless, Into the Wild, and the New North:  
No Neighbors at All 
The joy of life comes from our encounters with new experiences, and hence there is no 
greater joy than to have an endlessly changing horizon, for each day to have a new and 
different sun. If you want to get more out of life, Ron, you must lose your inclination for 
monotonous security and adopt a helter-skelter style of life that will at first appear to you 
to be crazy….Don’t settle down and sit in one place. Move around, be nomadic, make 
each day a new horizon….You are wrong if you think Joy emanates only or principally 
from human relationships. God has placed it all around us. It is in everything and 
anything we might experience. We just have to have the courage to turn against our 
habitual lifestyle and engage in unconventional living….Ron, I really hope that as soon 
as you can you will get out of Salton City, put a little camper on the back of your pickup, 
and start seeing some of the great work that God has done here in the American West.  
--Alexander Supertramp (aka Christopher McCandless), in a letter to Ronald Franz cited 
in Into the Wild (57-58) 
 
[There is] a kind of freedom we often undervalue: freedom from burdensome emotional 
ties with the environment, freedom from communal responsibilities, freedom from the 
tyranny of the traditional home and its possessions; the freedom from belonging to a 
tight-knit social order; and above all, the freedom to move on to somewhere else. 
—J.B. Jackson from Discovering the Vernacular Landscape (100-101) 
It is from within this static and dreamless post-1989 Fukayaman era, in which 





democracy as the conditions for all future development, that Jon Krakauer’s 1996 book 
Into the Wild emerged, both as a document of one young man’s doomed attempt to 
escape the neoliberal order, and as an ambivalent reconsideration of—indeed, a neurotic 
and obsessive process of working through—his traumatic failure. In exploring a 
contemporary American Adam’s adventures in the New North, Krakauer lingers over a 
smell of death that refuses to dissipate. (Sean Penn’s 2007 film carries on the would-be 
therapeutic process, raking the story of Christopher McCandless over the coals yet again 
from a more distant historical vantage point in which the early 1990s have already begun 
to become outmoded). Into the Wild narrates the life and death of recent college graduate 
Christopher McCandless, an intelligent and resourceful young man who in 1990 
disappeared without notifying his family, donated the bulk of his money to the global 
charity Oxfam, got rid of his car, and began tramping around the Western U.S. and 
Mexico before finally trekking to Alaska, where he intended to live off the land for as 
long as he could. In the end, McCandless starved to death in an abandoned bus, unable to 
survive alone in his isolated outpost.  
If it is true, as Northrop Frye has put it, that the tragic form proceeds as a case 
before judge and jury, such that the audience listens to lawyers laying out different 
perspectives on a case, then Into the Wild puts the American Adam—with his desire for 
escape into the characteristically innocent Western space of the New North—on trial 
from within this Fukayaman period. Krakauer’s view is elegiac, rueful; he sympathizes 
with McCandless’s desire for freedom, and both laments and pays tribute to the young 
man’s tragic innocence. He allows the prosecution to speak, but he acts as McCandless’s 





absolutist, self-absorbed, and so on. Yes, he displayed hubris. He was flawed. But in his 
desire to take risks, in his search for “spiritual revolution”—above all, in his willingness 
to suffer in his search for beauty and autonomy—McCandless is a tragic hero of sorts 
(163). He realized too late that he could not go it alone, but if he had lived, we would 
probably be describing him as a remarkable man. Yet there is something particularly 
haunting about Chris McCandless’s story. He is not merely a tragic character in 
Krakauer’s terms, but a particularly uncanny and gothic one. Why, we might ask, are we 
still talking about such American Adam figures? Why, in other words, must such a 
character—fiercely defensive of his innocence, committed to escape and independence--
be repeated again and again, not only in the tragic form of Christopher McCandless and 
kindred souls like Everett Ruess (a young man who disappeared into the Utah wilderness 
in the 1930s), but also in the more comic or “successful” forms of Patti Smith’s punk 
rock heroes and New Northern libertarians?  
Accordingly, Krakauer’s investigation into McCandless’s death often slips into a 
ghastly tone, as if the author’s obsession with McCandless has veered over into 
claustrophobic discomfort. For Krakauer the Alaskan wilderness, remapped as the site of 
McCandless’s death, loses many of its connotations of freedom and beauty, and instead 
becomes something closer to what Jeffrey Andrew Weinstock has described as Charles 
Brockdon Brown’s “frontier gothic” tradition. Like the Norwalk of Brown’s 1799 novel 
Edgar Huntly, the Alaskan wilderness “almost consciously thwarts human intentions”; it 
is 
a place of mystery and concealment—a site of hidden hollows, numberless 
waterfalls, and underground passages. It is a space outside time, of midsummer 
snow and ‘slow decay’ where ‘eternal murmurs’ whisper across the detritus of 





knowledge, only to frustrate one’s designs with paths that ultimately lead 
nowhere. (47)
 
Investigating the area around the bus where McCandless died, Krakauer is struck by 
“something disquieting about this Gothic, overgrown landscape,” such that it becomes 
not merely challenging, but positively “malevolent”: “our feet churn the muck on the 
bottom into a foul-smelling miasma of decomposing slime” (175-176). And when after 
trudging through this forbidding place (“gloomy, claustrophobic, oppressive”) Krakauer 
finally discovers the bus, he recoils at the traces of McCandless in the place: “Sitting on a 
steel cot across from the stove to mull over this eerie tableau, I encounter evidence of 
McCandless’s presence wherever my vision rests….I feel uncomfortable, as if I were 
intruding, a voyeur who has slipped into McCandless’s bedroom while he is momentarily 
away. Suddenly queasy, I stumble out of the bus to walk along the river and breathe some 
fresh air” (179-180). 
 The ghost of Christopher McCandless, then, hovers over the book (and the film) 
as an unquiet presence—not quite as a triumphant (if flawed) tragic character who sees a 
truth and falls in dignity, but as a specter who betokens a mystery yet to be solved, and as 
a figure with whom Krakauer feels both repulsion and an uncanny connection. In 
response to attacks on McCandless by local Alaskans—that he didn’t know what he was 
doing in the wilderness, that he was yet another privileged upper middle-class kid who 
threw away his opportunities, that he recklessly endangered his own health and the 
feelings of his friends and family—Krakauer suggests that these vehement reactions may 
conceal the ultimate similarity between McCandless’s desires and their own: “I’m sure 
there are plenty of other Alaskans who had a lot in common with McCandless when they 





him. Maybe McCandless reminds them a little too much of their former selves” (186). 
And as Krakauer makes clear, he too identifies with McCandless. Although Krakauer 
insists that he does not intend to intrude on this story, he spends two chapters describing 
his own story of obsession in the Alaskan wilderness, recalling a (failed) attempt at an 
unprecedented solo ascent of Devil’s Thumb in Alaska. As he makes clear, his 
connection with McCandless is based first and foremost on a shared Oedipal drama; 
Krakauer, like McCandless, was trying to prove his independence to a father who he 
perceived as tyrannical and smothering. And like McCandless, Krakauer was not looking 
for death exactly, but for an exhilarating form of adventure that might filter out the details 
of the outside world. In the localized immediacy of adventure, Krakauer desperately 
hoped to find purpose: a “world” and thus a meaning in life.  
 For Krakauer, then, McCandless is not simply a piece of information, not simply a 
news item to be discarded on the pile, but a fitting subject for a story that might provide 
us with an opportunity to pause and reflect. But if Krakauer finds resonance in age-old 
dramas—the son striving to impress a father who he both loves and rages against, and in 
the spiritual adventure—he spends relatively little time discussing McCandless’s social 
and political context. To put it another way, in the trial staged in Krakauer’s book, the 
one on trial is Christopher McCandless, and not the society and culture out of which he 
came. But perhaps it is impossible to understand McCandless’s uncanny quality without 
prying into the question of why our society continually produces such figures in the first 
place. Why the urge to escape? To escape from what? Krakauer’s reluctance to engage 
the merely historical, as opposed to the mythical, is itself symptomatic of the New 





“anti-historical” rhythms of Nature, the mythical self, the “route of the whale” rather than 
face “all we disapprove in human history” (188). But the uncomfortable familiarity of 
Christopher McCandless is not simply that he reveals to us some universal or Jungian 
archetype of the young warrior or the Icarus-like searcher—that he represents something 
about the adolescent stage of life that his Alaskan critics would like to repress—but that 
he reveals something about ideals which they still hold: about freedom, purity, promise, 
autonomy, and the like. It is not so easy, then, for the dominant U.S. cultural imagination 
to forget McCandless. His death (so graphically depicted in the film) resonates as what 
Jameson calls an “odor that circulates through the luminous immobility” of a digital 
culture. 
The reason he resonates is perhaps because he suggests the ironic question: 
Among all autonomous individuals, where is the autonomous individual? Like his fellow 
postcolonial melancholiacs of the New North, McCandless trumpets his innocence and 
flees from what he sees as invasive social structures. And in doing so, he disowns any 
further connection to those who have been affected by U.S. coloniality. Notably, he does 
not head to the metaphoric South, toward Indian reservations or to Guatemala, but North 
to an Alaska that he imagines as a pristine refuge. And there he takes the New Northern 
ideology even more seriously than its usual practitioners do; not content to articulate a 
cultural nationalist restriction of borders, he dreams of the absolute purity of an 
individual self-sufficiency uncontaminated by any form of community whatsoever, let 
alone the circulation of commodities and capital enabled by the capitalist superstate. He 
wants to evade both of the chief forms of intrusion in contemporary life: spectrality and 





where he can have no Neighbors at all. Thus on the one hand, he wants to “kill the false 
being within” by rejecting the abstract “poison of civilization” (literally, by burning his 
money) and encountering the world directly (cited in Krakuer 163). He wants to escape 
many aspects of a hegemonic capitalist society that theorists have often defined in terms 
of space rather than place: top-down abstraction, communications technologies, the 
reification of social identities (including class positions), and commodification. In fleeing 
to a stone-age idyll, he rejects the technology that typifies a spectral West built in tandem 
with the military/industrial complex (and rebels against his father, a brilliant engineer 
who designed satellite equipment to benefit the Cold War state). But on the other hand, 
his rejection of spectral abstraction coincides with a parallel rejection of biology, of the 
social more generally—of sexuality, of the interpenetration of human beings, of 
fecundity. His rejection of his parents (and as one of McCandless’s friends put it, his 
rejection of “the very idea of parents” [115]) signifies a fear of brown: the abject, the in-
between and composite space of the mother-body, impurity, making, nurturing, the 
“fugue and funk” of loss and uncertainty, the permeable self.  
In his vehement rejection not only of government but also of the family, the 
domestic home space, the church, the money system, the corporation, and the institutions 
of contemporary capitalism, he unmasks the contradictions implied by a Reaganite ethnic 
core that would unite all of these elements under the signifier “private.” McCandless, 
then, functions like what Slavoj Zizek calls the “obscene supplement” of the liberal 
individualist frontier imagination in the U.S., since he takes its animating impulses (the 
desire for autonomous self-creation, self-naming, self-authorship free of external 





repressed figure of the mountain man: nomadic, antisocial, and unassimilable. And the 
frontier individualism he represents has now been hounded to the far spaces of the New 
North, where it subsists on life support. As Rodriguez puts it,  
What is endangered in America is the notion of the West. In the late 1950s, at the 
same time that California became the most populous state, Alaska became a new 
horizon—an albino hope, a gray-rolled cumulus, a glacial obsession—like 
Melville’s great whale. Alaska absorbed all the nouns that lay bleaching along the 
Oregon Trail. Solitude. Vacancy. Wilderness. (156)
  
If Alaska is the “white whale,” Christopher McCandless is its self-described Ahab, 
destined to flounder in its wake. His loss, then, is actually our loss, rooted in our inability 
to offer him a vision beyond the frontier ideology he so uncannily repeats. Into the Wild, 
then, stages an ambivalent process of mourning for the loss of the West, not simply as a 
literal frontier, but as an ideal. Not yet able to focus on the experience of the colonized 
excluded, it registers these figures only obliquely, in the background. Instead, in lingering 
on the grotesque details of a death in the wilderness, it documents the loss of the 
autonomous individual as such, leaving its survivors with questions appropriate for an 
age of U.S. postcolonial melancholia: what are we left with now? What kind of society 
would we like to create, and with what structures and openings—what combination of 
borders and hybridities?   
  
Utopias and Heterotopias 
 If McCandless’s yen for escape ultimately leaves him in the uncanny company of 
desexualized American Adams from Huckleberry Finn to Faulkner’s Ike McCaslin (and 
even Rodriguez’s Peter), we may have something to learn about a more profound politics 





West. Our lot is not simply to mock him and move on. McCandless’s journey, after all, 
does not merely take place in Alaska. Rather, McCandless’s circuitous odyssey also leads 
him to any number of odd corners: failed real estate booms, an abandoned army base 
transformed into a mobile flea market, an inland ocean produced by an engineering 
mistake, and various lumpenproletariat camps full of hippies and drifters. As if striving to 
squeal out of the grid of fragmented homogeneity that is capitalist space, McCandless 
seeks out spaces in which ownership over land is particularly hazy, in which (residual) 
alternative patterns and habits of dwelling unevenly persist despite their imbrication in a 
larger hegemonic pattern of ownership. McCandless moves on from these places as soon 
as they begin to intrude on his autonomy, but they linger in the reader’s (or viewer’s) 
memory, providing shards of possibility for different forms of society, affiliation, and 
ownership. In these discarded, accidental places—the archaic ruins of Utopian dreams 
left behind in U.S. development--we find room for a Benjaminian long experience and a 
pregnant pause in which ironic reflection can occur. 
 In a sense, then, Into the Wild can be read not as a story of McCandless’s “inner 
journey,” not about the foreground of the hero’s experience; instead, the story’s greater 
interest lies in the background through which McCandless travels. Like Alfonso Cuaron’s 
Y tu Mama Tambien and Children of Men in Zizek’s interpretation, the film, especially, 
achieves the effect of anamorphosis, a “paradox” through which a certain dimension of 
reality can only be disclosed obliquely, not directly: “If you look at the thing too directly, 
the oppressive social dimension, you don’t see it. You can see it in an oblique way only if 
it remains in the background.” If we wanted to, we could view its out-of-the-way spaces, 





spaces” separate from a dominant social order. But despite their seemingly marginal 
character, none of these spaces remains independent of late capitalism’s oppressive social 
dimension. None is an absolute space, not even the Alaskan wilderness. Instead, although 
the various spaces in Into the Wild are largely floundering projects imbued with an 
escapist Foucauldian ethos, we find in them glimpses of a different way of imagining 
heterotopias: in Henri Lefebvre’s terms, not as isolated alternatives to a hegemonic order, 
but as sites for a dynamic interplay between a marginal space of desire and the colonizing 
efforts of that dominant social order. Such spaces enable a possibility of ironic 
Kierkegaardian reflection about the totality of which they are an unstable part. 
 Before describing McCandless’s travels throughout the U.S. proper, it is 
important to note that the young man flirted with (but ultimately rejected) the opportunity 
to explore the Southern world of Mexico and Guatemala. And to the extent that the South 
exists in the U.S. as well (especially in Los Angeles), his rejection of Mexico and 
Guatemala provides a point of departure for understanding the irresistible urge that pulls 
him to Alaska. For McCandless is not interested in any heterotopia, but only in those 
spaces that might enable him to avoid spectrality and biology. And in Into the Wild, 
Mexico does not come across as it might be depicted in travel brochures, as a point of 
access for the quaint and archaic, the natural or the free. The colonized South, rather, 
emerges as a space specifically unprotected from the spectral effects of neoliberal 
power.43 Ultimately, then, McCandles must leave Mexico and Los Angeles, since in these 
                                                          
43 In U.S. culture, Mexico often provides a space of freedom, distant from U.S.-dominated institutions: 
John Wayne and the ex-prostitute Dallas (Claire Trevor) running across the border to start a farm at the 
conclusion of John Ford’s Stagecoach (1939), Sam Peckinpah’s U.S. outlaws seeking shelter (and sexual 
comfort) in a Mexican village in The Wild Bunch (1969), or in more complex and ambivalent fashion, 






spaces he cannot find even the illusion of autonomy—an illusion ironically more plentiful 
in the New Northern wilderness of Alaska, where it is specifically managed into 
existence by government policies. Thus insofar as McCandless’s assertion of 
independence is driven by his desire to evade the paternal gaze, the South (site of 
surveillance, control, and the homo sacer dominated by sovereignty) cannot fulfill his 
fantasy. 
As reported by Krakauer, McCandless twice enacts a journey that symbolically 
rejects the South and embraces the New North, thus rendering Into the Wild not merely a 
U.S. story, but a transnational story of Greater Mexico and the Hemispheric Americas. 
The first story occurs prior to McCandless’s graduation from college and subsequent 
transformation into Alexander Supertramp. During a summer break from college, 
Christopher drives off in his Datsun and indicates his whereabouts only through two 
laconic postcards to his father. The first reads “Headed for Guatemala,” prompting his 
father’s panic: “When I read that I thought, ‘Oh, my god, he’s going down there to fight 
for the insurrectionists. They’re going to line him up in front of a wall and shoot him” 
(124). But later, Walt McCandless receives a second postcard, which reads “Leaving 
Fairbanks tomorrow, see you in a couple of weeks.” As Krakauer interjects, “It turned out 
he’d changed his mind and instead of heading south had driven to Alaska” (124). In the 
second story, narrated both in Krakauer’s book and in Sean Penn’s film, Christopher—
newly self-christened as Alexander Supertramp—leaves his Datsun in a ditch in Arizona, 
buys a used kayak, and floats down the Colorado River, hoping to reach its conclusion. 
But rather than finding a space of triumphant release at the river’s end (which apparently, 





Mexico’s colonized position relative to the United States. As in Palestine, where Israel 
assumes control over water supplies and grants only a pittance to the occupied territories, 
the United States appropriates most of the water in the Colorado River before it reaches 
Mexico.    
Each of these stories indicates that, for McCandless, the South inhibits his New 
Northern self-image as a heroic, innocent, and autonomous traveler. Had he travelled to 
Guatemala, McCandless would have headed toward human history rather than prehistory, 
and may have discovered the extent to which U.S. wilderness, by contrast, is a socially 
constructed space managed by powerful institutions—local police and authorities, but 
also federal park rangers equipped with helicopters and complex navigational equipment. 
Having climbed volcanoes in Guatemala myself—well after the civil war--I can attest to 
the profound difference in the felt phenomenological experience of place between a 
managed First World wilderness space and Guatemala’s less protected terrain. Although I 
don’t consider myself an overly cautious traveler (my wife and I hitchhiked through 
much of the country), I can hardly conceive of trudging off into the Guatemalan 
mountains without a guide and a sizable group of travelers. The risk of bandits or gangs 
is not to be ignored, such that in any such trip one could not focus on the “natural” 
scenery without constantly sensing potential (human) dangers around the corner. In 
Guatemala today--a barely managed state in which narco-traffickers, gangs, and ex-
military thugs co-exist with corrupt policemen, Mayan villagers, and a fearful middle-
class minority--one cannot reliably depend on authorities. Such risk, of course, would 





overriding need for social solidarity could not be escaped; one simply has to depend on 
others in order to survive.       
In Mexico, McCandless learns a comparable lesson. When he finally does make 
his way to what we might call the global South, he discovers that he had reason for 
trepidation, since Mexico confounds his desire for a “spiritual revolution” in natural 
solitude (163). In a surreptitious (indeed, illegal) kayak trip down the Colorado River, he 
finds Mexico to be the exact opposite of an escape from society. Instead, although he 
does manage to live alone for a time off the coast of Baja California, he cannot evade 
Mexico’s status as a colonized space, worked over by developmental forces. Although he 
derives a certain pleasure in transgressing the law, he seems uncomfortable with his 
illegitimate status there as a noncitizen who has crossed the border without identification 
or permission, and his fantasy of omnipotence is disrupted when he sneaks across the 
border and discovers that the Colorado River in Mexico has become what Krakauer 
describes as a “maze of irrigation canals, marshland, and dead-end channels, among 
which McCandless repeatedly lost his way” (34). In his journal, McCandless (writing in 
the third person, as if authoring himself as a character in his own book) expresses dismay 
and confusion: “Canals break off in a multitude of directions. Alex is 
dumbfounded…Alex is crushed” (34). Soon enough, he finds some Spanish-speaking 
Mexicans who help him move the boat to a more promising location, and he notes in his 
diary, “Alex finds Mexicans to be warm, friendly people. Much more hospitable than 
Americans” (35). But the going does not improve: “All hopes collapse! The canal does 





confounded….Completely demoralized and frustrated he lays in his canoe at day’s end 
and weeps” (35).  
Although he finally finds a “miracle”-- some English-speaking Mexicans who 
drive him to the ocean--he ultimately leaves Mexico with a bad taste in his mouth (35). 
The last straw occurs when a sand storm in the Gulf of California nearly kills him: 
“Finally through extreme effort and much cursing he manages to beach canoe on jetty 
and collapses exhausted on sand at sundown. This incident led Alexander to decide to 
abandon canoe and return north” (36). Before he can return north, however, McCandless 
must pass through the gauntlet of the U.S. border. After attempting to skip back into the 
country (while carrying a gun and no identification), McCandless spends the night in jail 
and loses the gun to authorities. And he discovers that crossing the border does not enable 
him to escape the labyrinth of the South, since it has seemingly crept over the border 
along with him; after travelling through the Southwest from Houston to California, faced 
with “the unsavory characters who rule the streets and freeway overpasses where he 
slept,” McCandless decides that he has had enough of the South. He travels to Los 
Angeles “to get a ID and a job but feels extremely uncomfortable in society now and 
must return to road immediately” (37 sic). Los Angeles, in this rendering, is the South as 
well, since it lacks the dimension of autonomy available in the West of McCandless’s 
imagination (where “the West is the best”). More than the West embalmed and preserved 
in the New North, it resembles the confusing network of Mexican canals. (And as I will 
illustrate later, Los Angeles as a site of spectrality and biology is even more clear in the 
film. For Sean Penn, the city of angels stands out as the degree-zero point of 1990s 





commodity fetishism, and thus as an impure site of confusing penetration that makes 
innocence impossible.) 
Twice, then, McCandless flirts with the idea of a Southern trip, and twice he 
changes his mind, fixated on the idea of the Alaskan wilderness as the prime locus for his 
heart’s desires. The key, it seems, lies in his statement of defeat, that he “feels extremely 
uncomfortable in society now.” Despite the hospitality of Mexicans, he cannot bear the 
confusing and claustrophobic quality that “society” seems to bring to places like Mexico. 
Rather than floating down the Colorado River in the United States, where the river is 
controlled according to a variety of interests (including, in large stretches, the interest to 
preserve the river in a managed state hospitable for wildlife and recreation—a state 
designed to evoke a “natural” feeling), in Mexico McCandless faces what Krakauer calls 
an “emasculated” river that cannot be navigated at all (32). This artificial river does not 
even pretend to a state of nature, but is disrupted and channeled into a bewildering array 
of ditches and swamps according to some larger abstract plan (or a thwarted or aborted 
plan, as it were). In such a place, McCandless faces not simply death, but death deprived 
of any heroic narrative. In Alaska, his death (should it come) would be heroic, since on 
such a “natural” stage he could play out his sublime fantasy of the individual in nature. In 
Mexico, however, his death would simply be pitiable: a solitary individual trapped in a 
labyrinthine, incomprehensible, and socially devised network of canals and marshes. 
Similarly, McCandless may have sensed that travelling to Guatemala (to “fight for the 
insurrectionists”) would culminate in a similar morass: not a clear-cut struggle for rights, 





This Southern labyrinth leads him to Los Angeles. In the film, the brown 
melancholy of L.A. stands out all the more intensely, since it emerges in contrast to the 
Grand Canyon spaces of McCandless’s illicit river trip, where we become privy to 
McCandless’s preferred mode of interacting with authority: a cat-and-mouse game in 
which he can simultaneously flirt with authority and avoid its reach.44 But if McCandless 
strives to manage the terms of his perverse rebellion, he cannot always strike the right 
balance. L.A., in particular, leaves him honestly traumatized, just as he is in the Mexican 
canal system. After a series of wild adventures on a train, which allow him to inhabit the 
relatively safe symbolic space of the hobo evading authority, he emerges from a squalid 
drainage pipe to face the unsymbolizable Real of a global city and financial center. This 
dangerous and traumatizing place is the urban equivalent of the Guatemalan wilderness; 
dirty and scared, McCandless eyes the place warily, as if expecting violence around any 
corner. This boy has braved death in a kayak without a helmet, but there is something 
different about his fear of L.A., since it offers him no narrative, no individuality, no clear 
                                                          
44 The libidinal economy of the film’s river trip scenes is by no means simple. Slavoj Zizek, in a Lacanian 
analysis of the 2011 UK riots, argues that enjoyment (of the kind experienced by McCandless during his 
Colorado River trip) does not constitute a rebellion against parental authority, but depends on this 
authority, since enjoyment is only achieved by evading the father’s gaze. More exactly, this kind of 
enjoyment is secretly enabled and provoked by the father’s prohibition: “While prohibiting his son’s 
escapades, the father discreetly not only ignores and tolerates them, but even solicits them…for Lacan…the 
only enjoyments are the little bits left to the servant by the Master when he turns a blind eye to the servant’s 
little transgressions…The servant’s belief is that he only gets little crumbs of enjoyment, while the Master 
enjoys fully—in reality, however, the only enjoyment is the servant’s. It is in this sense that the Father as 
the agent of prohibition or the law sustains desire or pleasure: there is no direct access to enjoyment since 
its very space is opened up by the blanks of the Father’s controlling gaze” (The Year of Living Dangerously 
49-50). Seen in these Lacanian terms, McCandless’s jouissance can only be achieved in the interstices of 
the paternal gaze, which both instigates the rebellion (by turning a “blind eye” to behavior that it secretly 
would like to engage in) and enables the libidinally charged enjoyment. McCandless, then, would not have 
insisted on going on the river trip—and would certainly not have achieved such enjoyment from it—were it 
not prohibited by the authorities that he faces. The paternal gaze is precisely what he both courts and 
evades in a relatively low-stakes game. If the federal authorities actually succeeded in catching McCandless 
kayaking illegally down the Colorado River, one can imagine the mere slap on the wrist he would face; 
since no doubt such authorities harbor Huckleberry Finn fantasies themselves, they would keep a straight 






meaning. Here, McCandless becomes a refugee, unprotected from both the spectral and 
the biological Real. In line with a host of multicolored faces waiting to enter a homeless 
shelter, he faces what Rodriguez calls life at the bottom, the undifferentiated life of the 
stew of humanity. And as a devotee of the New North, he finds this place disturbing and 
humiliating, an intrusion into his inviolate space. Here he is not cocky and voluble, as he 
is with others, but silent. The soundtrack plays spare, hesitant guitar chords. Once inside 
the shelter, McCandless attempts to charm a skeptical black female social worker, but 
seems to recognize that he sounds silly (rather than defiant and triumphant) announcing 
his theatrical name: Alexander Supertramp. In subsequent shots, McCandless walks 
through darkened L.A. streets, frightened by shadows and hooded, huddled figures. He 
eats at a Mexican café, gazing out the window. Here, McCandless finds a gothic 
landscape, and Penn underlines his disjointed and halting subjectivity through freeze-
frames, jump cuts, and blurry slow-motion shots, as if McCandless cannot assimilate 
these travels into his symbolic adventure. 
Most uncanny of all, he can look up from this place of dangerous poverty to see 
huge buildings, emblems of wealth and power. Penn presents us with establishing shots 
(from McCandless’s lowly perspective) of tall, sleek banks, but also perhaps the Westin 
Bonaventure Hotel famously interpreted by Fredric Jameson as a sign of the impossible 
task of situating ourselves within the “postmodern hyperspace” of late capitalism 
(Postmodernism 44). From McCandless’s hounded vantage point, spectralized inequality 
is profoundly visible, unavoidable, and thoroughly inscribed into his sense of self. 
Walking past an upscale restaurant, he looks into a window and sees a young, well-





wearing nice clothes and gazing at him with a cocky smile. More than anything, 
McCandless cannot face this uncanny, spectral Real. It is not simply that McCandless is 
haunted by the repressed return of his perverse rejection of his inheritance—a rejection 
that can never succeed, since despite burning his money he secretly retains access to class 
mobility, such that he could willingly become this well-heeled version of Christopher 
McCandless. Rather, he is disturbed by the very rupture between Alexander Supertramp 
and Christopher McCandless, by his own multiplicity, and by the enigmatic gap that 
separates them—a gap inextricably bound up with another rupture, the wound of class 
struggle itself. This rupture is where the Real enters, both for McCandless and for the 
polarized city. Profoundly enmeshed in this wound that defines the spectralized 
neoliberal city, McCandless is hard-pressed to preserve the innocence that he craves. In 
seeing his ghostly double, McCandless is forced to confront the hysterical question: Who 
am I for the Other? Why am I who you say I am? And unable to face this abyss at the 
base of his subjectivity, he panics, retrieves his things from the shelter, and hops a train 
out of the city in search of the New Northern fetish.  
This time his encounter with authority is different: no longer a romantic hobo 
performance of freedom but a confrontation with the Real of an authority disinclined to 
play games. In an uncanny evocation of the power of corporate railroads during the 
development of the West (and in the harsh treatment of historical hobos and striking 
railroad employees), he is severely beaten by a company representative who threatens to 
kill him if he sees him again. Here McCandless becomes a homo sacer, since he can 
presumably be killed with impunity. The affront is not personal, but financial, again 





is the goddamned railroad. And we will do whatever we have to do to keep you 
freeloaders from violating our liability.” A vicious, barking dog intrudes into the camera: 
biology. In this scene, McCandless unwillingly leaves the terrain of myth and instead 
finds himself deposited in history, trapped inside the subject position of many who have 
come before him, thousands who have faced the corporation’s boot in the face, the 
terrifying canine growl of its dominance. McCandless’s response is the same as his 
response to the border agent, but this time the symbolic play of authority has been 
replaced by the Real of a colonizing power: “Yes sir.” 
 
Accidental Places 
Accidental places are the only real places left. 
—Thomas de Zengotita from “The Numbing of the American Mind: Culture as 
Anaesthetic” (37) 
 
While scientific experiment is indeed the construction of a sure road (of a methodos, a 
path) to knowledge, the quest, instead, is the recognition that the absence of a road (the 
aporia) is the only experience possible for man. But by the same token, the quest is also 
the opposite of the adventure, which in the modern age emerges as the final refuge of 
experience. For the adventure presupposes that there is a road to experience, and that this 
road goes by way of the extraordinary and the exotic (in opposition to the familiar and the 
commonplace). Instead, in the universe of the quest the exotic and the extraordinary are 
only the sum of the essential aporia of every experience. Thus Don Quixote, who lives 
the everyday and the familiar (the landscape of La Mancha and its inhabitants) as 
extraordinary, is the subject of a quest that is a perfect counterpart of the medieval ones. 
--Giorgio Agamben from Infancy and History (32-33) 
In the face of this Southern trauma, where might McCandless find relief? 
Retreating from the spectrality and biology of Mexico and Los Angeles—and headed 
inexorably toward his fate in the black hole of Alaska—McCandless enacts a tour of the 
weird corners of a U.S. Western imaginary, finding scattered spaces of desire where 





the abstract accumulation of property and capital. As a rule, he is drawn to places that 
cater to mobile characters like himself, people who (like J.B. Jackson’s prototypes) want 
“freedom from the tyranny of the traditional home and its possessions.” In the trifecta of 
liberty, equality, and fraternity, he is searching above all for liberty. But in Into the 
Wild’s heterotopic spaces, most people are not looking for liberty alone, however 
understood; rather, they are torn between place and motion, between nostalgia for 
residual social structures and a desire for a different future, and between memory and 
forgetting. Thus in probing these accidental places, McCandless often finds more than he 
bargained for: not simply freedom from social obligation or authority tout court, but 
alternative dreams of social organization that persist as residual enclaves from a largely 
bygone pre-capitalist past. In Into the Wild, the most interesting—and indeed, strange, 
enchanting, and dreamlike—places are not the “exotic” spaces of the Alaskan frontier 
(the “last refuge of experience” that he is aiming for in his grand adventure), but the 
accidental places he passes along the way. In them, the everyday emerges as 
extraordinary, revealing confused desires for a different world in which labor is less 
alienated, social relations are more nurturing and durable across generations, and equality 
and fraternity can thrive alongside liberty. But even these places contain too much 
“society” for Alexander Supertramp, who must move on to a site where he believes he 
can evade everything that would inscribe his life from the outside. 
What does McCandless find in Alaska? Not the Holy Grail (the road to 
unimpeachable experience in which reality is distilled into a single phenomenological 
site), but yet another aporia within the mesh. The key moment, perhaps, in Penn’s filmic 





a moose and unsuccessfully tries to preserve the meat for later use. Not simply a failed 
attempt at wilderness butchering, the moose episode carries all the tragic gravity of 
McCandless’s recognition that he has not escaped society, biology, and authority, but has 
merely become a paternal authority in a different way. Concurrent with images of the 
rotting moose carcass, Penn depicts McCandless engaged in demented play-acting, 
yelling at his mother and sister in his father’s demanding and angry voice. Possessed, 
then, by his father’s violence, and aware that like Walt he has created a mess and gotten 
in over his head, McCandless sees that he has not escaped obligation, since he has failed 
in his responsibility to the moose. Claustrophobic intimacy operates in nature, too. As 
does power. The moment rings with meaning for McCandless beyond what one might 
expect; he writes of the “disaster” in his diary: “One of the worst tragedies of my life.” In 
attempting to escape all Neighbors, then, McCandless discovers not only that he has 
Neighbors in the wild, but that he is toxic himself; in Timothy Morton’s terms, he 
discovers the uncanny fact that he is the “strange stranger” he has been trying to avoid.  
And if McCandless feels guilty about attempting (and failing) to seize mastery over 
nature, he no doubt feels similarly guilty about figuratively killing his father by cutting 
him out of his life—about seizing the authorial right to control the narrative of their 
relationship.  
It becomes increasingly clear that McCandless cannot control his narrative 
anywhere, least of all in the wild, since the terrifying Neighbors who live there with him 
exert agency as well. In the wilderness, biology becomes invasive, proximate, revealing 
to McCandless his own permeable and vulnerable body. Beavers build dams that make 





poisoned by a surreptitious intruder into his body, a mold-encrusted wild potato that turns 
his flesh against itself, making it impossible for his stomach to digest food and hastening 
his death by starvation. There is a lesson in the wilderness, but not one of autonomy in 
pristine “nature”; rather, the lesson is about ecology.  The process of looking for food 
enlightens McCandless to his place within a larger mesh. As Krakauer puts it, although 
McCandless traveled to Alaska “to explore the inner country of his own soul,” he instead 
encounters the key ecological insight, that he is constituted within a material context that 
renders the borders of the individual self unstable: “an extended stay in the wilderness 
inevitably directs one’s attention outward as much as inward….The entries in 
McCandless’s journal contain few abstractions about wilderness, or for that matter, few 
ruminations of any kind. There is scant mention of the surrounding scenery….He wrote 
about hardly anything except food” (183). No doubt McCandless experienced beauty in 
Alaska, but more than anything he experienced the destruction of his inviolate space. As 
both Krakauer and Penn are at pains to suggest, the ecology of which McCandless is a 
part is not simply an immediate environmental one. He is part of a social ecology, too. As 
McCandless’s play-acting, writing, reading, and self-dialogues demonstrate, his 
adventure is a form of communication that presupposes an interlocutor, an audience. 
 Whether McCandless ever comes to a realistic or productive vision of the social 
world is unclear.45 But just as the disjointed narrative of Into the Wild is set in motion by 
                                                          
45 McCandless was alone in his Alaskan bus, but some of his cryptic messages get through, even if we can’t 
quite determine their meaning. Penn and Krakauer make much of the passages McCandless underlined in 
the books he read in Alaska, especially a passage from Boris Pasternak’s “Doctor Zhivago”: “And so it 
turned out that only a life similar to the life of those around us, merging with it without a ripple, is genuine 
life, and that an unshared happiness is not happiness…And this was most vexing of all.” In the margins of 
this passage, McCandless wrote “Happiness only real when shared.” Similarly, when McCandless writes 
his final goodbye note, he signs it not “Alexander Supertramp” but “Christopher McCandless,” indicating 
that he had once again accepted his imbrication within a social system, and thus come to a kind of peace 





the wilderness trauma, such that it floats through memory-space in search of significance 
in McCandless’s journey, it will be useful at this point to leave Alaska and scan the map 
of his travels elsewhere for evidence of such a complex social vision in the background 
of his story. And although I think we will find more promising territory elsewhere, there 
is reason to pause for a moment over Carthage, South Dakota, where McCandless falls in 
with a seasonal team of male workers who use combine equipment to cut grain in a 
South-North swath from Texas to Canada. In this working class, homosocial atmosphere, 
McCandless finds a “surrogate family” of men who live in a common house and enjoy 
work and leisure together, evoking nothing so much as the artisan republicanism 
celebrated by Walt Whitman and others prior to the onset of wage labor as a 
standardizing structure (and ably described by Bryan Garman). These men, who gather 
under the umbrella of a man named Wayne Westerberg, hearken back to an older 
workshop culture of skilled white workingmen who once operated a master/apprentice 
guild system before it was decimated by the factory system. In this milieu, McCandless 
encounters an implicit moral critique of the acquisitive and competitive ethos of 
contemporary capitalist norms—if not a structural critique of capital or of an individual 
rights framework (such that Garman cites Whitman’s claim to be “radical—but not too 
damned radical”). Historically, artisan republicans opposed the concentration of wealth in 
the hands of the few; instead, they took pride in their skills, looked out for each other’s 
                                                                                                                                                                             
did his social ecology extend? It is unclear. But the passage from Pasternak paints a picture, not of a world 
in conflict, structured according to divided interests, but “a life similar to the life of those around us, 
merging with it without a ripple.” Here we have an image of durable place, a common project—and yet we 
have no idea how such a place might interact with other places, or how it might manage internal conflicts 
“without a ripple.” If McCandless settled on this passage as a way of imagining social life (and I would 
never venture to say that he had), he has substituted an idealized view of individualist autonomy in nature 
for an idealized view of community. In this picture, we have neighborly neighbors, but no terrifying 
Neighbors. We have no intrusion of the spectral and biological Real, but rather a cohesive symbolic order 





interests, and celebrated a republican ethos of fraternity and equality (although this 
equality did not extend, in their minds, to women or nonwhites). The accidental space of 
Carthage, South Dakota, then, stands out both as a place that time forgot and as a loose-
knit community built on a tension between egalitarian social ties and the worker’s 
freedom of movement.46 
Although this nostalgic bachelor’s paradise surely reveals something about the 
desire for unalienated labor, about the pleasures of useful work and mutual support, Into 
the Wild offers a more striking symptomal space in which to consider Dirlik’s dialectic of 
social withdrawal and reconstitution, purity and hybridity. After living briefly in Arizona, 
McCandless takes to the road once again and ends up at a place in California informally 
called The Slabs, where he finds a community of a different sort, pregnant with 
dialectical tension. Krakauer describes The Slabs as an accidental place increasingly 
claimed by its heterogeneous occupants:  
an old navy air base that had been abandoned and razed, leaving a grid of empty 
concrete foundations scattered far and wide across the desert. Come November, as 
the weather turns cold across the rest of the country, some five thousand 
snowbirds and drifters and sundry vagabonds congregate in this otherworldly 
setting to live on the cheap under the sun. The Slabs functions as the seasonal 
                                                          
46 McCandless’s affinity for the artisan republican combination of anti-authoritarian populism and liberal 
individualism helps explain what Krakauer describes as McCandless’s unorthodox political positions. As 
an editorial assistant at his college newspaper, he veered all over the map: attacking Democrats at one 
moment, and then celebrating Jesse Jackson in the next moment. He started a College Republican Club, but 
he “lambasted Bible-thumpers of the Christian right” and railed against “the rich kids at Emory.” As 
Krakauer puts it, “Chris’s…political positions were perhaps best summed up by Thoreau’s declaration in 
‘Civil Disobedience’: “That government is best which governs least” (123). And McCandless’s suspicion 
for centralized authority coincides with his belief that moral and not structural reform provides the answer 
to social ills. He was incensed with South Africa’s apartheid regime, but even this consuming interest in 
Africa’s humanitarian crisis reveals not a structural critique of capital flows or neocolonial domination, but 
a liberal individualist ideology of human rights and republican equality under the law. The anti-apartheid 
struggle supplied him with a perfect mission, since in opposing the legal racism of the South African 
regime, he could demand formal equality without challenging fundamental economic structures. Similarly, 
when (as recounted in Into the Wild) he travels to inner city Washington D.C. to hand out food (and moral 






capital of a teeming itinerant society—a tolerant, rubber-tired culture comprising 
the retired, the exiled, the destitute, the perpetually unemployed. (43)
 
In stressing the “otherworldly” quality of this place—the spare, modernist style of its 
huge concrete spaces set against the desert sands and sun—Krakauer captures something 
of its utopian quality. More broadly inclusive than the white male milieu of Carthage, 
The Slabs functions as a squatter’s paradise for men and women (and their families) who 
dream of founding a new type of community, built not on long settlement but instead on 
migratory patterns, like those of birds, or the indigenous tribes that once moved 
seasonally from camp to camp. The bartering patterns of the place suggest an alternative 
economy of sorts, in which people scrounge whatever they find along their travels and 
swap their salvage among like-minded travelers.  
 Although The Slabs strives through its alternative economy to avoid spectral 
capitalist power structures--or more exactly, to build itself on its erstwhile ruins--it is also 
the staging ground for multifaceted human relationships that (more so than in the 
homosocial sibling society of Carthage) threaten to spill out all over the place in 
terrifying ways. Here McCandless teams up with some “rubber tramps” (people who 
drive around the country from place to place) that he had met earlier in his travels: Jan 
and Rainey Burres, who figure as substitute parents for McCandless, with all the 
ambiguity such a status entails for a young man intent on purity and self-authorship. 
From McCandless’s point of view, The Slabs is a dangerous space of biology, a labyrinth 
not of physical danger but of physical and emotional entanglement: of Neighbors, 
religion, family, and place. More than any other site in McCandless’s odyssey, it 
represents the two-sided dilemma of maternal warmth (and thus of sexuality); like 





and the suffocating pressures of desire, need, obligation, and love. Even the name implies 
a slippage between its concrete modernist architectural foundations (slabs of concrete), 
and Rodriguez’s risky biological territory (slabs of meat that might provide sustenance if 
taken into the body, but must be tended if rot is to be avoided).  
It is appropriate, then, that here Alex is compelled to perform social roles that he 
nevertheless attempts to keep at a distance: friend, son, lover. In the spatial map of Into 
the Wild, The Slabs evokes what Bill Brown has described in regionalist literature as a 
“poetics of attachment” (42); although the space itself is detached in many ways from the 
surrounding national space, the exchanges that take place there are specifically of the 
emotional and cultural kind, such that when Jan Burres offers McCandless a hand-knit 
hat as a gift, the young man is hesitant to accept it. He knows that the hat is not simply 
another object, but is rather closer to what Gillian Brown has called a “sentimental 
fetish”: a thing that links him to others, to the past, to this substitute-mother, and through 
her to his memory of the mother he has cut out of his life (45-53). Like Celaya’s heirloom 
rebozo in Sandra Cisneros’s Caramelo, the hat lays a claim on him, forges a connection. 
It is significant, then, that when McCandless arrives in the Alaskan wilderness, he leaves 
the hat on a branch before crossing a river that functions as the threshold into the wild; in 
crossing the river, he symbolically attempts to leave behind all obligation to society, all 
entanglement, all ghosts, all traces of the sentimental fetish. A similar poetics of 
attachment (and its rejection) appears later in McCandless’s response to an offer of 
adoption from Ronald Franz, an elderly and lonely man who attempts to hold on to the 
boy he knows as Alex. In asking Christopher to continue his line, Franz is asking 





will define him, not as a self-created individual, but as one who is identified according to 
a lawful social relationship: in this case, as an adopted grandson imbricated within the 
weave of a continuing generational process of nurture as well as authority and obligation. 
McCandless’s rejection of this offer is yet another instance of his rejection of any poetics 
of attachment, paving the way for his atomized death, cut off from any who might save 
him.    
As Rodriguez’s Brown reveals, any poetics of attachment points toward the 
ambiguity involved in recognizing one’s incomplete ontological status in Kristeva’s 
image of the abjected mother-body. And in the film, Sean Penn fully develops 
McCandless’s simultaneous attraction to and repulsion from this maternal image in the 
figure of Jan Burres. Burres, mother of a teenaged son with whom she has not spoken in 
two years, serves as a safer stand-in for McCandless’s own mother, who also grieves for 
a vanished son. But the relationship is predictably tense. On the one hand, McCandless 
finds with Jan a jouissance unavailable elsewhere. With Jan and Rainey, he can play a 
role denied him at home: the perfect and omnipotent son who ensures familial harmony.  
In an early scene in the film, he inspires this troubled couple with his boundless energy 
and vibrant youthfulness (at one point, Rainey laughs at him as an “industrious little 
fucker,” and jokingly compares him to Jesus as a miracle-worker who would walk on 
water). As if compensating for Jan’s lost son, whose ghostly absence makes her wary of 
further emotional connection, McCandless helps Jan and Rainey reconcile with each 
other. In cavorting (always innocently, or so he would have it) with Jan in the ocean, he 
finds a partner in jouissance. But when Jan and Rainey’s reconciliation becomes 





have the other side of the tale: McCandless yearns to lose his individuality in union with 
the mother, but also throws her off since she reminds him of his own vulnerability and 
incompleteness in the face of power. Still, McCandless cannot quite put Jan out of his 
mind. When they reunite in The Slabs, Alex’s relationship with her resonates with more 
erotic charge than we find anywhere else in the film. When she pleads with him to call 
his mother, he reacts with torn emotions. On the one hand, he avoids the uncomfortable 
intimacy of the conversation and stands up; but he also yearns to please this woman, and 
thus leans down, so that their faces are nearly touching, and says fervently, “I will sit here 
with you all night.”  
 Since McCandless is unable to face the mother without acknowledging his own 
(hysterical, castrated) status, he can take no lover at all. In his book, Krakauer asserts that 
McCandless probably never had a sexual relationship—not in high school, not in college, 
and not during his odyssey. But although he recognizes that Oedipal interpretations of 
McCandless may have merit, Krakauer does not dwell on the matter, instead arguing that 
McCandless may have found an erotic charge in nature: “His yearning, in a sense, was 
too powerful to be quenched by human contact. McCandless may have been tempted by 
the succor offered by women, but it paled beside the prospect of rough congress with 
nature, with the cosmos itself. And thus was he drawn north, to Alaska” (66). I don’t 
claim to understand McCandless as a human being, but insofar as he emerges as a 
cultural signifier, it seems productive to imagine him not simply as positively drawn 
toward some eros of nature (though he surely was), but also as repelled by the biology 
implied by human sexual congress. McCandless may have been drawn to an idealized 





he bargained for!), but it does not go too far to imagine that this “lust” compensated for 
an anxiety about human contact that he shares with the New Northern sensibility. And 
Sean Penn seems to agree with me. In the film, he develops a character mentioned only 
briefly in Krakauer’s book: Tracy, a young woman in The Slabs who falls in love with 
McCandless. Played rather unsubtly by Kristen Stewart, Tracy seethes with sexual desire 
for McCandless, but although the young man seems willing to transgress other laws, he is 
unwilling to sleep with this sixteen-year-old girl. In the end, he lectures her hypocritically 
(and cruelly), “Just remember, if you want something in life—just reach out and grab it.” 
Yes—reach out and grab it, as long as it is not me, because my space cannot be violated!  
Tracy’s inability to hold on to Alex is an overtly sexualized depiction of the plight 
of McCandless’s other friends in the film, who also would like him to remain with them, 
but who are (in a way) complicit in his departure, because their desire for him is 
conditioned by the same cultural logic that inspires him to yearn for new pastures. Tracy 
loves this free-spirited traveling boy partly because he is a free-spirited traveling boy, 
thereby trapping herself in a deadlock of desire. The melancholy quality of the film—
which is, after all, told not from McCandless’s point of view, but by the community left 
behind—is largely due to the ambivalent character of that community’s desire. In both 
the film and the book, McCandless is aestheticized as a fleeting character, a lost presence 
for whom the other characters mourn. Like beauty itself, McCandless can only appear in 
lyrical and poetic moments that are by nature transitory. The film, especially, employs a 
poetics of mourning in which the movement of the narrative is interrupted by lyrical 
recitations, often backed by mobile images, music, and occasionally words on the screen, 





itself as a Derridean trace of meaning that is always already lost, fading, incomplete. The 
nonlinear quality of the book’s narration, employed by Krakauer as an investigative 
gesture of circling around the truth of McCandless’s story, is further amplified in the film 
as a visually poetic process of mourning in motion. It takes place not in homogenous 
time, but in a time punctuated by memories that surge forward, offering pain and solace, 
hope and despair. As a result, McCandless’s advice to Tracy, intended to be inspiring and 
affirmative, is also a taunt to the audience. We are encouraged to grab what we want, but 
if what we want is Alex, we cannot grab him. He is not only dead, but missing in plain 
sight; and love for him disappears down a black hole that is not merely his own creation, 
but constitutes the dead end of hegemonic U.S. Western ideals of independence and 
rugged masculinity in nature.  
 If the film suggests an antidote to this deadlock, it is glimpsed only fitfully in 
possibilities that are not taken, roads that are not travelled. And some of these 
possibilities emerge at The Slabs, where Alex contrives means of fending off Tracy’s 
sexual advances. These metonymic dalliances, which prolong the moment of his 
departure, help illustrate the way that art can be made out of absence—that by asserting 
and embracing a lack at the center of experience we can find a semblance of the way 
forward. One such moment takes place as Alex and Tracy perform a song together at an 
open-mic venue at The Slabs. Faced earlier with Tracy in her underwear, Alex says 
instead, “You want to do something together?” and arranges for them to sing a song on 
stage. As Tracy strums the guitar and Alex plays the organ, they sing a duet of John 
Prine’s “Angel of Montgomery,” a quintessentially melancholic frontier story about 





connection) that never arrives. In this often-sung tune, Prine tells the story of a woman 
caught in the negative repetition of a spiritless life, but who nevertheless prays for some 
utopian intervention. Unable to communicate and trapped in the monotony not only of 
alienated labor but of alienated desire, she wonders, “How the hell can a person / Go to 
work in the morning / Come home in the evening / And have nothing to say?” In Alain 
Badiou’s terms, this woman lives in a world in which no Event is possible: “I ain’t done 
nothing since I woke up today.” Accordingly, Prine’s angel (“Make me an angel / that 
flies from Montgomery”) encapsulates a form of grace that would enter in and cut 
through the deadlock, making some kind of rebirth possible. And yet the narrator in this 
song can only imagine an “angel” like Christopher McCandless: a long lost “cowboy” 
and “free ramblin’ man.”  
The longing here suggests that although the people of The Slabs inhabit a 
vernacular culture around the principle of motion (thus ratifying McCandless’s departure 
even as they mourn it), they are not simply free people making an unambivalent choice, 
satisfied in Jackson’s terms with evading social obligation and discarding obsolete values 
and objects. Rather, like Prine’s protagonist, they are the detritus of a capitalist frontier 
society built on a principle of nomadic motion and rapid commodity circulation. And this 
society, with its emphasis on individual economic liberty, provides little room for 
equality, solidarity, or the care-taking involved in the creation of durable places. Indeed, 
the top-down cultural and economic structures of their society positively encourage 
motion, serial abandonment, and creative destruction; the demagogues of decentered late 
capitalism would wholeheartedly agree with McCandless’s admonition to “move around, 





security” in favor of “a helter-skelter style of life that will at first appear to you to be 
crazy,” he uncannily captures the precarious quality of rhizomatic neoliberal motion, his 
ridicule of a “secure future” another way of pushing fiscal austerity and the cult of the 
risk-taking speculator, his rejection of “human relationships” another manifestation of 
rigorous individualism. The denizens of The Slabs are in many ways still complicit in 
McCandless’s nomadic ideology, but they yearn for something different; these refugees 
and pilgrims gather from the far corners, only to recognize their own bafflement. As 
ragpickers searching in the desert for the fragments of a new society but with little idea of 
how to construct it, they do not simply destroy place by moving on, but create place as 
well. Fleeing a situation dominated not even by desire but by fragmented short-term 
drives, it is only by retreating to The Slabs, in a sense, that they can have access to desire 
in the first place, that they can pause long enough to mourn, dream, and perhaps build 
something new together. 
Such an improvised, layered quality of place—along with the yearning for grace 
to intervene in the deadlock between love and individual autonomy—is particularly 
visible at Salvation Mountain, a collective art project outside of The Slabs, where Tracy 
brings Alex early in their interaction. Built by a strange older man named Leonard Knight 
(along with outsiders who have brought materials to him), Salvation Mountain is a huge 
installation in the middle of the desert: a sprawling and messy network (mesh?) of 
plaster, wood, and metal festooned with passages from the Bible and with messages of 
“love.” When Alex asks Knight where he got the telephone poles used in the installation, 
the artist responds fervently, “Oh, a lot of people in the valley just love me a lot. 





wisdom to love ‘em back. And that’s about it, so I really get excited.” Alex is amused by 
Knight, and probes more deeply: “You really believe in love, then.” Knight looks him 
squarely in the eye and repeats, with conviction: “Yeah. Totally.” The passion at work 
here, combined with the absurdity of the whole project, reveal a structure of feeling that 
captures a defamiliarizing aspect of the Christian narrative. Like El Pastor in Charles 
Bowden’s Murder City, the man emerges as a folk John the Baptist, preaching in the 
wilderness and using all of his rhetorical power to communicate what he sees as an 
astonishing and defamiliarizing message of erotic uncanniness: “This is a love story that 
is staggering to everybody in the whole world—that God really loves us, a lot.” That such 
a “staggering” message is delivered by this clownish figure, a skinny old fellow puttering 
around in the desert (outside a quixotic community looking for a new messiah, as it 
were), is fitting for what Rodriguez describes as “a church established for losers…a 
kingdom for fools.” As Soren Kierkegaard might put it, the Christian message cannot be 
fully appreciated unless one understands how absurd the message truly is, and Knight is 
truly a fool for Christ. 
He is not the only fool for Christ in the narrative; we find another such figure in 
Ronald Franz, who becomes friends with McCandless and is both fascinated and 
frustrated by the boy’s free-wheeling ways. This elderly man, a devout Christian and 
WWII veteran, lost his wife and son to a car crash in 1957 and lives alone in Salton Sea, 
California, a dwindling suburban town alongside an accidental ocean created by an 
engineering snafu, and the site of a failed real estate boom. When he meets McCandless, 
the young man is posting up at Oh-My-God Hot Springs, described by Krakauer as a 





of post-apocalypse America” (50). In an echo of Wayne’s milieu of artisan 
republicanism, Franz becomes a master to McCandless’s apprentice. A leather worker by 
hobby, Franz invites McCandless to his house and helps him design and create a belt 
festooned with scenes from the boy’s travels. The belt culminates in the letter N, for 
north. For Penn in the film, the scenes with Franz achieve the existential intensity and 
minimalism of a California-ized Beckett play. The flotsam and jetsam of Mexico, Los 
Angeles, The Slabs, and Oh-My-God Hot Springs disappear, and McCandless’s terrain is 
reduced to an empty suburban house in a seemingly vacant desert city: not the 
flamboyant apocalypse of the hot springs, but the quiet, lonely apocalypse of two 
generations facing each other on a single stage, surrounded by the ghostly flows of a 
society in motion. In the film, they seem like the only people left in the world.  
If Carthage is the bachelor’s Eden, and if The Slabs is the ecclesia of a messianic 
community, Franz’s Salton City home is the hermit’s hut. Despite its presence in the 
midst of spectral flows, it is nonetheless an archaic space in which the cards are not 
simply discarded onto the pile; rather, the pacing is slow, the confrontation between 
generations stark, and death hangs in the empty air as a reminder of time’s sudden 
intervention. And these two people are puzzled by each other and choosing how to react. 
Franz is fascinated (and sometimes incensed) by McCandless’s rejection of conventional 
domesticity, and troubled by his lack of a family, but clings to McCandless as if this boy 
has some secret wisdom. McCandless, on the other hand, is only willing to play the role 
of apprentice to a point. Most of all, he lectures Franz on his sedentary ways, and 
encourages him to get out and travel, to see the world and give up the security of life in 





them enjoy a good bit of back-and-forth banter, as well as mutual confidences and even a 
moment of grace. At one point, Franz meditates on McCandless’s rant against the social 
world, and perhaps thinking of the boy’s family, channels Leonard Knight by evoking the 
importance of love. As the two sit on a hill over Salton Sea (again echoing Salvation 
Mountain and the Sermon on the Mount), Franz attempts to give the boy some advice: 
“When you forgive, you love. And when you love, God’s light shines on you.” At this 
very moment, the sun appears from behind a cloud; the old man and the boy erupt 
together in laughter, amazed at the coincidence. The image is a brief moment of 
loneliness shattered--even an Event in Badiou’s terms, since it transforms the relation 
between the possible and the impossible in a way that opens up a space for new action.     
 Yet just as McCandless flees Salvation Mountain and The Slabs, he flees the 
Salton Sea as well. In doing so, he flees the knowledge embodied in Ron: the tragic 
knowledge of human mortality, the body’s weakness in old age, the trauma represented in 
Ron’s loss of his family in a senseless accident. Unable to process this knowledge, 
McCandless instead sends Ron a letter upbraiding him about the necessity of uprooting 
his life, of embracing the chaos of nomadic motion. Both, in their different ways, are 
right. Though McCandless’s message is riddled with a denial of his own social 
imbrication (and as I mentioned, with a celebration of deterritorialization that mirrors a 
similar investment within the structures of disorganized capitalism), its implicit 
message—that we can’t hold on to things, that loss is a part of life, that there is no safe 
retreat in the world—cannot be ignored. But McCandless’s upbeat message misses any 
ironic or tragic quality, any sense that despite our inability to protect a place or a 





the flip side of social vulnerability: that even if we cannot protect love, we cannot live 
without it. It is perverse rather than hysterical. Franz, on the other hand, is the abject 
figure par excellence; upon learning of McCandless’s death, he drinks himself into 
oblivion after having abstained from alcohol for decades. Shocked by the trauma of the 
event, he renounces his Christian faith and declares himself abandoned by God. Utterly 
alone, with no family and no heir, he stops drinking, but faces a thoroughly uncertain 
future. He has no one to take care of, and no one to take care of him, revealing in 
dramatic terms a culture and economy predicated on carelessness. 
 The story of Into the Wild, in a sense, emerges through eyes comparable to those 
of Ronald Franz. Like Mr. Franz, Krakauer and Penn remain trapped in the space of 
recollection not because they are nostalgic in some simple way, but because they are 
driven to work through the trauma of loss and have not yet emerged on the other side of 
this therapeutic process. Nevertheless, because its narrative space consistently looks 
backward, and because it fails to let the past be past, Into the Wild never quite reaches a 
Benjaminian Jetztzeit of explosive action in the present. Instead, it hovers on the brink of 
a revolutionary pause. Having been at some point entranced by the frontier values 
represented by Christopher McCandless (aka Alexander Supertramp), Krakauer and Penn 
grant him an exalted space at the center of their nonlinear narratives. In their still 
unresolved postcolonial melancholia, they have only begun to work through the fact that 
McCandless offers them no solution. Unlike Linklater’s Fast Food Nation, then, their 
drama is centered not on the experience of those at the bottom, on the invisible people 
who staff the fast food restaurants, chain stores, slaughterhouses, and ranches of the New 





people who have forgotten how to live and desire, deprived of savoir-vivre and of “life’s 
savor” by the penetration of Taylorized management into the libido (30). Desperately 
searching for life’s savor, Krakauer and Penn are left scanning the traces of 
McCandless’s journey, as if poring over each frame of the haunting piece of folk art 
strapped around his emaciated skeleton, with every scene carved into this home-made 
belt (including the extra holes the young man cut when his body began to waste away) 
pointing toward its inexorable end in the letter N: North. Thrown off balance, disoriented 
and lost, Into the Wild nevertheless searches among the ruins of North and South for a 
new direction, and for new Neighbors--not least of all the uncanny Neighbor that is the 












DESTRUCTION AND REVELATION: CHARLES BOWDEN’S 
MURDER CITY AND THE PROBLEM OF NARRATION  
IN THE NEOCOLONIAL REPORT 
 
Perhaps you think I am mad? I can see that look in your eyes, and yes, I understand why 
you have reservations. But then you do not have to listen to those two women talking into 
the night. I cannot decide what is worse: when they are crying or when they are laughing. 
And something has changed inside, something in a deep part, near that place we can 
never locate but often claim is the core of our being. In the past, I have covered 
kidnappings, murders, financial debacles, the mayhem that my species is capable of 
committing. I spent three years mired in reporting sex crimes. There is little within me 
that has not been battered or wrenched or poisoned. But the path I followed with Miss 
Sinaloa proved all my background to be so much nothing. I have not entered the country 
of death, but rather the country of killing. And I have learned in this country that killing 
is good. (xii) 
--Charles Bowden, Murder City 
 
My concern is with the mediation of terror through narration, and with the problem of 
writing effectively against terror....The colonized space of death has a colonizing 
function, maintaining the hegemony or cultural stability of norms and desires....Yet the 
space of death is notoriously conflict-ridden and contradictory; a privileged domain of 
metamorphosis, the space par excellence for uncertainty and terror to stun permanently, 
yet also revive and empower with new life. 
--Michael Taussig, from Shamanism, Colonialism, and the Wild Man: A Study in Terror 
and Healing (3, 374) 
 
At one point in Charles Bowden’s 2010 book Murder City, Bowden describes 
what amounts to a magical reality in the relationship between the United States and 





There is the one reported by the U.S. press, a place where the Mexican president 
is fighting a valiant war against the evil forces of the drug world and using the 
incorruptible Mexican army as his warriors. This Mexico has newspapers, courts, 
and laws and is seen by the U.S. government as a sister republic. It does not exist. 
There is a second Mexico, where the war is for drugs, for the enormous money to 
be made in drugs, where the police and the military fight for their share, where the 
press is restrained by the murder of reporters and feasts on a steady diet of bribes, 
and where the line between government and the drug world has never existed. 
(118)
 
Thus if the U.S. press in this description rarely calls into question the relatively ordered 
Mexico with which they are officially presented (and which confirms their vision of 
globalization as progress), the “second Mexico” is not a clear picture either—and not 
only because the Mexican press is intimidated. Rather, Bowden insists that there is no 
way to know what is going on in Juarez these days. Instead of a clear-cut picture in 
Mexico, Bowden sees an epistemological swamp in which the desire for order, for 
explanation or justification, outflanks any reality on the ground. As a result, he argues 
that “the killings overwhelm simple explanations” (18): 
There are too many authors writing too many short stories on bodies, there are too 
many styles of handwriting... No matter how clever the examiner, still, there is a 
door behind whatever explanation is offered. The gangs are sent to kill, but who 
sends them? The cartels are killing, but who in the cartels gives the orders and 
why? The army slaughters, but who is behind the army? (162-163)
  
Faced with the annual death and disappearance of thousands of people in Juarez, 
Bowden dutifully employs numbers (counting the dead as best he can), but also calls 
them into question. Such numbers, he suggests, easily become a comforting fetish (“We 
love the look of hard numbers” [41]), obscuring more than they illuminate. And what is 
true of the drug war is true of the class war also; the fetish term “development,” with its 






We have made careers out of studying the Juarezes of the world, given them the 
name Third World. We have fashioned schemes to bring them into our place 
beside the sacred fire and called these schemes development…We count the 
employment, we tally the exports, we rummage in the till, and we comfort 
ourselves with these numbers because that is our safe place. We do not wander 
the calles….And we are careful what we count. (116-117)
 
In order to illustrate the slippery quality of economic numbers, he points out that the 
official population of Juarez is tallied at 1.2 to 1.4 million, even though the city actually 
has closer to 2 million people (though again, who really knows?). The lower population 
numbers allow Mexico City to apportion less spending to the city’s social services, and 
have the added benefit of concealing the number of unemployed, poor, and slum-dwellers 
in the city:  
A simple shift in total population takes Juarez from the column called developing 
to the column called failure….But what if Juarez is not a failure? What if it is 
closer to the future that beckons all of us from our safe streets and Internet 
cocoons?...After decades of this thing called development, Juarez has in sheer 
number more poor people than ever, has in real purchasing power lower wages 
than ever, has more pollution than ever, and more untreated sewage and less water 
than ever. (117-118)
 
Despite NAFTA, then, despite the much-touted maquilas, and despite the fact that 
Mexico boasts scores of billionaires (including the man many consider to be the world’s 
richest, the telecommunications magnate Carlos Slim), Bowden questions the official 
story about the country (“The economy will get better, and this will make every single 
human being better” [115]), and instead asks: what is not being counted here?  
In traveling to Juarez to document a neocolonial situation of unequal power 
relations and exploitation, Bowden enters into a long tradition of colonial muckraking. In 
some ways, for example, his authorial posture as crime investigator is comparable to that 
of Roger Casement, a British consul who in 1903 was sent by his government to 





Hochschild, Casement begins—like Bowden--from a posture of suspicion.47 Other 
inspectors had visited the Congo before, but most had accepted the terms of what we 
might call the official Belgian tour. As a result, they became spectators of a performance 
coordinated by colonial officials, and delivered comforting reports and numbers to 
interested European parties. Casement, however, took his own boat down the Congo 
River, refused the entreaties of Belgian authorities, and thereby witnessed unimaginable 
atrocities. The Casement Report helped galvanize activists in Britain and elsewhere in 
their efforts to delegitimize Belgian leaders. But although many Europeans scapegoated 
King Leopold for his crimes, the Belgians were by no means alone in deploying colonial 
violence. Even in Africa, German and British leaders committed comparable crimes; and 
later, Casement travelled to rubber-producing areas in South America, where he 
uncovered similar atrocities among Spanish colonial officials and their British financial 
backers. (In the end, the Irish Casement revolted against the British themselves). In 
discussing Casement’s work –and the genre that we might describe as the colonial 
report--anthropologist Michael Taussig agonizes over the same questions of rhetoric 
faced by Bowden: how best to faithfully document the atrocities of colonialism? Should 
one adopt a pose of objectivity by producing the expected statistics and dispassionate 
analysis? Or was it better to transmit a more subjective sense of horror, uncertainty, and 
fragmentation—in other words, to channel the subjective experience of many who 
experience coloniality?  
After all, what Taussig calls the colonial “space of death” functions precisely 
through uncertainty, such that a vague sense of terror (innuendo, legends, and confusion 
about where reality ends and madness begins) is not incidental to many manifestations of 
                                                          





colonial power, but a definitive aspect of a culture in which distortion is part of the weave 
of reality itself. In such a culture of terror, events happen but disappear into the 
“epistemic murk” (121), as “officialdom strives to create a magical reality” (4) which 
renders violence impossible to narrate. The result is a supposedly ordered society that is 
actually built on a foundation of disorder: “What is endangered…is the existence of the 
society’s moral foundations” (4). In order to illustrate such a culture, Taussig points to a 
story repeated by Chilean writer Ariel Dorfman during Augusto Pinochet’s 1980s 
dictatorship. According to legend, when witches kidnapped children, they would “break 
the child’s bones and sew the body parts together in an abnormal way. The head is turned 
around so the child has to walk backwards, and the ears, eyes, and mouth are stitched up” 
(4). For Dorfman, Pinochet played the role of the witch in this story, transforming 
ordinary Chileans into something like Imbunches: “even if their bones are not actually 
broken or mouths sewn up, the… Chileans ‘are isolated from each other, their means of 
communicating suppressed, their connections cut off, their senses blocked by fear” (4). In 
such a context of isolation and social denial, the difficulty of telling a coherent story is 
produced as a key aspect of the oppressive situation.   
Although it is distasteful to compare tragedies, in the Congo Roger Casement 
faced a colonial space of death perhaps more extreme than what Dorfman found in Chile; 
Casement describes a slave labor system in which Belgian authorities kidnapped 
Congolese from their villages and worked them to death harvesting rubber in dangerous 
jungles. In response to this disturbing colonial situation, at least in Taussig’s reading, 
Casement opts for an objective pose. On the one hand, Casement (perhaps inspired by his 





perspective of Congolese and Putamayan people; he claimed that he could see “through 
the eyes of another people once hunted themselves” (cited in Taussig Shamanism 53). 
But on the other hand, Casement understood that his elite British audience would resist 
seeing through the eyes of the colonized, or even through Casement’s complicated 
subjective position; instead, they would prefer to see events through what Taussig calls 
“the market-price way of understanding events, political economy as common sense” 
(53). And in this common sense parlance, the Congolese were functionally voiceless. As 
a result, Casement does not fundamentally challenge the dominant terms of the 
government report; instead, he adopts a clinical rhetoric of facts and objective 
description. Still, because the report is full of so much graphic detail—and because the 
British public was more willing to oppose Belgian atrocities than to acknowledge the 
violence that provided the material foundations for their own society—Casement’s report 
was effective in fomenting anti-Belgian sentiment. As a result of this limited 
effectiveness, Taussig describes Casement’s “realism” as a politically motivated act: “It 
was into the official common sense of political economy that the author, willy-nilly, had 
to squeeze reality” (53). But his report constituted a trade-off; though he achieved a great 
deal in immediate pragmatic terms, he failed to instill doubt in Britain about the larger 
colonial system of which the Congo was but a single symptom.48 And eventually the 
British elite would turn against Casement himself: he found his end in the hangman’s 
noose.    
However, other colonial reporters have adopted different, more phantasmagoric 
strategies. In doing so, they help reveal not only how the business-like “rationality” of the 
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profit motive can lead to atrocities, but also the way that economic rationality can morph 
into an irrational terror governed by its own libidinal impulses—or, as Taussig puts it, 
“the way business can transform terror from a means to an end in itself” (53).49 Joseph 
Conrad, for instance, in contrast to Casement, largely relinquishes any pretense of 
objectivity in his 1899 novel Heart of Darkness. Although his narrator Marlowe fails to 
imagine the inner space of Congolese characters, who hover and grovel like so many 
ghosts and zombies, Conrad nevertheless captures Marlowe’s subjective experience in a 
way that might be described as gothic. Rather than simply laying out facts, Conrad 
depicts the claustrophobia, fear, and discomfort of his protagonist. Puncturing an 
“illusory rationality…Conrad abandoned the realism practiced by Casement for a 
technique that worked through the veil while retaining its hallucinatory quality” (53-54 
my emphasis). And this gothic approach remains relevant today, since although old-style 
colonialism is over, analogous spaces of death have by no means disappeared. Writing in 
the late 1980s, for instance, Chilean writer and torture victim Jacobo Timerman cannot 
conclude that his torture was simply an unambiguous means to an end. Instead, its 
surplus violence exceeds the bounds of conventional representation because uncertainty 
is key to its effect: “like torture itself, [Timerman’s text] moves through that space of 
death where reality is up for grabs. And here we begin to see the magnitude of the task, 
which calls neither for demystification nor remystification but for a quite different poetics 
of destruction and revelation” (Taussig 9 my emphasis). In Conrad and Timerman, we 
are presented with an epistemic murk; and like the Imbunches trapped in this murk, 
unsure of what or whom to trust (and cut off from clear avenues of communication), we 
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as readers must work through this particular morass if we are to figure out a course of 
action. 
This gothic path contains potential pitfalls, however (how could it not?); 
acknowledging terror and confusion does not erase the possibility that paralysis or 
xenophobic hatred will result from its poetics of destruction and revelation. Indeed, the 
gothic frame runs the risk of heightening a paranoia that can easily have negative effects. 
With regard to Conrad’s Heart of Darkness, Taussig worries that the reader might be 
taken in by Marlowe’s fear of a Congolese space portrayed in phantasmagoric terms. 
Through Marlowe’s eyes, we see the Congo as a Gothicized landscape—not as a 
straightforward or “real” place, but as a surreal manifestation of Marlowe’s pre-existing 
set of mythological references. And because this lack of objectivity can result in 
important distortions, Taussig questions the efficacy of Conrad’s approach: “Might not a 
mythic derealization of the real run the risk of being overpowered by the mythology it is 
using?...Is not horror made beautiful and primitivism exoticized throughout this 
book?...Is not the entire thing overly misty?” (10). Nigerian writer Chinua Achebe has 
famously criticized the book in similar terms.50 Yet Taussig ultimately concludes that the 
very distortion of Conrad’s project is indispensable to rendering the horror of coloniality, 
since instead of resolving the ambiguities in the imperialist myth Conrad leaves them 
“intact”: “Here the myth is not ‘explained’ so that it can be ‘explained away,’ as in the 
forlorn attempts of social science. Instead it is held out as something you have to try out 
for yourself, feeling your way deeper and deeper into the heart of darkness until you do 
feel what is at stake, the madness of the passion” (10-11). In describing coloniality in the 
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Congo and the Putamayo, then, Taussig questions the parameters of realism as a 
representational strategy: “Here the need to sensationalize is painfully obvious, moving 
from the surreal quality of the dream, distanced, inevitable, and maudlin, to the 
histrionic….Yet could not the histrionic be true?” (33).  
In Shamanism, Colonialism, and the Wild Man, Taussig finds a “mythic 
subversion of the myth” not only in colonial reports, but in a whole range of other 
sources: shamanic ceremonies, Walter Benjamin’s dialectical images and profane 
illuminations, surrealist techniques of montage, and folk art and stories. In such modes, 
narration cannot proceed unabated, but is instead disrupted and interrupted, haunted by a 
disorder that can never quite be harmonized or unified. To reveal the space of death, then, 
is not to demystify it, but to cause it to come forward in its dark and contradictory magic: 
“In this state where the disorder of order rules, death becomes not an underworld but 
coterminous with life’s unstable surfaces and the ‘historical materialist’… stops telling 
the sequence of events like the beads of a rosary” (466). In such passages, Taussig might 
as well be describing the gothic approach as I have outlined it in this dissertation. In the 
Gothic, we confront the difficulty of narration, such that we can no longer tell stories like 
the beads of a rosary. And the Gothic, too, risks being described as histrionic or 
sensationalist—and indeed, provides the reader an alibi to treat the whole thing as a bad 
dream or overwrought nonsense—but nevertheless has the capacity to haunt the reader in 
a way that a more “objective” narrative might not, and thus to provoke transformation. It 
asks: might the histrionic be true? As Jerrold E. Hogle puts it, in confronting Gothic texts, 
“we are always poised on a fulcrum” between denial and confrontation, between perverse 





discourse, which like the forlorn attempts of social science, attempts to explain 
everything away—or do we feel our way into the heart of darkness until we feel the 
stakes for ourselves?  
 
Dancing with the Devil in Neocolonial Space 
My subject in fiction is the action of grace in a territory largely held by the devil. 
--Flannery O’Connor, from Mystery and Manners (18) 
 
When Baudelaire and Blake declare the essentially Satanic nature of commerce, they 
exploit a great mythological tradition to say something which has not yet been said in any 
other way. 
--Norman O. Brown, cited in Jose E. Limon’s Dancing With the Devil (16) 
 
With the abandonment of the population rendered supernumerary and unproductive by 
the rapid expansion of automation, the advances of remote-access computing, the 
crepuscular decline of the Providence-State would find a geography readily aligned with 
the decline of public assistance, a geopolitics of emergency, of unemployment, and of 
destitution illustrating the coming of a post-industrial and transpolitical Destiny-State, 
founded on the threat, the apocalyptic risk, and no longer that of the political enemy, the 
economic rival, the social adversary or partner—a veritable countdown of History, end of 
the principle of territorial integrity and legitimacy, where places, people and things 
become interchangeable at will. 
--Paul Virilio, Critical Space (61)   
However useful Taussig’s framework might be in thinking through the problem of 
representing terror in a colonial situation, the world we live in today is fundamentally 
different from that which Conrad and Casement inhabited. Governments do not brazenly 
pillage other places on the pretext of racial superiority, at least not without incurring the 
wrath of the so-called international community. Neo-colonialism, rather, is a much more 
subtle enterprise. What Marx called primitive accumulation (the more or less open theft 
of resources) has largely given way to more complex modes of accumulation, such that, 
for example, the flow of wealth from poor nations, regions, and individuals to wealthy 





century, the U.S. has preferred to outsource military repression in Third World areas to 
friendly leaders (sometimes installed through covert action, as in the 1973 U.S.-
sponsored coup in Chile which led to Pinochet’s neoliberal dictatorship), and to exercise 
financial power alongside military threat. The resulting shocks go beyond a simple 
bayonet in the back. Through debt crises, for example (in places like Argentina, Thailand, 
Mexico, and elsewhere), investors can come out on top, renegotiating loans to squeeze 
every drop of money from dependent governments in the developing world. In the 
Mexican debt crisis in 1982, for instance, the U.S. government encouraged the Mexican 
government to accept loans from New York investors, but then provoked defaults 
through changes in monetary policy, after which the U.S. could intervene with “bailouts” 
(for investors), along with new contracts that required the Mexican government to cut 
social programs, sell off public assets, and pay high interest rates. The upshot: in former 
U.S. Secretary of the Treasury Andrew Mellon’s terms, “In times of crisis, money returns 
to its rightful owners”—in this case, wealthy investors paid off by public funds (cited in 
Harvey The Enigma of Capital 11). The Mexican crisis then served as a model for 
structural adjustment programs in other nations, administered by the International 
Monetary Fund and presided over by U.S.-led financial hegemony.51  
 Keeping track of such methods of expropriation, however, is extraordinarily 
difficult given the fast-paced, improvised nature of market flows within a complex 
geography irreducible to the level of the nation-state. What can sound like an orchestrated 
policy in hindsight can actually turn out to be a high-velocity war of position in which 
various interests (transnational corporations, government officials, informal class 
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coalitions, investors from a number of countries) fight for advantage in a heterogeneous 
and interactive geographical field. Though the trend of tribute from poor to rich may be 
traceable from a distance, it is not clear that anyone can actually control any given 
situation or predict the next turn. Nor is it obvious that anyone is “in charge,” even if 
some people have access to information, technological capacity, capital, and connections 
that help them navigate the fast lane of high-stakes finance with more skill and panache 
than others. In facing down the neocolonial situation, then, it can be difficult to point to 
willful atrocities of the kind Casement could identify. Representatives of multinational 
companies do not travel to Mexico, kidnap poor Mexicans, and work them to death by 
requiring them to provide quotas of rubber without pay. Rather, it can often seem as 
though each atomized element (individuals, corporations) in a given conjuncture operates 
on an equal playing field, follows the same global “rules,” and simply makes rational 
decisions on the basis of economic self-interest. A corporation appears one moment, cuts 
jobs for a variety of reasons (downsizing, offshoring, new automation technologies), 
spends money lobbying politicians in one nation or another, secures itself special favors 
and tax breaks—and disappears, only to appear somewhere else the next moment. And 
always, it faces competition from others; as a result, it is motivated to develop new 
product lines, cut costs wherever possible, and react as flexibly as it can to changing 
market conditions. (Workers on the ground, of course, face an entirely different grid, and 
are often mystified by the spectral forces which shape their employment prospects, 
wages, and physical and emotional well-being). 
 Within this complicated and fast-moving neoliberal constellation of flows, 





Stiegler’s phrase “the dictatorship of short-termism” and its corollary, the “becoming-
mafia” of the capitalist class (57, 63). Capital, and its ally the neoliberal state, tends to 
foster the pillaging of long-term resources in a number of ways: by replacing older forms 
of solidarity with serialized anticollectives, by prioritizing short-term speculative gains 
over and above social and human investment, by undermining structures of authority and 
replacing them with the superego injunction to enjoy (defined in terms of short-term 
drives rather than communal dreams), and by destabilizing the commons of the climate, 
to name a few. And insofar as the (now transnational) ruling class engages in such 
speculative and destructive short-term practices, it becomes less a bourgeoisie 
(committed to fostering social order) and more like a mafia operating on a cynical 
principle of indifferent gain: “One calls a speculator…someone who scoffs at the 
economic as well as social consequences of ‘profitable’ decisions. Such a person belongs 
to the category of those whom one otherwise calls the indifferent, the uncaring, or the 
careless” (Stiegler 80).52 The atomized and decentralized actors in the neoliberal 
conjuncture, then—however interactive and dynamic—evince a breakdown in social 
order that Paul Virilio describes as “dismembering” any “unities” that might lead to a 
more nurturing collective system: “one catches a glimpse of the…centrifugal process 
which contributes today to the undoing, along with the territorial organization of the 
population, of the social and familial tissue inherited from a recent past of productivity” 
(62). Alongside profit (for some), we have rising negative externalities that must be dealt 
with one way or another. 
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 Geographically, then, this centrifugal landscape is far removed from what Virilio 
calls the older “EXO-COLONIALISM of the central empires,” which were predicated on 
the long-distance control of industrial processes in the provinces; instead, in today’s 
“post-industrial ENDO-COLONIALISM”--built on flexible labor practices, 
instantaneous exchanges and transfers, and remote-control warfare--places are to an 
unprecedented degree interchangeable with each other, at least in principle: “that which is 
interactive is interchangeable” (59). In such a situation, distance is often erased. The 
center/periphery structure of colonial control is replaced by a comparatively 
deterritorialized pattern in which colonized spaces can occur anywhere within the system. 
Thus as Virilio registers, such a rapid interactive system—what neoliberal ideologue 
Thomas Friedman describes as a flat world—in no way implies equal conditions; rather, 
Virilio’s model for neoliberal space is that of the South African township, the dominated 
Bantustan within the nation rather than outside of it (or rather, included out of it). Such a 
model of internal segmentation is visible in a number of spaces, from the hollowed-out 
postindustrial wastelands of Detroit and St. Louis to the slums of Mexico City and Sao 
Paulo, from Native American reservations to Palestine. And many of these walls and 
exclusions are justified by the fact that, in accordance with the collapse of distance, 
enemies are as interchangeable and interactive as anything else. Global warming, drone 
bombers, international terrorist groups and gangs, financial crises, and planetary disease 
contagions (both cyber and bio) are deterritorialized threats; they can appear potentially 
anywhere. And because no one is truly “in charge” of these flows—and no one can 
predict them effectively, not even the oligarchs—we are left, in the absence of a strong 





paranoid practices of North American survivalist groups; in Virilio’s terms, we are left on 
our own, responsible for our own “self-sufficiency,” such that we increasingly become 
postindustrial survivalists.     
In attempting to chart cultural responses to this endo-colonial vision of post-
industrial survivalism, Fredric Jameson resorts to the term dirty realism. In the 
architecture of Rem Koolhaas, but also in the literary genre of cyberpunk and in films 
like Ridley Scott’s Blade Runner (1982), Jameson sees a cultural attempt to represent the 
collapse of civil society, as both private and public spaces become subsumed by the mass, 
abstract logic of capital (The Seeds of Time 153). In the spaces of late capitalism we 
ostensibly see the demise both of private bourgeois spaces like the home (which become 
addendums of the private market, “shed[s]…into which you ‘put your stuff’”) and of 
public spaces (which become invaded by the market and put to use according to the profit 
motive) (157). Dirty realism catalogues the replacement of such spaces with new spaces 
that are simultaneously collective and atomized, like the market itself: “Dirty here means 
the collective as such, the traces of mass, anonymous living and using….the end of the 
civil, for example, and of official government, which now dissolves back into the private 
networks of corruption and informal clan relationships” (158). Whether in the form of 
corporations (or their doppelgangers the drug cartels), dictatorial oligarchs and their 
cronies, or tribal chieftains elevated to state power, these private networks of corruption 
suffuse both First World and Third World spaces, squeezing out (or infiltrating) the state. 
In such contexts, people on the ground are effectively subjugated beneath a higher order 
that is difficult to glimpse directly, but that nevertheless exerts a powerful (even if 





modeled on cities like Tokyo), provides a case study here; in such spaces, “the street is 
somehow inside, so that the city as a whole, which has no profile, becomes one immense 
amorphous unrepresentable container that realizes the essence of the geodesic dome 
without the dome itself” (156). Trapped under the dome of a totalizing system that 
nevertheless keeps a lid on chaos and incommensurable elements, we find ourselves in 
the “no man’s land” of dirty realism (159).    
As a way of envisioning neoliberal urban space, the replicated chaos of dirty 
realism provides explanatory power (and we will see its application in the close reading 
of Juarez to follow). But Jameson goes wrong, I think, when he suggests that in 
postmodern space proletarianization no longer inspires the dread it once did. He certainly 
has a point: just as the space of dirty realism begins to dismantle the binary between 
public and private (and the binary between inside and outside), it also challenges the 
binary between lower class and upper class signifiers. In the spaces of cyberpunk—as in 
the spaces of U.S. gangster dramas like The Godfather and The Sopranos—the line 
between the oligarchic ruler and the street criminal is somehow effaced, such that these 
figures begin to resemble each other in important ways. If, as Jameson maintains, dirty 
realism grows genealogically from the tradition of naturalism, which was built on a 
dynamic of simultaneous fascination and repulsion with the lower classes—and thus 
dramatized “the fundamental petty-bourgeois terror of proletarianization, of slipping 
down the class ladder, of falling from a secure yet perpetually menaced middle-class 
‘respectability’ and ‘decency’ back down into a proletarian space fantasized both in terms 
of filth and animality and also of insecure wage work”—dirty realism depicts a world in 





circulation and recirculation possible between the underworld and the overworld of high-
rent condos and lofts: falling from the latter into the former is no longer so absolute and 
irrevocable a disaster” (151, 152). As a corollary, it also depicts a world of capital-
becoming-mafia in which the “elite” are less often recognized as benighted or noble in 
some way, and more often as ordinary gangsters who have managed to get lucky, or who 
have a particular drive and a talent for opportunistic action and exploitation. In Karl 
Marx’s terms, everyone in the dirty realist landscape is stripped of his halo.  
My sense here, however, is that Jameson oversells the extent to which First World 
subjects no longer fear falling into the lower echelons of society. Or more precisely, the 
dirty realist vision fails us on this score, since in its very dirtiness it tends to ignore the 
utopian element in the neoliberal landscape, where clean spaces from Davos to 
Greenwich Village beckon as escapes from an otherwise dirty reality. Perhaps in a 
“plebianized” contemporary U.S. culture we do not find the same sharp line of “terrifying 
specieslike difference” between a dishwasher and a computer technician as once might 
have obtained between a British country gentleman and a coal miner (152). But the very 
slipperiness between social positions today gives rise to new fears that must be covered 
over in various ways, such that First World subjects remain haunted by the ghost of an 
older naturalist moment. Indeed, as Tatum argues vis a vis the information economy of 
the U.S. West, First World spaces are all too capable of glowing with utopian promise,53 
and thus of summoning fears of spaces in which such promises are denied. Whether in 
gated communities, chic shopping centers, rustic organic farms, or the “utopian dream 
attendant upon becoming electronic through technological prostheses,” we are not all 
                                                          
53 In Chapter 2, I describe these utopian Western spaces in terms of the frontier (in which utopia always 
remains one step ahead and thus produces motion) and the pastoral (in which harmony is established in a 





resigned to a dirty realist world (Tatum 21). Instead, we take refuge in what David 
Harvey has called “degenerate utopias,” where “the dialectic is repressed and stability 
and harmony are secured through intense surveillance and control” (164, 167).54 All of 
the Western degenerate utopias above--enabled by a neoliberal economy built on 
technology, tourism, the culture industry, and the military/industrial complex—remain 
haunted, not only by “low-skilled, low-wage earners drawn largely from ‘Greater 
Mexico,’” but also by offshored production sites like Juarez, Dhaka, and Shenzhen 
(Tatum 24). The halo remains in place, but only because inhabitants in clean spaces can 
avoid confronting dirt, or because they can see dirt without registering it subjectively (as 
in the manner of the fetish: “I know there is dirt, but nevertheless I do not believe it…”)  
What Tatum identifies, then, is a symptomal anxiety about the proletarian part of 
no part that persists in the contemporary U.S. West and other neoliberal spaces. But these 
“primal anxieties about proletarianization” (Tatum 24) can be evaded in a number of 
defensive cultural ways, such that the lower classes are acknowledged or registered but 
not subjectively engaged (through styles of dress, speech, or musical citations: Beck 
riffing on gangster rap, or even Camper Van Beethoven riffing on the narcocorrido). And 
this problematic of denial emerges in a U.S. Western context of division between two 
strata: on the one hand, people who can effectively tune out their contexts (since they 
inhabit a “mobile” and “placeless or context-free” space engendered by technology, “an 
                                                          
54 Harvey draws from Louis Marin to describe the “degenerate utopia” as an autonomized fetish space: 
“The example that Marin used was Disneyland, a supposedly happy, harmonious, and nonconflictual space 
set aside from the ‘real’ world ‘outside’ in such a way as to soothe and mollify, to entertain, to invent 
history and to cultivate a nostalgia for some mythical past, to perpetuate the fetish of commodity culture 
rather than to critique it” (Spaces of Hope 164-167). Beyond Disneyland, we can point to a whole series of 
postwar spaces in the United States that might function as degenerate utopias: the space of television, 
suburbia, the fast food restaurant, and the mall, to name a few. One would not want to overemphasize the 
success of the control in such spaces, since even in these realms we find contradictions and conflicts, but to 
the extent that such spaces reproduce what George Lipsitz has called the “managed gaze,” they often 





idealized, homogenous space analogous to that of the identical ‘clean rooms’ where 
silicon computer chips are produced around the world”) and on the other, people who 
simply live in the dirtier context that their class superiors so effectively tune out (23). The 
result is a return of Zizek’s symptomal proletarian, not simply as a station on the slippery 
ladder in a dirty realist world, but as a fractured subjectivity of invisibility, destitution, 
and contradiction, found as much in the border towns of Mexico as among the janitors at 
a Colorado Springs convention center. And in rendering this anxiety, the metaphoric line 
between the U.S. and Mexico emerges as a paradigmatic space—not as a literal place 
(since the First World is also in Mexico and the Third World in the U.S.) but rather as a 
symptomal metaphor of the separation between what Zizek calls the “Excluded and the 
Included” in a neoliberal period (Zizek First as Tragedy 91). 
Within this anxious border complex, the transnational drug economy (so crucial to 
any understanding of Juarez) illustrates many of the neocolonial tendencies and 
contradictions I have tried to sketch out here: global flows, consumer addiction, the 
becoming-mafia of capital, the dictatorship of short-termism, the collapse of civil society, 
and the erection of borders designed to contain a deterritorialized enemy. In the 
neoliberal drug economy, the key nodal points of which have shifted flexibly from the 
Andes to Mexico and Central America in recent years, the contradictory devil of late 
capitalism (so uncannily rendered by Taussig’s South American proletarians) assumes 
symptomatic form: in contradictory fashion, monetary wealth can only be channeled 
toward short-term luxury spending, while rendering barren other sources of social 
fertility. In Bowden’s description of Juarez, no one necessarily expects to live for long, 





mansions,” and money-fuelled bling are understood even by those who enjoy them as 
momentary waystations on a fast-moving road to death, incompatible with long-term 
social life. As one former bodyguard tells Bowden, “It was an ugly life. You had money 
but no peace. You love no one. You serve the devil. You don’t care about your wife or 
son. One day I said to the Lord, if you exist, rescue me. But I got no answer” (58). Here, 
lines between mafia, government, and capital can no longer be drawn; and because no 
one in this system can see the whole picture (let alone control it), terror infiltrates 
everyday life through the interactive violence of a deterritorialized enemy, and the 
population is reduced to providing its own security in a postindustrial survivalist manner. 
But however chaotic the violence in Juarez, inequalities and borders nonetheless remain 
salient, chiefly in the form of the U.S.-Mexican border, which enables U.S. companies to 
pay low wages to workers mere miles from the relatively safe city of El Paso, Texas—
safe, that is, for now.  
Murder City, then, is a neocolonial report, since it operates in the relatively 
deterritorialized, free-floating space of the global neoliberal city. In contemporary Juarez 
as rendered in this text, we do not find an obvious, colonizing nation-state imposing 
military discipline on a subjugated people (even if the threat of violence always hangs in 
the air in one way or another). Rather, in the neocolonial report we find evidence of a 
more abstract mode of colonization defined by restless capital flight, flexible labor 
practices, the collapse of civil society and its replacement by corporations and cartels, 
and the financial predation of debt traps and IMF-imposed austerity, all of which lead to 
the enrichment of a small elite and the relative disempowerment of a subjugated 





haunting barrier that follows characters wherever they go and renders national boundaries 
symptomatic of other divisions. Insofar as Juarez’s violence grows out of its interaction 
with the U.S. (and particularly the West), Murder City is as much a story of the West as 
of Mexico, illustrating a U.S. terror of its own forms of proletarianization and civil 
collapse even as it documents the impossibility of disentangling any Mexican narrative 
from a U.S. story within the global neoliberal situation. In documenting these neocolonial 
spaces, then, Bowden faces the challenges outlined by Taussig, and elaborated by Zizek 
and Jameson: how to represent the space of death most effectively? How is it possible to 
cut through the fetishistic appropriation of violence and dirt, to short-circuit the 
stereotyped repetition of accepted meanings, not only in order to cause anxiety in the 
reader/viewer but to contribute to a dialectical process of transformation in which the 
contradictions of the situation come into view in such a way that might reveal new 
possibilities? If we are not talking about demystification, but rather of destruction and 
revelation, where might such revelations be found?     
In approaching such questions, Bowden is openly suspicious of narrative as such, 
because as he sees it, telling a coherent story about the recent torrent of murders in Juarez 
cannot help but reduce the trauma of the Real to the comfortable level of the Symbolic. 
As he puts it with regard to the inhabitants of Juarez, stories enable denial by offering 
closure: “The city protects itself by telling stories about itself….And so in this story 
swirling around Juarez, the murder of a child is made sense of and thus made safe for 
everyone” (105). Because Bowden chooses the creative nonfiction form, he can shift 
between registers in a way that disrupts any single mode or story; at one point, he can 





the argument, calling these facts into question or expressing his own subjective response 
to them. Perhaps most importantly, he can address the reader directly, contaminating him 
with his worries and his struggles. In doing so, he derealizes “nonfiction” itself.  But 
although Bowden resists the way a coherent story can function as a fetishistic end in 
itself, he nevertheless resorts to narrative strategies in the end. Murder City may often 
read as a repetitive and metonymic series of contiguous elements (the counting of murder 
after murder), but its edifice is held together by a number of narrative elements: 
allegorical figures who appear again and again, appeals to a calendar different from the 
numbing repetition of killing, and an arc of transformation within its central character and 
narrator, Bowden himself.  
Bowden, then, approaches the border-riven neoliberal U.S. West in 
characteristically gothic terms. Murder City is “out of joint” in important ways, since 
Bowden seems to understand that he is attempting the impossible; he narrates what 
cannot be narrated because he “cannot not do it” (Jameson “Marxism and the Historicity 
of Theory” 161). In a dialectical manner, Bowden presses (more or less hysterically, 
though also analytically) against the limits of an autonomized, fun-obsessed culture of the 
fetish in order to reach the contradictory symptom beneath. And staring down the collapse 
not only of civil society but of what many people call traditional values, as historical 
memory recedes and a culture based on symbolic paternal authority becomes transformed 
into a fragmented culture of spectacularized consumption, Bowden must decide how to 
grapple with the ambiguous ruins of an older form of order. He must decide whether to 
retreat backwards and deny the devil completely, or to dance with the devil in an attempt 





the figure of Kierkegaard as one who believed that the old, supposedly organic world of 
belief was gone, and that the call to a new form of life arrives not as a gentle transition, 
not (in Zizek’s terms) as “the (re)discovery of what is already in myself,” but as  “an 
Event, something violently imposed on me from the Outside through a traumatic 
encounter that shatters the very foundations of my being” (The Ticklish Subject 212). And 
just as Kierkegaard insisted on the power of the imagined past, the spiritual impulses of 
which could be repeated in a new context, Bowden looks to the past for guidance without 
any illusions about regaining it. 
 
Neoliberal Perversion and the Hysterical Narrator in  
Murder City’s Space of Killing 
Every time I come to Juarez, I swear it is for the last time. And then, I come again and 
again. I seldom write about these visits, so that is not why I come. I seldom enjoy these 
visits, so that also fails to explain my returns. I think it is about tasting the future. Juarez 
is the page where all the proposed solutions to poverty and migrations and crime are 
erased by waves of blood. I feel at one with El Pastor. He keeps telling me of his mission, 
how back in 1998, when the bad snow came, and ‘I was driving that day and singing to 
the lord and it was snowing. I said, ‘Lord, I’m working with you,’ and the Lord pulled 
my hair.’ That is the moment when he began scooping the crazy people off the streets and 
creating his asylum in the desert. Now El Pastor is jubilant because he is talking about 
Juarez. ‘I love Juarez,’ he says. ‘I know it is dirty and very violent but I love it! I grew up 
in Juarez. I love it. It is a needy city and I can help my city. I can make a little 
difference.’ As he blurts out his love, we are at a red light. A boy with needle marks 
racing up and down his arms fills his mouth with gasoline, raises a torch, and then spits 
fire into the air. I tell people I hate Juarez. I tell people I am mesmerized by Juarez. I tell 
myself Juarez is a duty. And I keep going back, month after month, year after year. I tell 
people I go to Juarez for the beaches. Or I tell people I go to Juarez for the waters. Often, 
people tell me I don’t know the real Juarez, a place of discos, party-hearty souls, laughter, 
and good times. I do not argue. I go for what I do not know. I go in the vain hope of 
understanding how a city evolves into a death machine. I watch modern factories rise, I 
see American franchises pop up along the avenues. Golden arches peddle burgers, but old 
MacDonald no longer has a farm. He lives in a shack in an outlaw colonia, there is no 
water, the electricity is pirated, and dust fills his lungs. Everyone has a job, according to 
the authorities. Every year, some mysterious form of accounting belches forth new 





the dead clutter the calles. And I keep going back and I have given up explaining my task 
to others. Or to myself. Like so many people in the city, I am a slave to it and no longer 
question my bondage.  
--Charles Bowden in Murder City (100-101) 
 
‘To win the energies of intoxication for the revolution’—in other words, poetic politics? 
‘We have tried that beverage. Anything, rather than that!’ Well, it will interest you all the 
more how much an excursion into poetry clarifies things. For what is the programme of 
the bourgeois parties? A bad poem on springtime, filling to bursting with 
metaphors….Where are the conditions for revolution?...Surrealism has come ever closer 
to the Communist answer. And that means pessimism all along the line. Absolutely. 
Mistrust in the fate of literature, mistrust in the fate of freedom, mistrust in the fate of 
European humanity, but three times mistrust in all reconciliation: between classes, 
between nations, between individuals. 
--Walter Benjamin, from Surrealism: The Last Snapshot of the European Intelligentsia 
(78-79) 
 
All human nature vigorously resists grace because grace changes us and the change is 
painful. 
--Flannery O’Connor, from The Habit of Being 
Early in Murder City, Charles Bowden describes a communique left on a 
monument to murdered police officers in Juarez: “Under the heading THOSE WHO DID 
NOT BELIEVE are the names of…five recently murdered cops. And under the heading 
FOR THOSE WHO CONTINUE NOT BELIEVING are seventeen names” (2). Here the 
killers of policemen curiously frame the matter of life and death (or more exactly, of life 
and killing) in terms of belief, as if the important issue is not what the policemen do, but 
how they subjectively register the rising toll of murder in Juarez (a city which during the 
years 2008-2010 became the murder capital of the world). It seems as though the killers 
hope to facilitate a kind of conversion: to shock the policemen out of what presumably is 
a state of denial or faithlessness. And characteristically, their mode of conversion is a 
violent one; the dead may not have believed before they were killed, but presumably they 
eventually came to believe. In the preceding pages, Bowden also adopts a violent stance 





narrative persona of the sicario (assassin), Bowden virtually kidnaps his reader, pulls him 
into a car, addresses him in the second person, and subjects him to violent threat: “Damn 
you, listen as if your fucking life depended on it” (xi).  
In treating narrative as a form of (sometimes violent) conversion, the 
Bowden/sicario narrative persona recalls the words of theorist Peter Brooks, who argued 
that narrative can function as “contamination” in the sense that, once we have listened to 
a story, we cannot unlearn it (218). A story can be a performative act, accomplishing an 
initiation such that we become baptized, as it were, into a new knowledge that marks us 
with a different identity. Bowden, in such passages, aggressively initiates us into a 
membership in which we might rather not be included. But then, Juarez itself seems to 
have operated in exactly this fashion for Bowden, since it has figuratively kidnapped the 
writer (“I am a slave to it and no longer question my bondage”) and conferred upon him 
what Brooks describes as an undesired “fallen knowledge” (218). Later, after 
interviewing a sicario, he puts the matter in terms that resemble Brooks’s formulation: 
I crossed the river about twenty years ago—I can’t be exact about the date, 
because I am still not sure what crossing really means, except that you never 
come back. I just know I scratch like a caged animal trying to claw my way out 
and reach the distant shore. It is like killing. There are some things that if learned 
change a person forever. You cannot know of the slaughter running along the 
border and remain the same person. You cannot know of the hopeless poverty of 
Mexicans who are fully employed in U.S. factories and remain the same person. 
And you cannot listen to a sicario—who functioned for years as a state 
policeman—tell of kidnappings, tortures, and murders and remain the same 
person. (137)
  
Here Bowden experiences knowledge not as a welcome state, but as a foundation-
shattering Event that offers him something he would prefer to forget.   
 El Pastor, too, experiences his conversion—in this case a Christian one--not as a 





role, pulling his hair in order to drag him out of his street life of addiction and negative 
repetition (after which he embarks on a mad career of gathering the rejects of the city and 
caring for them at an asylum in the desert). As we have already noted with regard to 
Kierkegaard, such a vision of painful grace has a long history within Christian discourse, 
from Paul on the road to Damascus to Flannery O’Connor’s violent revelations. When 
Bowden holds a gun to our heads and demands that we listen to his story, he imitates the 
Misfit in O’Connor’s 1953 story “A Good Man is Hard to Find,” in which a sicario of the 
U.S. South kills an entire family (and finally an aged grandmother) before concluding: 
“She would have been a good woman if it had been somebody there to shoot her every 
minute of her life.” Like O’Connor, Kierkegaard, Zizek, and El Pastor, Bowden senses 
that if we are to experience grace, we must be jolted out of complacency by an external 
act. And this act can only be experienced in terms of the traumatic Real, since only such 
an unsymbolizable Event can result in a revelation worth having. Bowden’s fascination 
with the traumatized subject, then—most visible in his constant repetition of the figure of 
Miss Sinaloa, a woman who has abducted and raped by members of a drug cartel before 
wandering off to El Pastor’s asylum to recover—derives from his basic sense that 
because such a traumatic experience can never be fully explained, it mirrors the action of 
grace itself.  
Just as O’Connor’s story involves a dance with the devil (here embodied in the 
“out of joint” Misfit), Bowden engages in his own dance with the devil by interviewing 
and even identifying with the murderous sicario. Through such “tarrying with the 
negative” (in Hegel’s terms), Bowden arrives at the most disturbing knowledge of all: 





space of death in the Putamayo documented by Taussig, killing in Juarez seemingly goes 
beyond economic rationality (a mere job one does for money, or to secure its rational 
circulation in the drug economy), but instead becomes an autonomized fetish and an 
addiction in itself. Killing in Murder City emerges as terrifyingly sexy and seductive, not 
simply an avenue to power but a perverse loop of pleasure. And this fetish quality 
illustrates why, for Bowden, explaining the violence by reference to poverty, free trade 
agreements, a patriarchal culture, and neocolonial exploitation is necessary but 
insufficient. Late in the book, a Juarez lawyer supplies him with gothic terminology that 
helps him approach the “failure of analysis”: “He tells me criminology will not explain 
what is happening, nor will sociology. He pauses and then says that we must study 
demonology” (234 my emphasis). In a way, Juarez is crawling with demons because it is 
crawling with murder addicts, such that any solutions to the problem must address not 
simply the material crisis of the matter (however important poverty may be), but the 
spiritual crisis as well. (We must note here that the demons and addictions here are not 
limited to Juarez; after all, most of the drugs are consumed in the U.S.). It is perhaps no 
accident that the ex-sicarios documented by Bowden turn to God as the only way out of 
their predicament; their only escape, as they see it, lies in a confrontation with another 
kind of death drive, the Real of a power larger than they are. 
However, if the neocolonial space of death in Juarez resembles the Putamayo of 
the turn of the last century in its surplus violence, and because it takes place on a 
relatively lawless frontier in which killing can be done with impunity, it is also different, 
since it takes place within a comparatively advanced capitalist world system in which the 





impress upon the reader not only the frequency of killing in Juarez, but above all its 
rhizomatic, centerless quality, which (like finance capital in Jameson’s terms) becomes 
an end in itself. Like a vision of Hardt and Negri’s neo-Deleuzian multitude gone bad, the 
killing in Juarez is a “hydra-headed” beast; it is not managed according to the top-down 
structure of bureaucracy, but rather emerges as the dark doppelganger of the 
participatory, entrepreneurial culture celebrated in the networked cyberspace of 
Facebook.55 Against the neoliberal ideologues, who presume a positive telos in a 
supposedly democratized march of individualized economic activity enabled by the 
networked global market managed by technocratic governance, Bowden sees something 
closer to what Jameson calls the collapse of civil society. In this world, “no one is really 
in charge and we are all in play” (22):   
We insist that power must replace power, that structure replaces an earlier 
structure. And we insist that power exists as a hierarchy, that there is a top where 
the boss lives and a bottom where the prey scurry about in fear of the boss. Also, 
we believe the state truly owns power and violence, and that is why any nonstate 
violence by people earns them the name of outlaws. Try for a moment to imagine 
something else, not a new structure but rather a pattern, and this pattern 
functionally has no top or bottom, no center or edge, no boss or obedient servant. 
Think of something like the ocean, a fluid thing without king and court, boss and 
                                                          
55 Indeed, Bowden’s description of Juarez as a participatory culture of entrepreneurial murder uncannily 
resembles writer Stephen Duncombe’s description (in his 1995 article “I’ve Seen the Future—And it’s a 
Sony!” from The Baffler) of visiting two museums: an aging IBM compound, where he finds the old top-
down announcements of corporate-administered progress (the “gray suits” are alive and well here), and the 
newer Sony museum, which trumpets not administered repetition but instead a fun and free-flowing 
“adventure” full of whimsy and enchantment. Multicultural, participatory, and indeterminate in its 
approach, the Sony museum is beguiling and open, a laboratory of affect: “The message here isn’t Think, 
it’s Wonder. In this era where everybody creates, I get the chance to produce Sonyproduct and be a part of 
the Sonyteam. Tapping into popular democratic aspirations, they give me interactive ‘choice.’… Sony 
Wonder gets under your skin without you knowing it. The chaos it projects keeps you from seeing any 
pattern or any political ideology. Instead the Sonyworld envelops you: swirling, dancing, embracing, 
amusing. As a child of the postmodern world, it’s hard not to get off on it at some point….Sony doesn’t tell 
me what to do, I’m already doing it” (108-109) It becomes increasingly clear that the supposedly absent 
ideology of Sony world is its ideology: “for the modern Sonypublic, like for the peasant of years past, the 
world is fixed, outside of human creation and control. So all that is left for us to do is just sit back and make 
the best—or worst—of it” (110). As in Juarez, where Bowden finally concludes (with his tongue in his 
cheek) that the best thing to do is “relax” because there is nothing to be done about the situation, an 





cartel. Give up all normal ways of thinking….Violence courses through Juarez 
like a ceaseless wind, and we insist it is a battle between cartels, or between the 
state and the drug world, or between the army and the forces of darkness. But 
consider this possibility: Violence is now woven into the very fabric of the 
community and has no single cause and no single motive and no on-off button. 
Violence is not a part of life, now it is life. Just ask Miss Sinaloa. (104-105)
 
In such a fluid context, in which even hierarchy is unstable because no one knows who is 
in charge, telling a coherent story (and thus developing what Walter Benjamin called 
“wisdom” or “counsel”) is especially difficult.    
Bowden’s insistence on the reality of the Event (the traumatic Real of the space of 
death in Juarez), combined with his continual resistance in Murder City to explanation—
to the reduction of the act to University Discourse—reveals him as a hysterical narrator, 
opposed as much to mystical evocations of the ineffable as he is to what Taussig calls 
“the forlorn attempts of social science” (10). Yes, the explanations may be necessary. We 
will need to confront the sources of the problem. But first he wants us to understand the 
subjective destitution of the people involved. This is the starting place. Bowden, then, 
remains in shock at what he finds in Juarez, and as a result, has difficulty transforming his 
experience into narrative. Like a hysterical survivor of post-traumatic stress disorder he 
returns again and again to the same themes, tropes, and allegorical figures, as if trying to 
work through a past that he cannot fully assimilate. As a result, the book reads less as a 
straightforward documentation of Juarez, and more as a repetitive, circular stab at 
meaning that never quite arrives, such that we follow Bowden through a series of failed 
gestures of assimilation: denial, rage, depression, fantasy, and rumination. Like Ike 
McCaslin in William Faulkner’s Absalom, Absalom, Bowden tells around the story here; 
his mode is not simply to tell the story (to narrate the “event” in a way that does not 





circle around it, to speculate about the meaning of the story before he has even told it, to 
investigate why the story is hard to tell. In doing so, he highlights his own Imbunche 
status, as one cut off from his senses, and from ordinary avenues of communication. 
  Much of Bowden’s anxiety revolves around the same risk posed by any colonial 
report, from Heart of Darkness to Fast Food Nation: that his work will be reduced to the 
level of the perverse fetish he is trying to document and reveal. Murder City, like these 
texts, is phantasmagoric in its rendering of Juarez, full of ghosts, strange images, and 
recurring nightmares. But in depicting Juarez as a nightmarish world of violence, he may 
allow the city and its killers to become yet another fetish; no matter how extreme its 
violence, a book about the murders in Juarez can become a pastiche in a perverse 
postmodern culture bent on drawing enjoyment (and profit) from even the most grisly 
episodes.56 (In a recent interview, for example, Quentin Tarantino defended his recent 
                                                          
56 To cite a very recent example, we might look at Shaul Schwartz’s 2013 documentary Narco Cultura, a 
documentary which moves back and forth between two subjects: a veteran crime scene investigator in 
Juarez (who experiences firsthand the dead bodies in the streets of the city) and an L.A.-based singer of 
narcocorridos (a popular style of music which glorifies drug violence in places like Juarez). Edgar 
Quintero, the narcocorrido singer, has little experience with Mexico, but instead writes songs based largely 
on internet research about the cartels, sicarios, and the like. And indeed, although one can question many of 
his parenting decisions (he smokes a joint while driving his son in the car), what strikes one about Quintero 
is not that he is a bloodthirsty monster, but that he is thoroughly ordinary: a father of two children who 
changes their diapers, a husband who goes with his wife to Mexican restaurants, and a striving entrepreneur 
who hopes to provide for his family. There is a strange disconnect, then, between Quintero as human being 
and his violent fetishized stage persona: he seemingly betrays no anxiety about singing narcocorridos, but 
simply thinks of the music as fun—as he terms it, “badass.” He “knows” about the drug life without really 
“knowing” it. And one of the most disturbing elements of the film is that this music is fun, and that the odd 
combination of musical and visual signifiers (the traditional-style polka music, the tuba, the bazooka on 
stage, the fancy embroidered suits that resemble the attire of bygone U.S. country singers like Buck Owens) 
do in fact radiate a potent quality of “cool,” such that it is impossible to imagine that this constellation of 
signifiers will not at some point be appropriated within the mainstream culture by a new Quentin 
Tarantino-style filmmaker or musician. And this “cool” quality may be impossible to detach from any 
treatment of the phenomenon. When the film showed at the Sundance Film Festival in Utah, the local punk-
style Slug Magazine featured the film on its cover, on which was festooned images of the narcocorrido 
band posing on a dusty hilltop, dressed in their fancy suits and showing off their fetish gear: the tuba, the 
bazooka, and other “instruments” of their trade. Thus although the magazine article (which, as it happens, 
was written by a former student of mine, who cites Gloria Anzaldua’s Borderlands/La Frontera in the 
text!) was thoughtful and informative, I found myself feeling uneasy about the entire enterprise, and 
especially the cover. Schwartz, then, like Bowden, dances with the devil in Narco Cultura—a 





film Django Unchained by appealing to the “fun” quality of its extreme violence). 
Bowden clearly understands—and explicitly tackles—the problem that the drug violence 
in Juarez can become “fun,” “cool,” or, in the characteristic contemporary parlance, 
“badass.” Indeed, part of his strategy for combating the fetish is to discuss it outright, to 
call it out in himself and others, and to force us to appreciate its power. Like Conrad, he 
allows us to feel our way deeper into the myth (in this case, the gangster myth), to try it 
out for ourselves until we see what is at stake: 
A big SUV rolls down the calle, you hop in, the windows are darkly tinted, and 
the machine prowls the city like a shark with its fanged mouth agape, and oh, it is 
so sweet when you squeeze the trigger and feel the burst run free and wild into the 
night air, see the body crumple and fall like a rag doll, right on into the black 
velvet after midnight, and there’ll be a party, fine girls and white powder, and 
people fear you, and the body falls, blood spraying, and you feel like God even 
though you secretly stopped believing in God some time ago, and they tell you 
that you will die, that your way of living has no future, and you see the tired men 
and women walking the dirt lanes after a shift in the factory, plastic bags of food 
dangling from their hands, and you caress the gun stuffed in your waistband, and 
life is so good and the killing is fun and everyone knows who has the guts to take 
the ride. Dying is the easy part. Killing is the fun part. Taking that first ride is the 
hard part. (123)
 
Just as the “fun” of killing (and the thrill of money, cocaine, and women) cuts through the 
ostensibly drab, intolerable inertia of working in a factory for low wages, Bowden’s 
virtuosic sentence here—with its long, free-flowing clauses and image after image—
contrasts with the  short, staccato sentences that populate the rest of the book: the 
numbing repetition of counting murder after murder. And yet this passage, too, ends with 
staccato sentences, which like gunshots bring us back from the Symbolic of the gangster 
fantasy to the Real of death, and a life cut short.    
Bowden, then, dances with the devil here, but he always tries to redirect his 





again, he attempts to collapse the distance between Juarez and the reader by insisting that 
his audience cannot keep the city (and what it might represent) separate or autonomized. 
Instead, as he puts it, Juarez is not a “failure,” but a success, the unacknowledged 
underbelly of the neoliberal utopian dream itself. Like Fast Food Nation’s gothic 
slaughterhouses (and in fact, at one point, Bowden explicitly calls Juarez a 
“slaughterhouse” [199]), Juarez is not an aberration or a barbaric throwback, but an 
illumination of the larger structure of throughput, exploitation, and perverse enjoyment 
that runs freely in the rhizomatic structure of the contemporary global system: 
Juarez is not behind the times. It is the sharp edge slashing into a time called the 
future….Here, boys stand on corners with pistols because there is no work, or if 
there is work, it pays little or nothing. Here, the girls walk by in their summer 
clothes, but they do not believe in the seasons or in harvest time. Here, 
Thanksgiving, Christmas, and Easter come and go without much fanfare save a 
drunken spree to memorialize a dead belief system. This is the way of bullet-
streets with graffiti on the walls, steel bars on the windows, faces peering out with 
caution, and corpses on the shattered sidewalks…Every claim of a gain is 
overwhelmed by a tidal wave of failure. And yet this failure, I have come to 
realize, is not failure. The gangs are not failure. The drugs, ever cheaper and more 
potent and widespread, are not failure. The media is increasingly tame here, just 
as it is in that place that once proudly called itself the first world, a place now 
where wars go on with barely a mention and the dead are counted but not 
photographed…. Please be advised that there will be no apocalypse. The very idea 
of a Gotterdammerung assumes meaning and progress. You cannot fall off a 
mountain unless you are climbing. No one here is slouching toward Bethlehem to 
be born. We shall not meet next year in Jerusalem. For years, I thought I was 
watching the city go from bad to worse, a kind of terrible backsliding from its 
imagined destiny as an America with different food. I was blind to what was 
slapping me in the face: the future. A place where conversation is a gun and 
reality is a drug and time is immediate and tomorrow, well, tomorrow is today 
because there is no destination beyond this very second. (116-118)
 
A passage like this, which can only be read as a hysterical rant, employs a fatalistic 
pessimism that we might not choose to take at face value. By insisting that Juarez 
constitutes a negative version of Francis Fukayama’s End of History, such that for all 





a Juarez-like “future” (in which not only the apocalypse, but any calendar whatsoever—
“Thanksgiving, Christmas, and Easter”—has become inoperative), Bowden decisively 
and hysterically rejects the neoliberal utopian calendar of progress, the bad poem on 
springtime that Bowden identifies in a “religion called the global economy” (137). But 
although Bowden seems to take Benjamin’s endorsement of “pessimism all along the 
line” to heart here, does he truly regard the situation as impossible? Is this the conversion 
into which he wishes to initiate us, or is this the midnight moment in which the 
possibility of such a future slaps us in the face, goading us on to some other course of 
action, or to imagine some other form of progress?57 
 
The Return of the Dialectic: What Is and What Will Be 
One of the things that upsets you most in the US is the frequency with which ‘the 
American dream’ is cited by mainstream politicians. I laughed at it when I first moved 
here, but I didn’t realize how ubiquitous it was as a concept. It is almost like a serious 
philosophical concept. You will hear people of all walks of life believing this, not just the 
President. So you have people from poor communities saying ‘We’ve been deprived of 
the American dream,’ and so on. The whole vocabulary of dream and magic in countries 
in more sober times, and political lexicons, would not have used it as such, or it would 
                                                          
57 By deploying a pessimistic rhetoric which Slavoj Zizek has characterized through the aphorism “Do not 
worry—the catastrophe will occur,” Charles Bowden here actually reverses the terms of the fetish. If the 
perverse subject knows that his fetish is just a game, but nevertheless believes in it (in Freudian terms: I 
know that the mother has lost the phallus, but nevertheless I believe that she still has it), Bowden here 
seems to know intellectually that the Juarez future is not inevitable, but nevertheless believes in such a 
future deeply within his bones. In doing so, he follows Zizek’s peculiar strategy for motivating action in the 
present: rather than wasting our time in the vain and cowardly hope that catastrophe will not occur, we 
should proceed as if the catastrophe (ecological disaster, violent global apartheid) has already happened in 
the future, and adjust our actions accordingly. Just as when we read a novel, we trust that the contingent 
actions on page one are not simply meaningless because they will appear retroactively important from the 
position of the end, we should narrativize our situations, presume the end as catastrophe, and then work as 
hard as possible to prevent the inevitable. Or, to put it another way: “if the catastrophe happens, one can 
say that its occurrence was decided even before it took place…[Therefore] we should first perceive [the 
disaster] as our fate, as unavoidable, and then, projecting ourselves into it, adopting its standpoint, we 
should retroactively insert into its past (the past of the future) counterfactual possibilities (“If we had done 
this and that, the calamity that we are now experiencing would not have occurred”) upon which we then act 
today.” If we don’t accept the reality of the future catastrophe, we will be able to persist in fetishistic denial 
(“I know global warming already threatens us in a fundamental way, but…I don’t really believe it”) and 
will never actually prevent the catastrophe: “Paradoxically,” then, “the only way to prevent the disaster is 





have been frowned upon. In this country it seems you have been mightily cheated if you 
don’t espouse it. Adorno said after Auschwitz, ‘There can be no poetry’—is is almost like 
after they have phrased ‘the American dream’ there can be no more dreaming. 
--Michael Taussig, from “Carnival of Senses” (53)  
 
To repeat is to behave in a certain manner, but in relation to something unique or singular 
which has no equal or equivalent….This is the apparent paradox of festivals: they repeat 
an ‘unrepeatable’. They do not add a second and a third time to the first, but carry the 
first time to the ‘nth’ power…it is not Federation Day which commemorates or represents 
the fall of the Bastille, but the fall of the Bastille which celebrates and repeats in advance 
all the Federation Days; or Monet’s first water lily which repeats all the others.  
--Gilles Deleuze, from Difference and Repetition (2-3) 
Toward the end of Murder City, Charles Bowden describes a moment in which 
time figuratively stops. On the evening of August 13, 2008, a group of men pass by a 
squadron of soldiers, enter a rehab center in Juarez, and for fifteen minutes gun down a 
group of recovering drug addicts who have been praying. Nine people die, and several 
more are wounded. The event impresses Bowden (and stands out amid all the bare 
repetition of death) to such an extent that he returns to the “toxic” Juarez after a much-
needed break: 
I am here against my will. I had decided that six months of killing was enough for 
me and everyone else, and that anything beyond that merely meant repeating what 
was already known. I had determined that I could not look at one more corpse, 
that I was ill, and that the toxic elements floating through my cells and through 
my mind came from this city and this slaughter….But people slaughtered while 
praying bring me back. (192)
 
Before he leaves the rehab center (which permanently closed down immediately after the 
slaughter), he notices a calendar on the wall that will always remain fixed on the same 
date, “stalled at August 13/14, the night of the killing” (200). But the frozen calendar 
means little, concludes Bowden, since “time goes on” and many more will continue to 
die. As a result, Bowden rejects not only the idea of a pause in the endless procession of 





We are in a place without beginning or end, and all the ways to tell the story fail 
me and repel me. There are many dead, and they each have a tale. Beyond that, 
the efforts to explain are to me efforts to erase truth or deny truth or simply to tell 
lies. I don’t know what is going on, nor do the dead or the living. But there are 
these stories of the killings, there is the tortured flesh, the individual moments of 
horror, and I rest on those moments because they are actual and beyond question. 
(200)
 
With no beginning and no end, there is no story: only a disconnected series of 
metonymically contiguous “moments of horror.” For Bowden here, to transform these 
moments into a story would betray the traumatic Real in which they were experienced. 
Only the dead, it seems, have a right to tell such a tale—but even these ghosts “don’t 
know what is going on.” 
 Despite vowing resistance to the storytelling temptation, a few pages earlier 
Bowden manages to access a different calendar. While he is attending the funeral at the 
rehab center, he looks into the eyes of a baby, the son of a former gangmember who was 
killed on August 13, and can’t help but make mental correspondences between this 
significant moment and other past moments that stand out in time: 
I stare into the baby’s wide, dark eyes and try to make out what is and what will 
be. A golden crucifix, Christ with arms outstretched in His agony, floats over the 
face so still now, the eyes closed. The baby stares with round eyes of wonder. I 
look into two versions of myself, the body in the coffin and the babe in arms. I am 
possibly past due for the coffin, but I remember through the haze those early 
glimpses of life when I was younger than I can even recall, those blues and 
greens, the smell of fresh apples, the feel of the grain in the floorboards in the old 
farmhouse, the cluck of chickens, the strange sounds coming from the mouths of 
adults. So I am in a small room full of people, the body is against the wall in a 
glass-topped coffin, the baby looks down at the still, dead face, and I can smell 
fresh hay from some forgotten summer when I first caught the light gleaming into 
my eyes. And I know that my early days were somehow similar, that bodies were 
still displayed in the house, that wakes were home affairs, the children and babies 
were not sheltered from the fate of all living things, and that all of life that 






This passage stands out from any other in the book, which otherwise tends to vacillate 
between numb shock (counting the dead, counting the days), anger, hysteria, depression, 
the hard-boiled grind of a former crime reporter’s trade, and the queasy excitement of 
finding a scoop. Here we have a different structure of feeling, such that Juarez is not 
simply “a place without beginning or end,” as he later concludes. Rather, prompted by a 
consideration of birth and death, Bowden hesitates and asks a question about “what is and 
what will be.” Like Uncle Pete in Fast Food Nation, he conjures visions of past and 
future; he considers his own beginning--a memory from a time before he know how old 
he was, before he started counting days and bodies, before he knew of sicarios—and also 
his own end, the coffin to come. The result is a series of images from a different time: the 
fruits of the harvest (apples, chickens, hay), sensual feeling (light, images, smells, the 
sounds of words he doesn’t understand), and a social order in which death stands out in 
sharp relief—not another flip of the card, as he often experiences it in Juarez, but a 
moment of pause which transmits enough gravity to be recalled years later. Finally, there 
is the image of Christ on the cross: a death that, in legend at least, leads to rebirth. And 
crucially, Bowden seems to conclude that the world of this memory is not completely 
divorced from the world he is in now; here, too, in Juarez, time stops to heed a death. 
 The free-floating tone here, filtered through the haze of memory, brings to mind 
Walter Benjamin’s reflections on the calendar: its waning in the feeling of Erlebnis 
(“isolated experience” and its associated form of ephemeral information) and its necessity 
to Erfahrung (“long experience” and storytelling). A calendar, by which Benjamin 
implies not merely a beginning and an end, but a vision of temporality in which certain 





storytelling is to take place. And as Naomi Klein observes, emerging from a state of 
shock requires the formation of narrative, since disorienting shock can only be challenged 
by a form of orientation in which we link our present state to the past and future. Like 
Klein, Benjamin refuses to allow trauma the last word; he is especially preoccupied with 
what Peter Brooks calls “binding” moments that disrupt the metonymic flow of 
contiguous elements and allow story to exist in the first place: ends, beginnings, 
connections, repetitions, and symmetries (101). In The Storyteller, Benjamin speculates 
that death is a crucial element in the storytelling matrix, since it retroactively confers 
authority and meaning on the events which precede it. If in an earlier time, “there used to 
be no house, hardly a room, in which someone had not died,” with bourgeois modernity 
comes a different, death-denying space in which storytelling cannot so easily thrive: 
Today people live in rooms that have never been touched by death, dry dwellers 
in eternity, and when their end approaches they are stowed away in sanatoria or 
hospitals by their heirs. It is, however, characteristic that not only a man’s 
knowledge or wisdom, but above all his real life—and this is the stuff that stories 
are made of—first assumes transmissible form at the moment of his death….This 
authority is at the very source of the story. (Illuminations 94)
 
Since we know death is coming, it works like the end of a story; and as Brooks points 
out, it is only because we know that a story will eventually end that we give meaning 
(through a process of “anticipation of retrospection”) to the events we read about.  
That Bowden only briefly accesses this “data of recollection” (before returning 
again to his refusal of narrative) indicates the depth of his struggle, and the seriousness of 
the “shock” and trauma at issue in Juarez. But just as the psychoanalytic patient must 
work through the past in an effort to create a new narrative, Bowden must (if he is to 
move forward) figure out a way to narrativize his experience by bringing the past into 





of a story always presupposes a listener. In psychoanalysis, the listener is the analyst, and 
through the process of transference, the analyst and the analysand together produce a 
hypothetical, “what if” space in which the past can be examined, such that it ceases to 
intrude forcefully in the present in the form of the symptom, but instead enables forward 
movement: 
There is in the dynamics of the transference at once the drive to make the story of 
the past present—to actualize past desire—and the countervailing pressure to 
make the history of this past definitively past: to make an end to its reproductive 
insistence in the present, to lead the analysand to understanding that the past is 
indeed past, and then to incorporate this past, as past, within his present, so that 
the life’s story can once again progress. (Brooks 227-228)
 
In Zizek’s Lacanian terms, what we are discussing here is the necessity of movement 
from the hysterical subject position (in which I cannot form a story because I question 
every master-signifier that would quilt it together) to the analytic subject position (in 
which I recognize the necessity for a master-signifier, even if I have faced the lack of the 
traumatic Real, which resists symbolization and produces “subjective destitution”). It 
involves seizing on to the symptom as a dialectical point of contradiction, and working 
through this “out of joint” element in order to produce new possibilities.  
In his dialectical fashion, Bowden ultimately shapes narrative out of the materials 
available to him, mediating between past, present, and future with the help of a 
presupposed listener: his audience. To begin with, Bowden turns to allegory. What binds 
Bowden’s book together as a structural edifice is largely its repeated attention to 
allegorical figures who emerge (he hopes, perhaps) not as stereotypes but as dialectical, 
symptomal figures who embody pregnant contradictions of one sort or another. Again 
and again, he circles around (in section headings, and in quick references) to the same 





reporter (“The Dead Man Walking.”) The sicario, in particular, stands out; in this figure, 
we find the starkest and most visceral embodiment of contradiction, an angel of death 
who thereby provides access to an urgent sense of meaning and the possibility of 
transformation. By interviewing a former professional killer and kidnapper (who 
nevertheless worked for the anti-kidnapping unit of the federal police!), Bowden dances 
with the devil in a particularly dangerous and revelatory way—exposing himself to risk, 
but also discovering a purpose that drives the writing of the book in the first place. In this 
sicario, Bowden finds a figure who dwells in a land above the law, a craftsman and a 
master of survival who never comes to trust others in any absolute sense, but who 
nevertheless reaches a point of ultimate “grace” by relinquishing fear, becoming 
figuratively reborn, and committing himself to combating the death machine that he 
helped create (224). By interacting with this devil/sicario, Bowden comes to imagine 
himself in allegorical terms, since at one point during their meeting the sicario 
interpellates the terrified author by asking him to play the role of medium: to channel 
both the devil’s story and God’s. In becoming allegorized as the shaman-like conduit for 
the sicario’s searing visions, Bowden finds himself confronted with a vision of the future: 
a goal, an endpoint and “mission” that provides an engine to the book (223). And this 
mission requires our presence as therapeutic listeners.   
This moment of Bowden’s calling, as it were, stands out as the book’s climax, the 
height of tension in which the dramatic situation of Murder City is fully revealed and 
explored, and in which its conditions of narrative possibility are interrogated most 
forcefully. And this dramatic situation revolves around the questions the sicario implies 





Real), and secondly, do you believe in transformation? (Or, what is ultimately the same 
thing: Do you believe in narrative?) And although Bowden insists that he will always be 
“haunted,” he answers in the affirmative: 
This is the point in all stories where everyone discovers who they really are. Do 
you believe in redemption? Do you believe a man can kill for twenty years and 
then change? Do you even believe such killers can exist? In every story, there is 
this same moment when all you hold dear and believe to be true and certain is 
suddenly called into question, and the walls of your life shake, the roof collapses, 
and you look into a sky you never imagined and never wanted to know. I believe 
his conversion to Christ, I believe he can change, I believe he can never be 
forgiven. And I am certain my knowledge of his life and his ways will haunt me 
the rest of my days. He says, ‘I have now relived something I should never have 
opened up. Are you the medium to reach others? I prayed to God asking you what 
I should do. And you are the answer. You are going to write this story because 
God has a purpose in you writing this story…God has given you this 
mission…No one will understand this story except those who have been in the 
life. And God will tell you how to write this story.’ (223)
 
Here the matter is not whether Bowden accepts Christ, or even whether the sicario can be 
forgiven for the pain he has caused, but whether Bowden accepts the possibility of 
“change.” And in this case, Bowden accepts the role of medium; he channels and 
performs this story of transformation, even if taking upon himself the shamanic role 
involves adopting masks, dancing with the devil, and facing knowledge he “never wanted 
to know,” thus risking the collapse of his own foundations by giving up his earlier life of 
relative innocence. 
 In the process of channeling the sicario, he discovers that “killing is good,” not 
because violence is always pleasurable (though it sometimes might be), but because in a 
dialectical fashion the violence of the sicario can be a (terrifyingly) positive, affirmative 
response to a static, deadening situation. In identifying with the violence not only of 
professional killers but also of ordinary people, Bowden insists that violence can be an 





sheds oblique light on possibilities for very different forms of power, and different forms 
of resistance that might be more constructive and socially fertile. The true death, in this 
view, involves submitting to the life imposed by neoliberal development, and the true 
space of death the factory: the low wages, the slums that have grown up around them, the 
job that can be removed at will by the movements of capital. (As Bowden puts it, “The 
factories are now the house of death, offering no future, poisoning the body with 
chemicals, destroying the spirit faster than cocaine or meth” [116]). It is this “crisis 
ordinary” (in Lauren Berlant’s terms) that the diabolical sicario rejects by pushing the 
crisis into the visible open; “killing is good” because it can serve not merely as a perverse 
fetish, but as a hysterical symptom of the larger and more structural violence out of which 
it grows.  
Bowden, then, rejects the “sensible people” who have helped create this structural 
violence. Instead, echoing Walter Benjamin’s judgment (“That things are ‘status quo’ is 
the catastrophe…hell is not something that awaits us, but the here and now” [The Writer 
of Modern Life 161]), Bowden insists that the violence of the sicario—even when it 
devolves into the perverse loop of the fetish—is preferable to the constituted violence of 
the existing structure:  
Listen to the sensible people, the governments that have told you since before you 
were born that everything is getting better. Skip those failures—they are bumps 
on the road, and the road leads to Shangri-La….Or consider the market forces, the 
magical pulse of an economy now global, hitch a ride on an information highway 
or bask in the glow of market forces, become part of a giant apparatus that is 
towing us all toward the golden shore…I can hear the voices of reprimand…yes, I 
can hear those voices telling me the facts of life. I say dream, I say fantasize, I say 
escape, I say kill, I say do not accept the offerings of the cops and the government 
and the guns that have slaughtered hopes for generations and generations. I say 
fantasy. I say go to Juarez. I say, Miss Sinaloa, will you take my hand? (96-97) 





In taking the hand of the sicario here, fully as much as the traumatized subject Miss 
Sinaloa, Bowden draws from these allegorical figures to find the dialectical promise in 
traumatized and killer alike, and an insistence that (contra Taussig’s formulation) the 
American Dream should not spell the end of all dreaming.  
In suspending fear of the law, then, the perverse sicario (the craftsman, the 
“murder artist” operating within the autonomized sphere of extortion and death) opens up 
a space that might be inhabited by more loving souls, thereby suggesting the specter of a 
different kind of dialectical figure: the revolutionary who suspends the space of the law 
not simply to make money from the drug economy, but to transform and combat the 
neocolonial space of death itself. In like fashion, Murder City presents us with a series of 
degenerate social formations that, if turned upside-down, might result in a life machine to 
counteract Juarez’s death machine: in the gang we find the distorted premonition of the 
militant collective, and in the cartel the negative prototype of a broader national or 
transnational apparatus that might protect the part of no part. Seen through this 
dialectical lens, the cartel’s advertisements (“Operative group ‘The Zetas’ wants you, 
soldier or ex-soldier. We offer a good salary, food and benefits for your family. Don’t 
suffer any more mistreatment and don’t go hungry,” or: “Join the ranks of the Gulf 
Cartel. We offer benefits, life insurance, a house for your family and children. Stop living 
in the slums and riding the bus”) ring with a new meaning (73). Ultimately, the missing 
term of emancipatory politics revisits the failed promise of the early twentieth century 
Mexican Revolution: the demise of Emiliano Zapata and his replacement by the new 
bosses of the Mexican elite who emerged with the support of the U.S. and other colonial 





proved to be an incomplete experiment: a pose of military power that collapsed in the 
face of army reprisals, and thus could not even achieve its limited objective of regional 
autonomy). No one in Murder City seems capable of resurrecting this emancipatory 
master-signifier, and Bowden lets its absence speak for itself, but in his vehement 
rejection of the neoliberal utopian dream, he carves out a space in which a new version of 
liberation might yet emerge. 
It is perhaps appropriate that the only figure to mention the Mexican Revolution 
(228) in Murder City is also closest to the revolutionary figure as such: El Pastor, who 
serves as the John the Baptist of the book, the crazy man in the desert working on behalf 
of a messiah whose appearance he fervently hopes for. It is in El Pastor that Bowden 
finds an alternative way of suspending the fear of the law, not the sicario’s but the 
apostle’s. El Pastor’s laughter is not the perverse “gangster laughter” of the professional 
killer; instead, it echoes the laughter of a man described earlier in the book, a former drug 
businessman who conquers a drug addiction, becomes a Christian, and leaves “the life” 
despite the ensuing dangers to his person (49). The businessman’s conversion leads to a 
terrifyingly comic scene, wherein his former bodyguard finds himself confounded by his 
boss’s strange and jolly transformation: “The business genius becomes a born-again 
Christian, but his bodyguard does not. One day, he goes for his pay and the guy says he 
can’t pay him, but not to worry, the Lord will. He becomes furious and is going to beat 
the business mind when suddenly the guy breaks out in laughter. The bodyguard is 
confused, he slams the door as he leaves” (59). The bodyguard’s confusion results from 
the very absurdity of his former boss, who responds to a veteran killer with laughter and a 





conversions in others, the businessman’s laughter results in a spiritual crisis for the 
bodyguard, who “cannot sleep” as “the laughter of the businessman rings in his mind” 
(59). After a surreal dream in which the Lord visits him, kidnaps him from a party ringing 
with gangster laughter, carries him through the air, and deposits him on a mountain, the 
bodyguard also gives up the drug life and becomes a Christian. 
El Pastor, who gives up his life of addiction and wandering to start an asylum in 
the desert, puts into practice the “ontological inversion” described by Alain Badiou as the 
definitive gesture of the apostle, since in Pauline Christianity “God has chosen the things 
that are not in order to bring to naught those that are” (47). Because the Pauline rebirth 
involves the rejection of knowledge, power, and being (what is) in favor of foolishness, 
weakness, and nonbeing (what is not), it involves a free acknowledgement of one’s lack 
of knowledge. And not only does the apostle “know nothing,” since the possibilities 
conditioned by an existing empirical reality are precisely what is transformed through the 
event (45); since evental grace is dependent on the “things that are not,” the Christian is 
concerned with those things and persons that are “refused” (literally tossed out in the 
garbage): “The real is attested to…as the refuse from every place, there where the subject 
rehearses his weakness….One must therefore assume the subjectivity of refuse, and it is 
in the face of this abasement that the object of Christian discourse suddenly appears” (56 
my emphasis).  And what does one do when one has been “reborn”? It is not that one 
immediately begins to refrain from “bad things,” as if one could list them in notebook 
form. Instead, one struggles in order to maintain a fidelity to this universally addressed 





If Badiou focuses on the end result of the transformation (the new symbolic order 
enabled by the apostle’s affirmation), Zizek insists that any such “good news” depends on 
passing through a negative moment of fragmentation, what Hegel called the “night of the 
world.” Even when a new master-signifier is established, it never achieves absolute 
harmony, since it remains haunted by this constitutive “out of joint” dimension. Bowden 
dramatizes such a moment of negativity by imaginatively staging a new version of 
Thornton Wilder’s Our Town, performed by the laconic dead of Juarez at the rehab center 
(where time stops, as it were). The “new Our Town,” in which dead citizens of the city 
emerge to recite one or two lines about their deaths (“Look, I don’t even know if I should 
talk. I was out driving with my wife in my white pickup. Then they took me. No reports 
about me since then, so I think I’ll leave it at that,” [215], “I am eight years old. They 
poured two hundred and fifty rounds into my dad’s truck and killed him. They shot my 
arm off. And then I died” [216]), is a metonymic series of disconnected horrors that 
cannot be reduced to facile explanation. Brevity is key to its effect, since it prevents us 
from taking refuge in University discourse or fetishistic distance: “We will not allow 
anyone with answers to be present. Explanations will be killed on sight.…Just bodies, 
severed heads bullets, these can attend. It is time to listen and look and feel” (209-210). 
Here we have something like the “night of the world,” in which (in Hegel’s terms) “here 
shoots a bloody head, there another ghastly white apparition” (cited in Zizek The Ticklish 
Subject 35). At the same time, though, Bowden’s Our Town is an allegorical, 
narrativizing event in itself, since it brings into being a ritual day that stands out from the 
calendar, a day left blank. Because it provides a revolutionary pause, a space for 





by Erlebnis or spleen, conceived here in Benjamin’s terms: “Spleen is the feeling that 
corresponds to catastrophe in permanence” (The Writer of Modern Life 137).   
Through his Our Town, then, Bowden allows the dead to speak—and in fact, 
serves as the shamanic medium through which they can do so. As such, the new Our 
Town resembles and repeats not simply Wilder’s play, but the power behind rituals like 
the Haitian Ceremony of Souls, described by George Lamming as a “solemn communion” 
with the dead in an attempt to chart a course into the future: 
The celebrants are mainly relatives of the deceased who, ever since their death, 
have been locked in Water. It is the duty of the Dead to return and offer, on this 
momentous night, a full and honest report of their past relations with the 
living….The Dead need to speak if they are going to enter that eternity which will 
be their last and permanent Future. The living demand to hear whether there is 
any need for forgiveness, for redemption; whether in fact there may be any guide 
which may help them toward reforming their present condition. Different as they 
may be in their present state of existence, those alive and those now Dead—their 
ambitions point to a similar end. They are interested in their future. (Cited in 
Kutzinski 181)
      
Described in this way, the Ceremony of Souls is not simply a matter of personal insight, 
not a backward-looking elegy for lost time, and not merely a wistful matter of “hope,” 
but a communal and political affair oriented toward critical questions about the present 
state of the collective as it moves dynamically into the future. The living are interested in 
“reforming their present condition,” while the Dead can offer a “full and honest report of 
their past relations with the living.” Both look toward the possibility of a redeemed 
Future. This quality, through which the dead live again and call to us as in a ritual 
ceremony, helps explain Walter Benjamin’s maxim about the way that political struggle 
in the now is better seen as oriented not primarily toward the future (to our children and 
grandchildren, as the cliché goes), but in a paradoxical way, toward a past that gazes at us 





historian will have the gift of fanning the spark of hope in the past who is firmly 
convinced that even the dead will not be safe from the enemy if he wins. And the enemy 
has not ceased to be victorious” (Illuminations 255). Bowden’s Our Town involves an 
effort to save the dead from their erstwhile fate as metonymic signifiers, headed toward 
oblivion. Even though they cannot understand their own deaths, their very 
incomprehension is what they can communicate to us, and that from which only future 
action can rescue them.  
 The haunted dead, then, resemble what Taussig describes, following Putamayan 
folklore, as the ghosts who produce “mal aires” (bad winds). Although the dark magic of 
mal aires are usually described as natural forces beyond the realm of the social (they 
might appear for no reason at all, or for the same reason a storm might arrive), they can 
also emerge when violence mars the community in one way or another; ghosts might 
wander through the streets of the town, bringing mal aires down upon the heads of the 
living. Drawing on anthropologist Robert Hertz, Taussig considers the possibility that 
when death is not properly inscribed into the community’s narrative, dark magic can 
result: 
‘Society itself dies a little with each individual’s death,’ suggested…Hertz…: 
‘Thus when a man dies, society loses in him much more than a unit,’ he wrote, ‘it 
is stricken in the faith it has in itself.’ He saw funeral rites and mourning as 
society’s way of restoring life and integrity to the social bond itself, to what we 
might call the very principle of being social and being constituted by the 
collectivity. Nevertheless, Hertz noted, there were certain deaths that society 
could not contain: ‘Their unquiet and spiteful souls roam the earth for ever,’ he 
wrote in reference to those people who died a violent death or by an accident, 
women who died in childbirth, and deaths due to drowning, lightning, or suicide. 
The normal funeral rites are suspended for such deaths….It is as if, he speculated, 
these deaths were endowed with a sacred character of such strength that no rite 
will ever be able to efface them….Is it possible that, as with the image so firmly 
impressed on memory of an individual struck down by violence, accident, 





struck down by Spanish conquest, could exist as unquiet, spiteful souls roaming 
the earth forever? (371-372)
 
Here Taussig speculates about—and later, describes folkloric evidence for—a root of 
certain mal aires in the mass process of colonization itself, which produced such a 
powerful and unrepresentable wave of death that it could not be managed by the 
community, and instead emerges in the symptomal dialectical image of the mal aires. In 
the new Our Town, Bowden allows the “spiteful” souls of neocolonial Juarez, whose 
deaths have not yet been properly managed by the ritual processes of a transnational 
global media society—and whose deaths should properly threaten that society’s faith in 
itself—a chance to haunt the living once again. 
 Given the ritual quality of ceremonial repetition that Bowden gives to his Our 
Town, it is perhaps appropriate that Bowden, accompanied by his enigmatic and 
traumatized sidekick Miss Sinaloa, offers us a historically resonant dialectical image to 
wrestle with during the otherwise monotonous performance. This symptomal image 
flashes out just as the audience begins to become numb from the play’s repetition; even 
Bowden begins to lose focus: “I drift off. I listen and don’t listen, in the same way a 
person sits in a bar and takes in the band and yet is hardly aware of the music” (216). But 
right when Bowden seems inclined to retreat to a different space and disavow the death in 
Juarez, he is interrupted by a profane illumination, “little image…a fragment.” He 
imagines a “barrio,” a “place that eats the cast-off entrails of a richer world.” And in this 
place he imagines the murder of a cocaine dealer, a man “in his thirties” who “has no 
other livelihood.” But the dialectical image is not the murder; it is the aftermath:  
What I see is his mother. It is night now, the body has been taken away, and there 
is a light on, the screen door is pushed open, and an old woman with a blank face 





home, and her face is as inscrutable as a block of stone.  Her arms are crossed, 
and she is a portrait of grief Juarez-style, silent, enduring, and doomed. (216)
 
This visionary dialectical image, then, is also a repetition. In presenting this new pieta in 
the midst of postmodern Juarez, Bowden redoubles the power of its original: Mary, the 
mother of Jesus, mourning the loss of a son whom she could not protect.  
This Kierkegaardian repetition is, as Deleuze might put it, “against the law,” since 
it functions according to a logic not of exchangeability but of uniqueness. Just as 
someone who recites an old poem in a new context does not replace it with an 
equivalence, but in commemorating it both imagines the past and stages a dramatic 
intervention in the present, here Bowden gives up the past for dead and moves forward 
into the uncertain future. Murder City, his list of the dead, is not written in scientific 
terms, but in lyrical ones as described by Deleuze: in “lyrical language…every term is 
irreplaceable and can only be repeated.” The mother in Bowden’s image cannot be 
replaced by some other mother; her story can only be repeated, just as the stories of the 
dead in the new Our Town cannot be explained according to the scientific terms of 
generality (numbers, statistics), but can only be repeated, over and over, redoubling their 
power with each lyrical recitation. The miracle, then, is that something new emerges with 
this very repetition, since its performance can only take place in the theater of now, of the 
Jetztzeit in which we attempt to regain hold of our narrative; just as the original pieta is a 
prelude to an unexpected resurrection, Bowden’s pieta, too, emerges on stage as part of a 
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